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ailway policy is a controversial
or, shall we say, is still a contro-
versial issue. In fact, it has been,
is, and probably will continue to
be a highly debated question for
various reasons, the most important
of which are the: 
1. relevant social impact railway policy has on people’s
everyday lives, on the social welfare of millions of
passengers/citizens and on the competitiveness of
companies using the railway system to move their
inputs and outputs; 
2. substantial financial repercussions transport subsidies
have on the public purse; 
3. considerable consequences transport policies have on
the environment;
4. socially controversial and politically sensitive issue of
employment, retribution and unionisation in the sector.
Given its well known structural characteristics (high
irreversible capital investment, dedicated labour supply,
costly technical innovation, high coordination
requirements among the various activities at all levels,
etc.) the railway sector is not naturally prone to
accommodating rapid and low cost modifications of
adopted working procedures and regulatory regime
under which it operates.
In other words one should never expect rapid structural
(technological, organisational,  regulatory, etc.) changes
in this industry.
Restructuring a declining industry
The structural reform effort promoted and sustained at
the European level and, with varying degrees of
enthusiasm and perseverance,  endorsed at the national
level is a product of the progressive worsening of the
structural and financial conditions of the sector. In fact,
given that in 1970 within the fifteen member states the
railway system moved 32% of the total freight
transported while in 1994 the percentage was below
15% and, for passengers in the same period the
percentage fell from 10.3% in 1970 to 6.2% in 1994, the
Community assumed that structural  changes had to be
implemented to stop and reverse this trend. 
The railway sector crisis may be analysed and
considered under various points of view. Among the
most relevant one should consider: 
1) it is a structural crisis of the whole sector that is 
linked to the intrinsic characteristics of the railway
system. In fact, structural changes in the economy
attributable to the transformation produced by the
increasing relevance of information and communication
technologies produced a substantial change in the
evaluation of transport attributes.
The increase in demand, both for
passenger and freight, pro-
gressively and steadily shifts
towards other competing modes
in general, and to road in
particular; 
2) the monopolistic organisation of the market seems to
contrast with the diversification of services required by
the market as well as with the re-organisation and
harmonisation that has begun in all public utilities at the
European level; 
3) the positive results in terms of increased competition,
reduced costs and increase in demand brought about by
combined liberalisation and deregulation in air transport
seem impossible in the railway sector exactly because of
its staunch monopolistic characteristics. The most
evident effect of a full fledged vertical separation (as in
the British case), is the substantial increase in demand; 
4) the Italian situation presents some peculiarities with
respect to other European cases since the low tariff level is
not merely attributable to market decisions but rather to
welfare considerations. However, the logic adopted, and
the absence of an even minimally business oriented
attitude, coupled with a public monopoly structure has
induced a swell up of production costs led by labour costs.
Great attention to market demand appears necessary if a
truly structural re-organisation is desired. A pre-
condition to pursuing this objective was the provision of
better quality services, that is, increasing commercial
speed, flexibility, and reliability while, at the same time,
reducing costs. The all-purpose instrument to be
adopted is competition. The deplorable situation
characterising the railway sector can be de facto
attributed to the unsuitable market and institutional
structure. In fact, until the early ‘90s the all-
encompassing characteristic of the various European
railways was its management by public monopolists of a
vertically integrated sector. 
The role of independent research
One should never underestimate the force of research in
shaping policy. In fact, it is this belief that allows
independent and high quality research the possibility of
influencing and redirecting policy by: evidencing
specific technical problems, suggesting possible
solutions, independently analysing strategic interactions
among the various actors directly involved in the
process of defining objectives, strategies for acheiving
them, and assessing the results. This independent form
of judgement characterising academic research is always
desirable and it is particularly valuable in a sector such
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as rail, where regulatory capture is highly likely.  
Independent economic analysis can work for the “public
good” because it contributes to the knowledge and
understanding of those issues that need to be debated
and discussed in a process of transition from one market
structure and organisation to another - such as, for
example, transaction costs, infrastructure charging,
strategic institutional analysis, etc. Dodgson, in a recent
issue of the Journal of Transport Economics and Policy1
dedicated to the railway sector, enumerates several
important issues where economic analysis can
contribute.  They are: cost productivity measurement,
demand modelling, pricing final and intermediate
products, optimal industry structures, competition policy
issues, franchising/auctioning, asset valuation, and
investment appraisal. All of the above mentioned issues
are important areas where economic analysis might have
something to say and could usefully be taken as a
benchmark for defining a well accomplished editing
work. In our case the scope is different. In its theoretical
aspects the present work is less comprehensive, even if
the analyses proposed on specific issues are detailed and
up to date.  In its practical and institutional aspects,
however, it is wide ranging and differentiated.
The conceptual structure of the issue
The main theoretical questions considered are: 
1. The relevance and calculation of transaction costs in
defining the desirability of a vertically separated
industry structure. Preston in his article uses transaction
cost economics to estimate the reciprocal advantages
and disadvantages of vertical separation between
railway infrastructure and operations. In fact, if on the
advantage side one finds greater specialisation and
scope for competition among operators, capital costs
transparency, and clear path allocation procedures, on
the disadvantage side one can see abuse of monopoly
power at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels.
The trade off investigated concerns production and
governance costs; given the highly dedicated nature of
the most relevant types of investments, a certain degree
of vertical integration is considered desirable.
2. The setting of rail infrastructure charges is not only
difficult and controversial but also relevant in terms of
the pursuit of different, and some times contrasting,
objectives that the decision makers have in mind. Nash
and Matthews tackle this important question,
confronting the pros and cons of the two polar
approaches to infrastructure charging. In fact, whereas
short-run social cost maximises infrastructure use, it
does not recover total cost, thus opening up a financing
issue. The use of efficient mark-ups and two-part tariffs
are commonly suggested for striking a balance between
the two contrasting objectives of infrastructure use
maximisation and total cost recovery. The cost of the
compromise is paid in terms of potential distortions to
competition between train operators. The authors
conclude that the most relevant issue to be investigated
in order to achieve marginal social cost pricing for rail
infrastructure is connected to the desire for rail
infrastructure managers to cover their total cost from
charges. This will in turn provoke the need for two-part
tariffs or for tariffs differentiated according to
willingness to pay.
3. The presence of an institutional and regulatory
environment conductive to a well behaved incentive
structure for the various operators. In this respect:
Ponti, Erba and Marcucci analyse, from different
although co-ordinated perspectives, the present situation
in Italy.  Venezia researches the strategic implications of
transfer pricing in a partially regulated monopolistic
environment, and Polidori describes and analyses the
role and perspectives that a Rail Transport Authority
might have. In more detail, Ponti and Erba, adopting a
public choice approach, analise the European railway
policy so far produced by the Commission and evidence
the role that cross subsidisation might play in a
monopolistic context. The unfulfilled expectations are
explained as a special capture case arising from cross
subsidisation as one of the biggest problems of public
governance in a still monopolistic environment. On the
closely related issue of transfer pricing, Venezia
describes the analogies and dissimilarities between
multinational corporate companies and multidivisional
monopolistic companies. The strategic implications and
possible solutions to the predatory use of transfer
pricing are analysed with respect to the Italian case.
Marcucci, in analysing the most recent institutional and
legislative evolutions in the Italian railway sector,
discusses their likely effects on the regulatory
framework. The Author proposes an evaluation of the
coherence between the instruments adopted, the
institutional framework within which the reform process
is taking place, and the widely advertised objectives
pursued not only at the national but also at the European
level. Special attention is paid to regulatory capture
since it plays a fundamental strategic role in determining
the possible outcomes of the reform process. The main
conclusions relate to the need of further regulatory
institutions, such as an Agency or an Authority and the
consistent risk of regulatory capture and slackening of
competitive incentives given the pre-competitive
constraints new entrants have to face in the present
institutional and regulatory scenario. Polidori, with
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reference to the Commission’s action programme,
discusses some critical points concerning the institution
of a European Railway Agency with the aim of
clarifying what role such an Agency might have in
terms of creating a European regulatory Authority. In
fact, independently of the method adopted to promote
competition, there will always be a strong need for a
regulatory Authority in order to promote the
Commission’s free competition policy. An Authority is
usually needed when the restructuring process of a
former vertically integrated industry is carried out via a
separation approach. Such an organisation, in order to
respect its mandate, has to at least have access to a
critical mass of information, dispose of competent and
highly skilled staff, and be endowed with inquiry and
sanctionatory powers.  In fact, the above mentioned
characteristics represent only the minimum requirement
since, as experience attests, in order to be truly effective,
antitrust action requires clear rules for courts concerning
the use of technical information and evidence.
4. The analysis of the possible market evolutions in the
railway sector at the European level given the present
regulatory framework. Forte and Del Vecchio try to
envisage the likely scenarios that might materialise in
the railway sector. The Authors suggest that after an
initial shock that might provoke an increase in the
number of train operating companies, one should expect
a consolidation in the ensuing phase giving rise to a re-
verticalisation process. The efficiency and regulatory
problems might be reduced by individuating dedicated
transport lines (passenger and freight) as in the case of
Australia and New Zealand.
5. Concerning the issue of risk perception in a
deregulated railway market, Nuti discusses the role that
risk assessment and perception plays in deciding which
mode of transportation people choose. The question is
not only discussed in terms of train safety assessment
per se but also comparatively, that is in terms of rail
safety versus other modes of transport. Risk and safety
perception are not only at the base of the estimation of
the consumer’s willingness to pay but also play a role in
terms of redirecting resources from other modes towards
the railways. These two elements are not univocally
influenced by a vertical separation process that increases
the number of independent actors interacting with one
another, thus diffusing the governance of the system and
potentially rendering each single actor less responsible
towards the end user. The whole problem is augmented
when considering that people sometimes perceive risk
very differently from a statistically rational point of
view, giving rise to dilemmas in risk regulation.
From an empirical and practical point of view, the main
issues considered are: 
1. Privatisation of national railways and vertical
separation in metro systems are analysed by White and
Ball. Following previous work on the net financial
impacts of rail privatisation in England, they examine
the outcomes of the first five full years of franchised
operation which have disclosed much more information
on trends in ridership and financial performance.  Great
attention is paid to separating the external effects
influencing industry performance from those only
ascribable to privatisation and vertical separation.
Furthermore, the effects of privatisation and
deregulation are also kept separate in order to assess the
effective impact of each single phenomenon. In order to
perform this social cost benefit accounting it is
important that a comprehensive inventory of assets is
created when either ownership and/or responsibility for
infrastructure is transferred to the private sector. There
also has to be a clearly defined interface between train
operators and the infrastructure needs as well as
between infrastructure providers and subcontractors to
clarify responsibility in the event of safety issues and
delays effecting final users. Carlucci in his contribution
provides a continental view of the privatisation and
vertical separation process taking place in the UK.
Departing from a theoretical reconstruction of the
motivations and theoretical underpinnings of the various
forms of intervention that have been adopted throughout
the world, Carlucci concentrates on the events that have
characterised the vertical separation process in the UK.
The main conclusion is that the railway sector cannot do
without some sort of public intervention. The case of
Railtrack testifies that an infrastructure–funding scheme
relying exclusively on the private sector cannot stand
the market test. Furthermore, in line with what Preston
has clearly suggested in his paper, Carlucci underlines
the potential detrimental effects that ensue from a
privatised and vertically separated railway sector, thus
suggesting the need for a certain level of vertical
integration, on one side, and for a cautious approach for
Italy, on the other.
2. Cowie concentrates on production economics in
passenger service provision, as organised in the British
case, where infrastructure is separated from operations.
The interesting result is that the size of train operating
companies is important and all the Train Operating
Companies (TOCs) are operating below the minimum
efficient scale. In another context it is therefore
important to consider carefully the maximum number of
TOCs allowed to operate on the network. As in the
British case, Cowie suggests that it would be interesting
Trasporti Europei
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to consider possible productivity gains via acquisition to
increase firm size.
3. From different points of view, Shoji and Killeen,
Musso and Ferrari, and Torbianelli all treat the issue of
vertical separation on local and regional transportation,
providing a cross-related perspective on the issue.
Concentrating on the Japanese experience, Shoji and
Killeen evidence that, notwithstanding the highly
concentrated market typical of Japan, train operating
companies are profitable also in less populated areas.
The two most important points suggested by the
Authors to explain the specific characteristics of the
regional railways in Japan are: a) railway companies are
private and behave commercially, deciding both the
level and type of service offered, and b) have
substantially differentiated their businesses in harmony
with trackside communities prompting systematic
regional development due to thier long-term
commitment. Musso and Ferrari analyse the
implications that vertical separation might have for
regional transportation in the Italian case. Departing
from an institutional and quantitative description of the
present situation in Italy, Musso and Ferrari describe
both the potential opportunities and the risks involved
with the specific process of adopted vertical separation.
Among the most important aspects to be clarified and
further researched, the authors note the following: a)
poorly defined roles among the different actors
producing either conflict or collusion; b) absence of pro-
competitive actions, and c) scarce planning capacities
associated with an insufficient financial and taxation
capacity for the regions. 
4. Maggi and Giuntini provide an historical perspective
of the privatisation and deregulation process that
characterise Italy in this specific period. Describing the
social, economic, and political scenario in which the
then private railway companies were brought in the
public realm, the paper provides a logical benchmark
against which to evaluate some of the considerations
that are now spurring ahead the privatisation and
deregulation progress. The contrast between the
reasoning that induced the nationalisation of the service
then and the opposite view now pushing  for
privatisation and vertical separation is self evident. The
most important result of this paper is the stimulation of
critical reasoning on both the justifications proposed to
support nationalisation as well as those suggested in
support of vertical separation and privatisation.
1 Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, vol. 33, part 1,
January, 1999.
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1. Introduction
The debate concerning the
vertical structure of the
railways is almost as old as
the railways themselves
(see, for example, Lardner,
1855). In this paper, we
attempt to review the
arguments by utilising
some elements of transaction cost economics. The
appropriate theory is briefly reviewed below. In section 2,
some of the advantages of vertical separation will be outlined.
In section 3, some of the disadvantages will be reviewed. In
section 4, some suggested solutions are examined. In section
5, some limited empirical evidence will be assessed. Finally,
in section 6 some conclusions are drawn. 
In this paper we will concentrate on the British configuration
of both privatised train operating companies (TOCs) and a
privatised infrastructure authority (Railtrack), whilst
acknowledging that at least three other configurations are
possible - see Figure 1. In particular, Sweden, where both
operations and infrastructure are, in the main, publicly owned
will act as a useful counterpoint.
Perhaps the most appropriate theoretical tool for examining
vertical integration is that of transaction cost economics,
which is associated with Oliver Williamson1. Williamson sees
a key trade off being between contractual market governance
(which implies vertical separation) and bureaucratic internal
governance (which implies vertical integration). Given
economies of scale and scope, it is argued that the production
costs of market governance (MC(k)) will always be lower
than the production costs of bureaucratic governance (BC(k)),
for any degree of asset specificity k. In other words, if we
define ∆C as BC(k) - MC(k) we might expect this to be
positive but declining with asset specificity because the
potential for scale economies across firms is reduced as assets
become more specific. This is illustrated by Figure 2. By
contrast, we might expect governance costs to be lower under
market governance than under bureaucratic governance where
asset specificity is low – which we might write as
BG(k)>MG(k). By contrast, where asset specificity is high
we might expect market governance costs to be higher than
bureaucratic governance costs – MG(k)>BG(k). If we denote
∆G as BG(k) - MG(k) we might postulate that this too
declines with asset specificity, but switches from being
positive to being negative at point k*. However, if we
vertically sum ∆C + ∆G we see that the crossover point is
k**. To the left of this point, market governance will be most
cost effective. To the right,
bureaucratic governance
will be most cost effective.
The question then becomes
where might railways be
located on this Figure.  In
the case of railways in
Britain, where there has
been a switch from vertical
(and horizontal) integration to vertical (and horizontal)
separation, the resultant changes in costs may provide an
important indicator of asset specificity, if the analysis
underpinning Figure 2 is correct.
Asset specificity may include site specificity, physical asset
specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated assets. The
latter occurs where a discrete investment in generalised
production capacity would not occur but for the prospect of
selling a significant amount to a particular customer. This
may be a realistic scenario for rail infrastructure whilst it
should also be clear that much rail infrastructure is site
specific and many physical and human assets are specific to
the railways. Asset specificity is particularly important when
transactions are recurrent. Table 1 suggests that the rail
industry may well be thought of as one in which there is site
specific transfer of intermediate product across successive
stages and hence unified governance (i.e. vertical integration)
might be preferred but this would need to be validated by
detailed case studies. Unfortunately what empirical evidence
there is on transactions costs tends to be concentrated on
traditional manufacturing industries2.
2. Advantages of Vertical Separation
The first advantage of vertical separation, at least in the
British context, was not economic but political in that it
permitted privatisation. It has become clear that a policy
priority of the 1992 to 1997 Conservative Government was to
privatise the railways quickly and in a manner that could not
easily be overturned by subsequent Governments3. The way 
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Infrastructure
Public Private
Public Sweden (Banverket/SJ) North America
(Amtrak, Via Rail)
Operations
Private New Zealand
Latin America
GB (Railtrack, TOCs)
Source: Brooks, M., and K., Button, (1995), Separating Transport Track from Operations: a typology
of international experience , International Journal of Transport Economics , Vol. 22, n¡ 3, pp. 235-260.
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Vertical Separation in Railways
Cost
Asset Specificityk* k**
∆C
∆G
∆C + ∆G
Source: Williamson, O., (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,
The Free Press, New York. Figure 4-2, p. 93.
Figure 2:  Comparative Production and Governance Costs
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this was done was to split British Rail into some 100 different
companies. Subsidy would be directed to the 25 passenger
Train Operating Companies (TOCs) but the remaining
businesses would be fully commercial so that they could be
privatised by direct sale or, in the case of Railtrack, by
flotation. By restructuring the railways in this way the
Government raised some £4.4 billion in privatisation proceeds,
with the process completed by the May election of 19974. 
The railways could have been privatised in a different manner.
If Railtrack was directed to base its access fees on short run
marginal cost and received the appropriate subsidy from
Government to do so, it is likely that many of the 25 TOCs
would be profitable and could therefore be privatised.
However, this would take a prolonged period of shadow
running to establish revenue and hence profit flows, which in
any event, would be difficult to forecast far into the future.
There also would be the possibility of a large residual part of
the railway remaining in public ownership, providing a base for
any subsequent re-nationalisation. With hindsight, it is easy to
see why the Conservative Government acted in the way it did5.
The second advantage of vertical separation is that it puts the
railways on a similar organisational setting as the rest of the
transport sector. The air, road and sea sectors are, in the main,
vertically separated. By separating infrastructure from
operations, one could permit different operators to compete
against each other on a third party’s tracks just as buses,
coaches and lorries compete with each other on the road.
Such an analysis fails to recognise the greater degree of asset
specificity in the rail sector than in the road sector. In any
event, substantial on-track competition has not been
permitted in Britain. The Office of the Rail Regulator
moderated competition so that in Stage I, which remained in
force up to October 1998, new open access competition was
limited to flows that accounted for less than 0.2% of a TOC’s
revenues. In Stage II, which in practice was not introduced
until the 1999/00 winter timetable, open access competition
was permitted on up to 20% (by revenue) of a TOC’s flows
registered for protection with the Rail Regulator and on all
non-protected flows. Stage II is due to come to an end on 31
March 2002 but in a statement issued in April 2001 the Rail
Regulator envisaged an Interim Period in which the Stage II
arrangements remained in force except where benefits to the
public were deemed sufficient to outweigh the legitimate
interests of the incumbent. Although there have been some
interesting developments such as the Hull Trains services,
competition has largely been limited to routes where there
was historic competition between BR profit centres. The
renaissance of the rail system based on open access
competition as envisaged by Gylie6, Starkie, (1986) and
Irvine7 (although only the latter envisaged privatisation of the
track authority) was not allowed to happen. In part this was
because such competition would have had a negative impact
on the franchising process, leading to politically unacceptable
delays in letting contracts. However, we have noted
elsewhere that even if competition were permitted it could
well be wasteful. Simulation work we have undertaken in
Great Britain suggested that, with infrastructure charges
based on full cost recovery, the most likely form of
competition would be cream skimming on the main inter city
routes8. Similar work we have recently undertaken in Sweden
suggests that where infrastructure charges are based on short
run marginal costs, head-on service and fare competition
becomes feasible, but tends to result in more service than is
socially optimal9.
The third advantage of vertical separation is that it allows
specialisation which may assist in minimising production and
governance costs. In retrospect, these arguments appear most
relevant to operations. For example, if the industry had
remained vertically integrated it is possible that there would
have been less involvement in the industry by bus operators
who appear to have been successful in controlling train
operating costs and increasing revenue. Similarly, one would
have thought that an organisation focused on the provision of
rail infrastructure would rapidly develop a body of specialist
expertise. In the case of Railtrack, that does not seem to have
been the case, possibly due to an over reliance on contracting
out.
The fourth advantage of vertical separation is that it facilitates
the greater transparency of the capital costs of infrastructure
and path allocation procedures. Market governance would
then be able to drive cost down to efficient levels. A number
of practical issues arise here. The first is how to estimate the
capital costs of rail infrastructure. Rather than use historic
cost or replacement cost methods (or capital expenditure as a
proxy), modern equivalent asset valuation was used to
determine an initial valuation of Railtrack’s assets. This
approach estimated replacement costs taking into account the
latest and most cost-effective technical possibilities,
economies from reconfiguration and spare capacity. However,
this required detailed knowledge of future operational
requirements; knowledge which was not possessed by
Railtrack or its accountants. The subsequent growth in
passenger and freight traffic (passenger kms up 29%, freight
tonne kms up 43% between 1993/4 and 2001/02 (see table 2)
was not predicted. Nonetheless, using this approach
Railtrack’s assets were valued at £6.5 billion, although
Railtrack argued that £3 billion was more realistic. In the
event, the market valuation of the company at flotation in
1996 was £1.9 billion. In March 2002, these assets were
revalued at £500 million.
Investment Characteristics
Nonspecific Mixed Idiosyncratic
Occasional Purchasing
Standard
Equipment -
Market
Governance
Purchasing
Customised
Equipment —
Trilateral
Governance
Constructing a
Plant —
Trilateral or
Unified
Governance
Frequency
Recurrent Purchasing
Standard Material
—
Market
Governance
Purchasing
Customised
Material —
Bilateral
Governance
Site specific
Transfer of
Intermediate
Product across
Successive stages
—
Unified
Governance
Based on Williamson, O., (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, The Free Press, New York.
Figures 3-1 and 3-2.
Table 1: Illustrative Transactions and Efficient Governance
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A second issue relates to determining the appropriate rate of
return for rail infrastructure capital. Initially a rate of return of
5.1% was set for Railtrack, increasing to 8% over four years10.
This was despite evidence that average private sector rates of
return in the UK between 1972 and 1992 were 6.6%. The
Railtrack charges for rail services in 1994/5 were £2146
million11, compared to £1760 million in 1993/412 – a nominal
increase of 22%. Subsequently the Rail Regulator required
these charges to be reduced by 8% immediately, followed by
a 2% per annum reduction up to the year 200013. This was
equivalent to a 17% reduction over the Control Period –
returning access charges to broadly their 1993/4 levels. For
Control Period 2 (2001-2006), a base level increase in
franchised track access charges of 2.5% was proposed in
2001/214 based on a 7.5% return on the regulatory asset base.
The Regulator also proposed that usage charges should be
based on assumed levels of efficiency gains over the next
control period. This was estimated to be equivalent to a 4.2%
reduction per annum in controllable costs or a 10% reduction
in total costs over Control Period 2. However, following
consultation, the present value of Railtrack’s revenue
requirements was increased by a further 7% (following on
from a 40% increase in the draft conclusions covered mainly
by grants from the SRA), based on a rate of return of 8% and
efficiency gains of 3.1% per annum. Base track access
charges would reduce by 11.2% in 2001/2 but then increase
year on year by RPI+5% so that they would be 6.5% higher in
2005/6 than in 2000/115. The figure are complex but suggest
that total track access charges in Control Period 1 were an
average of 10% higher than under the previous regime, rising
to around 40% in Control Period 2. With respect to Figure 2,
this seems to confirm our suspicion that rail infrastructure in
Britain is located somewhere to the right of point k**. 
A third issue is the determination of efficient cost levels for
rail infrastructure. This is very difficult, with the main
approach applied to date that of international benchmarking.
For example, NERA16 compares Railtrack’s ways and
structure costs with those of railways in Australia, Canada,
Japan, Sweden and the United States. However, the railways
in Australia and North America are predominantly long haul
freight railroads, whilst the railways in Japan are
predominantly high frequency passenger railroads. Only in
Sweden is there a mix of passenger and freight operations as
in Britain, although even here freight operators are much
more important in Sweden than in Britain. Moreover, up until
1995 capital expenditure by the Swedish track authority
(Banverket) was depreciated in the year of purchase.
Depreciation charges only refer to assets purchased since
1996, and as a result capital expenditure is used as a proxy for
depreciation. From Table 3, it can be seen that Railtrack and
Banverket’s costs are broadly similar. Banverket’s costs per
track mile are 4% higher than those of Railtrack. However,
Railtrack’s costs per train mile are 18% higher than those of
Banverket, whilst Railtrack’s costs per traffic unit (passenger
mile or freight gross ton mile) are 55% higher. 
The above suggest that determining actual and optimal costs
of rail infrastructure is difficult. Nontheless, the trade press in
Britain has highlighted a number of cases in which there have
been substantial cost increases. For example, the costs of the
West Coach Mainline upgrade have increased from £2.2
billion in 1997, to £5.8 billion in 1999 (but with an upgraded
specification), to an estimated £7.5 billion (Rail, 422,
November 2001, pp 4-5). Industry analyst Roger Ford
believes that costs for upgrades and modernisation projects
have increased by 150% and for maintenance costs have
increased by 50% compared to British Rail (Modern
Railways, 638, November 2001, page 18). The root causes
are that ‘possessions are limited, contractors are wading
through contractual treacle, track safety…is more stringently
monitored and so on’. In other words, the governance costs in
a vertically separated railway appear excessive. We shall
return to this issue in section 5. 
Critics point to the success of Northern Ireland Railways, a
vertically integrated operator, in reinstating the Bleach Green-
Antrim route on time and on budget at a cost of around £0.7m
per km17. However, it should be noted that this is a single line
with two passing loops and a maximum speed of 90 mph. By
contrast, a recent study has suggested that in Great Britain,
the average price for upgrading a line to high speed running
might be £3.4m per km, whilst the cost of a new high speed
line might be £7m per km18. Box19 estimated that a km of new
double track in 1991 cost £4m per km under British Rail at
1999/00 prices, with the corresponding price for track
upgrading of around £0.8m per km. 
These cost increases were exacerbated by Railtrack’s status as
a commercial enterprise. Therefore prices are set on the basis
of full cost recovery. This resulted in a charge of around £6
per train kilometre at the beginning of Control Period 1,
declining to around £5 per train kilometre towards the end of
Control Period 120. For a natural monopoly, with declining
average costs, it is well known that average cost pricing will
lead to a deadweight loss. The magnitude of this loss might
be gauged from the fact that in Sweden, where infrastructure
93/4 94/5 95/6 96/7 97/8 98/9 99/00 00/01 01/02 Change
93/4 –
01/02
Passenger
Kms
(billion)
30.4 28.7 30.0 32.1 34.7 36.3 38.5 38.2 39.1 +29%
Freight
Kms
(billion)
13.8 13.0 13.3 15.1 16.9 17.3 18.2 18.1 19.7 +43%
Train Kms
(million)1 350.2 340.2 353.5 360.0 376.3 405.1 418.4 427.2 435.9 +24%
Source: Strategic Rail Authority, (2002), “National Rail Trends 4. 2001-02”. SRA, London.
1 Before 1997/8 train kms from Preston and Root (1999).
Table 2: Trends in Passenger and Freight Transport by Rail
in Britain 1993/4 –2001/2
W&S
Cost
£ m
Cost per
Route
Mile (£)
Cost per
Track
Mile (£)
Cost per
Train
Mile (£)
Cost per
Traffic Unit
(£)
Railtrack 2290 217447 107991 7.95 0.051
Banverket 874 128733 112735 6.71 0.033
Derived from, National Economic Research Associates, (NERA), (2000), Review of Overseas Railway
Efficiency, report for the Office of the Rail Regulator, NERA, London. See text for details.
Table 3: Comparison of Railtrack and Banverket’s Ways and
Structures (W & S) Costs – 1998
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access prices are based on short run marginal cost, charges
are only around 65 pence per train kilometre. These
deadweight losses might be mitigated by Ramsey pricing or
multi-part tariffs but are likely to remain substantial.
It should also be noted that from Box21 it can be estimated that
infrastructure costs under the old British Rail regime (1991)
were around £4.96 per train km (at 1999/2000 prices).  This
again suggests a cost increase on separation of around 20% and
re-inforces the view that the main up-shot of greater cost
transparency is the realisation of just how expensive rail
infrastructure is. This results in total operating costs per train
km in Great Britain in 2000 of around £12 per train km22. Box
(1992) estimated the corresponding operating cost per train km
under British Rail was around £10 per km at 1999/00 prices.
Most of this cost increase can be attributed to higher
infrastructure and rolling stock costs. Recent work we have
undertaken in Sweden suggests total costs per train km of
between around £3 to £7 per train km, depending on train type23.
3. Disadvantages of Vertical Separation
Preston24 identifies, three broad types of problem connected,
with vertical separation, relating to strategic, tactical and
operational functions. These will be discussed in turn. It will
become apparent that many of these priorities relate to the
trade-off between governance and production costs.
3.1  Strategic Functions
One of the areas that critics of the reform process highlighted
was safety. Commentators with practical experience, both in the
UK25 and abroad, particularly Japan26, questioned whether safety
standards could be maintained with a fragmented railway.
However, the trends in train accident rates and rail fatalities (see
figure 3) suggest that past trends towards improvements have
continued. There have been a number of high profile fatal rail
accidents (Southall (1997), Ladbroke Grove (1999), Hatfield
(2000) and Potter’s Bar (2002)) where some have argued that
the way the rail industry has been reformed was a factor. Initial
criticisms of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and
Railtrack were that they were bureaucratic, slow and costly27.
Transaction cost economics might suggest that the governance
structures were inappropriate. Subsequently, Railtrack has been
stripped of some of its safety functions, with further
recommendations that HSE takes on responsibility for assessing
as well as approving train operators’ safety cases and sets up a
rail accident investigation branch, whilst the industry as a whole
takes responibility for safety standards28. The implications in
terms of transaction cost economics do not seem to have been
considered in any detail.
Another area of strategic concern is that of investment. An
unregulated natural monopolist will under-invest. This will be
exacerbated for intermediate goods in which there is only one
consumer, which is often the case for rail infrastructure. The
resultant bilateral monopoly in a vertically separated regime
will lead to double marginalisation29. Such problems can be
overcome by regulation although it is possible that price cap
regulation can be equivalent to rate of return regulation with a
lag, leading to the Averch-Johnson effect of overcapitalisation
(and hence over-investment). However, Helm and Thompson30
argue that where industries have sunk costs, price cap regulation
is likely to lead to under-investment. The reasoning is as
follows. Suppose Railtrack makes a capital investment so as to
reduce costs. The Regulator knows that this investment is sunk
and cannot be reversed. In determining the X element in an
RPI-X pricing formula, the Regulator will only take into
account future cost reductions and not past investments.
Railtrack, realising this, will avoid sunk cost investments unless
there are large revenue gains (e.g. station redevelopments). The
unambitious nature of many of Railtrack’s Network
Management Statements may reflect this. The incentive to
under-invest (and the welfare implications thereof) is likely to
be particularly acute in price inelastic markets, such as the
London commuting market. This might partly explain why
progress on Thameslink 2000 (sic) and Paddington-Liverpool
Street Crossrail has been particularly slow.
There are further problems regarding information asymmetries.
Only Railtrack knows its true capital costs and can therefore
enjoy an information rent31. However, only the TOCs know the
magnitude of train operating cost savings and revenue growth as
a result of capital projects, despite Railtrack’s attempts to model
demand using programs such as SCORES or RIFF. There may
be scope for TOCs to overstate cost savings/revenue growth in
order to persuade Railtrack to make sunk cost investments.
Subsequently the TOCs would try to negotiate access at
marginal rates rather than full cost rates. Knowing this,
Railtrack will be reluctant to make sunk investments unless ex-
ante bilateral (or multilateral) agreements are made (as with
Virgin on the West Coast Mainline). However, these are difficult
to make when some 15 operators are involved.
The data on investment since privatisation suggests that some
of these concerns have not arisen. Figure 4 suggests that
1990 0.882 1994/5 6.032Sweden
2000 0.646
Great Britain
1999/2000 5.039
Sources: Nash, C.A., (1997), The Separation of Operations from Infrastructure in the Provision of Railway
Services — The British Experience , ECMT Round Table 103. OECD, Paris. Prognos, A.G., 2000. Assumes
increases in RPI 1990/91 to 1999/2000 is 27.8%
(http://www.netaccountants.com/rpi.html).A s s u m e s  t h a t  _ 1  =  £ 0 . 6 4 6  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9
(http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb199912en.pdf).
Table 4: Swedish and British Rail Infrastructure Charges
Compared (1999/2000 prices £ per train km)
Figure 3: Significant train accident rates (from 1975)
€
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investment in rail infrastructure has doubled since privatisation.
The investment victim of vertical separation appears to be
rolling stock32.However, we should be cautious before
dismissing the infrastructure investment problem. There is the
problem of cost inflation highlighted earlier. If new
infrastructure costs have really doubled since privatisation then
there will have been little change in the levels of physical
investment. There is also the cyclical nature of rail investment.
High investment levels in the late 1990s might follow on from
low investment in preceding periods. There is the further issue
of mega-projects. The Channel Tunnel Rail Link and the West
Coast Main Line Modernisation may account for over two
thirds of current infrastructure investment.
Figure 4 also shows that level of revenue support from
Government for the passenger railways in Britain broadly
doubled with the implementation of privatisation. This was,
in my view, due to a broadly equal combination of one-off
transitional governance costs and the increase in capital costs
under the new regime. The subsequent reduction in support
levels so that they returned to pre-privatisation levels by
2000/01 was due to the elimination of the transitional costs
and the efficiency gains made by the TOCs and Railtrack.
Most recently, there is some evidence that revenue support for the
passenger railways is beginning to increase as franchisees negotiate
more generous contracts with the Strategic Rail Authority.
The last strategic issue to highlight is that of land use.
Original proponents of rail privatisation saw property
development as the key to a commercially viable railway33.
The performance of the real estate division of Railtrack has
been relatively disappointing (typically only 5% of
Railtrack’s income has come from property rental), whilst
developments have not always complemented rail operations.
This is in contrast to the vertically integrated railways of
Japan where profits largely come from real estate
development and diversification into retail, leisure and other
activities. Only 51% of the revenue of major private railways
in Japan comes from rail operations, with this figure
declining to 38% for minor private railways34.
The vertically separated railway in Britain has failed to
exploit the synergistic benefits of train operations and
complementary land-use development.
3.2  Tactical and Operational Functions
Tactical issues such as train length and speed, stopping patterns
and vehicle size and type are operational decisions which will
be constrained by infrastructure. As with investment generally,
optimal decision making concerning timetable co-ordination
and capacity allocation within a vertically separated regime
may be plagued by information asymmetries and/or excessive
transaction costs. Similar arguments pertain to the scheduling
of maintenance where the British tradition of concentrating
major work on Sundays persists, despite evidence from
continental Europe that this may have a high opportunity cost
in terms of revenue foregone. For example, in Sweden, daily
rail traffic on Fridays and Sundays is double the daily traffic
during the rest of the week35. Similar issues also arise with
respect to operational planning in the event of infrastructure,
vehicle or some other failure.
The architects of rail privatisation realised that there might be
insufficient incentives to provide the optimal levels of service
quality, particularly in terms of punctuality and reliability. This
arises because the infrastructure authority and, in some
instances, the train operator have a degree of monopoly power.
As a result a complex performance regime was developed
based on the estimation of a Marginal Revenue Effect (MRE)
per passenger of a minutes delay, calculated as36:
MRE = [TR x MUJT x EGT] / [Q x GT]
where
TR = Total Revenue (£)
MUJT= Multiplier for Unscheduled Journey Time (a typical 
value was 2.5)
EGT = Generalised Time Elasticity (a typical value is –0.9)
Q = Journeys
GT = Generalised Time (the sum of in-vehicle time, a 
service interval penalty, an unscheduled delay penalty 
and an interchange penalty - minutes).
The original rates were between 0 and 15 pence per passenger
minute. The governance costs of such a regime were not
taken into account nor were the opportunity costs of the
resultant financial transfers.
Figure 5 shows that this approach initially had some impact on
improving punctuality. Railtrack was particularly incentivised, at
least in the short run, because the performance regime represented
a significant proportion of Railtrack’s variable revenue (or
variable costs). The performance regime was less important for
the TOCs as it represented only a small proportion of variable
revenue/costs. As a result, the improvements in performance
bottomed out and there was some indication of a deterioration.
The Shadow Strategic Rail Authority’s initial response to the
decline in punctuality was to double incentive rates37. However,
the impact of this was overshadowed by the events of 17 October
2000 which triggered the biggest disruption to passenger railways
services in Britain in peacetime. The accident at Hatfield that
occurred on that date was found to be caused by gauge corner
cracking which was found to be endemic across the system.
Railtrack (and its contractors) had misjudged the technical life of
its main asset – rails. The emergency measures which were put in
                                   Source: Strategic Rail Authority, (2001), “National Rail Trends 2001-02”. SRA, London.
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place to overcome this situation led to Railtrack incurring a £2
billion operating cost over-run and £0.5 billion in poor service
penalties (DTLR Press Release, 11/10/01). It was Railtrack’s
gross misfortune that the deterioration in its performance
coincided with the introduction of a more penal incentive regime.
It was the issue that eventually led to the company’s demise.
Prior to financial year 2000/01 Railtrack’s finances appeared
to be sound with the company regularly turning in profits of
around £1 million per day (see Figure 6). However, there
were some warning signs. Railtrack’s total operating costs
had only reduced by 3.3% in real terms between 1994/5 and
1999/00, although train kms had increased by as much as
23% over this period (see Table 2), although network kms
were broadly unchanged. This may be computed to be
equivalent to an efficiency increase of around 4.7% per
annum. Cowie estimated that over the period 1995 to 1998
the TOCs increased productivity by 4.4% per annum38. The
aftermath of Hatfield found Railtrack’s income in 2000/01
fall by 26% and its costs increase by 8% in real terms, leading
to a large loss of about £0.5 billion. This implies an efficiency
loss of 5.8% in this year. The company faced a further deficit
of £0.7 billion by 8 December 2001, rising to £1.7 billion by
March 2002 (DTLR Press Release, 15/10/01). The
provisional figures for 2001/02 suggest an improvement, with
an operating profit before extraordinary items of £321
million. However, extraordinary items involved writing down
Railtrack’s assets by £1,951 million, leading to an
extraordinary loss of £1,724 million.
4. Solutions
Railtrack believed it faced three options: restructuring,
receivership or renationalisation. In fact, there are a number of
other alternatives which might be referred to as the reconsideration
of social ownership, Renewcos, reintegrated franchises and
redirection of subsidy. These options will be considered below.
Railtrack had already restructured organisationally – with
greater emphasis on functional separation (e.g. between safety,
maintenance and major projects) and geographical
specialisation. What Railtrack now requested was a suspension
for up to four years of the regulatory regime plus an injection,
in terms of equity, of £3.5 billion from Government. Perhaps
unsurprisingly Government rejected this offer and on 7 October
2001 placed Railtrack into receivership.
Moreover, the Government came up with an alternative of its
own – the concept of a not for profit trust. The origins of this
idea can be traced back to a paper produced by Tony Grayling
for the Institute for Public Policy Research in February 200139
but which could arguably be traced further back to the
concept of social ownership promoted in the late 1980s40. It
was taken up in a lecture given to the Transport Planning
Society by Phil Goodwin in June 200141. It makes use of the
criteria for the assessment of whether public or private
ownership or a public-private partnership would be preferable
in the case of particular industries, based on the work for the
Commission on Public Private Partnerships by John
Hawksworth42. These criteria are:
• The degree of direct competition in the market, with more
competition tending to favour private ownership.
• The significance of non-commercial objectives, with such
objectives tending to favour public ownership.
• The scale and complexity of the required future investment
programme. This may require private sector investment
skills, although not necessarily private sector ownership.
• The extent of uncertainty as to required future service
provision. The greater the uncertainty, the more flexible
contracts will need to be if a public-private partnership
option is to be effective.
• The extent to which the business can be broken up without
losing significant economies of scale and scope.
Grayling argues that, as applied to Railtrack, these criteria
suggest that public ownership is appropriate given its
monopoly status, the importance of non-commercial
objectives (including safety, reducing road congestion and
environmental complexity) and the problematic nature of
regulation. However, Grayling suggests that public ownership
need not necessarily mean state ownership. For industries that
are primarily a natural monopoly and where non-commercial
objectives such as safety are an important feature, then a not
for profit model may have advantages. It would avoid the
perception of any conflict between profit and safety while
allowing for the involvement of all stakeholders, including
the private sector. A trust would also have access to private
finance without changing treasury rules. Possible models
              Source: SRA, (2001), op. cit.
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Figure 6: Railtrack’s Financial Performance
include Welsh Water, Trust ports such as Dover, National Air
Traffic Services and housing associations. A not for profit
trust need involve no taxpayers’ money but could issue
private sector bonds, as with Welsh Water. It is estimated that
Welsh Water could reduce customers’ bills by 10%, all other
things being equal, as a result of lower financing costs. This
assumes that all other things are equal and there are no
adverse financial impacts from transferring risk from
shareholder to customers and taxpayers. It should be noted
that around 80% of Railtrack’s business is with the Strategic
Rail Authority and the PTEs. It also assumes that commercial
incentives for efficiency are not diluted. This could be
avoided through continuation of the regulatory regime, which
may be assisted by reduced incentives for secrecy, and sub-
contracting. A geographical fragmentation of the trust so as to
permit yardstick competition might also be considered.
This policy option resulted in the launch in March 2002 of
Network Rail, a not for dividend commercial company, with
no shareholders but around 100 stakeholder members. A £500
million bid would be made for Railtrack plus a further £735
million for assets associated with the Channel Tunnel Rail
Link. Railtrack shareholders would receive compensation of
around £2.50 a share, equivalent to almost £1.3 billion. This
acquisition was completed on 3rd October 2002.
There are other alternatives. The re-franchising process might
incorporate special purpose vehicles, essentially joint venture
companies between Railtrack, SRA, TOCs and Contractors.
Such a form of financial engineering, promoted by Sir Alastair
Morton and epitomised by the aborted Renewco project, would
permit a degree of vertical re-integration, at least for major new
projects and upgrades, but it is not clear what impact they
would have on the cost of finance. An alternative approach
might be to unbundle Railtrack based on geographical zones
and sell these mini-Railtracks to the highest bidder43. This
could set up an important market test for vertical re-integration,
with at least two TOCs (Stagecoach’s South West Trains and
First Great Eastern) expressing an interest, although the Rail
Freight Group has voiced opposition.
If the industry is to remain vertically separated, then another
alternative might be to restructure the industry to be more in line
with Sweden. The new Railtrack would base access charges on
short run marginal costs, although there is the none trivial task
of determining scarcity costs, which are more likely to be
important in Britain than Sweden44. Under such a charging
regime, it is likely that major inter city routes and long distance
commuting routes into London would be profitable and could
be operated on an open access basis – although there could, as
we have already noted, be a serious risk of wasteful
competition. Subsidy would be directed to socially necessary
services such as short distance commuting and rural services
with an enhanced role for the GLA, the PTEs, the Scottish
Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and, in time, English Regional
Assemblies and a reduced role for the Strategic Rail Authority.
5. Evidence from Elsewhere
The collapse of Railtrack may be interpreted as important
empirical evidence against vertical separation in the rail
industry and/or evidence against privatising rail
infrastructure. It suggests that for railways total production
and governance costs may be greater under market
governance than bureaucratic governance. There is little other
evidence but such evidence is mixed. Cantos Sanchez has
shown that track infrastructure and passenger operations are
cost substitutes45. Higher track costs will lead to lower
operation costs by permitting faster services. By contrast,
track infrastructure and freight operations are cost
complements. Higher track costs will lead to higher operating
costs as higher maintenance costs are not offset by reduced
train operating costs through increased speeds. This suggests
that there may be benefits from vertical integration,
particularly for a passenger railway but also for a freight
railway. However, it also suggests that there are diseconomies
of scope of providing joint passenger and freight services at
least above certain output and quality levels. This reinforces
earlier work by Cantos Sanchez46. Mizutani and Shoji, in a
case study of the Kobe Kosoku Tetsudo railway in Japan,
estimated that infrastructure maintenance costs were 6%
higher on this vertically separated railway, compared to other
vertically integrated railways in Japan47. They also note that
dealing with train schedule changes is slow and costly.
By contrast, Shires et al. found, based on a translog cost model,
that rail operating costs in Sweden reduced by around 10% after
separation in 198848. However, this separation was also
accompanied by the gradual introduction of tendering which may
have been the key cost driver.  Similarly, using a stochastic cost
frontier approach, Kim and Kim estimated that vertical separation
of Seoul’s subway system might reduce total costs by 3%49.
6. Conclusions
There is a temptation to see the failure of Railtrack as an
indictment of the privatisation of public utilities. It does seem
that, at times, Railtrack put the interest of its shareholders before
all other stakeholders, as witnessed by its decision to pay
shareholders some £150 million in dividends at the same time
as reporting large losses and receiving the first instalment of a
£1.5 billion grant from Government. The irony was that this
short termism proved ineffective as many of Railtrack’s
shareholders have suffered substantial losses.
However, if privatisation was really the problem, then why
haven’t other privatised utilities fallen victim to the failures
of myopic profit seeking capitalism? Clearly, Railtrack made
some specific, serious strategic mistakes and was not helped
by a complex regulatory system and some personality
clashes. In my view rail privatisation and competition was
essentially about a Williamsonian trade-off between reducing
production costs and increasing governance costs. Proponents
of privatisation, such as Foster, argued that substantial
productive efficiency gains would be made by the reforms,
whilst the costs of governance would be minimised through
the use of information technology50. Reliable empirical
evidence is difficult to obtain but there is some suggestion
that the unit costs of existing infrastructure increased by 20%
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on implementation of the reforms, only falling back to
original levels towards the end of Control Period 1 (and this
was assisted by increases in traffic density). The unit costs of
new infrastructure provision may have increased by an even
greater rate (as witnessed by the increased revenue
requirement for Control Period 2). 
There is the important counter-argument, posited by Foster,
that under public ownership rail infrastructure costs in Britain
were artificially low, due to the price of capital being below
economically efficient levels. This is difficult to refute but
comparisons with Sweden suggest that the charging regime
adopted may have led to train operating costs that could be
around double the optimal levels based on short run marginal
costs and that infrastructure costs per train km may be almost
20% higher in Britain. I would argue that some of the modest
cost performance of Railtrack is due the underestimation of
the governance costs that have resulted from a complex
vertical separation. Information technology does not seem to
have yet reduced contractual costs. The costless trading of
train paths is still some way off, despite the pioneering work
with auction theory by the likes of Nilsson51 and Plott52.
Thus the Government’s apparent favourite solution, a not for
profit trust or some variant thereof such as a company limited
by guarantee, will only solve the part of the problem associated
with the way Railtrack was privatised. It will not solve the
problems that stem from vertical separation. I would prefer to
see a system that moved towards some form of vertical re-
integration, although ultimate ownership of infrastructure could
remain with a separate body, who might also have
responsibility for major upgrades. Under this model, I would
see the not for profit Network Rail split into a number of
geographic zones that broadly correspond to the re-franchising
map. During a revived refranchising process, bidders could be
invited to bid on the basis of just operating trains or operating
both trains and infrastructure. An important market test for
vertical integration would be established. If my interpretation
of Williamson’s transaction cost economics is correct then
unified governance will be preferred to market governance and
the industry will re-integrate. Even if this did not occur, there
would be important scope for yardstick competition, as
recommended by Dodgson53.  
Access pricing would be based on the efficient component pricing
rule. A vertically integrated operator should charge based on the
direct cost of infrastructure provision plus the opportunity cost (net
revenue foregone) of providing access if additional paths are made
available or on the basis of the revenue foregone minus the direct
costs if the incumbent is to be supplanted by an entrant54. For such
a pricing rule to work, detailed information is required concerning
infrastructure and train operation costs, whilst a regulatory system
is required to enforce this rule. One advantage of a temporary
period of vertical separation of ownership is that it has given us a
better understanding of rail infrastructure costs, not least through
the vertical separation of accounts which would need to be
maintained in a vertically re-integrated system, as required by
directive 91/440. Moreover, the reforms have also established an
appropriate regulatory body in the shape of the Rail Regulator. 
Whatever the organisational form adopted in the future the
key challenge is going to be to reduce rail infrastructure costs
and increase quality. This will require a reduction in the
number and complexity of the 2,000 contracts that were said
to underpin Railtrack’s business55. My view is that a vertically
re-integrated system based on around 15 longer term re-
franchises responsible for the operation of the infrastructure
underpinned by a not-for-profit trust responsible for
infrastructure ownership may be the best way forward, with
special purpose vehicles established for major upgrades. This
would need to be combined with a simplification of
regulatory structures and some rationalisation of sub-
contracting. However, more detailed analysis of the
transaction costs involved needs to be undertaken to support
this proposition. Although some useful desktop studies could
be undertaken, some controlled experimentation with one or
two integrated franchises might be more informative. 
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1. Introduction
The European Commis-
sion’s policy of separating
railway infrastructure from
operations and opening up
operations to new entry has
given rise to the need for
explicit methods of
charging for the use of rail
infrastructure.
The European Commission
sees open access as an
important way of improv-
ing the efficiency and marketing of rail transport and, hence,
of increasing the role of the railways in the European
‘Common Transport Policy’1. They are keen to see
comparable approaches to infrastructure charging being used
in all member states, to avoid the distortions that exist when
neighbouring countries charge for the use of infrastructure on
a totally different basis, and to base these charges on marginal
social cost as the most efficient approach to transport pricing2. 
Deriving an appropriate pricing system, however, poses many
difficulties and there are numerous barriers to
implementation. A fundamental problem is that a number of
different objectives for infrastructure charges may be
identified when attempting to derive a charging system, and
most possible systems score well on some objectives and
badly on others. A typical list of objectives3 would be:
• promoting efficient use of the infrastructure;
• promoting efficient investment in and development of the
infrastructure;
• recovering the costs of providing the infrastructure,
including adequate funding for investment;
• promoting efficiency of operators, for instance through
facilitating competition;
• harmonisation of the terms of competition between modes.
To achieve an objective of maximising the efficiency with
which existing infrastructure is used, prices for the use of that
infrastructure should be set equal to short run marginal social
cost. In terms of railways, this means charging for the
incremental, or marginal, cost of use of the existing, i.e. fixed
in the short run, infrastructure by the train concerned, given
the assumption that all other trains on the network are
running. However, charges set equal to short run marginal
social cost are not likely to achieve an objective of recovering
the costs of providing the infrastructure, due to the decreasing
cost nature of the industry which results from it being subject
to economies of traffic density4. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to pursue a cost recovery objective
whilst at the same time promoting efficient use of the
infrastructure via, for example, ‘two-part-tariff principles.
Two-part-tariffs involve a variable component equal to short
run marginal social cost and a fixed component to make up
the shortfall between marginal social cost and total
infrastructure costs.
However, such a system is
somewhat at odds with the
objective of promoting
competition within the rail
sector, as it tends to favour
large train operators over
smaller entrants.
The relative emphasis given
to the different possible
objectives varies enor-
mously between member
states. For instance, at one
extreme, Sweden has espoused the objective of efficiency
regardless of cost recovery considerations, whilst at the other
extreme Britain, and to a large extent Germany, has organised
its rail infrastructure company as a fully commercial
organisation requiring complete cost recovery.
This paper seeks to identify the key barriers to implementing
short run marginal social cost pricing for the use of railway
infrastructure in Europe and to offer suggestions of how these
barriers might be overcome. Section two begins by setting out
the development of the European Commission’s approach to
railway infrastructure charging, through the different policy
papers and directives of the past decade. Section three
considers policy developments in practice in three countries
that have taken very different approaches to infrastructure
charging – Britain, Sweden and Germany. Section 4 identifies
what we see as being the principal barriers to implementing
reform of infrastructure charges and section five then
discusses these barriers, the extent to which they may pose
constraints on policy-makers’ opportunities to pursue reform
and the ways in which they might be overcome. In these
sections, reference is made to work we carried out for the
European Commission finded MC-ICAM project. Section
five then seeks to draw our conclusions.
2. EC Policy development
For many decades, railways in most of Europe have been
seen by the Commission as a problem.  They have steadily
lost market share and required high and increasing levels of
subsidy. Underpinning these problems was thought to lie a
number of organisational and control issues5. Despite initial
attempts by the European Commission in the late 1960s to
encourage governments to reorganise railways as autonomous
commercial bodies, the Commission perceived continued
major problems in the rail transport field.
In the face of these problems, the Commission produced a
radical new policy statement late in 19896. From the point of
view of this paper, three of the proposals were crucial. Firstly
there was a requirement for governments to ensure increased
commercial and financial independence and realistic balance
sheets for their railways.  Secondly, and more controversially
was the requirement for rail operators to establish separate
divisions for infrastructure and operations, to require the
infrastructure to be accessible to other operators, on fair and
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equal terms and to implement a system of charging for the
use of infrastructure (based on train kilometres, speed, time,
axle weight, etc) which facilitates this in the context of fair
competition between modes. In other words, for the first time
a policy based on separating infrastructure from operations
and seeking to attract new entrants to compete in the rail
industry was being put forward. Thirdly there was a
requirement to replace generalised public service obligations
by contracts, spelling out clearly the services to be provided
and the prices and subsidies to apply.  The key issue is the
extent to which a more formal contractual arrangement leads
to a more transparent and effective relationship between
government and railway. 
After much negotiation, a limited version of these proposals
was implemented in Directive 91/440. Separation of
infrastructure from operations was only required in the form
of separate accounts with transport infrastructure charges.
Legal rights of access to railway infrastructure in EC
countries were established for two types of undertaking:
international groupings of railway undertakings - defined as
two or more operations from different countries wishing to
run international services between the Member States where
the undertakings are based, and any railway undertaking
wishing to run international combined transport goods
services between any Member States.
Despite two follow-up directives relating to licensing, path
allocation and charging, relatively little progress had been
made in introducing more competition to the railways and
virtually no open access operations had emerged by the time
the Commission issued its next White Paper on Railways7.
Many argued that this was because the existing legislation
only provided for minimal rights of access for international
rail freight operators, and left the administration of those
rights, and the charges to be levied, in the hands of the
existing rail operators, who had a vested interest in
preventing them from being exercised. Accordingly the
Commission argued for stronger actions to open up the
railways to market forces.
In 1998 a further ‘railway package’ of proposals was
produced, calling for clearer separation of infrastructure from
operations, at least into separate divisions, for a gradual
extension of access rights and for transparent and non-
discriminatory infrastructure charges. However, what was
eventually agreed was much more limited. Separation of
infrastructure from operations was still only required in terms
of accounting by Directive 2001/12, although separate
balance sheets as well as profit and loss accounts, and
separate accounts for passenger and freight, would now be
required. Access for international freight services was to be
extended throughout an extensive defined European rail
freight network by 2005 and to all routes by 2008. There is an
important separation of powers provided for in the form of an
independent regulator, and the separation of path allocation
and infrastructure charging from any organisation responsible
for running rail services. We return to the Directive on
infrastructure charges below.
More recently, in January 2002 the Commission adopted a
communication (known as the second package) on the further
development of the European railways: ‘towards an
integrated European railway area’.  In this, they put forward
five specific proposals:
• a new directive on the regulation of safety and
investigation of accidents and incidents on the
community’s railways;
• amendments to two previous directives on
interoperability;
• a regulation to establish a new European safety and
interoperability agency;
• a recommendation for a council decision authorising the
Commission to negotiate the conditions for community
accession to the COTIF;
• most fundamentally an amendment to 91/440 so as to
open up access to the infrastructure for national services
in order to completely open up the rail freight market.
Further measures to open up rail passenger markets to
competition are already under discussion, and other proposals
would introduce compulsory competitive tendering for all
subsidised services.
The issue of open access cannot be separated from pricing
policy. To have the right of access, but at whatever price the
infrastructure manager chooses, is valueless. It has long been
the declared aim of the Commission that pricing policies
should be developed which promote economic efficiency.
This requires prices based on marginal social cost. Originally,
this was seen mainly in terms of charging for the use of
infrastructure according to marginal operation and
maintenance costs, but more recently the concern with
environmental problems has led to an emphasis on the
external costs of transport as well - congestion, accidents and
environmental costs. 
In 1995 the Commission published a Green Paper entitled
‘Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing’8. The basic argument of
this paper was that many elements of cost - congestion,
accidents, environmental  costs and infrastructure
maintenance costs - were either not reflected at all in current
prices or were reflected only in part. In total these uncovered
costs might be as much as 250billion ecu per year for the
Union as a whole. The emphasis on external cost in this paper
was a radical departure in EC discussion of infrastructure
policy, but  - whilst the paper proposed many sensible
measures, including urban road pricing, a kilometre based tax
for heavy goods vehicles and more differentiated rail
infrastructure charges - it did not contain clear proposals for
implementation.
In 1998 the Commission published its proposals for the
introduction of a common transport infrastructure charging
framework, which placed a further emphasis on the marginal
social cost pricing approach, whilst allowing non
discriminatory fixed charges to be levied where this is not
adequate for full cost recovery9. The proposals on railway
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infrastructure charging emerging from the 1998 railways
package were enshrined in Directive 2001/14, on allocation
of railway infrastructure capacity and levying of charges10.  In
summary, the directive determines that charges must be based
on ‘costs directly incurred as a result of operating the train
service”11.  They may include:
• scarcity, although where a section of track is defined as
having a scarcity problem, the infrastructure manager
must examine proposals to relieve that scarcity, and
undertake them unless they are shown, on the basis of
cost benefit analysis, not to be worthwhile;
• environmental costs, but only where these are levied on
other modes; 
• recovery of the costs of specific investments where these
are worthwhile and could not otherwise be funded;
• discounts but only where justified by costs; large
operators may not use their market  power to get
discounts;
• reservation charges for scarce capacity, which must be
paid whether the capacity is used or not;
• compensation for unpaid costs on other modes;
• non discriminatory mark ups but these must not exclude
segments of traffic which could cover direct cost.
In other words, this Directive reflects some quite
sophisticated arguments. It seems clear from the list of
elements that may be included in the charges that ‘the direct
cost of operating the service’ is to be interpreted as short run
marginal social cost. The arguments, however, that this form
of pricing may lead infrastructure managers to artificially
restrict capacity or to be unable to fund its activities in total
or particular investments are all addressed by special
provisions. Moreover, there is allowance for second best
pricing in the face of distorted prices on other modes. The
effect of these provisions (all sensible in themselves)
however, is to water down considerably the likely effect of
the Directive by giving infrastructure managers various
loopholes under which they can argue for the maintenance of
previous forms of infrastructure charging. In particular, the
degree to which competitive charges for paths involving
several countries, based on comparable pricing regimes, will
be achieved will inevitably be limited.
In order to consider further the way in which the Directive
might be implemented an expert group from the industry was
set up. It is understood that this group will be reporting soon,
and will thus be in a position to influence the guidance on
calculation of marginal social cost which is to be issued along
with the forthcoming Framework Directive on Transport
Infrastructure Charging.
3. The diversity of approaches within the industry
National governments have, in many cases, sought to pursue
their own programmes of railway industry reform over the
past two decades.  These reforms have generally been in an
effort to try to revitalise their national rail system and, in
general, have formed part of the wider European policy
initiative.  Understandably, national programmes of reform
have progressed at different rates and have sometimes moved
in different directions.  Against this setting, the current
situation is one in which there is a diversity of approaches in
terms of charging, institutional arrangements and competitive
structures.  In addition, there is a diverse set of stakeholders
in the industry, all of whom are inter-linked but often with
differing objectives. 
We will comment briefly here on the different paths taken by
Britain, Sweden and Germany. In Britain the infrastructure is
owned and managed by a private sector monopoly, whilst
passenger operations are divided into 25 privately owned
operating franchises and freight operations are privately
owned with open access. An independent regulator issues
licenses, and approves track access agreements including
charges. Open access for passenger train operators is very
limited, both by explicit decisions of the Regulator and by
lack of track capacity.
Sweden also has complete separation of infrastructure and
operations, but with a publicly owned infrastructure company
- Banvehrket. There remain publicly owned passenger and
freight train operating companies, but all services requiring
subsidy are subject to competitive tender and there is open
access for freight. The result is an increasing number of
private companies sharing the track with the publicly owned
companies.
In Germany, infrastructure and the majority of operations are
in the public sector.  DBAG, a public limited company with
share capital, owned wholly by the Federal Government,
forms a holding company for five other companies:  two
responsible for the infrastructure and three incumbent
operators - one for long-distance passenger services, another
for regional passenger services and a third for freight
services. In addition, some regional services are contracted
out by the regional governments and there is open access in
both passenger and freight operations. Germany has always
had a number of small private railways and these are
increasingly operating over DBAG tracks. 
The three countries have also taken very different approaches
to rail infrastructure charges. For the main franchised
operators, Britain has adopted a system of two part tariffs,
with the variable element of the tariff based on an estimate of
short run marginal cost. We will say more in a later section on
its calculation. The fixed element was originally set to meet
the full financial needs of Railtrack, but Railtrack now
receives funding direct from the Strategic Rail Authority (a
government body) as well. Open access passenger (where
permitted) and freight operators now only pay the variable
element, although previously they paid a negotiated charge on
the basis of willingness to pay. By contrast Sweden has a
simple charge per train kilometre, which is intended to reflect
short run marginal social cost; the degree to which it does is
examined in a paper by Jan Eric Nilsson12.
The situation in Germany is the most complicated. Originally
Germany had a system of charges per train kilometre
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differentiated by type of train and location and designed to
recover total cost, except for those capital costs borne by
government. In other words it is essentially an average cost
pricing system. Modifications led to the introduction of a two
part tariff, in order to meet complaints from regions about the
high marginal costs of high frequency services. However,
following complaints that the two part tariff favoured large
operators, and especially DBAG itself, it has reverted to a
single part tariff with a differentiated charge per kilometre.
Thus it may be seen that there are large differences in
charging systems between countries. Partly these are
philosophical; Sweden for instance subscribes to marginal
cost pricing principles, whilst Germany appears to believe
that average cost pricing is the basis of efficient allocation.
Britain lies between the two, in that – at least at privatisation
– it was believed important for efficiency that Railtrack
covered its total costs from charges, whilst offering a variable
charge related to marginal cost. But there are other reasons
for the differences; for instance, the emphasis on open access
in Germany makes non discrimination a key issue, whilst the
constraints on open access in Britain mean that two part
tariffs are more acceptable. 
4. Barriers to implementation
We noted earlier that not only are there difficulties in deriving
and developing railway infrastructure charging policy, there
are also barriers to implementing policy once it has been
agreed.  We have seen in section 2 above that the European
Commission has been very active in the area of railway
policy development, particularly throughout the last decade.
However, section 3 illustrates that progress with and
approaches to implementing reforms have been rather varied
across the different member states.  A number of reasons for
this can be identified and are typically thought to arise out of
particular ‘barriers to implementation’. 
Barriers to implementation may come in a number of
different forms.  Some barriers may relate to the industry in
general, irrespective of the member state or region involved,
whereas others will be more country-specific, being linked to
the institutions, finances or philosophy of that member state
or region13. Whilst industry-related barriers are likely to apply
more or less evenly across the different member states,
country-specific barriers may be very relevant for some
member states but much less relevant for others.  In addition,
barriers may be actual or perceived.  Perceived barriers may
exist where research is not effectively feeding through to the
policy-making community.  A failure to disseminate state of
the art research on issues affecting the implementation of
marginal cost pricing may result in policy-makers perceiving
there is a barrier to implementation where there is not.  It is
important to expose these perceived barriers through effective
dialogue between the research and policy-making
communities.  In the end, the important task is to identify the
actual barriers and, subsequently, possible means of
overcoming them.
As part of an EC funded project (MC-ICAM), the authors
have led the work relating to rail implementation of marginal
social cost pricing of rail infrastructure, which has involved
reviews of experience with implementing reform in Britain,
Sweden and Germany (as well as Hungary), including
interviews with some of the key actors in the reform
processes; the discussion which follows rests heavily on the
British experience, being that with which we are most
familiar.  From this work, the relevant barriers to marginal
social cost pricing in the rail sector appear to be:
1. problems of measurement; 
2. complexity of tariffs; 
3. financial implications ;
4. equity;
5. technical efficiency; 
6. fair competition within the rail sector; 
7. fair competition with other modes; 
8. acceptability on behalf of train operators and infrastructure
managers;
9. acceptability on behalf of end users and the general public.
Problems of measuring the additional costs imposed by a
particular train service, given that all other services are
operating and are paying for the additional costs which they
each impose, have often been cited as a barrier to
implementing marginal cost pricing.  The costs generated
when an additional train uses the infrastructure are comprised
of five main elements: 
•· use-related wear and tear costs; 
• congestion costs; 
• scarcity costs; 
• external accident costs; and 
• environmental costs.
In order to implement effective marginal social cost-based
pricing, it is, therefore, necessary to be able to derive
accurate, disaggregated estimates of these various cost
components.  Whilst there are difficulties associated with the
measurement of each component, problems are especially
acute for congestion and scarcity.  Other papers for the
IMPRINT seminar provide a review of the state of the art on
research into the measurement of these costs14 and particular
approaches to measurement of scarcity15. Below, we give a
brief summary of approaches to overcoming this barrier in
Britain.
Tariff complexity arises as a result of marginal social cost
varying widely across space and time, as it does in the
railways sector.  The marginal cost associated with a
commuter train, operating during the peak and serving a busy
metropolitan area, using the infrastructure is likely to be very
different from the marginal cost associated with a rural train
service in the middle of the afternoon.  The danger is that the
tariffs become so complex that they are then difficult to
understand and interpret, resulting in the incentive
underpinning them being masked. However, despite there
being scope for such complexity within rail infrastructure
charges, we view this as probably not being a particularly
serious problem, either in terms of infrastructure charges or of
tariffs to final users.  Infrastructure charges are levied on train
operating companies who should have the sophistication and
software to handle complex charging structures. For final
users the railway industry has employed complex tariff
structures already for some time, and can do so because
tickets are generally purchased in advance via systems that
can handle the complexities involved.  There is, however,
some evidence that freight operators are having some
difficulties with interpreting the new regime of infrastructure
charges in Britain, particularly the congestion component of
the charges, and there is a long history of complaints that
passengers, and even railway staff themselves, do not
understand the full complexities of the fares system. So tariff
complexity is an issue of some importance.  
The financial implications of marginal social cost pricing of
railway infrastructure arise as a result of the economies of
traffic density which are generally recognised to exist in the
rail industry.  These economies of traffic density mean that
the short run marginal cost of infrastructure use is below
average cost and, hence, that marginal cost pricing will result
in a financial deficit.  Evidence from Sweden and Finland
suggests that revenues from charges based on the marginal
wear and tear costs recover less than 20% of total
maintenance and renewals costs16. Whilst the picture is less
clear once charges for congestion, scarcity, accidents and the
environment are added into the equation, it is likely that pure
marginal social cost pricing will still fail substantially to
recover total costs.  The key question determining whether
and to what extent this is a barrier to the implementation of
marginal social cost pricing is whether governments are
willing and able to provide the necessary subsidies to cover
the financial deficits.
One of the factors influencing whether or not governments
are willing to provide the necessary subsidies to cover
financial deficits in the rail industry is the issue of equity.
The argument is that it is unfair to provide subsidies to the
rail industry because rail users tend to come from higher
income groups.  Hence, it is argued that subsidy to the rail
industry disproportionately benefits those higher income
groups through, for example, lower rail fares than would
otherwise be the case and is, in effect, a subsidy to ‘the rich’.
This is often seen as a major issue, especially where rail users
do tend to come from higher income groups17. This leads to
various forms of mark up over marginal cost so as to
minimise subsidy levels in many countries.
Concern regarding technical efficiency is a further reason
why governments might be unwilling to use subsidy to cover
financial deficits in the rail industry.  That is, there is a fear
that subsidies lead to technical inefficiency by relieving
railway managers of hard budget constraints.  This is a long-
standing argument in economics against  subsidy and some
evidence for this in the specific context of railways is found
by Oum and Yu18. The growing requirements for subsidy
within the railway industry in many countries during the
1970s and 1980s may also be seen as more general evidence
of this. 
Fair competition within the rail sector is a further potential
barrier to marginal social cost-based pricing of railway
infrastructure use, in a situation in which mark ups are needed
for financial reasons. Second best policy involves two part
tariffs and/or Ramsey pricing, but can this be done in a way
that preserves terms of competition between operators?  
Fair competition with respect to other modes is also a
potential barrier to implementing infrastructure charges based
on marginal social cost.  As shown above, the EC Directive
permits rail charges to be below marginal social cost if this is
the case on competing modes. It is necessary to consider the
phasing of reform across all modes of transport where they
compete with each other, rather than dealing with any one
mode in isolation.
We have already seen that acceptability to local authorities
was an issue in the German experience. Acceptability to final
users is also an issue, especially where commuter fares are
involved, as commuters are regular travellers who seem to be
better organised to exert political influence than most groups
of rail users. 
5. Possible means of overcoming the barriers
The first barrier raised above was that of measurement.  As
noted above, this has been the subject of considerable
research in recent years, both at national and European
levels19.  
In Britain, research into the causation and variability of
maintenance and renewal costs was undertaken both by the
infrastructure manager (Railtrack) and the regulator as part of
the periodic review of Railtrack’s access charges.  The
proposals they arrived at for measuring costs and levying
charges were, however, somewhat different from one another.
The approach to cost estimation put forward by Railtrack was
a bottom up approach based on an understanding of detailed
engineering relationships and the summation of individual
elements of cost caused by additional trains.   Somewhat by
way of contrast, the Regulator put forward a top down
approach which starts by identifying the total planned
maintenance and renewal expenditure on different types of
asset, then applies the percentage of these costs which vary
according to number of trains run so as to derive a total
variable cost for each asset type.  It then uses detailed
engineering relationships to allocate these total variable costs
to particular vehicle types. An advantage of the Railtrack
approach is that it produces estimates at a level of fine detail
for different types of vehicle and infrastructure category.
However, the regulator was not happy that all the elements of
the Railtrack model were based on adequate evidence, and he
was concerned that the charges produced by the model had no
direct link with Railtrack’s actual expenditure. The charges
finally agreed upon were derived using the Regulator’s ‘top
down’ approach, though this incorporated Railtrack’s findings
on the detailed engineering cost causation relationships.  
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We commented above that one of the most difficult issues to
deal with in rail infrastructure charging is that of scarce
capacity. Charges need to reflect two different costs; the cost
of expected additional delays to other services as a result of
running an additional train, and the costs of not being able to
obtain a path at the desired time.
The costs of additional delays may be estimated by means of
modelling20. For instance, the approach taken by Railtrack in
Britain was to use historical data on delays and capacity
utilisation to specify a function which could replicate the
observed delays.  This involved identifying appropriate
measures of delay and of capacity utilisation, identifying
appropriate functional forms and then testing the strength of
the relationship between incremental delay and capacity
utilisation. The result was a proposed tariff broken down into
several thousand track sections and by time of day. However,
the Regulator both simplified the structure and halved the
level of charges before incorporating this element of costs
into the tariff.  It seems that he was concerned at the degree to
which levying the full congestion charge might reduce
demand (and it must be said that the proposed charge was
based on existing, rather than equilibrium, levels of
congestion.  On the other hand, given the expected underlying
growth in demand, it may reasonably be expected that
congestion will get worse rather than better).
In addition to the expected delays there is the issue of
inability to obtain the desired slot.  The most attractive
solution to this problem in theory is to ‘auction’ scarce slots.
There are many practical difficulties however, including the
complicated ways in which slots can be put together to
produce a variety of types of service, and the possibility of
lack of adequate competition to ensure a competitive price. In
practice it is therefore usually accepted that any degree of
price rationing of scarce slots will have to be on the basis of
administered prices rather than bid prices, although some
countries, including Britain allow for a degree of ‘secondary
trading’ in which slots change hands between operators at
enhanced prices (strictly, this must take place through
Railtrack, so it is not secondary trading in the sense forbidden
by the EC Directive).  The issue of auctioning is considered
in more detail by Nilsson21.
A second possibility is to simply impose a price and see what
happens to demand, and then iterate until demand equals
capacity. The risk is, however, that serious distortions may
occur whilst the price is adjusting, and that strategic game
playing may occur to force the price down by withholding
demand, where competition is not strong.
A third approach, recommended by NERA22, is to identify
sections of infrastructure where capacity is constrained and to
charge the long run average incremental cost of expanding
capacity. However, this is a very difficult concept to measure
(the cost of expanding capacity varies enormously according
to the exact proposal considered, and it is not easy to relate
this to the number of paths created, since they depend on the
precise number and order of trains run). It may be argued,
however, that more appropriate incentives are given to
infrastructure managers if they are allowed to charge the costs
of investment they actually undertake, rather than for the
scarcity resulting from  a lack of investment. Directive
2001/14 seeks to get round this by requiring infrastructure
managers to undertake studies to determine the cost of
expanding capacity, and to test whether this is justified on
cost-benefit grounds, where scarcity charges are levied.
Given the difficulties with all these approaches, it may be
thought that the best way of handling the issue is to permit
direct negotiation between operators and the infrastructure
manager over the price and allocation of slots, including
investment in new or upgraded capacity. However, British
experience of this approach is that it is complex and time
consuming given the number of parties involved and the
scope for free-riding. It is also difficult to ensure that this
does not lead to the abuse of monopoly power, particularly
when the infrastructure manager and the operator are part of
the same company. An independent regulator is certainly
needed but their job is far from easy.
An alternative is for the track charging authority to attempt to
calculate directly the costs involved. For instance, if a train
has to be run at a different time from that desired, it is
possible to use studies of the value people place on departure
time shifts to estimate the value to its customers of the cost
involved. Similarly, the costs of slower speeds may be
estimated from passengers’ values of time.
We comment above that tariff complexity should not be an
overriding problem in the case of rail infrastructure or
services. Nevertheless, the Regulator did simplify Railtrack’s
proposals in Britain, reducing the number of track sections
for which different prices were charged, and ‘banding’ the
charges, with all low charges for congestion reduced to zero.
This appears to have been a judgment as to the appropriate
trade-off between giving clear incentives to operators and
accurately reflecting costs, rather than an attempt to quantify
the costs and benefits, but such trade-offs have to be made.
Nevertheless the degree of complexity of existing tariffs in
the rail sector suggests that the result can still be tariffs which
vary in time and space and which reflect variations in
marginal social cost reasonably accurately. 
With regard to financial implications, Britain’s approach has
been to adopt a two-part tariff charging regime for
infrastructure use, designed to cover infrastructure costs and
provide a financial return on the assets.   Nevertheless,
government still provided subsidy to the industry but this
was, initially, channelled entirely through the franchised
passenger operators and specific grants for freight facilities.
More recently, subsidy has also been granted to the
infrastructure manager, particularly to assist with investment
expenditures. Roy23,  indicates that efficient charges on road
would more than cover the costs of efficient levels of subsidy
to rail infrastructure managers, at least for the sample of
countries he has examined. However, there may be other
objections to this use of road user charges in terms of equity,
particularly where it involves not just cross subsidy between
modes but also between regions.
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The concern that subsidy may reduce technical efficiency
may seem odd, given that all governments do subsidise their
railways. The real issue is whether to give the subsidies to the
infrastructure manager or the train service provider.  Britain
started with the latter approach on the basis that it was more
efficient if the infrastructure manager was driven solely by
the commercial requirements of the train service provider.
But in practice, it proved very difficult to achieve agreement
for improvements affecting, and being paid for, by a host of
different operators.  Moreover, increases in access charges
approved by the Regulator led to automatic compensation
under the terms of franchise agreements.  We have now
moved to a position where the SRA both contributes to the
cost of investment and towards current operating costs, and
arguably that gives it more control on efficiency than if it
were paying subsidies indirectly. 
With regard to fair competition within the industry, Britain’s
approach for passenger services has been to focus much more
on competition for the market, via tendering for train
operating franchises, than on competition in the market, via
open access operations.  This has meant that barriers to entry,
as represented by the fixed component of a two-part tariff,
have been of less relevance than, for example in Germany
where they have sought to promote open access.  However,
for freight operations in Britain, where there is open access,
all operators now pay according to the same tariff, based only
on marginal cost. This is possible because of the willingness
of the government to subsidise rail freight in order to increase
the rail market share and remove some of this traffic from
road.
Fair competition between the modes remains a prima facie
second-best argument for subsidising rail charges below
marginal social cost, in particular in urban areas where road is
the main competitor mode and which remains substantially
under-charged. A recent study found that road users in
general are charged less than marginal cost for use of roads in
urban areas and on congested motorways and trunk roads;
heavy goods vehicles are also undercharged, leading to a case
for subsidising rail freight access24.  
On acceptability, the big issue in Britain has always been
commuter fares, and in terms of one of the biggest remaining
distortions this is the area to look at. Both the franchise
agreement, which for commuter season tickets requires that
price is typically increased at 1% per annum less than the
retail price index (higher increases are allowed where
performance is good, and lower where it is bad) and the
decision not to pass on all congestion costs in variable access
charges tend to hold commuter fares down. This tends to
mean that charges are below marginal social cost and that it is
difficult for train operating companies to fund investment to
cater for additional peak traffic from revenue; indeed, they
have an incentive to discourage growth in this area. On the
other hand there are good second best reasons for holding
these fares down.
Thus, measurement problems should be gradually relieved as
estimates of marginal cost improve. Second best reasons for
subsidy because of charging regimes on other modes may
also be gradually reduced by reform of charging on other
modes. It is difficult to see measures that will ease other
constraints, particularly financial and equity ones. It is likely
that rail infrastructure charges in many countries will
continue to need mark ups above marginal social cost for
these reasons, and that the argument between two part tariffs
and Ramsey pricing (i.e. essentially basing markups on the
willingness to pay of the traffic concerned) will continue,
despite evidence that a complete reform of transport pricing
would leave governments well able to fund rail track charges
at marginal social cost. 
6. Conclusions25
The principal barriers to the introduction of marginal social
cost pricing for rail infrastructure are difficulties of
measurement (especially for congestion and scarcity), fears
that does not give the right incentive for investment, financial
constraints and the desire to constitute railways as
commercial bodies. The EC Directive on infrastructure
charges (2001/14) recognises these issues by permitting non
discriminatory markups  above  marginal cost for financial
reasons and to recover the costs of specific investment. It also
permits rail infrastructure charges to be below marginal cost
for second-best reasons.
No country other than Britain explicithy includes congestion
costs in its tariffs, and no country includes pure scarcity costs.
Scarcity costs remain a priority for further research. However,
we believe that measurement problems can be gradually
overcome over time, and second best reasons for subsidy will
little by little reduce as prices on other modes are reformed.
The crucial issues in achieving marginal social cost pricing
for rail infrastructure relate to the desire for rail infrastructure
managers to cover their total cost, or a greater proportion of
costs than implied by marginal cost pricing, from charges,
and the consequent need for two part tariffs or for tariffs
differentiated according to willingness to pay. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the
most recent evolutions that
have taken place in the
railway sector in Italy and
discusses the likely effects
of the evolutions of the
regulatory framework. The
paper addresses the follow-
ing basic questions: 1) are
the declared objectives
coherent with the instru-
ments adopted? and 2) is
the institutional framework,
within which the reform process is taking place, appropriate
to reach the widely advertised objectives proposed not only at
the national but also at the European level? After a synthetic
description of the economic and strategic features common to
different network utilities, comprising a specific examination
of the regulatory/commitment network, the paper recalls the
evolution of the regulatory reform of the railway sector in
Italy. The historical reconstruction of the reform process
provides the background against which the analysis of the
present situation is carried out. Subsequently the regulatory
framework is analysed using game theory in order to evaluate
the coherence between incentives given and objectives
assigned to the different agents. The investigation method
proposed should clarify both the missing points of regulation,
as we think there are some, and the most likely effects the
situation might produce. Special attention is dedicated to the
issue of regulatory capture1 since it plays a fundamental role,
for strategic reasons, in determining the possible outcomes of
the reform process. In fact, as seems likely for the local
public transport reform, there is the substantial possibility that
the reform is formally respected but produces little or no real
change. The relevance of the capture issue is not only
demonstrated by academic works2 but also by various
antitrust cases3.  The main conclusions provided relate to: a)
the evident change of pace in the liberalisation process that
has begun in this sector in Italy since the early ‘90s, b) the
need of further regulatory institutions, such as an Agency or
an Authority4, c) the consistent risk of  regulatory capture and
slackening of competitive incentives given the pre-
competitive constraints new entrants have to face under the
present institutional and regulatory settings. 
2. Network utilities: the  basic economic and
strategic characteristics 
In many respects, Railways can be thought of as a network
utility, similarly to energy, telecommunication and other
industries. These utilities usually are capital intensive, long-
lived and immovable and are usually significant both in terms
of mere size as well as function. They have been used as
examples of natural monopoly as is in all those cases where a
single firm can serve the entire market demand for the
respective range of goods or services at a lower total cost than
any other combination of
firms. Since markets can
be spatially limited a
network utility may be a
natural monopoly only
locally and not at a
geographically larger level.
Most surveys of natural
monopoly have individuated
some specific characteristics
of natural monopolies
(Farrer, 1902). Among the
most commonly acknow-
ledged, one can recall:
economies of scale, capital-intensity, non-storability of supply
with fluctuating demand, location specificity generating
location rents, producing necessities or essential services for
the community, and involving direct connections to
customers. When speaking of natural monopolies one usually
refers only to the first issue, forgetting various other concerns
that could justify  public interest. Network duplication
implies an increase in the total supply cost for a given market
and, in the presence of fluctuating demand for a non-storable
product or service, either capacity is sized to peak demand or
demand is rationed. 
When in presence of substantial locational advantages
(maintenance facilities, marshalling yards, etc.) the firm will
achieve at least a local monopoly and various other firms may
try to establish their own local monopolies. In this case
competition may fail to secure the benefits of co-ordination,
interconnection and system standardisation. This is
particularly true for the railway sector, when taken from a
European point of view - even if the validity of the reasoning
might be also confirmed at national and regional levels.
Network externalities are generated whenever the benefit of
one user depends on the number of other users connected to
the same network. Even if the classic example is telecoms,
railways  also constitute an appropriate example  - at least
until capacity is reached. The presence of relevant network
externalities may lead to market failure due to the absence of
proper incentives to establish appropriate interconnections
and efficient network expansion. Furthermore, the combined
recurrence of necessity and direct connection leaves  greater
exploitative power in the hands of the producer, posing a
difficult regulatory question that has, in the past, been solved
through public ownership. Efficient network expansion is
very unlikely to come about if the investors have only
limited interest in investing due to their restricted ability to
obtain compensation for it. Once the investments are sunk,
investors can be blackmailed by the regulator, which is why
appropriate legal specifications, specially those concerning
property, might be considered a public service provided by
the state. The success of a good private financing scheme for
public utilities has to be based on credible and satisfactory
regulation, from both the consumer’s and  the investor’s point
of view. 
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3. The regulatory/commitment framework:
a game theory approach
Having briefly described the fundamental characteristics of a
network utility, an analysis of the commitment, credibility,
and reputation of the different actors is put forward with the
intent of setting the theoretical stage for the game theory
discussion of the Italian regulatory framework in the railway
sector.
To keep things simple and concentrate on one specific
regulatory issue, one can assume that there are only two
actors playing the regulatory game. The first is the
community, represented by the regulator, and the second, the
utility owner5. The interests of the two actors partially
coincide and partially contrast with one another. Let’s assume
that the community has the power to grant exclusive access
rights, whereas the utility disposes of the expertise to
undertake, finance and manage the investment needed to
construct the utility. Potential conflict between the two
operators may arise from the distribution of the rents
generated. This situation can be represented via a game of
conflict and co-operation6. 
To describe a game one needs to clarify the following items:
the number of players, the set of possible actions, information
available to each agent when taking a decision, and the set of
strategies7. Modelling the regulatory framework in which the
regulator and utility will take their actions implies defining
each element of the game while matching them up with
relevant features of the economy in question. The most
difficult and important task in defining a game is the
limitation of the set of actions open to players. In our case,
the level of difficulty confronting the analyst is asymmetric.
In fact, while it is reasonably simple to define the actions
open to the utility (operating plants up to capacity, then
investing to increase it but not recovering the total value
–usually very little– of the existing capacity), on the other
hand the regulator has much more room for manoeuvre. The
assumptions made for the regulator concern both the stability
of the regulatory regime as well as the antitrust laws applying
to the utility defining the legally available actions8. The
maturity and comprehensiveness of the regulatory regime is
very important in determining the final results of the game. In
fact, whereas the Anglo-Saxon regulatory tradition is long
standing and the appropriateness of the distribution of duties
and powers among the various agents has been tested,
clarified and further defined through various disputes and
rulings, constituting a sort of institutional public good, the
European tradition is, on the contrary, historically much
weaker even if the European Union’s regulatory and antitrust
body of law is growing quickly. The main objective of this
paper is to analyse what effects the present regulatory
framework is likely to have on the efficiency of the decision
making process.
Other important aspects to define are both the sequence in
which the agents take their decisions as well as the
information available to them when making a decision. One
usually imagines a situation in which the public decision
makers define the regulatory rules at the outset and
subsequently empower a regulator that will act as its agent.
Given the regulatory framework and the forecasts concerning
both what the regulator will consider an admissible level of
return, as well as the level of demand, the utility will decide
how much capital to install. This decision is difficult to make
since the utility will face a variable demand during the
economic life of the investment and the actual level will be
known only after the investment has been made.
As for the payoffs, the definitional problems encountered for
the action set are reversed. In fact, whereas the revenues less
the operating and financial costs incurred constitute the
profits earned by the utility and therefore its payoffs, on the
other hand, defining the payoffs for the regulator is more
difficult. In fact, the actual definition of the payoffs will be
influenced by the hypothesis made concerning the interests
the regulator is actually representing. Supposing that the
regulator responds only to consumers and shareholders, if the
government takes a part of the profits (taxes or dividends) or
represents the interests of those capitalists that have invested
in the utility, then the regulator may be interested in
guaranteeing a good level of profits; if the regulator responds,
as in some models of representative democracy, to the
average voter, then the situation will be reversed since the
main focus will be on the expenditure, on the utility’s service
and on the consumers’ surplus.
The game envisaged can be considered a simple non co-
operative game where each agent is only interested in its own
payoff9. In our situation the regulator possesses different legal
revenue functions that it may choose to impose and,
therefore, is not credible when declaring the  restriction of
future behaviour. In other words it cannot precommit. Given
these premises the utility will have to predict what the
regulator will actually do and forecast what its interest will be
after the investment has been made and the capital has been
sunk. If one supposes that the agents are playing a one-shot
game, the outcome, given the potentially unrestricted
behaviour of the regulator, looks rather bleak. In fact, if the
regulator can freely choose to pay the promised return or
cheat when reaching any decision node and, given that its
payoff will be greater if it cheats, the utility will cautiously
decide not to invest since it could make a loss.
4. Theoretical suggestions and institutional changes
In this section, after describing the fundamental concepts and
strategic interactions in a network utility context, the
coherence between the theoretical suggestions and the
institutional changes influencing the economic incentives
facing the various agents is analysed.
As noted earlier, the continental regulatory tradition is much
weaker than the British one. Italy constitutes no exception to
this general consideration, even if it has devoted the 1990’s to
an intense catching up process. As recently recognised by the
OECD, “Regulatory reform was only one of many changes in
Italy in the 1990s, but it was an essential one”10. In fact Italy,
during this decade, witnessed a substantial dismantling of
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centralised policies as well as the introduction of more
transparent and pro-competitive policies. The turning point
can be considered the passing of the 1990 Competition Act
with which the Antitrust Authority (AA) was created, thus
providing a strong base for market-oriented regulatory
reforms. Given the short history of the Italian competition
policy, the AA took Europe-wide reforms as basic references
and, strengthened by the independent status it was given and
by a prestigious leadership, it soon became an institutional
reference in most policy debates, playing an important role in
the promotion of competition principles. The role played by
the AA has been important and relevant, but its functions and
powers could and should be further increased (specially in a
transition phase from monopoly to competition) by on one
hand giving it, a wider range of sanctions and incentive
instruments and, on the other, by providing greater judicial
support for competition policy initiatives11. 
With specific reference to the transport sector, and rail in
particular, there is widespread agreement on the necessity of
increasing, widening, and rendering more stringent the
regulatory reforms already undertaken. In fact,
notwithstanding the unique range of actions undertaken to
favour the liberalisation process, covering all modes of
transportation, the relationship between Ferrovie dello Stato
(FS) (the incumbent) and the regulator will only by the end of
2003 be regulated by competitive tendering for service
contracts, and only with respect to local transport. Meanwhile
the restructured incumbent, even if still inefficient when
compared to other European railway companies12, has been
reducing the patent over-manning and has also been more
free to price services according to the effective value of the
service produced.
The further steps that should be taken relate, on the one hand,
to the need of reducing entry barrier to make competition
really feasible and, on the other, to the need of reforming FS
governance and regulation so that it has credible incentives
to: a) bargain toughly, b) take commercially oriented
decisions, and c) invest efficiently in infrastructure. The most
important reform is to take away the control function over the
railway sector that resides within the government sphere and
attribute it to a regulatory body. Along with the deregulation
of the railway sector the privatisation of FS would, through
the shareholders, introduce a direct interest for generating
profits that would stimulate greater efficiency. Another
relevant incentive induced by privatisation concerns
rationalisation and capacity increase. In fact, vertical
integration produces insufficient incentives for capacity
increase if it is not properly rewarded and especially if it
could be used by a potential rival. All the regulatory powers,
direct and indirect, presently in the hands of FS should be
passed to an independent regulatory body which should also
provide information to the regions which, de facto, will be in
charge of the franchising for all the local public transport13.
Clear and well balanced rules for infrastructure access,
especially to stations and freight terminals, and greater use of
competitive tendering would favour new entrants. The
presence of different operators on the network would generate
the additional advantage of providing the regulator with a
series of benchmarks for the whole community of contractors.
The unbundling process between the monopoly and
competitive elements in the sector began in 1999 when the
first accounting separation was implemented between the four
divisions created at that time (passenger, freight, regional
transport and rolling stock)14. Under the co-ordination of a
holding company, the subsequent year FS was split into two
separate companies-infrastructure and transport services.
Even if this meant a significant step toward effective
separation, it was not generally perceived as sufficient for
preventing discrimination as some antitrust cases
subsequently described in this paper testify.
5. Institutional and regulatory evolution in the rail
sector in Italy
FS is a state-owned company and responsible both for rail
infrastructure and rail services in Italy  (where only a limited
part of the network is run by private companies). The bleak
prospects of reducing the huge national deficit burdened by
the subsidies paid to FS and the need to respect the
parameters of the stability pact, among other economic policy
measures, have induced the Italian government to start
looking into the railway’s black box. The increase of service
quality, reduction of government spending in this sector, and
the inversion of the modal split trend towards an ever
increasing use of the road- both passenger and freight - are all
objectives pursued by the introduction of competition in the
sector. The first action to take involves reducing entry and
exit barriers so to render competition in the market effective.
With respect to these issues, art. 131 of Law 388/2000
intervened on barrier reduction by introducing, among other
things, third party access. A ministerial decree of May 23rd
2000 granted a license to Trenitalia for operating transport
services, thus liberalising the market by eliminating FS’s
previous concession. The general impression is that there is a
generalised increase in pressure for greater efficiency. This
impression is corroborated by changes such as the following:
government budget tightening15, greater pricing freedom
(even in presence of a price cap), and performance-related
rewarding for senior managers. In order to speed up the
liberalisation and vertical separation process, other initiatives
should be taken to reduce entry barriers for rail and multi-
modal transport market: remove regulatory power from FS’s
hands and move it to either the government or, even better, to
an independent authority; introduce competition in the market
whenever possible16; acquire and analyse all the relevant
information at a national level in order to administer
regulation properly;  and introduce competitive bidding also
for maintenance and construction services. All these further
steps would be more easily taken if there were a clear
intention to create an independent regulatory body with
instruments and objectives similar to those characterising the
Office of the Railway Regulator in the UK.
At present FS is owned and regulated by the state (Ministry
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of the Treasury and Ministry of Transport), while at the same
time being subject to European rules. The relationship is also
ruled by a “Contratto di Programma” (Master Plan) as well as
by a public service contract. The first defines investment
guidelines whereas the second regulates the unprofitable
services that FS is asked to produce along with the
compensation mechanisms used. CIPE (Interministerial
Committee for Economic Planning) and the Ministry of
Transport regulate prices for freight and long distance
passenger services as well as track access charges. CIPE
defines the guidelines and their practical application is left to
the Ministry of Transport17. The AA has only  limited
jurisdiction in this sector with reference to competition law
enforcement and, notwithstanding some legal controversies
over interpretation, it has exerted its advocacy powers to
stimulate the adoption of pro-competitive measures.
5.1  Infrastructure charges
After the switch from concession to access right awarding, one
of the most important policy reforms is the regulation of
access to rail infrastructure. This institutional change can be
classified among those instruments that directly influence
prices. CIPE Resolution 180 of the 5th of November 1999
defines the method of calculating access charges and provides
the first railway infrastructure information report stating track
assignment criteria for railway license holders and the new
Master Plan with the infrastructure manager - now Rete
Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI) still within FS Holding. Resolution
180 foresees an access charging system based on the following
principles: a) “usage costs”18 are taken as a base for calculating
access fees, b) the “usage costs” considered for calculating
access charges are not effective, but estimated taking into
consideration that, since they depend on the level of the
overall network efficiency, the effective ones are higher than
those that would occur were the network efficiently
managed19, and c) the calculation method aims at maximising
network use and favouring new entrants20. The proposed
solution stands mid-way between marginal cost pricing, on the
one hand, and average cost pricing on the other. The first
charging method would stimulate maximum railway
infrastructure use by facilitating the entrance of new operators
but just covering a mere 10% of the total costs21, whereas the
second would cover approximately 50% of all the costs due to
infrastructure management but would, at the same time,
reduce infrastructure use to a socially inefficient level. The
solution adopted mediates between the two desirable but
contrasting objectives - cost coverage and increased number of
operators. Subsequent adoption of these general principles has
come through the Ministerial decrees of March 22nd and 23rd
2000 defining access charge procedures along with the above
mentioned guidelines. The new Master Plan, on the other
hand, clarifies the engagements the State assumes in financing
the investment and extraordinary maintenance programmes
that RFI will undertake as well as the financial contributions
covering the “technological component” part of the “usage
costs” that are temporarily not paid by train operators.
Furthermore, the Prospetto Informativo della Rete (Network
Information Report - NIR), published by RFI, defines the
criteria for track assignment for the period from the 10th of
July 2001 to the 14th of December 2002.  It not only conforms
to the principles set by the European directives, but also states
that pluri-annual contracts cannot be used to assign a number
of track-kilometres that would engage more than 70% of total
network capacity in general.  With specific reference to each
single origin destination pair, the maximum limit is set to 85%
of the total amount assigned. In case the assigned track
capacity is used for less than 80% and for passenger and for
less than 50% for freight, the initial assignment is not
confirmed for the remaining periods. Further constraints have
been imposed on RFI in accordance with the general European
regulatory stance. In fact, not only must it provide basic
network access and usage services but it must also guarantee
each train operator, sufficient space proportional to the
quantity of tracks booked, for auto production or third party
production of manoeuvre services in passenger stations, and
marshalling yard facilities for freight and maintenance
services if requested22. Regulatory aspects concerning the
appropriateness of keeping this function within a company
that de facto belongs to FS will be considered in relation to
regulatory capture problems in paragraph 6.
5.2  Medium-long run passenger services 
Together with the regulatory innovations implemented for
RFI there has also been a relevant intervention in the long-
distance passenger rail transport market to create the
necessary preconditions for offering a commercially
remunerative service, given that this is a market sector in
which true competition is most likely going to take place.
Trenitalia, the incumbent, is presently operating in a situation
where tariffs and operational costs are, respectively, lower
and higher than those of comparable train operators in other
European countries. To stimulate competition in this market,
it is important to reduce the gap between costs and charges
since, otherwise, any potential new entrant would be
disheartened by the presence of a subsidised incumbent
producing non remunerative services23. Following this general
orientation, CIPE passed the Resolution 173 of the 5th of
November 1999 defining: 
a) a price cap mechanism for medium-long distance services
for a four years period (2000 – 2003) allowing a mean
weighted price increase of 3,5% in real terms; 
b) the  price increases linked to the amelioration of the
service quality provided will not only allow for the reduction
of the gap between Italian railway prices and those of the
major European partners but should also guarantee the
coverage of, at least, the “efficient production” costs for each
service unit produced;
c) the freedom for Trenitalia, within the imposed price cap
limits, to charge commercially based prices.
5.3  Regional transport services
Italy is undergoing a profound process of competence
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decentralisation and the regions24 are acquiring greater
administrative powers. The transport sector has undergone
similar changes and, in different aspects, has been a
forerunner. Regional governments will receive funds from the
national level and will then be responsible for local passenger
transport in all modes, bus and rail constituting the most
important components.  Law 242 of 1997 and its subsequent
integration, Law 400 of 1999 (to be further modified by a
forthcoming Law), emphasise the role of competition in the
market, and, whenever public service obligations and public
subsidies are needed, it clearly states the compulsory
adoption of competitive tendering for the assignment of the
service. Once the tendering operations are over and the
winner is selected the service contract will serve to specify in
detail all the reciprocal obligations. The service contract will
allow some revision mechanisms so as to provide a flexible
regulatory instrument helpful for the fine tuning of what will
always remain an incomplete contract. 
The debate on the interpretation of the various articles of the
Law and general philosphy has been quite heated. Even if
there are different interpretations and substantial divergences
in the adoption time path,25 the general perception is that the
change will have long standing influences on the way the
whole sector is organised and administered. Probably most
regions, for route and schedule coordination purposes, will
tender a single contract for all rail services, or even tender bus
and rail services together. The probable adoption of this
approach might also be due to the scarce confidence that
regional bureaucracies have with regulatory instruments. This
tendency should be scrutinized critically and regions should
be induced to look  carefully at the technical feasibility of
introducing competition on the same (bus and rail) routes
whenever possible. Both theoretical considerations and
practical experience indicate that modal and intermodal
competition in the market are the best recipies for lowering
prices and increasing service quality26. Another reason for the
regions’ intention to bundle together the various transport
services is being able to use cross-subsidisation to finance
unprofitable services at the expenses of the profitable ones.
This too should be discouraged since it would invalidate the
results that competitive tendering should produce, i.e. -
assigning the service to the most efficient producer. Tenders
for unprofitable services should be kept separate from
profitable ones in order  to choose the most efficient producer
in each case, thus minimising the cost of subsidies. The
liberalisation and privatisation trend seems to be confirmed
by the recent 2002 Budget Law (n° 448, 28th December
2001), which has confirmed the implementation of market
incentives for local public service companies in various
industries.
6. Might regulatory capture be a problem?
One issue that should be carefully dealt with when modifying
the institutional structure governing such a complex and
articulated sector is the impact that introduced innovations
might have on the pursuit of the final public goals.  Given the
present institutional configuration, it is worthwhile asking
whether regulatory capture might be a problem and if so what
might be its origin, and what can be done to avoid its
undesirable effects.
In the benchmark model of regulation, the regulator is
supposed to know everything necessary to operate, to be able
to pre-commit, as well as to operate in the public interest.
Deviations from the hypothesis of this best-case scenario
pose different problems. In this paragraph the hypothesis that
the regulator may not always be acting in the public interest
will be questioned. Different economists have debated the
realism of such hypothesis27 and have considered the
conditions under which it is likely that the regulator will act
in the interest of the incumbent rather than in that of
consumers and potential entrants. The main points of the
analysis concern the actual winners and losers after the
regulatory reform has taken place, that is - those who will
benefit and those who will pay the cost of the rent-seeking
attitude that the institutional arrangements will induce. In
fact, the regulators themselves might be faced with situations
in which they are confronted with strong incentives to behave
in their own interest, to the detriment of social welfare and in
favour of other groups in society, namely the incumbents and
employees. Supposing the prices of a firm are set by a
regulator. They must decide whether to privilege low prices
making consumers better off or, on the contrary, high prices
leading to high profits thus making firms better off.  Since
regulatory chores require a high level of technical skills, the
regulator usually receives a vague mandate and has relatively
high discretion over policy. Since the managers of the
regulated firms frequently meet with regulators and also
represent a better organised and financially stronger lobby
than consumer ones, it is likely that they might be “captured”,
unless there is a linkage mechanism between regulators’
salaries and regulatory results in terms of consumer welfare
produced.
Regulatory capture is more likely whenever there are a high
number of actors with conflicting interests, on one hand, and,
an inappropriate regulatory system on the other. In fact, this
might well be considered an appropriate description of the
regulatory regime in the Italian railway sector. Regulatory
capture might take place at different levels. First of all there
can be a form of regulatory capture deriving from the greater
relevance attributed by politicians to objectives that contrast
with the objective of creating a common level playing field
where the forces of free competition may meet and interact.
Furthermore, what is more commonly considered regulatory
capture refers to the capture of the technical office or person
in charge of verifying the correct application of the regulatory
mandate that, for negligence or for personal economic
convenience, willingly avoids the application of the
regulation.
In this situation there are actions that can be taken to favour
the correct functioning of the market that, on the contrary, are
not taken so as to favour those that should be regulated. This
type of behaviour is more likely when the institutional
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environment does not provide incentives to behave correctly,
that is - to conform to what regulatory laws prescribe.
Contrasting signals coming form the political sphere do not
help the strengthening of the regulatory stance. The
likelihood of regulatory capture on both levels increases in
the presence of asymmetric information especially, as usually
happens, when regulated actors dispose of better information
than the regulator itself. Information asymmetry problems
pose various questions to the regulator, but there are also
countermeasures that might be adopted to reduce and
circumscribe the negative effects provoked by this situation.
In fact, the regulator that has to catch up with the regulated
firm in a context of information asymmetry might act to: a)
acquire specialists of the regulated sector, b) acquire
information by cross-examining the various regulated firms,
c) stimulate yard-stick competition whenever possible  to
indirectly acquire previously undisclosed information, or d)
foster a best practice virtuous circle. Unfortunately in Italy
the regulator (Ministry of Transport and CIPE) is in such a
situation that it is not capable of adopting any of the above
mentioned actions. Given this bleak reality one has to
recognise that an implicit and even unwilling regulatory
capture is very likely or inevitable since the technical phase
of a regulatory process is usually completely dominated by
the incumbent and only through a subsequent bargaining
process on the economic aspects is the final decision taken.
Unless the regulator gets access to an independent, credible
and ascertainable flow of technical information, or else the
whole regulatory process loses credibility.
7. What is the Antitrust Authority doing in the
meanwhile?
The position taken by the AA has to be analysed in order to
understand what are some of the most important regulatory
interventions in this sector. The analysis of the AA position
will be based on a recent paper that one of its experts in the
transport sector presented at an international seminar on
competition and European railway development28. 
Low productivity and substantial deficits can largely be
attributed to pre-competitive factors linked to the lack of
effective budget constraints and inefficient control of
expenses. An absence of stringent budget constraints has
reduced any incentive to minimise costs, resulting in
overmanning and low service quality. This situation, coupled
with an asymmetric information position objectively difficult
to dismantle, has provided good arguments to FS managers
asking for ever increasing subsidies. 
Italy, along with other European partners, has introduced
substantial modifications of the regulatory asset in the
railway sector but, nonetheless, there is still clear opposition
to further developing and implementing the liberalisation
process. In fact, those who presently enjoy monopoly rents -
i.e.: a) FS via subsidies, b) FS managers and employees via
higher salaries, c) FS suppliers via supra-competitive prices -
are, from their point of view, understandably against further
liberalisation. Nevertheless, one has to consider carefully the
role that market liberalisation might play in increasing
efficiency and fostering better service quality. The position
expressed by the AA, both on FS’s behaviour as a dominant
rolling-stock purchaser as well as a dominant supplier of
railway transport services, is of great interest for the analysis
proposed in this paper. Since the early ‘90s, the AA has
intervened several times in the railway sector29. The
proceedings of these interventions concerned the relationship
between FS and its suppliers, the potential monopolisation of
road and maritime transport, vertical restraint and
discrimination affecting inter-modal transport. 
The apparently “self-damaging abuses”, (as Pezzoli describes
the Capri Consortium and Fercomint case30,  whereby FS’s
purchasing policies resulted in a de facto protection of a
particular national supplier), have been substantially
redressed both via AA’s decisions also thanks to the
introduction of tendering procedures. Nowadays FS’s
purchasing procedures are much more efficient thanks to the
adoption of more competitive purchasing mechanisms.
The Sogin/FS decision31 is useful in clarifying the attempt
made by FS to integrate rail with other modes of transport in
order to put into place anti-competitive strategies. FS decided
to buy the Sogin bus company in order to acquire a dominant
position. In this case the costs that integration provokes more
than outweigh the actual benefits in terms of allocative
efficiency, even considering the potential benefits deriving
from schedule integration -given that integration- where
service overlapping is avoided automatically reduces inter-
modal competition and increases the risk of dominant
position abuse.
Vertical restraints and discrimination in multi-modal transport
has also been a matter of concern for AA. In fact, FS, thanks
to its integrated structure, has adopted anti-competitive
purchasing practices jeopardising free competition on
markets contiguous to rail transport. FS, managing both
infrastructure and rail transport services, is always exposed to
the enticement of discriminating against new entrants with
whom it competes in the down-stream markets32.  These cases
were particularly important in evidencing the role that multi-
modal and combined transport might have in favouring the
liberalisation process by allowing the access of new entrants
in high added-value segments of the rail transport sector. The
AA intervened when it detected an unjustified application of
different conditions for equivalent services thus provoking
unfair drawbacks to FS’s competitors.  
The AA interventions have demonstrated both the need for a
strong and well defined regulatory body and that the
incumbent, if properly stimulated and given the correct
incentives, will start behaving in a free market compatible
way. The AA follows, for institutional reasons, a case by case
and ex post punishing intervention approach and does not
dispose of all the necessary regulatory capabilities needed for
effective governance. Better results would be achieved had it
the chance to act in a pre-emptive way or to use a sort of
moral persuasion with respect to the incumbent. These
considerations indicate the need for further structural
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intervention accompanying the liberalisation process in the
Italian rail sector. In fact, either good care is taken of
interoperability, labour contracts and track assignment
problems or else sooner or later FS will be induced to exploit
its dominant position, thus forestalling the whole
liberalisation process and frustrating all present efforts.
Infrastructures, traction, and rolling stock de facto represent a
precondition for true competition as, for example, does the
need to accept flexible labour contracts in this sector  (given
that their present nature is due to the peculiar industrial
relations that characterise a monopolistic environment). If
new entrants have to sustain the same labour costs as the
incumbent, a good part of the foreseen benefits of
liberalisation will automatically vanish. Finally, the need for
an independent player, third to all the participants in the
market, is clearly identified especially in connection with the
problems arising from track assignment competencies.  As
Polidori33 suggests in his work published in this volume, a
first step in this direction would be the creation of a dedicated
agency, that acquires, organises and circulates information,
and standardises procedures, creating a group of highly
skilled experts capable of dialoguing at the same level with
private company managers. Even if the need for a specific
regulatory authority in the transport sector cannot be denied,
in Italy the political obstacles have concerned the excessive
proliferation of independent authorities. With reference to the
aforementioned difference between the political and technical
capture risks, however, one has to consider that the creation
of an independent authority has two desirable characteristics.
On the one hand, it reduces to a minimum the likelihood of
regulatory capture at a technical level by: a) acquiring highly
specialised experts, b) receiving well defined powers such as,
for instance, punishing ones, c) being institutionally
independent from the Government in power so as to avoid
influence by political pressures, and d) also reducing the
likelihood of political regulatory capture via a clear-cut
definition of the programming (public), operating (private)
and regulating (authority) competencies. These conditions are
not present in the current Italian regulatory settings since the
bureaucracies to which most regulatory competencies are
remitted are, by definition, not independent from the
executive power and often are over-exposed to the
detrimental effects that political instability provokes34. The
present situation seems to be a good example of how to
promote regulatory capture at all levels and the pro-
competition efforts that have so far been put into place will
not be able to produce all the desirable effects if the political
will deficit is not overcome and profound institutional
modifications are implemented. 
8. Summary and conclusions
This paper has provided an analysis of the present
institutional settings of the regulatory situation in the Italian
railway transport sector. Departing from the analysis of the
economic and strategic characteristics of network utilities,
theoretical suggestions and institutional changes have been
individuated. Following a general description of network
utilities the analysis has subsequently been focused on the
most recent evolution in the regulatory scenario in the sector.
The characteristics of the most recent innovations in terms of
infrastructure charges, track assignment, medium-long term
passenger services, and regional transport have been
discussed with the aim of both illustrating the peculiarity of
each problem and, at the same time, of describing the
institutional settings in which the whole problem is taking
place.  Regulatory capture is treated as the most worrying
issue that might arise from the unsatisfactory institutional
context, where pro-competitive actions are taking place in an
environment in which, as the antitrust cases described
demonstrate, pre-competitive problems are still present and
where issues such as effective interoperability, flexible labour
contracts, and independent track assignment management are
still chimeras. Unless these problems are solved, the expected
beneficial shake-up effects that vertical separation is
supposed to achieve will not materialise, and after the ashes
settle we will be left simply with a more complex and less
credible regulatory system which will be even more open to
anti-competitive incursions.
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The Full Legislative Story of the Rail
Transport Reform Process
Emanuela D’Alessio
C O P I T
1. The process of liberalisation in the rail sector in Italy
1.1  Guidelines for the reorganisation of the FS (State
Railway) - Directive from the President of the Council
of Ministers, January 30, 1997 (Prodi Directive)
The salient points for the economic and financial
reorganisation and improvement of the company FS are the
following: a four-year business plan, an investment plan,
containment of unit cost of production, revision of the tariff
system for passenger transport, and separation between
infrastructure management and operation services.
The four-year business plan should outline the necessary
provisions for bringing the company up to par with the
average European standards of quality and characteristics for
services offered, unit costs of production, and cost coverage
through market revenues.  It should provide for an investment
plan as well as criteria and objectives for the development of
passenger and goods transport as well as indicate ways in
which to reorganise the company financially and
economically.  In the area of production cost containment, the
per-unit production cost of labour will have to be revised,
introducing significant elements of flexibility. The definition
of the new Public Service Contract 1997-2000 provides for a
new tariff system for passenger transport to cover effective
costs of production.  Such tariffs will constitute the base for
applying a price-cap method.  The price quota to be carried
by users, and the residual quota to be shouldered by the state,
and the time needed to bring the tariffs into line, must still be
established.
1.2 FS Reorganisation - Directive from the
President of the Council of Ministers, March 18 1999
(D’Alema Directive)
The D’Alema directive, much inspired by concepts from the
preceding Prodi Directive, adds some further fine-tuning and
new concepts.  The central point is the business plan (relative
to the years 1999-2003) that contains general and concise
objectives.  These include: an increase in the volume of
passenger and goods traffic, a balanced budget, safety and
quality of service, an evaluation of human resources, a
reordering of organisation and parternships, an investment
plan, and economic improvement. The investment plan must
take some new priorities into account, such as new
automation technology, safety, acceleration of the High
Capacity project, integration with the European network, the
rail shipment project, development of the network in the
south, urban area projects, and respect for anti-pollution laws.
The directive pays particular attention to safety, providing for
a new annually updated safety plan.  Another chapter of the
business plan must deal with the development of transport
services, defining commercial strategies for the development
of traffic and accounting for the process of liberalisation in
the European rail transport market.  The Directive also gives
a privileged place to service quality, with particular reference
to passenger and goods transport in terms of punctuality,
comfort of rolling stock, and reliability. In terms of reordering
of organisation and partnerships, the Directive states precise
implementation deadlines that have been substantially
respected by the present organisation of FS.
1.3  The Evolution of the Ordering of FS
The FS group was turned into a Stock Corporation (Ltd.) in
1992.  The shareholder of the Italian railways is the state, and
in such, the Minister of the Treasury.  Relations with the state
are regulated by an Act of Concession that gives the railway a
70-year license to manage public rail and marine transport
and to construct new lines and systems. With the Master Plan,
the state as shareholder contributes to the maintenance of the
infrastructure and provides financing to the company for the
development of the existing rail network, acquisition of
advanced technology, development of the High Capacity
project, and for the renewal of rolling stock.  With the Service
Contract, on the other hand, the state buys those services that
meet social needs that are cost-unsustainable for the
company.
The company further evolved in 1998 when the Infrastructure
Division was created.  In May, 1999, a further three divisions
were created to ensure medium and long distance passenger
transportation, shipment of goods, and local area transport
(carried out under the Prodi and D’Alema Directives).
The current structure is as follows. FS is the industrial
holding that oversees strategy. Trenitalia, formed on June 1,
2000, is in charge of passenger transport and shipping and is
subdivided into four divisions (Passenger, Regional
Transport, Cargo, and Rolling Stock Technology Unit). RFI,
formed in July, 2001, manages the rail network and holds the
following responsibilities: ensure all rail activities over the
entire rail network, guarantee the development and
maintenance of an efficient infrastructure system, ensure the
technological development of the Railway’s systems and
components, oversee safety and issue safety certificates to rail
companies, oversee network capacity and usage by rail
companies through the establishment of schedules and the
management of contracts with the same rail companies.
The other companies that complete the State Railway Group
are organised according to their specialisation: TAV is
responsible for the High Capacity project; Italferr is the
engineering company that plans and carries out large scale
infrastructure and technological projects; Metropolis manages
and evaluates the holdings of the Railway Group and plans
renewal projects in the rail areas of the large cities; Grandi
Trasporti Europei
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Stazioni manages, renews, and evaluates the rail stations of
the principle cities; Sogin oversees integrated mobility, rail,
international, national, and local auto services; Fercredit is
responsible for financial services.
2.  Acceptance of Community rail Directives.
Acceptance of Directive 91/440/CEE
2.1  Regulation with implementation norms
for the acceptance of Directive 91/440/CEE relative to
the Development of Community Railways -
DPR July 8, 1998, n. 277
In accordance with Directive 91/440 and the principle of
separation between management of infrastructure and
operation, this regulation specifically refers to the
management of rail infrastructure and the activity of rail
transport by the Italian railroad companies, as well as access
rights to rail infrastructure for international rail companies
and those companies involved in combined international
transport. The principles introduced by the Community norms
are: autonomous management of rail companies, possible
reorganisation of rail company financing, separation of
accounting or formation of separate companies to manage the
rail network and infrastructure, and free market access for
transportation of goods or passengers by rail. The
infrastructure manager is any public or private organisation in
charge of building and maintaining the infrastructure, as well
as managing control and security systems needed for convoy
circulation. The infrastructure manager must be independent
from companies operating in the transportation sector. A
concession and a Master Plan regulate the relationship
between the infrastructure manager and the state. Access to
services is guaranteed by the manager, respecting the
principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment of
international rail companies and rail transport companies.
Those international associations of rail companies of which at
least one member has its principal headquarters in Italy have
the right of access to the infrastructure. The manager will
apply and collect an access fee from these companies for
using the infrastructure. The access fee is determined by the
appropriate Minister, given the opinion expressed by CIPE
(see Resolution CIPE n. 180/1999). The present regulation
obviously does not take into account the new directive
2001/12/CE, still waiting to be accepted, which integrates and
modifies 91/440/CE clarifying the question of separation of
accounting by defining the separation of essential functions,
extending access rights, and defining the figure of the
Infrastructure Manager responsible for its area of business.
2.2  Act of Concession for Relationships
Between the Rail Infrastructure Manager and the
State - DM October 31, 2000, n.138T
The ministerial provision has refined the concession act for
the regulation of relationships between the infrastructure
manager and the state, as outlined by Art. 5, Comma 2 of
DPR 277/1998.
2.3  Master Plan 2001-2005 -
Resolution CIPE April 4, 2001
This resolution has refined the master plan between the
Minister of Transport and Navigation and FS, still in
accordance with Art. 5, Comma 2 of DPR 277/1998.  The
master plan regulates the relationship between the state and
the infrastructure manager regarding the financing of:
ordinary and extraordinary infrastructure maintenance,
investments for safety improvement, investments for
research, experimentation, and updating in the areas of health
and the environment, updating of specific techniques for the
inter-operability of the European rail network, and
investments for the development of the High Capacity
program.
2.4  Accounting separation accomplishment between
infrastructure management and transport activities –
DM n. 703696 May 22, 2000
With the implementation of art. 4, comma 4 of DPR
277/1998, the accounting separation process was
accomplished with the definition and approval of the
separation method to be used in dividing infrastructure
management from operations. This process had started back
in 1998 when FS transferred infrastructure management
functions to its Infrastructure Division.
3.  Acceptance of Community Directives concerning
rail transport. Acceptance of Directive 95/18 e 95/19
3.1  Regulation for the Implementation of Directive
95/18/CE on Licensing of Rail Companies, and
Directive 95/19/CE on the Assignment of Rail
Infrastructure Capacities and Collection of Usage
Rights - DPR March 16, 1999, n.146.
This regulation defines the following concepts: license - the
authorisation given by the appropriate authorities of the
member states to companies with headquarters in Community
territory for the provision of international passenger and
freight transport; slot - the period of infrastructure usage
necessary for one train to travel between two locations;
capacity - the sum of slots that constitute usage potential;
assignment - the allotment of infrastructure capacity.
It has been determined that the companies must have a
license granted by the state of residence (by the Ministry of
Transport and Navigation) for any provision of public rail
service.  Granting the license authorises the provision of
services and formally recognises the applicant as a qualified
rail company.  The procurement of a license, however, does
not imply the right to use the infrastructure. This right must
be obtained by agreement with the infrastructure manager.
Infrastructure usage is to be granted only to companies in
possession of a license and safety certificate, and which have
stipulated with the infrastructure manager the necessary
administrative, technical, and financial agreements relevant to
the assignment of capacity.  The infrastructure manager is
responsible for the assignment of capacity, and must, being
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knowledgeable of the capacity of all available lines, proceed
with assignment so as to guarantee equity, non-
discrimination, and efficient infrastructure usage.  The criteria
and procedures for assignment are to be made public, and
rejection of applications must be for sound reason.  Upon
request for capacity the applicant must give the manager a
deposit for the amount directly fixed by the manager. The
present regulation obviously does not take into account any
future abrogation of Directive 95/19 concerning the
assignment of capacity or its complete substitution by the
new Directive 2001/14/CE (waiting for acceptance) that
outlines new duties on the part of the infrastructure manager.
3.2  Issuing of Licenses to Rail Companies
and Determination of Relative Fees -
DM March 23, 2000, n.45T
This ministerial decree has brought about the determination,
outlined in Art. 4, Comma 4 of DPR 146/1999, of the
reimbursable fees to cover administrative costs sustained for
the investigation, consideration, and granting of the license.
The first license was granted to FS, now Trenitalia, with the
DM 73T of May 23, 2000.
Another 8 licenses were successively issued under the
guidelines of  DPR 146/1999.  Furthermore, in compliance
with Art. 131 of the finance law (legislation n.388/2000) all
nine license-holders have been conceded extensions to
national services.
3.3  Assignment of Rail Capacity -
Network Information Report (NIR)
In compliance with Art. 9, comma 2, of DPR 146/1999, the
infrastructure manager made public the criteria and
procedures for rail capacity assignment on October 27, 2000.
4.  Tariff system
4.1  Rail Network Access Charging Scheme-
Resolution CIPE n.180, November 5, 1999.
This resolution established a tariff system for the access toll
to the rail network based on a few principles: the cost of
infrastructure usage - that is the direct and indirect cost of
circulation - remain the responsibility of the state.  This
includes the extra costs of technological lag and the burden of
a provisional toll “discount” for transport companies.  The
cost of infrastructure usage is financed by the state through
the program contract, including the costs of depreciation of
existing infrastructure, new investments, and ordinary and
extraordinary maintenance.
4.2  Criteria for Determining the Rail Infrastructure
Usage Fee - Ministerial Decrees March 22 and 23,
2000, 43T and 44T.
The indications of Resolution CIPE 180/1999 were applied in
the successive Ministerial Decrees 43T and 44T, which
determined some toll rates in accordance with methodologies
indicated by CIPE.
4.3  Medium and Long Distance Rail Tariffs-
Resolution CIPE n.173 November 5, 1999.
With Resolution 173/1999, another regulation was added to
the network management regulations for the purpose of
making the medium and long distance transportation of
passengers remunerative. The resolution’s most salient points
are: the establishment of a 4-year price cap for medium and
long distance services, a strong link between tariffs and
progress in efficiency and quality, and freedom to set and
manage tariffs for Trenitalia.
5.  Local and regional transport
5.1  Granting of Functions and Tasks Concerning
Local Public Transport to the Regions and Local
Bodies, Under Art. 4, Comma 4 of Law n.59 of March
15 1997, n.422 of November 19, 1997, and n.400 of
August 4, 1999.
Another relevant aspect for rail transport liberalisation in
Italy is the granting of regional transport functions and tasks
to the Regions in compliance with the Bassanini Law
n.59/1997.  Air, maritime and road transport at the
international and inter-regional level, remain in the hands of
the state.  National and international rail transport remains
under state control only if involving high standards of quality
or medium to long distance travel.
In short, these are the salient aspects of the legislation:
decentralisation of programming (planning) and
administration of local public transport, creation of local
public bodies to carry the functions of programming,
administration and control, and reorganisation of service
management. The instrument regulating relations between the
different bodies involved is the service contract - designed to
define and establish individual areas of competence.  Lasting
no longer than nine-years, the service contract ensures that
from January 1, 2000 at least a 0.35 ratio between revenues
and operating costs is achieved, net of infrastructure costs.
The assignment of the service is the choice of the service
manager, and the regions are compelled to go through the
open-competition procedure to obtain them. December 31,
2003 was the date fixed for the termination of the transition
period during which service assignments could be performed
without competitive tendering. With particular reference to
the rail sector, the following should also occur: the transfer of
rail infrastructure in concession and the former governmental
commissioned management to the regions, the postponement
of terms for the stipulation of new service contracts between
FS and the regions, and the extension to local rail authorities
of European norms and relative integration decrees
concerning separation of infrastructure and services as well as
division of capacity.
5.2  Article 35, Law N.448, December 28, 2001
(Budget Law 2002)
This article is inspired by the general principles of
liberalisation and the substantial privatisation of local public
Trasporti Europei
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service firms (including local public transport). The
ownership of networks and systems is maintained by local
bodies that can transfer it to companies of their own in which
they maintain a majority share-hold. Where sector norms
allow for it, network and system management can be
separated through service distribution. The first can be
directly entrusted to public companies or assigned by tender,
while the second can only be assigned by public tender.
5.3  D.Lgs Infrastructure and Transport - July, 2002 
On July 17, 2002 the Parliament approved definitively the
draft legislation connected with the Finance Law of 2002
containing norms concerning infrastructure and transport.
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1. Introduction
The Public Choice (PC)
approach can be summaris-
ed, in an extreme synthesis,
as the rebuttal of the
assumption of the public
decision-maker as “bene-
volent” and “all-knowing”.
This rebuttal has wide
consequences: market
failures must be balanced
against the failures of the
state; and in so doing, an
entirely new set of policy
tools has to be developed. Luckily, these tools can also be
derived by different sources of elaboration: the principal-
agent relationship, incomplete contracts theory, etc.. This
field has been explored mainly in order to deal with “private”
problems (insurance contracts etc.); its convergence with the
PC approach to the political environment, is apparently a very
fertile occasion for further developments.
The main issues of the PC approach are related to the
identification of the possible “egoistic” objectives that can
explain the actual behaviour of the decision makers, when the
traditional “Social Choice” (SC) approach appears incapable
of explaining that behaviour. In turn, within this analysis, the
decision makers have to be separated in two main categories: 
1. elected officials at different administrative levels, whose 
main “egoistic” objectives can be re-election (i.e. locally, 
short-term, special-interest oriented ones); and
2. public agencies (for example, the national railways),
whose main “egoistic” objectives can be of a “rent
seeking” nature, (i.e. reduced efforts, guaranteed subsides,
etc.) and “capture”, (i.e. the capability of controlling the
political regulators of the agencies through vote
exchanges, “information rents”, etc.).
The PC approach to policy analysis contrasts the more
traditional SC approach, in which public policies are assumed a
priori as aimed to welfare maximization (assuming therefore a
“benevolent prince” as the actor of every political process).
The PC approach is generally applied within an ideological
context that strongly supports extreme pro-market solutions.
This is consistent with the assumption of a “core” failure of
state intervention, since the same motivations of this
intervention show deep distortions, independently from the
actual result of the political action itself. Nevertheless, the
logical tools developed within this approach seem effective
and useful also within a different, more redistribution-
oriented context. As far as the proposed tools are valid, they
may become of primary importance for reforming a socially-
minded political system, not only for destroying it.
Distortions and weaknesses of the welfare state are probably
more worrying as greater importance is attributed to the role
of the state. 
Within the transport sector,
this role remains crucial, for
well-known technical
reasons. The sector in fact
looks specially prone to
market failures: natural
monopolies are dominant in
the infrastructures, environ-
mental and safety externa-
lities are of growing magni-
tude, as are congestion-
related externalities1. Capital
indivisibility phenomena,
and “network effects”, are
also large for infrastructures, and “Mohring effects” for collective
services, and railways in particular2.
Furthermore, collective transport services are in many cases
considered an effective tool for income redistribution, as
infrastructures are considered important tools for the
economic growth of less-developed regions. This part of the
picture is specially true for Europe. 
It seems, therefore, relevant to use these types of realistic and
up-to-date analytical tools for evaluating the structure of the
European rail policy .
2. The picture up to now
2.1. The European policy
The Council Directive of  July 29, 1991 on the development
of  the Community’s Railways (EU 440/91) was aimed at
opening the European railways market. It made mandatory
for Member states to separate the industry vertically, i.e. to
keep the rail infrastructures mostly public3, and to promote
competition in the market for the services. The directive
immediately showed several limitations: only the long
distance services were to be opened to competition, while the
regional ones were not. Furthermore:
• in an initial phase, only  inter-modal freight services were
involved;
• “special” infrastructures (i.e. high-speed lines) were
exempted; 
• access fares and rules were vaguely specified, although
they are not permitted to be “discriminatory”,
“grandfather clauses” were not explicitly excluded;
• state subsidies to the incumbent service providers are
formally excluded, but in fact a wide set of hidden
subsidies resulted possible.
Subsequent directives from the Commission have specified in
further detail track allocation and licensing procedures for
operations.
More generic “recommendations” have been issued by the
European Parliament, but without major practical impact.
Apart from Sweden, and, of course, the U.K., not much has
happened within the different European countries.
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Paradoxically, for local services, some national legislation
(Germany and Italy) seems to be more market-oriented than
the European policy4.
Political pressure, specially from France, to permit exceptions
and delays to liberalisation, remained strong (stressing, for
example, the need for “collaboration” between national
railway companies, as a more effective approach than
competition).
The basic explicit goal of the European policy for the sector
was to improve the performances of an environment-friendly
mode and, at the same time, to reduce the financial strain that
the heavy subsidies were generating on the public purses
(given also the Maastricht constraints on the public debt and
deficit of the member states).
Implementation problems of the European policy appeared
severe from the very first years after EU Directive 440/91.
The national companies (the incumbents) immediately  began
a de facto strong opposition to the liberalisation process, and
set up, as a matter of fact, a “cartel” in order to defend their
positions. 
Three examples can confirm this argument. 
The Union of the European Railways appointed seven
academic experts to produce a document on EU 440/91. The
document was basically favourable toward the Directive,
even if underlying drawbacks, weak spots, undefined issues,
etc. This document, however, not only was never made
public, but also its results were never discussed with the
authors themselves5.
A second example is the fate of the “freeways” project6
(COM(97) 242). The European Commission, acknowledging
that the liberalisation process, after several years, was getting
nowhere, tried a more consensus-based approach. Several
international rail corridors were designed (the main ones
going through Germany), where competition was to be
allowed, even if only for freight. Further conditions
concerned a minimum commercial speed (60 Km/h) and a
“single shop” service, in order to provide rail operators with
only one counterpart, able to deal with track allocation,
schedules and tariffs for all the chosen routes. No one
applied. The reason was simple: Germany choose to charge
the average cost for track use (obviously much higher than
the marginal cost). German trains were paying the average
cost themselves too, so formally there was no discrimination.
The only detail was that German trains were paying that
amount to themselves, vertical separation not yet being in
place, and the subsidies to the services were not formally
forbidden by the Directive. 
The third example is in fact a “missing action”. Why did no
incumbent try to enter in a foreign market under competitive
terms, not even on the “freeways” that were set up in
consensual term with the incumbents? It is totally unrealistic
to assume that the costs of the rail services for the incumbents
do not show differences encouraging a cost-based
competition (quite the contrary is true). The only possible
explanation lies within the strength of the above-mentioned
cartel.
More than ten years have passed and no long-distance
passenger train and very few freight trains are running under
competitive conditions in continental Europe. As usual, “real”
competition is promised by politicians as coming “very
soon”. To consider this a policy failure seems quite obvious.
In the meantime, public costs remain very high
(notwithstanding some periodical declaration by individual
railways of achieving a “break-even” budget; this result is
technically true, but it is obtained against arbitrary subsidies,
set often in advance specially to allow for this public-pleasing
result). Furthermore, a provocative extrapolation of the
“Financial Times” shows that the railway system, in
continental Europe, will disappear completely after 2017 for
lack of demand. This forecast looks unrealistic, but the
weakness of the system remains evident.
The main consideration concerning the causes of European
policy failure in this sector has to focus on the crucial role
played by the governments with respect to their own railways
companies (the incumbents). This contradiction probably
undermined the liberalisation process from the beginning. A
second “technical” explanation can be found in the already-
mentioned weakness of the rail mode, that loses traffic
notwithstanding the large state subsidies (quite a different
picture from the air or road sector). This means that the
external pressure from new-entrants is limited or non-
existent. It  has to be observed, however,  that the high level
of subsidisation easily permits incentives for the entry of new,
more efficient operators, if the subsidies are really allocated
in a non-discriminatory way. The problem is the lack of
political will to give clear “signals” of that intention. 
A “capture” phenomenon seems quite evident for this sector.
“Rent seeking” by the large rail “agents” (the incumbents) has
been achieved (i.e. overstaffing, salaries and wages well above
the average of similar private sectors, low per-capita physical
productivity, no risk of loosing jobs without large
compensations). The supply industry (rolling stock etc.) is also
generally protected from real competition (often due to fancy
technical barriers). The main explanation can be basically set
within the double power of the trade unions: the control of a
large number  of votes, and the capability of blocking the
entire system since this is a monopoly with extended technical
and functional “indivisibilities”. These two facts reinforce
each other, in a vicious circle. An immediate value judgement
can be made here: defending labour income may be an
acceptable political goal, perhaps even sector-by-sector;
defending overstaffing is less acceptable, since the rail system
is technically a capital-intensive sector (trains can be run
almost automatically, due to the “guided” route and remote-
controlled traffic). Overstaffing the railways means “blocking”
its technical progress, that is mainly linked to automatisation.
A secondary explanation appears far weaker: politicians
defend the rail system against competition, fearing that
competition may imply a reduced social content of the service
(safety, environment, marginal settlements to be served, etc.).
It is fairly evident, however, that all these goals can be made
explicit in transparent contractual terms, and the contracts
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“auctioned” in the market. Perhaps emotional factors are at
play too. A good example of a misled perception can be
drawn from the safety problems of the (privatised) British
rails7. Forty casualties have given rise to a large emotional
pressure against the entire liberalisation process, while the
107 casualties of the (totally public) German railways have
never been linked to their “sloppy State management”8
(exactly the same emotional attitude was visible for a certain
period in American air accidents: they were linked with the
deregulation process, even if the statistics showed no actual
worsening of safety records after liberalisation).
2.2 Cross subsidies as a special “capture” case
In a monopolistic context, cross subsidisation constitutes one
of the biggest problems of public governance9. In the rail
sector, long distance services (national intercity services,
overnight services, etc.) present operating deficits on some
links and extraordinary profits on others: the passengers on the
first type of link subsidize the passengers (or the empty trains!)
on the others. This solution isn’t necessarily unacceptable, but
a democratic and transparent debate is needed.
On one side, the rail companies use “social” arguments to
defend this policy; on the other side the regional (or national)
administrations obtain “free” services across their territories.
The result is a kind of “free riding” policy of the local
administration in subsidising non-commercial passenger
services.
A correct approach should transfer the extra profits from the
rail companies to the state that in turn can decide to subsidise
non-commercial services. Other allocations of these funds are
possible: the state can decide to subside schools, hospitals, or
other transport services. In particular, on non commercially
viable links it can decide to subsidise the existing rail
services, or alternative services, for example bus or air
services; the “border line” solution is to provide no service at
all. In this case, the state can defend the consumers of the
high-traffic services eliminating the extra profits on the
profitable links through a standard regulatory act (i.e. a
price/subsidy cap or a competitive bidding policy), forcing
down the fares in this way. But a democratic decision-making
system is necessary, and every decision must be rendered
explicit, with the different actors involved showing  their real
objectives. In particular, the state must show its specific
social strategy, and every trade-off must be supported by an
explicit and public debate.
This political transparency seems necessary both within a SC
approach and within a PC approach. In a SC approach, this
should be so since there are important “market failures” in the
sector, and the ensuing  “corrections” would require a specific
political debate. In a PC approach, on one hand, because
through cross subsidisations (and the related extra profits, in
case of private operators) the incumbents can “capture” the
regulatory agencies, improving their monopolistic positions;
on the other hand, if the regulators are elected (or too strictly
depending from elected officers), because their motivations
can be distorted by the need to obtain support for the next
election. Further specifying this point, an elected decision-
maker couldn’t possibly motivate service reductions in his
region, damaging his electorate, in order to get equity results
aimed at other social groups, although the latter decision may
well increase  total welfare10.
To avoid cross subsidisation and “capture” phenomena, it is
necessary to separate commercial from the non-commercial
service operations. The two kind of services must be operated
by different companies or, if operated by the same company,
at least separate budgeting procedures are needed in order to
avoid the permanence of a dominant position through
political “exchange of favours”.
Now, some example cases will be analysed; at the end, some
recommendations and solution will be put forward.
2.2.1 Sweden
In 1988 Sweden began transport reform. In the rail sector the
separation between the infrastructure and the rail services has
been the most important innovative element11. Banverket
(BV) is the new company of rail infrastructure. The passenger
services have been divided into two groups: regional services
and national ones. Regional services have been regulated in
concurrence with the market and “gross cost” contracts: in the
first round the incumbent Staten Järnvägern (SJ) won twelve
of sixteen lots auctioned, and all the lots in the second round.
The national services have been further separated into
commercial and non-commercial services. The incumbent
operates the commercial services as an unregulated
monopolist and also decides on the division of the national
services into the two above-mentioned groups. Apparently, a
“moderation of competition” principle defends the
incumbent, as a “national champion”. 
The national non-commercial services have been regulated
like the regional services, but with “net cost” contracts. This
railway managerial set-up is supposed to be capable of
avoiding cross subsidisation. Formally, SJ could not subside
non-commercial services through profits deriving from
commercially profitable lines, particularly if new entrants
operated regulated services. In reality, this was never the case
since SJ won all the services on non-commercial links.
The biggest problem lies in the SJ group structure: the same
firm provides commercial monopolistic services and
participates in the awarding of the regulated services. So, SJ
can subside non-profitable services trough monopolistic
profits (made in previous periods) on commercial links.
Dumping is formally forbidden by the Swedish antitrust
authority, but nevertheless SJ can offer services strictly at
short run marginal costs; here as a borderline case, SJ does
not cross-subsidise other activities. SJ can have profits,
however, and can hide, for instance, depreciation allowances
on commercial links while its competitors, operating in
isolation, must at least cover their average costs. In the end,
the competitors’ costs exceeded SJ’s costs in bidding for the
contracts of service, even if they are potentially much more
efficient than SJ. In Sweden, BK Täg (the new entrant who
won four lots for regional services) appealed to
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Konkurrensverket, the antitrust authority, against SJ. BK Täg
accused SJ of bid-dumping in undercutting other offers,
thanks to the expected extra profits on other services.
2.2.2 Italy
In Italy, cross subsidisation can be seen explicitly only in
national passenger services and, maybe, between passenger
and cargo services12. As we will see, some commercial lines
subsidise non commercial ones.
After the beginning of the deregulation process, Trenitalia
Holdings has been articulated into three different companies:
regional transport (RT), long distance passenger services
(LD) and freight services (Cargo).
Regional authorities decide on local services and subsidise
them. The incumbent TL provides all the services as  a
monopolist, with some feeble regulatory pressure coming
from locally negotiated fares; this situation will not change
before January 2006, with the first competitive bidding (the
previous deadline of 2004 has been recently further
postponed). As stated, regional governments subsidise all
local services, through large fixed subsides per train-
kilometre, equal for every train (independent from its own
characteristic and patronage).
So, there is no pressure on LD to subsidise RT. The real
problem lays inside the LD services: LD is the only company
to provide long-distance passenger services13, and new
entrants up to now couldn’t enter the market, although the
actual law does not seem to be completely clear. Some
studies14 demonstrated very large extra profits for LD on
some lines (e.g. Milan–Venice and Milan–Naples intercity
links). But LD declares a balanced budget. If  this is true,
there must be other lines whose revenues are far lower than
their costs: an evident case of cross subsidisation emerges.
The decision whether long-distance,  non-profitable services
have to be provided is taken by Trenitalia according to its
business strategy, and not by political decision-makers (or by
a specific planning agency) after due public debate, with the
related political and equity problems put on the table. LD
strategy seems clear: as is generally the case of public
incumbents with extra profits, it tries to derive from them
maximum benefits in terms of guaranteed protection from
competitive pressures. In a liberalised context, this behaviour
will be equivalent to an entrance barrier. In fact, every
possible new entrant on the non-profitable services would
have to offer these services at least at short run marginal
costs, while LD could sell below that limit.
In fact, at present, new entrants cannot “invade” the profitable
part of the rail market also due to the saturation of the most
profitable lines15, over and above, as we have seen, the
absence of any mechanism of capacity allocation different
from “grandfather’s rights”.
So, LD “captures” the political decision makers via a
“preventive action” against competition, providing “free”
services instead of forcing an explicit debate on the social
worth of the low-patronage services. In this way, LD tries to
create a political entry barrier. By providing non-profitable
services, LD acquires political protection against
liberalisation in general, and against the menace of new
entrants in particular. The political decision makers have little
incentives to accelerate the deregulation process, in order to
keep the above-mentioned “benefits” while LD can more
easily defend its monopolistic position. A severe equity
problem emerges, however, concerning the passengers of the
profitable services who de facto subsidise other services, due
to a managerial decision taken by Trenitalia and not following
any public debate.
2.2.3 Some solutions for the cross-subsidy problem for
passenger services
The Swedish case and the Italian case seem to be very
different. Nevertheless, in a few years, the Italian rail regional
transport will be regulated with an approach based on
competition for the market. The actual Italian incumbent
could have a dominant position due to political reasons, and it
could be motivated by the competitive pressure to cross-
subsidise the regulated services with the profits of the
unregulated ones16. In Italy too the “Swedish problem” may
well show up. 
Some different generalised recommendations are possible.
1. “Open entry” in the national commercial services. So, if
that market works properly, no competitor can have extra
profits, distorting regular competition for regulated
services, at the same time providing efficiency incentives
in commercial services. The incumbent may lose its
dominant position. The State must subsidise social (or non
profitable) long-distance services after a democratic and
transparent debate. The worst “capture” phenomena can
be avoided. 
2. If large scale economies emerge also for LD services, this
sector should also be regulates for the market as well. In
fact, this solution is similar in its effects to open entry.
Also the social issue concerning long-distance
unprofitable services can be solved via competitive
bidding. A preferential position may well result for the
incumbent (again, the “national champion”), but this risk
is always present.
3. In case of only partial opening of the passenger market
(for example, only for non-profitable services17), the
incumbent should be split into two completely separated
companies: the first one operating long distance profitable
services with a price-cap regulation, and the second
producing local and long-distance unprofitable ones,
exposed to competitive bidding. The LD incumbent
cannot cross-subsidises other services; nevertheless its
dimension could be so large as to generate “capture” risks
for the regulator, in particular if the regulatory agency is
not able to value correctly the incumbent’s conditions,
given the large information rents existing at present. The
only advantage left to the incumbent in the competitive
bidding sector will be the possible information rents. 
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Note that the third solution seems to be the minimal one (both
in Swedish and in Italian cases) when regulated and
monopolistic services coexist, or during the temporal gap
between different stages of  the liberalisation process.
Furthermore, it has to be noted that in general the incumbent,
in order to reduce entry risks in its own market, is motivated
to transfer the largest possible share of costs from services
under competition to monopolistic ones, taking advantage
from the information rents generally related to the
“historical” subsidy mechanism. This may well constitute a
special case of cross-subsidisation.
All these suggested approaches promote an acceptable level
of transparency in the decision making process. No decision
concerning  the social services to be provided can be taken by
the operators; the regulator (and its elected “principal”) are
the only subjects enabled to decide. “Capture” phenomena
can thus be minimised. Some problems may still exist as to
the role of vocal interests in obtaining an unreasonable level
of subsidised services; but this goes far beyond the scope of
this analysis.
2.3 The English case
A PC approach could be also used in analysing the severe
problems of the British railways, although large cross
subsidisation phenomena apparently have been avoided. “The
trouble is that the economic architecture of privatisation has a
serious defect. The train operators can add services only if
Railtrack finds network slots for them. Although Railtrack
has a regulatory duty to meet the train operators’ needs, it has
no financial incentives to do so. This is because 97% of its
track access income is fixed regardless of the number of
trains18”. As consequence, on one side, Railtrack decided its
investments with  attention to their effects on rail traffic and
capacity. This  architecture was decided only to guarantee the
initial investors large profits19.
A safety problem can also be encountered. When accidents
happen, public opinion overreacts against rail companies;
people flee the railways and take to their own cars, even if
road safety is far lower than rail safety. Moreover, the public’s
willingness to pay for safety is widely accepted as a key
principle in appraising safety projects. After rail deregulation,
because of the co-presence of different subjects in the business
(the government, the regulator agency, the train operators,
Railtrack), attention to rail safety increased. The elected
bodies surely are paying attention to these instances, and are
scared of the potential reaction of the press too.
Therefore the solution focuses on the increase of investments
in safety. All safety measures imply the determination of a
value of life. So, knowing the costs of safety systems and the
corresponding number of avoided deaths, the implicit value
of a life can be determined. As a result, the cost per avoided
railway fatality results twice as great as that for roads. This
difference is not perceived by public opinion, due to an
asymmetric information problem. So, “in order to be seen to
be doing something, the government prods the railways into
extra safety spending”20. And because Railtrack is a regulated
natural monopoly, it has no reasons to resist government
pressure for more and more safety since, at the end, the
government will pay. “So, when it [the government] prods,
Railtrack jumps”21.
This situation is not reasonable in social welfare terms. Why
spend a fixed amount of money on rail safety instead of on
road safety when the results can be better in the latter case?
The answer is that in the collective imagination a rail crash
(like an air crash) is more destructive than the sum of small
road crashes, although the total number of deaths is far
greater. A component of assumed confidence in a service
provider, as opposed to self-driven vehicles, is also present.
So, these large crashes generate strong reactions from
politicians, worried  about their short term electoral
objectives. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider the safety
problem as a borderline “capture” problem. In fact, if rail
safety is perceived as outstanding by the public opinion at
large, and the public is kept duly informed on the
comparative costs and results, solving the problem can be
considered a legitimate objective for politicians, and not only
a way to increase their consent. Thisis the case even if its
strict economic rationality is limited, or even flawed.
On the other hand, after October 5th, 2001, when Railtrack
announced its bankruptcy, it is clear that “Railtrack’s biggest
problem was no longer fixing the rail network, it was fighting
to survive. [...] By now, it was obvious that the company had
only one place to go for most of the money it needed: the
government. So the company basically asked taxpayers to
bail out its shareholders. Given that Railtrack had been
privatised, shareholders were supposed to bear the risk. For
shareholders who had instead assumed that the government
would always come to Railtrack’s rescue for political reasons,
there was more bad news. The government said in April that
it would continue to support the railway industry as a whole,
but not necessarily individual companies”22.
There is a problem of asymmetric information, that could
degenerate into a “capture” phenomenon, between Railtrack
and the government about the strategies for the future. In fact,
Railtrack seems to consider the government obliged to save
the company, for social objectives, and because Railtrack is a
monopoly operator of an essential service. It develops this
policy in order to save its shareholders: in this sense,
Railtrack in fact “captures” the government. The solution is
not yet clear; it seems to be a new private company but
without any power left to the shareholders. In other words,
because the government will have to underwrite any future
investment, it “means that rail network has been
renationalised in all but name”23. In this way some political
objectives (short term political objectives?) can be reached.
Apparently, the mistake lies in having privatised something
that cannot go bankrupt: in this case it looks unavoidable that
public intervention tends to become blurry and contradictory.
A British “capture” problem, common to all Europen
railways, concerns the regional distribution of subsidies. The
public subsidies (per passenger) to lines with limited traffic
seem to be five times bigger than the subsides to the main
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commuter lines. This situation can be considered a social
paradox (showing an evident “capture” phenomenon), when
there are easy alternatives for low-traffic lines seen as
socially “deserving” objectives, i.e. the provision of  low fare
(and low cost) bus services.
Finally, the “capture” aspects of the privatization process
itself is now so well known that it deserves only a short
reminder here. Railtrack knew the franchisees well; the real,
medium run costs of Railtrack were severely underestimated,
probably not innocently, so the initial expected profits were
huge, and so were the gains of the initial shareholders reaped
in the stock market (taking advantage from their large
information rents). These initial shareholders, “close” to the
conservative government, sold their shares as soon as the
market peaked, leaving the new buyers (and the following
labour government) in dire straits.
3. The political compromise of the new Common
Transport Policy (CTP) 
For many years the European Parliament has been seeking a
larger role against the “technocratic” powers of the
Commission.
The Commission is considered a non-elected body, and has
been successfully accused of some (minor) misbehaving in
order to reduce its powers. Apparently, this is the same fate
that many independent Authorities are suffering in several
states. This “priority to the political sphere” ideology may
well be read, in PC terms, as the reaction to the reduction of
discretionary powers by the single states. Discretionary
power is a vital ingredient for building electoral consensus
independently from any real political content. In fact, the
Commission is and has been much more pro-market that the
sum of the single states. This shift of power is quite evident
from the content of the new CTP document. Competition is
still allowed for in this text even if in a far less prominent
way compared to previous documents.  Infrastructures, i.e.
investments and public spending, appear more urgent. As far
as the railway sector is concerned, a political compromise
looks quite evident24. There is a definite program aimed at
liberalising freight traffic, with due time thresholds. For
passenger services, nothing similar exists, i.e. no enforceable
European policy is in sight. A definite policy does exist
indeed: the build-up of European high speed  services are
recommended in order to curb the environmental pressure
and congestion of air services. France has always opposed
railway liberalisation (even suggesting, at parliamentary
level, the term “co-operation” as an alternative to
“competition”). France holds a dominant industrial role in
high speed technology, with well amortised production plants
for rolling stock and signalling, etc..
A compromise has been struck: gradual freight liberalisation 
against the revamping of the semi-dead European network of
high-speed services. Besides, high-speed services can be
exempted from any European liberalisation rule.
Is this per se a bad deal? After all, high-speed rail services on
some distances can really compete with air services, and they
are surely less polluting. The problem is that on the distances
involved, the traffic is generally not large enough to pay for
the infrastructure, if it has to be built anew and if the service
has to compete with liberalised air fares (i.e. low cost
services). In the end it depends on the balance between
infrastructure costs and environmental costs. Generally,
whatever figure is used for environmental costs, the balance
seems to be in favour of air services. A rough order of
magnitude: a kilometre of high-speed line costs around 15
million Euros while environmental cost for a passenger*km
on a plane is less than 0,05 Euros25. The demand needed to
balance these figures is in the order of 30 million
passengers/year, a dimension of an intercity demand very
difficult to reach, except among major state capitals.
Other aspects of railways policy are not clarified in the
document, and the general trend toward other modes of transport
leaves little space for optimism. The main issue concerns the
allocation of scarce capacity. Scarce capacity arises where the
demand is concentrated, and, given the large economies of scale
of rail services, this implies that it concerns the most profitable
routes. The problem is similar to slot allocation in air transport.
In turn, the recent document on slot allocation from the
Commission basically confirms the “grandfather clause”
principle that foresees slots left in eternal and free use to the
incumbent carriers, blocking any potential competition on the
more profitable European routes. Competition is left on minor
“point-to-point” routes (with some exception in U.K.) and only
there the low-cost carriers can prevail.
If this anti competition principle is accepted for air transport, the
incumbent rail companies will find an easy ground for asking a
consistent European approach also for the rail sector (adding to
this some environmental and social spurious argument).
Another issue concerns the overall European market
structure, and this issue looks in fact outside the scope of DG-
TREN. The incumbent state rail companies are probably, as
we have seen above, a de facto cartel: they collaborate in
defending their monopolist position, with mergers (Germany
and Dutch freight services), joint projects (French TGV
services in Italy, Cisalpino services between Italy and
Switzerland, etc.), and above all avoiding any  inter-state
competition within the next ten years.
As said, it is impossible that all the national incumbents have
the same costs, i.e. that they have no interest in entering a
foreign market. The only possible explanation of this behaviour
is the existence of a cartel, but the Commission has little power
and/or will to intervene in public cartels. (In some states, even
by law the anti-trust authorities are denied the possibility of
intervening in politically-sponsored monopolies).
4. Conclusions and recommendations
The traditional principal-agent problems (moral hazard, and
adverse selection) in the public sector are compounded by the
presence of two separate “steps”. The primary principal-agent
relationship is the electorate-politician link: politicians
develop “egoistic”, short-term objectives (re-election), and
favour special interest groups against less vocal ones, and
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against long-term objectives. 
Public  agencies and transport operators are themselves
“agents” in respect to their political “principals”, and again
these agents maximise egoistic, rent seeking, objectives. The
resulting picture is complex, and requires further analysis,
specially for the railway sector.
A different diagnosis has sometime related the above-
underlined problems to a possible “prisoner’s dilemma”, in
order to explain the weakness of the European railway policy.
Each country is afraid of liberalising first, since this will put
its national companies at a disadvantage, not knowing if other
countries will follow suit, and at which “speed” they will. It is
the well-know theory of “national champions”, that have to
be defended at least till they are “strong enough” to compete
internationally on a fair basis. This hypothesis is not
convincing: if the “prisoner’s dilemma” damages everyone,
as the theory clearly demonstrates, why not accelerate the
negotiation process, as in “pure private” sectors? The “close
relationship” between the political world and the transport
sector in general (and specially with the railway companies)
is a much more powerful explanation. Natural monopolies,
externalities, social goals are intertwined and far more
relevant than in other sectors, and for this reason the state has
been much more directly involved.
Another, less pessimistic, approach may suggest that the
European picture is changing, and in fact it is slowly
introducing more consistent and pro-competition actions.
Speed, however, is not a neutral factor within a liberalisation
process. Within a slowly moving context, incumbents can
organise themselves well, taking advantage of information
asymmetry and of sunk costs, forming cartels, cross-
subsiding their activities, etc. Everything becomes more
difficult if policy allows for lengthy organised resistance.
Recommendations in this field can only be humble, but
nevertheless consistent with the picture outlined above.
In the first place, it seems useful to minimise the
discretionary components within the decision-making
process. Improvements in cost-benefit techniques26 and
explicit distributive evaluations may help, without forgetting
that the process has to remain a political and democratic one
(where value judgements are the core of the game).
In second place, the increasing role of independent authorities
may help in separating efficiency goals (for example, with
price-cap policies on natural monopolies, avoiding cross
subsidies, checking artificially dominant positions stemming
from the political defence of the incumbents, etc.) from
distributive and environmental ones, where the political
process has to play a larger role.
In third place, a shift of subsidies from service companies to
final users allows for increased transparency, and better social
effectiveness both for environmental and for redistributive
goals, at the same time increasing the possibility of explicit
policies in favour of a competitive environment for railways.
The strengthening of efficiency-oriented, pro-market
regulatory bodies is also consistent with a stronger role for
the European Commission, as compared to national
(“egoistic”) interests. The present political trend seems shaky
at best on this issue, but optimism is mandatory (general “the
interest” will prevail). Optimism, eventually, can derive from
a “domino-effect”: if competition begins to take hold, and
delivers, as it has done up to now in every economic sector,
the same will happen also in railways, even within a trial-and-
error process.
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NO T E S
1 Congestion externalities are nevertheless a special case, being
conceived as “club” externalities, in the sense developed by the Public
Choice approach.
2 Ponti, M., (1997), “Le esternalità di consumo nei trasporti collettivi”,
Economia e Politica Industriale, n° 96, Franco Angeli.
3 Even if privatization was allowed, as in the U.K. case.
4 Germany has permitted competition of aggressive new entrants in the
regional services, and Italy has recently issued a quite pro-competition
reform law on local transport (N422).
5 The document was written in collaboration also by the author of the
present paper, and is available upon request.
6 European Commission, (1997), Trans European Rail Freight
Freeways COM(97) 242,  May .
7 Nuti, F., (1997), “Il caso britannico”, in Nomisma, Liberalizzazione e
privatizzazione nelle ferrovie europee, Vallecchi, Firenze.
8 Even taking into account the larger dimensions of the German rail
traffic, safety statistics look comparable in the two cases.
9 In market contexts cross subsidization is forbidden by antitrust
authorities, to avoid anti competitive behaviours (i.e. dumping policies)
10 Non-commercial services operate at a loss because of low tariffs
and/or low traffic; in this second case, the services are seen as a “local”
asset, whose availability is perceived as more useful then its real use.
Nothing is said about the real social (distributive and environmental)
content of these services.
11 Swedish reform began three years before the EEC directive 440/91
12 Even if there are no specific figures to confirm it, some compensation
mechanism is well possible within the consolidated budget of the FS
holding. 
13 Cisalpino AG provides international services in partnership with
Trenitalia, and Trenitalia owns shares of this company.
14 Pagani, F., (2000), La liberalizzazione delle ferrovie, mimeo, Milano.
15 According to the studies of the Italian  general transport plan , in
particular between Milano and Bologna, and in some “hubs”: Milan,
Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples, Venice
16 Regione Lombardia will be the first Italian local administration to
introduce concurrency for the market; but it decided to start regulating
only a small portion of its railway network.
17 It is peculiar that non-profitable passenger services are opened to
competition before the profitable ones, and this again can be seen in
“capture” terms; but it is the real case both for Italy and Germany.
18 The Economist, (1999), “The Rail Billionaires”, July 3rd.
19 A subsequent elaboration on this point.
20 The Economist, (2000), “The Price of Safety”, November 25th.
21 The Economist, (2000), op. cit.
22 The Economist, (2001), “Bloods on the tracks”, October 13th.
23 The Economist, (2001), op. cit.
24 And confirmed to the author, by an authority inside the Commission 
25 Assuming an interest plus amortisation cost of capital expenditure in
the order of 10%. For environmental costs, see Rothengatter. 
26 See on this issue, for example, recent papers from the British Ministry
of Transport, and within the “Transtalk” project funded by the
Commission.
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1. Introduction
The process towards a
European Internal rail
market is just beginning.
With Directives 2001/ 12,
13, 14/EC a common
framework for access to
railway infrastructure,
licensing and safety certi-
fication, allocation of rail-
way infrastructure capa-
city, and for charging for
use has been established.
This new framework
should be implemented by
March 2003 when
international freight services are opened to competition.
A European railway network that is efficient and opened to
competition is an important step for the future development
of the European Common Market. In fact, revitalising the
railways is one of the key components in the strategy
proposed by the Commission to shift the balance between
modes1. However, even if the European transport strategy
seems to give great importance to the rail transport mode, the
rail’s market share is continuing to decline, while quality
standards for good services remain far from sufficient. The
greatest cause for concern is the state of rail freight services.
For example, their share of traffic stands at 8% today
compared with 21% in 19702. The action program suggested
by the Commission proposes three types of measures to
revitalise the railways:
1. first - a tariff system for all modes of transport must be 
organised to reflect the full value of the cleanest modes;
2. second - the development of the trans-European transport 
network must continue giving priority to rail and 
concentrating on removing bottlenecks and promoting 
interoperability;
3. third - a legally and technically integrated European 
railway area must be constructed.
The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the critical points
proposed in this action program. The setting up of a European
Railway Agency3 will be particularly analysed with the aim
of understanding if the agency could be a first step towards
the creation of a European Regulatory Authority for the
railway sector. In this paper we will follow the idea that either
in a context where the railway sectors is reformed via
separation of its vertical structure or via competitive access
the need for a public regulatory authority or for an agency
that can support the action of the European Commission to
promote free competition is strong. In fact if the objective of
the Community is to promote competition a common set of
technical standards and rule has to be established and a
regulatory body or a technical agency is the only way to
reeduce the lack of organised information that up to now has,
among other reasons,
curbed the process of
integration promoted by the
Commission in the railway
sector. Our idea is that
technical barriers can be
one of the main obstacles to
competition and to the
development of a common
market for railroads. A
prerequisite for having a set
of common rules is to
centralise information on
technical characteristics of
the network and rolling
procedures. This prelimi-
nary step is necessary for developing a future method of
tracking and tracing system that could be extremely useful for
developing a European fee system for network usage.
For the scope of this paper no distinction will be made
between passenger and freight railway transport because
attention will be focused mainly on technical and institutional
steps that should be taken to develop an efficient and
competitive rail sector, and on the role that a European
Agency could play in this reform process.
The paper is organised as follows: in part 2 some key
economic questions concerning the reorganization and
financing of the former vertically integrated railroad sector
will be treated.  In particular the main reason for the current
crisis of the European railway system will be discussed -
presenting the economic and structural solution adopted by
the European Community. In part 3 some models for the
reorganisation of the railroad sector will be presented with the
objective of showing that each solution highlights the role
and importance of a regulatory body structured at a European
level. As follows from recent economic analysis, the level of
information concerning public institutions plays a critical role
in the reform process of the railroad sector. Which
information is relevant to railway reform will be discussed in
part 4, specially regarding the organization and application of
a future tariff system for network usage. Part 5 describes the
tasks that will be assigned to the European Railway Agency;
here we will show how the information collected and
organised by the Agency is a necessary prerequisite for the
constitution of a future regulatory institution in the field of
railroad transport. Part 6 presents some conclusions.
2. How to finance the railroad sector: some key
questions
The rail industry is one of the most extensively regulated
sectors in the economy.  In fact, prices, entry, financial
structure, accounting methods, vertical relations, and
operating rules are more or less subjected to some form of
governmental control. The public utility paradigm of
governmental regulation has been widely applied on the
assumption that the economic characteristics of this sector
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preclude competitive organization.  In the last ten years, this
common way of thinking has been taking a more critical
position on the traditional public utility regulation of the rail
industry. First, there are already industrial segments of the
sector where effective competition exists or can be
developed.  Second, government intervention produces
misallocation of freight traffic among competitive transport
modes, excess capacity, excess operating costs and, often,
poor investment decisions as result of misguided national
policy objectives (as suggested by the  public choice theory)4.
This regulation policy has resulted in the financially poor
conditions of the railroads, the deterioration of rail
infrastructure, the suppression and delay of cost reducing
innovation, and low quality service5.
Railways, like other major industries with a network
infrastructure such as natural gas or electric power, are
characterised by a mixture of competition and monopoly
elements in supply.  Furthermore the organization of these
sectors is quite often complicated by public service
objectives. In these cases centralised and state-controlled
industries failed in the objective of self-financing the sector,
and therefore of improving the quality of the services and
technological innovation. This is mainly due to two factors:
first, the use of such industries for improper objectives such
as fighting unemployment and supporting underdeveloped
regions; second, a misguided policy of pricing focused on
cost consideration instead of on demand and cost together.
This second mistake could be due to an inappropriate
application of the perfect competition model where optimal
prices are equal to marginal costs given particular conditions
on the demand side. In sectors characterised by high fixed
cost and natural monopoly conditions, however, marginal
prices no longer finance infrastructure investment and do not
allow an adequate rate of return. By contrast there are pricing
principles which promote economic efficiency while
removing impediments to adequate returns for carriers; these
principles lead to demand differentiated prices following the
well known Ramsey formula6. The idea that underpins these
principles is that in order to develop the right investment
policy and an efficient allocation of financial resources, price
policies in these industries should not be used to achieve
redistribution objectives. Only following these criteria can
prices convey the correct signals. Redistribution policies
should be pursued using different and less distortionary
economic instruments.
Revenues are defined to be adequate when they are just
sufficient to enable the firm to attract the financial resources
needed for maintenance, replacement, modernisation and
whatever demand conditions require. If revenues are lower
than this the predictable conclusion is the deterioration and
eventual disappearance of the service in question.  For these
reasons the railroad sector manifests a clear need for
restructuring. Of course, there is always the option of
subsidising with general taxation some particularly important
investment in infrastructure that is considered strategic for the
development of the European economic area, but this kind of
policy can no longer be applied as a general rule. 
One primary question is the level of contestability of the
railroad sector, long considered to be characterised by
indivisibility, pervasive economies of scale and scope, high
cost of entry and few competitors.  A market structure of this
kind usually justifies prices for the use of the network
infrastructure that, to be sustainable, should be above
marginal costs. If contestability does not exist  the classic
solutions to this market structure are private unregulated
monopoly, private state-regulated monopoly, and government
operation7.  If some form of contestability can be found,
however, the range of possible solutions becomes wider and
some kind of competition may open up at least in specific
segments of the sector.  The sunk cost and longevity of
railroad capital  may suggest that this industry is one in which
contestability analysis cannot be applied. However railroad
services are far more contestable than these initial
considerations would suggest because they receive strong
competitive pressure from other modes of transportation. In
fact, this kind of pressure is one of the reasons that have
contributed over time to railroad decline in terms of
transportation market share. Nearly every sphere of rail
freight service now faces intense competition. In those
activities where there is no evidence that rail sector holds a
position of market dominance the railroad should be offered
freedom in prices; in all the other cases government
regulation should be applied.
The present problems and difficulties of railroads compared
to other modes of transport seem mainly related to a lack of
efficiency, technological innovation, and interoperability
within the sector that makes it not competitive compared to
other modes. There is, of course, a problem of pricing.  In
fact, many of the external costs (i. e. environmental costs)
associated, for example, to road or air transport are not
properly internalised. The environmentally friendly
technology associated with the railroad and its capacity to
establish permanent corridors for passengers and
commodities is a resource for the future. The choices made
by the European Community for railroad improvement show
its willingness in the direction of railroad restructuring for
competitiveness, interoperability and safety with the aim of
promoting this way of transport for the development of the
European common market. This way of thinking has
recognised that rail is a contestable market with competition
coming from other modes and that the only way to support
this transport system is the development of efficiency and
innovation within the sector.
3. The restructuring of the railroad sector
The restructuring of railroad sector has three main options for
designing the vertical railway structure. The first is to
continue to follow the traditional monolithic approach under
which the railway is an integrated entity owning and
operating its own facilities and vehicles. As mentioned
before, this choice lacks financial incentives and desegregated
information on profitability, it is usually production oriented
Trasporti Europei
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and is not sensible to movements of market demand for
services; the governance structure is hierarchical. Railroads
organised and controlled according to the monolithic model,
however, must be restructured in order to contribute to the
economy and to avoid economic inefficiencies. A slightly
modified version of this approach separates different lines of
business organization within the same integrated entity.
Entities may be reorganised and accorded financial
responsibility for line of business to encourage
comprehensive market sensitive and cost sensitive decisions
such as greater responsiveness to demand changes for various
services. The scope of this kind of restructuring could be to
give the commercial sector a profitability objective and to
give non-commercial lines incentives to reduce their losses.
An internally restructured railroad enterprise may show lower
technical operating efficiency by some traditional measure
(i.e. coach-km per locomotive-km) but may achieve greater
responsiveness of each services to customers’  needs and their
willingness to pay.
The second option is that of separating the ownership of
facilities from other rail functions such as train operations and
marketing. These solutions follow a classical approach to
divesting vertically integrated industries8. These options are
quite interesting because they seem to mitigate the problems
associated with sunk and not recoverable costs. Natural
monopoly conditions hold only for the rail network, and
regulation is needed only for the part of the sector that still
remains an essential facility. In fact only in this case the sunk
nature of infrastructure costs creates significant barriers to
entry. On the other hand the cost condition relating to the
operation of services exercised on the network may be more
consistent with active and potential competition. Two
different kinds of vertical separation are possible: with the
first solution the railway entity could own and operate the
fixed facility and perform all operations on behalf of
marketing operators which would be the retailers. The
railway itself would haul the trains but would do no
marketing to shippers. With the second solution the entire
essential facility would be the property of and responsibility
of a single owner. There could be one or more authorised
users which would pay tolls for using the facility9.
The third option is competitive access. In this case,
companies would have exclusive control over some portion
of the rail network, but would also have (and give) the right
to competitive access over the portions of network to other
companies. This approach differs from the previous one
because in the “toll” regime separate entities provide the
fixed facility and conduct operations, whereas under
“competitive access” more than one entity operates in a given
market over a specific portion of the rail network. In the
competitive context the “common interest” of different
operators in having access to different networks and markets
is crucial for avoiding either opportunistic behaviour or the
use of a dominant position to reduce competition. The open
market is a consequence of “reciprocity”, but it is possible
only if operators have comparable market power and there are
no strategic corridors or sub-network that have the
characteristic of an “essential facility”10.
Given the proposed analysis it seems clear that the monolithic
approach and any possible transformation of it is not a good
solution especially looking at the strong financial and
restructuring needs that the rail sector has in order to compete
with other transport modes. Comparing separation with
competitive access the last is an optimal solution only under
certain conditions, and none of the proposed alternatives
completely avoids a certain level of public intervention and
control with regard to maximising allocative efficiency11. In
the case of separation the classical analysis on the divestiture
of a vertically integrated sector with the consequent
regulation of the economic phases that still remain a natural
monopoly calls for the constitution of a regulatory authority,
at least for pricing access to the essential facility12. In the case
of competitive access, there will always be the need for an
antitrust authority due to the firm natural inclination to
collusion. Given this economic framework the constitution of
a European Railway Agency can be read as a necessary step
towards the constitution of a new and efficient market for
railways able to compete with other transport modes.
4. The role of information in rail reform
As follows from more recent economic analysis, the role of
information in any economic process is crucial13. Either in
pure private economic context or in a regulated context where
a game is played by a private agent and a public agency, the
level of information concerning the players is a key element
for defining strategies and, in many cases, winners.
Regulators cannot rely on regulatory contracts that are
contingent on information held only by the firm or, more
generally, on information not easily verifiable by the court.
For this reason much of the recent economic literature has
been devoted to finding models with which to discuss
alternative and more subtle ways of creating information to
lessen the informational asymmetries for the promotion of
competition or the involvement of watchdog supervisor.
What level of information is required to design the market for
a new and more efficient rail sector? We will first analyse a
regulated environment, then briefly analyse a competitive
framework.
In the separation option it is obvious to concentrate attention
on segments of the network that are  characterised by natural
monopoly or in any case by being an essential facility. In
these cases a factor of crucial importance is the regulation of
Third Party Access that is the pricing of the access to the
network. Following the theory the three main options for
pricing access are marginal cost pricing with subsidies to
finance the fixed cost not covered by the tariff, Ramsey
pricing with their equity problems, and two-part tariffs. Third
Party Access is the duty that the network landlord or the
network manager has in order to provide open access to the
network to any competitor that is willing to pay a given
access fee. In order to attract operators with the desire to
constitute railways as commercial and self sufficient bodies,
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access fees should be non discriminatory among operators,
financially sustainable and efficient in order to produce the
right signals concerning the operators’ willingness to pay and
about infrastructure scarcity. Of course, to design a such a
kind of tariff is very difficult and many informational
requirements are needed14. 
Pricing access to pure marginal cost is not an easy task and
has relevant informational requirements concerning:
problems of measurement, complexity of tariff design,
financial implication, equity, efficiency, fair competition
within sectors and transport modes, and acceptability.
Two of the main critical points are the pricing for congestion
and scarcity. The first is related to the extra cost caused by a
new network user and the second is related to a lack of
network supply related to the level of demand. There are
different options for pricing congestion and scarcity but all of
them have cumbersome informational requirements.  To solve
the problem of pricing congestion, the cost of an additional
delay may be estimated by using a complex network model -
and obviously here it is critical to understand the technical
characteristics of the rail network. To organise a sufficient
level of knowledge of network characteristics and operator
behaviour is quite difficult in a national context where there
are few network users and a well established  set of laws and
rules. In the European context the task is even more difficult,
and in fact, the basic requirements concerning network
knowledge and the definition of a common set of rules on, for
example,  interoperability and safety do not exist and are far
from being established.
Even more complicated, at a national and European level, is
the possibility of solving the problem of scarcity by using
economic instruments. A classic solution to the issue of
inability to obtain the desired slot is the application of auction
theory to assign scarce slots. A second possible solution, but
theoretically less efficient because it does not take into
account the different reservation price of operators, is the call
for administered prices. Practical difficulties for an efficient
solution of the scarcity problem are related to the complicated
ways in which slots can be organised to support the
production of different kind of services and, in the case of
auctions, the possible lack of competition among agents.
Another possible scenario for pricing access to the network is
represent by the efficient component pricing rule15. With the
application of this rule the access price has to include the
direct cost of access service supply and of all others
opportunity costs of the network landlord. With the efficient
component pricing rule the network operator will have to
receive a mark-up on the final service exactly equal to the
marginal cost that it has to support on the downstream
market. Therefore he himself will have to consider an access
price to “his own infrastructure” that is the same as the price
imposed on other competitors in the final market. The main
property of this rule is that it guarantees entry into the sector
only to efficient firms with a cost structure lower than the
cost structure of the incumbent. Furthermore because this rule
is neutral towards the incumbent firm’s profits, it does not
provide any incentive for the network landlord to maintain
anti-competitive behaviour with the scope of denying access
to new entrants in the downstream market of final services.
The efficient component pricing rule can be efficiently
applied only if the separation option has been adopted in such
a way that the network operator is also active in the
downstream market for services and there would be an
interest for strategic behaviour in order to avoid access and,
therefore, competition from others service operators16.
Regarding informational requirements, the efficient
component pricing rule present the same problems noticed in
the previous analysis. The cost and profit structure of the
incumbent has to be known in order to define the mark up
that has to be applied to the access direct cost. The network
characteristics are relevant for the definition of rolling stock,
congestion, and scarcity costs, and also in order for
recognising when access is denied because of strategic
behaviour on the part of the incumbent or because of real
technical constraints that do not permit the entry of a new
operator.
In a competitive access context there is no regulator to define
access fees, but the need for information is not less than in the
separation option. In this case the main informational
requirements are related to the application of an efficient
antitrust policy. The possibility that technical constraints
related to the network can be used to deny entry require a
common set of rules on interoperability and common working
standards as far as common protocols on safety and
environmental protection. In this context the idea of
“reciprocity” among operators can be improved only if there
are common initial conditions that can facilitate cooperation
among different operators. In a sector characterised by high
fixed investments for the development, upgrading and
maintenance of the network, it seems necessary to reach a
critical common level of interoperability in order to let free
competition take hold and work efficiently. Furthermore,
even after this critical level has been reached, the unavoidable
antitrust actions require a certain level of technical
information that has to be centralised if it has to be used
appropriately and efficiently.
Following these considerations it appears evident that, in the
different European railway restructuring options proposed,
the level of information required it is, at least initially, not
very different. This is exactly the reasoning that justifies the
introduction of a European Agency, as a first necessary step
towards railroad restructuring and towards a common market
for railways. This is going to be discussed in the next section.
5. The role and perspectives of the European
Railway Agency
In the White Paper “European Transport Policy for 2010:
Time to Decide”, the Commission announced a new package
of measures that included the creation of a Community
structure for railway safety and interoperability17. The
proposal for a regulation by the European Parliament and by
the Council establishing a European Railway Agency was
Trasporti Europei
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presented in may of this year in the Official Journal of the
EU. Following the Community way of thinking, the
progressive creation of a common railway area requires an
action in the field of technical regulation applicable to both
the technical aspects and the safety standards, the two being
inextricably linked. In fact the technical and operational
differences between the railway systems of the Member
States have compartmentalised the national  rail markets and
prevented dynamic development in this sector throughout
Europe. 
For a long time safety objectives have been a purely national
matter, mainly because the national markets were closed. In
the new common perspective a need has emerged to develop
common approaches to safety: first to ensure high safety
standards as the market is opened up to an increasing number
of operators and second to allow efficient use of
infrastructure access without which incompatible national
safety regulations would create new barriers to entry. One
step could be the facilitation of issuing safety certificates to
railway undertakings with a view of their mutual recognition
in the long term. Furthermore in the field of safety it would
be important to ensure the greatest possible transparency and
an effective flow of information, with an analysis of
performance based on common indicators and linking all
operators in the sector.  In case of safety requests from
national authorities directed to receive information
concerning other Member States, it would be important to
have an independent technical opinion.
In one way safety is an essential requirement for the technical
specifications for interoperability and must be taken into
account directly when drafting them, while conversely
different safety regulation among member states could be an
obstacle to interoperability of rolling stock. For example
rolling stock maintenance is an important part of the safety
system and no genuine common market can be developed
without a system of certification of maintenance workshops.
The solution to this correlation is defining technical
specification and European standards.
In the context of safety and interoperability, human capital
also plays an important role and the vocational qualification
required for train drivers could be relevant for the
development of railroad system in Europe. These are also a
precondition for the free movement of workers. For these
reasons one of the Agency tasks is, among the others, to
support exchanges of drivers and trainers between railway
companies from different Member States.
None of these actions could be taken without the support of
an independent and technical body to supply the Community
with high quality expertise while ensuring neutrality vis-à-vis
market operators and national authorities18. The economic
improvements that will follow from a common set of
technical and safety standards are a substantial improvement
in the competitiveness of the European industry, the cost
cutting of rolling stock, and the creation of a common internal
market for railway equipments. Therefore, given this
scenario, it is now easier to interpret the different objectives
and services that should be provided by the European
Railway Agency19. First, it must supply technical support for
establishing a system for the registration of rolling stock.
This act of registration is a prerequisite for the recognition of
the technical capability of the existing and future stocks to
operate under certain conditions. Second, the Agency must
collect documents and any kind of relevant information
useful for the process of interoperability and must make all
these documents and information accessible to the public and
interested operators. The Agency must also provide an
efficient means for exchanging this information. Third, it has
to promote innovation (in the field of railway safety and
interoperability) and the use of new technologies. Fourth, it
has to contribute to the implementation of the Community
legislation for the creation of a common and free European
railway area. The agency must be independent, having legal
autonomy and a budget financed by the Community. It will be
guided by an Executive Director supported by an
administrative board20 and by a staff of independent personnel
under the full responsibility of the Executive Director.
The Agency is not an Economic Regulatory Authority,
however, because although it may adopt recommendations
addressed to the Commission and express opinions to the
Commission or to the authorities in the member states, it does
not have any direct regulatory power. It does not have the
power to submit to member states compulsory regulation and
it does not fix prices (as do the majority of existing regulatory
authorities in the field of public utilities). This very important
specification does not make any difference to the  information
required needed in order to operate. In fact, neither the
European Railway Agency nor classical regulating authority
could work without a critical mass of centralised information
to be created for and by the Agency. We do not know if the
Agency represents a first step in the direction of railroad
regulation in the European context, but it must at least
organise a framework of data bases, human skills, expertise,
and registration documents necessary for the work of a
typical regulatory body.
As mentioned before, one important task of the Agency will
be the promotion of innovations aimed at improving railway
interoperability and safety, particularly requiring, however,
the use of new information technologies and tracking and
tracing systems. The development of these kinds of expertise
and models will be extremely useful for the application of a
future system of access prices at a European level. If, for
example, for the future European railway network the
solution of pricing access following the marginal cost pricing
rule is adopted, the question of the applicability of this system
of prices will deal with the possibility of estimating use
related wear and tear costs, congestion costs, scarcity costs,
external accidents costs and environmental costs. The
estimation of the first category of costs requires a well
founded knowledge of rolling stocks and operational
techniques while the others costs, accidents apart, can be
estimated using models of tracking and tracing21. If,
otherwise,  pricing via average costs (or with two part tariffs)
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is applied there will still be the need for  identifying
bottlenecks and infrastructure scarcity, therefore it will be
important to have a system to model the railroad network
usage during peak and off-peak periods.
It seems plausible to conclude from the above discussion that
the process of railways restructuring promoted by the
Commission and now on the floor calls for a future European
regulatory body. This institution, in order to operate,  requires
a certain critical level of human skills and information that
are in part contained in the information that the proposed
European Railway Agency has the duty to collect and
organise. Of course, the technical requirements are, for the
moment, far from being the political requirements necessary
for the establishment of a typical national regulatory
authority.
6. Conclusions
This paper has discussed questions concerning the economic
regulation of the railroad sector and the proposal for
regulation by the European Parliament and  Council to
establish a European Railway Agency. The main idea of the
paper is that the European Railway Agency represents a first
step towards the constitution of a future European Authority
for the railroad sector, even if, at present, the Agency
proposed is far from having the institutional requirements that
can allow it to work as a typical authority. Generally an
authority is needed when the process of restructuring a
formerly vertically integrated sector is implemented through
separation. This approach consists of splitting the different
phases of service production introducing competition when
possible, and regulating the phases that have the economic
characteristics of a natural monopoly. In order to operate
properly, an authority needs a critical mass of information, a
certain organization and a staff endowed with specific skills.
Only in this case can the game among private operators and
public institutions  be fruitful for the development of
competition and the development of efficiency within the
sector, given the presence of asymmetric information that
characterises these processes of restructuring.  Even if, for the
reorganisation of the railroad sector, the alternative solution
of competitive access is chosen, however, the question of
maintaining a certain amount of critical information that  can
allow market designing and the construction of a new and
competitive framework still remain critical. In fact any
antitrust actions made to support the market require clear
rules for courts and technical information and evidence that
can support any action towards the protection of competition.
The European Agency’s task, at least at the beginning of its
activity, is to organise and provide information, standardise
procedure, create a body with highly qualified and competent
human skills, and to promote innovation. With these acquired
capabilities the agency could be transformed without many
problems into a European Authority for the railroad sector,
once the necessary political conditions exist.
Of course there would not be the need for a European
Authority for the railroad sector if a common and open
market for railroad services did not exist. For this reason, the
agency must create the necessary conditions for the naissance
of this market through interoperability, common technical
standards, and safety rules. Once the European railway
network has been organised with common technical operating
rules, and once the common market is monitored, for
example, with tracing and tacking systems, it would be
possible to proceed with any kind of technical and economic
regulation such as organising rail transport flows in
bottleneck situations, pricing access, introducing transport
tariffs, and promoting strategic infrastructure investments (for
the development of the European market).
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1. Introduction
The railways in Europe
have been going through a
period of turbulence for
nearly ten years. In truth, at
the moment, the turbulence
is predicted or hypothetical
rather than real.
Nevertheless, the “real
turbulence” should corre-
spond to a precise objective
of EU transport policy, that
derives  directly  from  the
Treaty of Rome. It is
neither a fashion nor
caprice. It is part of the
political objectives being
carried out by the EU.
The scope of this paper is to see how the deregulation process
is moving, if it will be realized completely and what will be
the probable scenario at the end of this process of
transformation.
2. Historical notes
Until the second post-war period, European railways had a
leading role in the public transport of people and goods, both
because  the alternatives were not technologically in a position
to replace the railways, and because the demand of mobility
generally increased at a low rate compared to the increase of
GNP. This situation was found particularly in the goods sector,
because  production was spatially concentrated, there was a
predominance of verticality in the industry, and the goods were
in big volumes, weights, and dimensions.
In the passenger sector, mobility was restricted with regard to
distance, limited with regard to commuting for work and for
school; welfare was not generalised and mobility for pleasure,
shopping, and tourism was also limited.
Immediately after the second post-war period the alternative
of roads dramatically replaced the rail one. In a short time the
road system (both for people and for goods) prevailed totally,
thanks to flexibility, door to door, specialisation, ever
decreasing costs, and continuous technological development.
The railway has  been  left behind to the point of obsoletion,
even compared to maritime and short-sea shipping that have
adopted, for instance, hub and spoke system for container
traffic.
The railway became very expensive and lost most of its
competitiveness due to the scarce flexibility of the services
offered. Labour and infrastructure were the main cost drivers.
Industrial development, based on industrial districts, has
increasingly reinforced road transport, in the end virtually
taking the place of the railway in the transport market.
For a long time it had been lacking commercial
aggressiveness, technological and organizational upgrading,
even if the technical specialisation of the engineers was often
very high. 
In addition, the general
planning of the transport
system underestimated the
dependence of land
transport on sea transport
in a scenario of globa-
lisation. The decline of the
railway industry is linked
to its gradual trans-
formation from leading
mode in the transport
system  to a tool of the
governmental economic
policy (employment, fares
policies, prices of final
products, etc.), producing
great re-distributive effects
as a result. 
The railway industry essentially continues, essentially, to
carry out so-called “public services”, ensuring passenger
service at marginal costs, or,  in the case of the goods
transport, carrying out a service that has no road alternative or
that was not much in demand in terms of quality and
reliability (i.e. the so-called poor goods in great volumes).
At the European scale the public financing of the railways
assumes the form of subsidies to “requirements for public
service” and to “aids for infrastructure costs”.
As a matter of fact, the railways were an element of the
welfare state, such that the ensuing crisis of one meant the
crisis of the other.
All that until when, in 1991, the EU issued “Directive 440”,
concerning the development of the EU railways representing
the first shock to the by now anacronistic giant.
3. From indifference to attention
Today, 10 years after the above mentioned directive, we have
a number of directives, statements, and “white papers”,
whose aims is to invigorate the railways. It is possible to
imagine a number of causes that determine these initiatives -
causes of a political  nature, such as the removal of barriers in
the construction of a common European market, the free
movement of people and goods and the progressive
elimination of national networks in order to create a European
one. The railways can neither escape this  logic nor be an
obstacle to it. There can remain no “state railways” but rather
“European state railways”. Obviously, this does not mean
there will be a single great European railway industry. We
have to remember that this process is being carried out in a
scenario of deep evolution at a world-wide level. The United
States of Europe will arise from the necessity to be stronger
and more competitive. Consequently the different elements of
the system must maintain dimensions adequate for this goal.
Adequate dimensions for the economies, industry, financial
groups, and the railways, must also be reached.
The opening of state railways to a European scale will also
determine the elimination of inefficiency and localised rents
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that characterise protected economies.
This situation is well explained by the “White Paper” on
European transport, published in September 2001 -
“European Transport Policy Until 2010: Time to Decide”.
This document was issued ten years after the first White
Paper, entitled: “The Common Future Development of
Transport”. The key concept in the  document is the opening
of the transport market: “In ten years, with the only exception
of the railway sector, – underlines the paper – this objective
has been virtually reached”.
The  directives, the white papers, the communications of the
EU, pay particular attention to freight transport, pursuing the
fundamental objective of modal rebalance. In the freight
sector, the increase of revenue is leading to an increase in the
demand for goods. The increase of transport demand is
consequent to that. It is also, however, consequent to the rules
of the new world-reorganisation determined by delocalisation
of production, increase of tertiary activities, and decrease or
elimination of stocks.
These factors, particularly the second, determine the increase
of transport demand - but of a demand with particular
features in terms of quality and reliability. Just in time factor
is one of the characteristics of this demand. Transportation
has to be assured even if the factories are very far from each
other, as  is  more and more frequent today, and separation
has to be bridged by a land-sea-land transportation sequence.
In addition, the land and maritime infrastructures are not
always developed according to European standards. In those
cases the logistic chain has to ensure “just in time”. This
means not only the final origin or destination in the factory
has to be determined, but also the intermediate appointments
of the change of transport mode, or those of load rupture.
This process is now under way, and one can see a generally
limited presence of the railway, compared to the share of
road, maritime and short sea transport. In other words, land
transport will have to be proportioned and dimensioned to
maritime and air navigation. This is the field of economic
logistics, a new discipline particularly devoted to the
investigation of new models of intimate integration between
production and transport.
In general, the overall rise in transport demand, increasingly
biased toward roads, will determine a saturation of at least the
most important origin destination axes. It will be difficult to
upgrade the supply of infrastructure to meet increasing
demand. In addition, it is probably not possible to create new
motorways on particular corridors in Europe, and only an
optimisation of the existing capacity through new technology
injection will be possible. Saturation, however, will be only
postponed for some years. In Europe, a doubling of transport
demand in the next ten years is very likely and it is inevitable
that the railways will be called to satisfy a share of this
increase. Its role in the logistic chain will be augmented if a
greater compatibly with other modes is created within its
vocational role. 
There is a future for the railway industry if the efficiency
level is raised. The railway system has to develop more
synergies with the other modes according to the needs of the
European and world-wide supply chain. The American
railway system for example, is linked to the maritime one.
When a container leaves from Japan and crosses the Pacific
Ocean, it is loaded on a train in Los Angeles and then reaches
Boston, going across the Atlantic Ocean, it arrives in
Rotterdam and from here it arrives in Germany by train. 
Another important element of infrastructure is that of
maritime terminals. The Northern Range ports are the biggest
in Europe and container business is increasing. The most
relevant growth possibility is linked to the Mediterranean
ports, such as those of the “Southern Range”: Algeciras,
Gioia Tauro, Malta and Taranto. The increasing East/West,
and vice versa, movement of goods will favour these
European ports. In this way the “Southern Range” might
replace the Northern one.
Finally, we can indicate another important issue: the
environment. The environmental equilibrium in goods
transport and its impact on land is a strategic matter of
economic logistics. This factor might not be the most
important, but sensitivity towards environmental problems is
widespread in the population and increasing. Strategic
decisions in the alpine countries hinder the transit and the
growth of road traffic in these territories. The EU support of
environmental positions has focused great attention on this
issue and has suggested possible solutions. 
The most important environmental impacts of transport are:
acoustic, atmospheric and land useage.  At present the
atmospheric impact is the most widely perceived problem. In
this case trains are clearly the winners (at least, if the
production of electric energy by oil is not considered). The
other two types of impact are: noise and the territorial impact.
Considering the first point, present rail transport seems to
pollute more than road, at least for freight traffic. Studies are
being carried out in order to resolve this problem. 
Finally, as for land use, increasing transport demand will
subsequently cause the proliferation of roads and, as reported
in the White Paper, “Every day ten hectares of territory are
covered with road infrastructure”. The railway system has to
be more exploited because it occupies only a third of the
territory of road-networks.
4. The normative measures taken by EU
Among the most important normative measures implemented
to stimulate rail transport in Europe over the last ten years are
the following: 
• Directive 18 of 1995, on the licencing regulations for
enterprises; Directive 440 of 1991 concerning the
development of the European railways.
• Directive n. 19 of 1995, on the sharing out of
infrastructure capacities and the recovery of infrastructure
usage rights.
• Directive 48 of 1996, on the standardisation  of high speed
railway systems.
• Directive 12 of 2001, that modifies Directive 91/440.
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• Directive 13 of 2001, that modifies Directive 95/18 on
railway licences.
• Directive 14 of 2001 on principles enforceable in the
determination of rail infrastructure usage rights.
• Directive 2001/n. 16 of 2001 on the standardisation of
conventional railway systems.
Let us look at these measures in more detail.
Directive 440 represents a milestone in the European railway
history. In fact, it suggests separating infrastructure from
service.
Directive n.19 of 1995 contains an important rule introducing
the so called “Certificate of Security” concerning the
technical capacity of a railway operator to circulate on a
certain rail-network.
The Certificate of Security allows an operator to offer a
transport service on a given network and constitutes a sort of
barrier to the railway market for new operators since the
railway system has a number of strict technical norms. 
The Directives n. 1996/48 and 2001/16 concern inter-
operability that is, the technical standardization of rail system
at the European level. The numerous and rigorous above
mentioned norms are in fact different in different countries.
In addition, these rigidities and differences are connected to
the industry of railway equipment supply.
To overcome these limitations the EU has formed a technical
association, the EARI (European Association of Railway
Interoperability). Both representatives of the railway and
supply industry are represented in this body. Undoubtedly an
acceleration of the standardisation process will come from the
present phase of reorganisation and concentration of supply at
a world-wide level.
In parallel, the EU is removing another part of ancient states’
supremacy - the traditional presence in the same entity of
both the railway operation and the function of rules and
control. The EU is gradually imposing the concept of the
independent body, able to certify the conformity of all
components of rolling stock and the infrastructure to the
technical specification established in the interoperability
norms, which must be mandatory throughout Europe.
Moreover, the EU is preparing other directives on railway
safety, on the modification of directives 96/48 and 2001/16,
on a regulation plan which creates a European Railway
Agency for safety, and on a project to modify the directive
91/440 to open the access to infrastructure also to the national
services and to complete the total opening of the railway
market.
5. Possible economic settings 
In order to create the new European railway it is necessary to
reduce the present national systems and to reorganise them on
a European basis. One can imagine that this process will pass
through the typical phases of: liberalisation, fragmentation,
and consolidation.
Therefore it is also interesting to examine how these phases
will play out and which of them will be more important and
lasting, and which, on the contrary, will feel the effects of the
railroad industry rather than those of manufacturing or
service. Here it is useful to recall what has already happened
in air and railway deregulation in the US, in order to
understand the potential changes in Europe. 
The first changes can be dated back to the late seventies when
the American Senate passed the Airline Deregulation Act
(A.D.A.). This act eliminated the regulatory  system that had
been protecting the commercial air sector from competition
for 40 years. 
The A.D.A. represented the tangible mark of the
government’s move to substitute the norms regulating entry,
exit, and fares with free market and competition rules.
Competition, argued the supporters of deregulation, would
produce a cut in fares, with clear advantages for customers. In
addition, airlines  would be  forced to regain lost efficiency,
thanks to the modification of the capacity offered and to the
rationalisation of their networks. In the end, deregulation
would create new opportunities, offering new and varied
services that would better satisfy customer needs.
This strongly conservative scenario changed with
deregulation. In fact, all companies satisfying technical
prerequisites had free access to the market and freedom to
choose the most profitable routes. Economic interests started
operating and legitimate competition between operators for
profitable routes made markets more competitive. 
In the years following the A.D.A. many air companies that
until then had been serving only regional markets, started
operating at a national scale. In 1984, after a number of
sensational failures, the number of air companies (or a
significant part of them) that served the entire territorial USA,
increased dramatically. Nevertheless, between 1984 and
1986, a combination of financial failures, mergers and
acquisitions clearly redesigned the structure of the sector, via
a substantial reduction of competitors. Many small operators
were acquired by the main operators, thus becoming great
carriers while others definitively left the market.
Amongst the strongest causes of this concentration of the
market, were the bloody fare wars that broke out among the
carriers immediately after the start of deregulation. This was
reinforced  by the appearance of low-cost carriers. These, in
exchange for very low fares, offered “no frills” services, in
accordance with a rigid strategy of operative costs reduction.
It is important to consider, however, that, although supporters
of the deregulation process considered the market perfectly
competitive, its oligopolistic and, in certain cases,
monopolistic nature soon became evident. 
Subsequently, at the beginning of the eighties, there was a
passage from an oligopolistic market regulated by the state to
an almost unregulated oligopolistic market.
In the freight sector, the same history concerns the world-
wide maritime container traffic.
Considering the deregulation of European rail transport, it
will be interesting to see whether there will be a return to
oligopolistic and/or monopolistic models after the first phase
of liberalisation has taken place.
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These models in fact could be influenced by the structure of
the railway industry, characterised by fixed costs, strong
economies of scale, and a natural tendency towards
concentration.
It is interesting to know what has happened in the American
rail freight sector - the only one relevant in USA, with a share
of 40% of the market, almost insignificant passenger service,
and with the same problems as in the European case.
In 1980, the Stagger Act was passed. This Act reduced the
role of the old ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission),
created in 1886 to regulate rail transport. Companies gained
the possibility of establishing market based fares and
abandoning unprofitable businesses. Furthermore, the Stagger
Act improved general market conditions but caused the
concentration that one can see today.
In the last few years, this concentration has caused problems
in terms of service quality. The different mergers and
acquisitions brought about a market dominated by four  big
companies: Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), CSX,
Norfolk Southern (NS) and Union Pacific (UP). These
companies have eliminated many lines and stations that were
active previously thus capturing many clients that are now
“prisoners” of the will-power of the four “majors”.
6. The possible settings for Europe
According to a first optimistic scenario there would be a first
phase of competition between companies. To make this
process easier, the EU has chosen to  separate the network
from operation. In this way the fixed costs of infrastructure
will be eliminated from operation and new firms will enter
the market by paying an access charge to the owner of the
network.
The EU norms that try to promote this separation are– as we
have seen – numerous and all going in the same direction. 
In principle, this hypothesised system should create a
competition-based market through a process of evolution.
This implementation path should avoid the direct passage
from the liberalisation to the concentration, without the
intermediate phase of fragmentation, as in the USA. In the
USA there is no separation between infrastructure and
operations. 
For Europe we can imagine  more networks, and more rail
operators - both identifiable by means of whatever criterion,
but surely not by means of the old national criterion.
Progressive elimination of public restrictions, increasing
technological standardisation, rationalization of industry
supply, creation of a European network mostly dedicated to
freight traffic, will all act to reduce barriers to market entry.
The present vertically integrated railways should be first
separated into two main network and operation sectors to cut
down on fixed costs. The operation will then be articulated
into homogeneous businesses: long distance passenger,
regional transport, and freight.
In the first phase one would have fragmentation, that is an
increase in the number of train operators over and above  the
present national companies. These operators will be
specialized and organized on the basis of the different criteria
- for example, by typology of freight sub-sector (e.g., wood,
chemical, intermodal, waste, etc) by direction/country
relationship (e.g., North-South, East-West,: Italy-Sweden,
Italy-Germany, etc.) and by geographical areas (e.g. National,
European and East-European traffic, etc.).
It is possible to imagine that new entrants will come from the
group of operators linked to the rail cargo market (e.g owners
of private wagons and rail tanks, combined and intermodal
transport operators, manufacturers that are already clients of
railway, freight village and logistic platform operators, etc.).
These could also be operators already inside the railway
industry, but from other sectors such as the passenger or
regional segment. 
There will also be cargo operators of other modes, such as
road and maritime transport. At the end of the day there could
be a scenario characterised by a strong horizontal market
segmentation. Subsequently the different firms will
progressively reduce production costs by outsourcing
maintenance, information services, and other subsidiary
functions.
Once the market has opened up, railway service
differentiation will increase especially those aimed at
manufacturing companies thus allowing a further reduction in
operating costs. Specialised firms, owning wagons and
locomotives, will be born in order to rent their assets to
railway operators. Platforms to manage information  services
will be created (like Railink in the USA). One might also
speculate that human resources, which today require long and
expensive training, such as for drivers, will be trained in
shorter periods by specialised firms.
In the end, railway operators will have obtained a deep cut in
fixed costs.
In a second phase one could witness a re-conquest of the
market share and the game will be played again through
technological innovation. In fact, the increase of volumes will
be made possible through an augmentation of track capacity.
The automation, control, and command systems for traffic
management on the network would be technologically
upgraded. Trains will have to be longer, heavier, and will also
dispose of technologies to rapidly set and break them up.
In parallel, it will be necessary to specialise network traffic in
particular segments: passenger, freight, regional, and high
speed. This specialisation will require the construction of
dedicated lines near big urban areas. Close to the junctions, in
fact, they will emphasise the promiscuousness of the different
types of traffic to avoid costly bottlenecks. Similar
considerations apply to terminals. 
In a third phase the sector might concentrate. There could be
mergers stimulated by those operators that are interested in
the acquisition of other potential competitors operating in
different transport sectors.
For example, firms in the maintenance sector might merge
with those renting locomotives, to obtain an integrated cycle.
On the market side, they could have the same requirements;
for example, the perishable business might merge with
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intermodal business to optimise the transport of controlled
temperature units. 
At the end of this process the scenario will show, on one
hand, a reduced number of horizontally and vertically
integrated big companies and, on the other hand, a number of
auxiliary subjects that will profitably contribute to the
optimisation of the world-wide logistic chain in the European
network. The process will at least be the same as that verified
in the world-wide full container shipping lines which, through
a number of processes of vertical integration, have become
terminal owners (e.g. Evergreen of Taiwan in Taranto) or
even owners of truck fleets and logistic platforms (e.g.
T.Notteboom and W. Winkelmans).
The second scenario could be considered realistic. The free
market game seems to be the key tool to relaunching the
railway industry. In reality the problem is complex, in fact it
is not simply a technical problem of company reorganization.
The question is how to regulate the institutional order and
define incentives capable of stimulating efficiency and
innovation in the railway industry. The principal cause of
decline was found in the lack of competitiveness and in the
deep defence of the national operators by the different
countries. The prescription is always the same: more
competitiveness - that is, more efficiency and more
development.
One way in which the EU interventions aims at developing
the European railway is by rendering management
autonomous from the respective public owners. If this
separation is made operational the railway industry could
then be managed according to commercial criterion, while the
social objectives could be warranted by means of auctioned
service contracts with the States financing both
infrastructures and commercially not viable operations. 
If one analyses the present situation in the European railways
one sees that the hoped for competitiveness in the final
market of the transport service has not yet been materialised,
and the clear “timidity” of the directives represent a difficult
obstacle to overcome. 
Network access to operators other than national incumbents
was permitted only for international associations of firms. In
addition, one can verify the strong opposition of incumbents
and of the states to the real liberalisation of the market. It is
thought, in fact, that the immediate opening of the market
could bring a competitive disadvantage for the national
incumbents. As a result of this fear, the present incumbent
operators have tried to create co-operation agreements in
order to discourage newcomers. One must not neglect,
moreover, the strong entry and exit barriers that genuinely
hinder competition. Among the most relevant barriers are the
almost total lack of technical interoperability, high start up
costs, lack of a secondary market for rolling stock, high
labour costs, and the lack of an independent authority
guaranteeing  equal market access opportunities. The result is
a non-existent competition in the passenger sector and very
low one in the freight and regional ones.  
To start the sequence of competitiveness-development, one
has to create structural incentives, through a structural
reorganisation, and a new managerial and ownership model.
The main objective is to create conditions allowing for
market contestability and sustainability, while preventing
predatory actions from incumbents.
Two competition models have been proposed1: competition
“in the market” and competition “for the market”. The first
model concerns the simultaneous competition among a
number of railway industries. It is applicable, in particular, to
the highly profitable passenger sector and to specific freight
segments. Conditional to the application of this model is the
separation of networks and operations, that is a prerequisite to
reduce entry barriers and to eliminate the unsustainable cost
component. The model based on competition “for the
market”, on the other hand, activates the competitive phase
only periodically, for example when choosing an operator that
will be able to operate a particular network or railway
segment according to the consolidated scheme of the legal
monopoly. This model is usually applied to the segments of
regional transports needing public subsidies.
The second important action is the constitution of an
independent authority capable of playing the role of referee
among the contrasting interests of the consumers,
shareholders, and the state. The authority should dispose of
highly skilled and well paid personnel to avoid regulatory
capture. This independent organism should introduce a
process of regulation within the sector that will aim to
guarantee access of new firms to the network, also by pro-
competitive policies favouring newcomers.
The third measure regards the possible privatisation of the
public firms born from the division process. The break up of
the incumbent into a number of firms, each for a different
segment of the market, should facilitate market flotation.
Combining the typical element of efficiency actions with
specific elements of the sector, (like the public service
management model, the formation of prices model, the choice
model of investment financing, the splitting of the cost
between public finance and user), should determine a change
in the institutional arrangement of the sector. This should no
longer be a policy of defence, but rather represent a real re-
conquest of the market.
An important issue in this respect is the susceptibility of
certain rail activities to open competition. One cannot
imagine, for example, network or line duplications for each
new entrant, so we can consider infrastructure as a natural
monopoly. Many railway accidents in England, and the
following  failure  of the infrastructure owner, Railtrack
suggest a deep study of railway privatisation in Europe. It
may be, in fact, more economical to keep the network in
public hands since it requires great investments and costly
maintenance needed for safety purposes. On the contrary,
operations should be opened up to competition. Interesting
considerations can be made by comparing the railway  market
and the liberalised telecommunications market where new
operators usually offer value added services. New operators
create their own infrastructures and are more competitive than
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Rails incumbents. Unlike telecommunications, the network
seems difficult to duplicate.
If the network were privatised, it is possible that enterprises
might not recover their investments and, in this case, it would
be necessary to envisage a new system to channel public
resources to  them.
If the aim were to have private firms operate not-
commercially viable services one would need public
subsidies to guarantee that network economies are not lost.
This would also ensure equal opportunity conditions for all,
stimulating competition. Once the supremacy of the
competitive framework is accepted, the scope of regulation is
to ensure the maximum number of competitors on the market.
The only undesirable consequences of deregulation are the
possibly inefficient fragmentation of the supply or, more
probably, false plurality, with the presence of incumbents and
niche operators. In addition an incomplete regulation of the
sector could promote the formation of trusts, as the American
rail experience and the world-wide air sector demonstrate.
The initiatives undertaken to favour interoperability and
intermodality, the incentives to favour leasing and the training
of specialised manpower, and the extension to this sector of
the limitations of the public subsidies, are important steps, but
they are not enough. 
Despite  these positive aspects, there is a long way to go
before reaching full and free circulation of the rolling stock
owned by different companies - not only in terms of
insufficient  interoperability and different signalling systems,
but also in terms of the real difficulties for private companies
in creating real  logistic networks for maintaining and
repairing rolling stock.
Europe is undergoing a period of transition from national no-
market regulation to pan-European regulation for the market.
Railway competition is based on wide competition and
business differentiation. In the presence of broad business
differentiation, the competitive advantage of the companies
depends on their capacity to anticipate change, on quick
response to customer needs, and on co-ordination capacity
and resource/skill combination. For this purpose, railway
companies are adopting the so called “strategy of market
creation”. This strategy consists both in horizontal
integration,  aiming at local market penetration, as well as
vertical integration, implemented through contractual
agreement with operators or by long term partnership with
customers, that might also end up in joint ventures. The
process of European market creation allows important
changes in the railway sector through the opening of the
national markets. In a short time the industry will pass from a
state of monopoly to oligopoly, and so railway companies
will increase the number of alliances and acquisition, while
reducing the number of European and international operators.
The only fear is that the old natural monopolies will become
new private monopolies on a European scale.
7. Conclusions
Once the phases of shock and successive rearrangement of
the railway are over, will we return to a model of vertically
integrated network/operations? Can one imagine that the
dilemma of separation between infrastructure and operations
will be reduced if specialised lines and terminals materialise
as, for instance, in the USA, Australian or New Zealand
models? The railway companies in these countries also own
the network and this proves that a vertically integrated
railway company, at least for the network and operation, can
bring in  revenue, in this way being adequate to the hub and
spoke model on which the world-wide market of all transport
modes tends to consolidate.
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1. Introduction
Sometimes the need arises
to transfer goods or
services from one division
of a large company to
another division of the
same company, or between
two subsidiaries. As a
consequence, it is
necessary to fix a price at
which transactions have to
be carried out. This is the
transfer pricing problem,
which can be defined as
the unit price assigned to goods and services when they are
transferred between the parent company and subsidiaries or
between divisions within the same firm.
A debate is under way in the academic world about the
definition of transfer pricing. As a matter of fact, some
authors use this concept for both inter-corporate and intra-
corporate transactions, while others generally separate the
two according to the ownership percentage of the subsidiary.
The presence of a transfer price is generally justified by a
process of decentralisation. This type of organisation can
bring, for example, financial benefits due to the transfer of
responsibilities to divisional/subsidiary managers, who are
responsible for the profits of their divisions/subsidiaries. This
can be seen, for example, as an incentive to divisional
managers, as they would thus have more control over the
factors that affect performance measures.  The abilities of
divisional managers and the profitability of each division is
always assessed and performance evaluated.
On the other hand, decentralisation often causes problems
between divisional managers and the organisation as a whole.
As a result of decentralisation, the head of one unit looks first
at the objectives of the division and then at the objectives of
the company as a whole. Consequently, some conflicts may
arise between the interest of a divisional manager and the
interest of the organisation as a whole. As a matter of fact,
when some strategic decisions are taken, it is sometimes
possible that the head of one unit has an increase in the
profits of that unit, but that company profits as a whole have
decrease. It is clear that this type of operation cannot be
carried out because contrasts with the interest of the company.
The Management Control System then has to advise that unit,
which has to modify decisions regarding that operation.
As a result, Central Management faces the problem of
coordinating the output decisions of different profit centres in
the interest of the firm as a whole. If all divisions are left to
themselves, it may be that some of them adopt monopolistic
behaviour that can negatively affect the profitability of the
company. It is necessary, therefore, for Central Management
to coordinate divisions by setting the transfer pricing system
also in order to take advantage of such transactions and to
eliminate contrasts among units.
As we mentioned above, in a large organisation there is
generally the need to
delegate some responsibili-
ties to divisional managers
in order to achieve better
control of the organisation.
This means that the
structure of a company is
based on a hierarchy of
divisions and, in turn, of
departments. As a result,
there are transfers within
the same organisation or
between  corporations of
the same group. There is
then the need to fix  prices.
As mentioned before, however, the transfer pricing problem
is much more than an accounting problem. Transfer pricing
policies have great effects on performance evaluation and
motivation of division/subsidiary managers1.
The aim of this analysis is to illustrate how transfer prices can
be fixed in this context. Also, the concrete case of Ferrovie
dello Stato S.p.A.2 will be analysed. This case study seems to
be interesting in the light of recent developments in the rail
sector, especially those which tend to highlight the actual
performance measures of all railway branches. 
2. The role of transfer pricing: crucial variables and
company goals  
Before proceeding further and analysing the core topic, it is
useful to define and clarify some concepts.
First of all, we have to distinguish between intra-corporate
transfer prices and inter-corporate transfer prices. The former
is used for operations among the divisions of the same
corporation and the latter is used for transactions among
different corporation of the same company.
Inter-corporate transactions may be due to the need to
transfer, for example, raw materials from a unit in one
country to another one of a different country, or due tl the
possibility that stages of the productive process are more
efficient in one country than in another, and so on.
In addition, it is useful to give prominence to the fact that
transfer pricing involving the divisions or the units of a
multinational company causes more problems than transfer
pricing within the domestic economy. As a matter of fact, for
the Multi National Company (MNCs) we have to take more
variables into account, such as tax legislation, custom duties
and currency restrictions. Consequently, as shown in Table 1,
there are some differences among companies located in
different countries and therefore some crucial variables
should be considered when determining transfer prices. Many
factors can affect decisions regarding the setting of transfer
prices. These factors weigh differently in multinationals
spread all over the world. In addition, it seems possible to
group some countries which prefer cost-based transfer pricing
methods and those which prefer market-based transfer pricing
methods. In the first group we can find American, French,
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British and Japanese companies while in the second one
Canadian, Italian and Scandinavian companies. For other
groups, a precise location is not possible3.
As shown in Table 1, generally the most important variable
considered is income tax. Actually, with the exception of
Germany, all countries considered this taxation highly
important. Finally, Arpan found that most firms considered in
his study used transfer price as an instrument of controlling
subsidiary operation rather than a technique for evaluating
and motivating subsidiary performance4. The study
considered here was limited to sixty multinationals, enough to
have an idea of the importance that the firms of each country
give to the most important variables considered to determine
transfer price.
Furthermore, for a multinational enterprise, international
competitiveness is a very important variable in determining
transfer prices and for this reason it is useful to understand in
which way the profitability of all operations can be reached
and how they affect each other. Let’s  consider  an example of
the relationships between a parent company located in the UK
and two subsidiaries, one in Japan, the other in Mexico. 
As shown in Figure 1, the Japanese subsidiary can be used to
finance increased advertising by its British parent. As well
low transfer prices on components shipped from a Mexican
subsidiary can lower the latter’s manufacturing cost and
permit more aggressive external pricing strategies in Japan or
raise the profitability of the Japanese subsidiary. 
Another point that needs to be stressed is the relationship
between organisational form and transfer prices. In the
presence of a highly diversified organisation with scanty
vertical integration, a policy determining transfer prices
might not exist, because in this case all units would be free to
establish some business relationships as if they were firms
operating in an open market. On the other hand, in an
organisation characterised by a vertical organisation, transfer
prices calculated at full cost might not be the most
appropriate. The difference between the first type of
organisation and the second comes at the moment when the
transaction implementation is decided upon. In fact, in an
organisation with low vertical integration transfer price is
market price, and on the basis of this price, a make or buy
decision will be taken. On the other hand, in a group with
vertical organisation, transfer price will be fixed after the
purchase is made inside the company.
To conclude this brief description of the environment in
which transfer pricing operates, it is important to add that
some corporate goals can be achieved by using transfer
prices. First of all, it is possible to save taxes which
maximises global after-tax profits. In this case, tax rates in the
different countries and the different procedures for obtaining
income to be taxed are carefully examined.
Transfer pricing systems can also be used
in order to minimise losses from
fluctuations in foreign currencies.  Here the
parent firm looks carefully at the exchange
risk and tries to reduce it by advising a
specific currency to be used for the
payment.
Moreover, transfer price can reduce the
impact of some tariffs, especially the “ad
valorem” ones. In this case, the sales
corporation favours the reduction of
invoice prices in order to reduce tariffs.
3. Transfer pricing systems
Transfer pricing can be set in different ways
and can be varied on the basis of the
circumstances existing in particular
situations or on the basis of the objectives of
the management. Therefore, no transfer
pricing method is appropriate in all
instances. In addition, there is often a
disparity between the theoretical approach
and the practical application of transfer
pricing mechanisms, but basically there are
two types of transfer pricing systems in use:
1) cost-based transfer pricing methods,  
2) market-based transfer pricing methods5.
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V ar iables Parent nationality
U SA Can ad a F rance G er many I taly S cand in avia U nited
K in gd om 
I ncom e tax 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 
Cus to ms du ties 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
I nf latio n 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 
Chang es in 
cur rency exch an ge
r ates 
3 3 2 2 3 3 2 
Exchang e con tro ls 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 
I mp ro vin g
f in an cial
app earan ce o f 
s ub sidiary 
3 3 3 4 4 4 1 
Exp ro pr iatio n 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
Exp or t s ub sid ies
and tax cr ed its 
4 2 2 4 2 4 2 
Lev el o f 
com petitio n
4 2 2 3 2 3 3 
Notes:
Weighti ng Scale:
1 = high i mport ance
2 = medium i mportance
3 = low im portance
4 = not ment ioned
5 = mentioned only with respect to non- US operations
Sour ce: Ar pan.
Table 1: National differences in relative importance given
to variables in transfer price determination
E L I S A B E T T A  V E N E Z I A
3.1. Cost-based transfer pricing methods
Transfer prices calculated in this way are essentially based on
internal costs. As shown below, different bases can be taken
into account in order to fix the final transfer price.
3.1.1. Standard costs
Standard costs are calculated on the basis of a cost accounting
system which uses predetermined standard costs which regard
some elements of cost.
The process by which standard costs are determined can be
described as follows:
1) detection of cost centres;
2) definition of the “standard operative conditions” of each
centre; 
3) determination of unitary standard;
4) determination of the volume of production;
5) calculation of process - and product - related standard
costs. 
The first stage is very important, because without it, it is
impossible to calculate standard costs, due to the fact that this
determination is based on each cost centre.
It is then necessary to define the quality of the outputs that
can be obtained for each cost centre, and the
factors to be used and the formality to comply
with in order to carry out all processes.
Then follows the determination of the unitary
standards and of the volume of production.
Standard costs will depend on these quantities.
Physical standards are determined separately
for each productive factor, for each good that
can be obtained and for each method of
production adopted. Lastly, the standards that
will be part of the calculation of some costs of
production are only those which have been
determined for some volumes of production
and for some formalities of carrying out the
production process.  Therefore, the real choice
will be made from a selection of all the
possibilities.
Transfer pricing based on this method is
appreciated by those managers who consider
that the standard cost system is based on an
analytically-developed cost unit. For them,
unit costs are calculated at an attainable
volume of output and therefore represent a
reasonable degree of efficiency. In addition,
the use of standard costs gives the possibility
of eliminating the delay in processing transfers
and also permits prior knowledge of the price
to be paid or received for transactions.
3.1.2. Actual costs
This very simple method is restricted to
situations in which the responsibility for profit
performance is centralised. Nevertheless,
production inefficiencies in the sales division
will be passed on to the purchasing division.
3.1.3. Full cost plus a basis
The aforementioned methods are more often used in
centralised companies. Actually, full cost transfer prices are
incompatible with some objectives of decentralised
organisations. In order to overcome the problem, when
division managers have some authority, it is preferable to
adopt a cost-based transfer price method which permits to add
a mark up on the full cost. Thus, it is possible to overcome
the problem of the objective of internal profit measurement,
but not the problem of objective allocation of the
decentralised company.
3.1.4. Marginal cost basis
When transactions take place on the basis of a marginal cost,
each division manager is able to accept other orders of goods
only if the price received exceeds the total marginal cost.
Some difficulties can arise with this method. First of all, it is
very difficult  to have a constant marginal cost, consequently,
very often it is not possible to know in advance the price at
which operations will take place. In addition, it is also true
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that the volume of production will depend on demand and
supply and changes in marginal costs are consequently linked
to this volume. As a result, all divisions should consider this
situation in taking output decisions, especially when each
division modifies this volume in order to cover the marginal
costs with marginal revenues. Finally, this method does not
take into consideration the performance measurement aspects
of internal profit reporting.
3.1.5. Cost plus investments
The imposition of internal purchasing might be a possible
solution for determining transfer prices. The sales division is
divided into an investment centre, on the basis of external
sales, and a cost centre for internal transfers. As a result, the
purchasing unit is responsible for the profits and for the ROI
of all the internal resources that are used to manufacture its
products.
This method can be seen as a financial technique able to
overcome, for example, some problems that can arise with
other methods such as dual pricing, for which there is the
problem of structural adjustments. Some problems may arise
with the cost-plus-investments method too. Most of them are
linked to the right allocation of costs and investments. In
addition, if conditions change, allocations (which are a bit
arbitrary) do not reflect the equilibrium between internal and
external sales. 
3.2. Market-based transfer pricing methods
Transfer prices calculated in this way have to be based on
external market price, as we can see for the following methods.
3.2.1. The perfectly competitive market
In this situation, the purchasing division should pay market
price such that then central management could only ensure the
application of that price as a transfer price. This solution seems
to be the best due to the absence of arbitrariness. As a matter of
fact, it is possible to carefully calculate the measure of the
economic performance of each division participating in the
transaction, also because the profits of each division are the real
economic contributions to the total company profits. In practice,
if competitive market prices are used for internal transfers, they
can appear too high, due to the fact that in such operations, for
example, the costs of advertising and transport have been saved.
Therefore, it would be better to use other mechanisms, as for
example a discount to be calculated on market price or dual
pricing.
3.2.2. Market price minus a discount
In this case, even though a transfer price may seem adequate
for internal aims, it is also true that the central management
affects transfer price by fixing the amount of the discount. As
a result, the possibility of fixing transfer prices to market
price levels is threatened.
3.2.3. Dual pricing
This method is a mix of the market price advantage (that is
the incentive to the profit for the sales unit) and of the
obligation to buy internally (that is the possibility of fixing a
volume of transferred goods in order to reduce the
manufacture costs of the unit). In this case, the purchasing
division will receive the transferred goods at a cost price,
whereas market price will be accredited to the sales unit.
Then the double calculation of the profits will be eliminated
from the highest levels of the organisation. As a result, even
if there is the intervention of the central manager, this is
compensated by a higher flexibility. Actually, the purchasing
unit receives the product at a lower than market price,
allowing the possibility to show profit in the report.
There are also problems with dual pricing. First of all, it is
necessary to deal carefully with the double calculation of
profits, because the net income of the company as a whole
will be slightly lower than the sum of all the profits of the
units if the financial and control systems are  not adequate.
In addition, as the buying unit receives the product at cost
price, it has no interest in negotiating a convenient market
price. As a matter of fact,  none of the units takes the trouble
to look at the performance of the others (typical of
competitive organisations).
Moreover, cost price might be higher than market price, as
can happen in the first stage of  product life cycles with a
significant learning curve.
At last, it is clear that the firms probably cannot use dual
pricing for long periods and for all products, even though it
can be used for some strategically important items.
To conclude, in practice theoretical methods are only a basis
on which transfers take place. Actually, transfer price is
generally negotiated between the interested units in order to
try  to simultaneously satisfy the objectives of each unit and
the objectives of the company as a whole.
4. The case of Ferrovie dello Stato SpA
The current and particular situation of Ferrovie dello Stato
SpA is the result of the European directives applied to the
railway sector (Dir. 91/440, Dir. 95/18 and Dir. 95/19) which
mainly introduce competition into the rail sector by
separating infrastructure from operation. The transfer price
system currently in force is the same adopted soon after the
process of accounting separation, the only difference being
that the context has changed: operations are mainly among
companies of the same group and no longer among divisions
of the same company. This reflects the modified structure of
Ferrovie dello Stato group, which is the result of both
managerial restructuring and an attempt at organisational
adjustment to external changes. Initially, the Ferrovie dello
Stato group was organised on the basis of horizontal
processes, which means that the company was organised to
reach the efficient use of resources without taking into
account the effectiveness of the services supplied to the
market. This negative aspect, together with the liberalisation
process of the railway sector in Europe and modified public
interventions in companies characterised by state monopoly,
brought about the idea of changing the company structure by
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creating divisions in 1998. This implied a greater attention to
demand needs, the urgency of increasing the operative
efficiency of organisational/productive processes and quality
standards, the need to increase economic efficiency, and
finally, the absolute necessity of a more flexible
organisational structure. The next step was the creation of a
group with a holding and different specialised companies6.
The  transfer pricing system of Ferrovie dello Stato SpA has
been structured to take into account the following aims: 
- stimulate each strategic unit to reach the efficiency and 
the effectiveness objectives 
- properly calculate revenues and margins, in order to 
have useful information so as to allocate resources and 
investments in more profitable areas. 
The starting points of the transfer pricing system are the exact
definition of:
- operations subjected to the transfer price scheme,
- criteria for pricing all operations
- drivers for quantifying internal movements 
- formal rules related to movements.
With particular regard to the transfer price determination,
Ferrovie dello Stato applies: 
- the standard price for services like ordinary maintenance 
of rolling-stocks. This way, each unit includes these 
operations in its budget and the managers responsible for 
the results of each unit are interested in getting their own 
results,
- the market price for services available on  external 
markets for which there are normal prices, such as 
ticketing, health services and so on, 
- an administered price applied mainly to circulation 
services7.
As to this final price, there are some hypotheses of evolution
strictly related to the opening of the market to private
operators. One of these criteria is to evaluate differently
guarantees train-km (evaluated with a base tariff) and non-
guaranteed train-km (evaluated with a negotiation process).
In the end, this system should allow an increase in negotiated
volumes on the market and a decrease in guaranteed volumes
in order to stimulate supply and satisfy the concrete needs of
the market. Can transfer pricing improve the internal
efficiency and answer to the competitive aspects of the
railway market? The answer is yes, neverthless efficient
control mechanisms (such as transfer prices) are not typically
independent of organisational forms. Therefore, full
effectiveness of these tools strictly depends on the internal
organisation of companies. As a consequence, the completion
of the necessary reorganisation process of Ferrovie dello
Stato stimulates great expectations in this sense, due to the
fact that transfer pricing systems are absolutely important for
the economic sectors characterised by the opening of
markets to competition. Furthermore, it seems that efficient
control mechanisms play an important role in sustaining the
separation of ownership and control common to public
corporation8. This, therefore, might be the right moment for
managers to take this chance into consideration.
In addition, managers of the railway sector should start
thinking that if the transfer pricing system is to be efficient,
prices must be established which foster a healthy competitive
spirit, provide an adequate profit yardstick for the measure of
management, and provide figures to top management to be
used for policy decisions.  
A further consideration is that of internal monopoly when a
supplier is in a monopolistic situation, commonly the case of
railway companies. Actually, the monopolistic position of the
supplier could hold the division/company it supplies to
ransom. Head management could perhaps take a detached
view of the situation if the amount which the transfering
division/company adds to its own profit merely offsets the
decrease in the profit of the transferee division/company. It is
possible, however, for the buyer to lose more than the selling
division/company gains, therefore adversely affecting the
profits of the organisation as a whole.
Currently, Ferrovie dello Sato SpA is still characterised by a
very complex transfer pricing system with too many
parameters. This is mainly due to the impossibility of
allocating some costs due to their intrinsic nature, therefore
causing the need to elaborate peculiar criteria which reflect
each service/product exchange. Probably the best solution is
to detect few and simple transfer prices – even less precise –
in order to give the same level of information to all parts.
Ferrovie dello Stato group is working hard to facilitate both
private and market views and to adopt a strategic approach
which will lead to more easily attained profitability
objectives. The corporation is improving the sense of
responsibility in all its components by revising management
control techniques, which should improve internal efficiency.
On the other hand, Ferrovie dello Stato Spa is trying to
externally apply the principles of contendibility and
competitiveness which consent the free entrance of new
operators in the railway service market. 
Nevertheless, competition implies that the transformation
from monopolies to open markets gives positive probability
of entry. The main problem is that competition may force
entrants  to cover activities and costs which cannot be raised
by single firms. Furthermore, in strategic terms Ferrovie dello
Stato Spa may in the future demonstrate predatory behaviour
by adopting predatory pricing after the entrance of new
operators. As a matter of fact, this behaviour may be favoured
by the instrument of transfer pricing, and by the fact that
Ferrovie dello Stato Spa might not have financial constraints
in the short term in light of higher profits in the future. This
operation could seriously cause problems to new firms, which
cannot operate with losses9.  
In addition, the transfer pricing mechanism may facilitate
predatory practices as Ferrovie dello Stato operations take
place among companies of the same group and information is
fully available. On the contrary, new entrants may have
imperfect knowledge, especially with regard to the cost
function of the current monopolist, and Ferrovie dello Stato
may respond aggressively in the effort to deter future
entrants10. 
As a consequence, barriers to competitive entry or anti-
competitive practices should be seriously considered, because
they might become problematic in the near future, even in the
presence of pro-competitive legislation11.  
This may occur in the next few years in the regional Italian
rail market where competitive tendering (competition for the
market) will be adopted.  This means that one firm, after a call
for tenders, is given the sole right for a predetermined period
to a specific service previously operated by monopoly12.
Nevertheless, even though local services may appear very
attractive, due to the current level of state subsidies and cross
subsidies, new entrants may face future practices not
characterised by large subsidies. On the other hand, if non-
discriminatory practices – linked to the allocation of subsidies
and to the behaviour of the current monopolist - are applied,
efficient operators might enter the market.
This change may only promote price efficiency in supply
segments with weak external competition where the railway
firm sells a service directly to few end users with significant
needs in terms of volumes13.
I believe, therefore, that there is an urgent need for a healthy
regulation policy which protects new entrants, in order to
create a genuine market in the rail transport sector and to
prevent anti-competitive practices. Failure to design these
rules could be one of the key reasons why the potential gains
from restructuring the railway sector are not maximised. 
At the same time, Ferrovie dello Stato should pay attention to
the possible behaviour of external competitors that can use, as
market prices, distress prices which are exceptionally low.
This may occur when the new operator acts in an attempt to
attract business in the short term. In this case, Ferrovie dello
Stato should not switch its source of supply from an internal
company/division to an external supplier, unless it is sure that
distress prices are not being quoted.
The current continuing changes introduced by the Ferrovie
dello Stato group in the asset allocation process and in the
transformation of divisions into companies will probably
reduce, in the near future, the number of exchanges
previously recorded among divisions. Nevertheless, the
corporation could pay the price for the luxury of having a
decentralised situation. As a matter of fact, the validity of a
decentralisation policy may be questioned where there is a
considerable volume of interdivisional trading, as in the case
of the Ferrovie dello Stato group. However, according to
Young, “the volume of losses arising from sub-optimisation
would have to be very high before the benefits of
decentralisation are given up. Nevertheless, transfer prices are
constraints on decentralisation because they are designed to
link divisions, while by definition all sub-systems in a totally
decentralised system should act as though they are
independent. The abolition of transfer prices means that the
profits of individual operating units can no longer be
meaningfully measured and also prevents accurate estimates
of the earnings on the proposed capital projects. The
underlying requirement for profit centre controls is
competitive prices negotiated in arms’ length bargaining by
divisional managers who are free to go outside the
organisation if unhappy with prices paid by or to other
divisional managers”14. 
5. Concluding remarks
Many theoretical methods exist for calculating transfer prices,
but each of them has some particular characteristics such that
it is impossible to use them without taking into account the
type of organisation in which they are applied. In order to
achieve some corporate goals, it is also useful to take into
consideration some important variables when the problem of
setting transfer prices is faced, such as the accounting
methods for determining income to be taxed, which generally
differ in each country.
Studies on transfer pricing systems indicate that there is often
considerable disparity between the practical application of
transfer pricing mechanisms and derivations from theoretical
analyses of the topic. More generally, the company, which has
the problem of fixing transfer prices, often prefers to set an
“ad hoc” price, therefore reflecting the structure of the units
involved in such operations. In some cases, though, there are
particular circumstances which to some degree account for
this disparity. For example, there may be justification for
permitting an economically unviable transfer price in the
short term in order to maintain the existence of a
company/division, if central management decides that this
company/division has a function to perform in the long term
policy of the group. While allowing that these explanations
account for some cases of transfer pricing mechanisms, in
fact, there are still many cases where transfer prices have
often never been posed or considered as an instrument for
improving the group efficiency. Many managers are unaware
that sub-optimisation is occurring within their organisations
and that a change in the transfer pricing mechanism could
seriously improve their overall profitability. I believe that the
case of the Ferrovie dello Stato group is an example of this
unawareness, because in the past the transfer pricing system
had been seen as a mechanism used when internally
transferring goods and services, without considering the
effects of the pricing system on managerial motivations and,
consequently, on the overall profitability of the organisation.
Probably, some future outcomes will stem from the current
restructuring process.
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1. Introduction
“When accidents happen,
the public opinion over-
reacts against rail compa-
nies; people flee the rail-
ways and take to their own
cars, even if road safety is
far lower than rail safety.
Moreover, the public’s
willingness to pay for
safety is widely accepted
as a key principle in
appraising safety projects.
After rail deregulation,
because of the co-presence of different subjects in the
business (the government, the regulator agency, the train
operators, Railtrack), attention to rail safety increased. The
elected bodies surely are paying attention to these instances,
and it are too scared of the reaction of the press.”1.
Today, everybody eagerly subscribes to the idea of having
ubiquitous markets ruling virtually everything. The pillar of
markets, in a utilitarian society, is demand - in other words,
willingness to pay. Markets, however, have their own
requirements. For example, markets will only work properly
if individuals are rational.  Does this mean only somewhat
rational, or ‘extremely’ rational? Textbooks warn us that
individuals must be endowed with unlimited rationality. Do
we think we are always able to shape our willingness to pay
according to unlimitedly rational attitudes?
As in the notable example of assessing the comparative
merits of competing travel modes, individual perception of
risk hardly coincides with the textbook definition of
‘unlimited’ rationality. Therefore, travellers will prefer
railways on grounds of safety, and will underestimate both the
actual risk and the cost of safety provision of this vis-à-vis
other modes. One consequence is the low level of
willingness-to-pay that railway users may exhibit. Another is
uncertainty on the part of the regulator as to which standpoint
to take.  Are individuals’ inclinations to be subscribed to,
according to an extremely utilitarian view, or are they to be
rejected?  Here we investigate the psychological reasons for
the apparent lack of rationality of travellers, and discuss the
diverging positions about public regulation of the issue.
Travel and risk come together under a number of different
headings. Many people draw - or believe they could easily
draw - distinctions as to the different level of riskiness of
competing travel modes. Few, however, believe that an
economic value can be attached to risk.
Trains are seldom discussed in terms of safety, except perhaps
after some big change – such as privatisation or regulation.
As a matter of fact, they are considered rather safe, and
therefore perception is that they should not warrant big
expenditures to enhance safety. Safety should come to
travellers free, or very cheap. Of course, when people feel
that the degree of safety has been severely (and perhaps
‘unduly’) reduced by some external factor (most of all, by
political actions), they
concede that a certain sum
of money ought to be spent
in order to at least restore
the previous safety level.
Rail privatisation in
England seems to have
done just this.
That trains are so safe, of
course,  is actually a
preconception which should
not prevent us from asking
how safe are they vis-à-vis
other modes. Therefore, we
should be prepared to pay something even for the preservation
of the current safety level. Especially after a (presumed)
worsening in the safety conditions, however, we might want to
ascertain how much we are prepared to pay for retrieving the
preceding conditions. These answers can have implications,
for instance, on the level of fares. On the other hand, the latter
problem necessarily points to another question, i.e., whether it
is worthwhile to redirect resources from other modes toward
railways (or vice versa). Unless we feel inclined to subscribe
to a non-economic view, like the idea that all travel modes
should be made equally safe or equally risky in terms of - say -
the number of casualties per period of time (an objectionable
view, to say the least), we must be ready to use some
economic analysis in order to assess the relative efficiency of
alternative modes in terms of safety: put in another way, in
order to determine the infamous economic cost of saving lives
in different (and competing) modes.
As it is, risk assessment is very controversial and raises a host
of problems in any sector of economic and social life.
Certainly transport and travel provide an amazingly high and
rich set of critical examples.
Sometimes in answering these questions, we do much more
than simply make a subjective judgement. We try to put our
judgements within the framework of an economic choice.
This is what we are required to do, for instance, when asked
to take part in a market decision concerning an uncertain
outcome. The growing faith in (and consequent spreading of)
market-like institutions, typical of the late XX-early XXI
century in so many countries, seemingly leads us to inquire
whether willingness to pay can be a proper substitute for
administered prices, which were ubiquitous in previous
institutional arrangements. 
“Willingness to pay, as a synonymous of demand, is the pillar
of any true competitive market”.2
Truly competitive markets, however, assume unlimited
consumer rationality as a prerequisite for economic choices,
if these are to be conducive to maximum welfare. Limited
rationality, much more easily found  in real life, can be a real
challenge to the building of a competitive setting.
The limited aim of this paper is to put together some
observations nowadays customary in the descriptive approach
to consumer choice. We deal with two main points:
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- the meaning and the limitations of the willingness-to-pay 
concept as applied to risky choices, with special reference 
to transport and travel;
- the consequences produced by the ambiguity of this 
concept at the level of risk regulation (again, transport and 
travel provide useful references).
2. Perfect competition, risk and transport
At the eve of the privatisation cum liberalisation of the British
Railways, in a personal exchange, one (not hostile) observer,
while commenting on the idea of ‘competition for the
market’, remarked that, contrary to a widely held belief,
incumbent firms would have little incentive to continue
lowering their costs, if the relative subsidy were to be
repealed too soon after the reaching of a higher degree of
efficiency. One is lead to speculate that the real world
competitive setting can have a sort of ineluctability, which is
not shared by its ‘fake’ counterpart, liable as it is to political
bargaining. This can perhaps be taken as an example of how a
partial reproduction of the competitive mechanism might not
be a perfect substitute for the original mechanism (and, if we
take the 2nd Best Theorem seriously, we are left with few
hopes about the gains which we can expect for partial
accomplishments).
That perfectly competitive markets are more likely to be
found in the realm of abstraction than in the actual world, is
widely acknowledged.
In a sense, we suspect that most people believe in markets
just as the characters in Charles Dickens’s Pickwick Papers
believed in the Holy Ghost, as Joan Robinson used to quip.
At any rate, the extent to which actual markets can be
allowed to stray from ideal, and still be considered socially
desirable, is unclear. In particular, the degree to which
consumers can differ from the ideal of perfect rationality
without harming society, and being harmed themselves, is at
the core of a number of current debates. 
Another consequence is uncertainty about  the standpoint that
the regulator should take. Must individuals’ inclinations, in
accordance with utilitarian views, be followed to their
extreme and sometimes paradoxical implications, or are they
to be rejected in the name of a more rational, if somewhat
paternalistic, vision of society?
Here we revise some of the psychological reasons for the
apparent lack of rationality of travellers, and discuss the
diverging positions about public regulation of these issues. 
3. Unlimited Rationality and  Willingness to Pay
Unlimited rationality is a necessary pre-requisite for the
working of ideal markets, because: 
- it shapes individuals’ willingness to pay for the 
commodities which are offered in the marketplace.
- it allows consumers to behave consistently to their real interest;
- in the end, it ensures the fulfilment of their true goals.
The first point is by no means a trivial one. Translating
individual preferences into monetary magnitudes amounts to
solving a number of problems which recent research has
proved to be highly challenging. From a long series of
experimental evidence, it can be seen that individuals’ actual
behaviour tends to differ from that prescribed by the textbook
notion of unlimited consumer rationality. In short, we can
perhaps say that the problem is twofold. On one side, people
have trouble simply ordering their preferences according to
logic patterns, and when it comes to actually choosing, many
of us are liable to exhibit inconsistent behaviours. On the
other side, individuals process data according to accounting
rules which seldom, if ever, resemble those suggested by
elementary statistics (basic probability theory, etc.). As a
consequence, even simple comparisons are rendered dubious,
and the attainment of efficient decisions becomes less likely.
A large body of literature is by now available on this issue.
While the conclusion that individual behaviour does not
conform to the paradigm of unlimited rationality has long
since been familiar to many scholars, it must be
acknowledged that the recent literature has highlighted a
number of regularities in typical consumer behaviour3. Such
regularities can be summarised as such:
- a search for decisional procedures capable of saving 
mental resources (leading to use of the so called heuristics
in solving new or exacting problems); an interesting aspect 
of this tendency is recourse to partial mental accounting, in 
which decisions are not submitted to any thorough 
analysis, but rather are relegated in separate ‘cells’ and 
dealt with in a piecemeal way, thus contradicting any basic 
idea of comparative efficiency;
- an inclination to stick to apparently fixed clues, as a way 
out from unfamiliar or intriguing decisional problems: e.g., 
a tendency to protect the status quo, and therefore to  
belittle radical changes in wealth vis-à-vis incremental 
changes with respect to the status quo itself; or to rely on 
stereotypes and idées reçues, a general proneness to 
saliency in processing information, and so on.
All this should hardly sound new to anybody. The clash
between the normative view (unlimited rationality) and the
descriptive view, however, has a story of its own, and it
seems worth observing that the latter has taken a long time to
re-surface after a period of total oblivion.
4. Problems in Risk Assessment
Risk is perhaps one of the most controversial notions in the
debate between the two visions of rationality, and more than any
other, is a multi-faceted construct. Anthropologists such as
Mary Douglas and economists such as Aaron Wildavsky have
explored the cultural foundations underlying the perception of
risk. The former, for instance, has observed a tendency to look
for moral, rather than scientific, bases for risk and to equate risk
with sin. They categorise cultures according to whether they are
built on personal risk perception, or rather on risk assessment by
a scientific hierarchy.4
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Travel, being a risky activity itself, provides many examples
of what has been found in recent literature.
For instance: it is well known that trains are perceived as less
dangerous than other comparable travel modes. Therefore,
railway accidents strike people as unexpected (and, perhaps,
‘unjust’). As a consequence, travellers might exhibit lesser
propensity to pay for railway trips than for other - assumedly
riskier - kind of trips. On the other hand, they might be less
inclined to pay for increasing safety on the railways than on
other transport modes. 
The relevance of willingness to pay is likely to become
greater, as certain public services are moved into the realm of
market relationships. In many European countries formerly
characterised by mixed economies, the role of consumer
demand was necessarily dwarfed by (a) limited reliance on
utilitarian principles in setting prices, and (b) prevalence of
general taxation as a means to collect revenues. These
premises are being increasingly overturned, or have been
overturned already in several places. Can willingness to pay,
however, be a reliable guidance to the determination of
economic prices?
Statistically, while being the safest travel mode on earth, the
railway is not safer than all other competing travel modes.
The fact that it is thought to be so may simply be due to bad
information. However, even when informed about the relative
riskiness of comparable modes, most people tend to insist that
they would feel more secure on a train than, say, on a plane.
In other words, it has been convincingly shown that, even
after being provided with evidences about the relative
magnitude of the chances to incur a disaster with a fatal
outcome on a train as opposed to a plane, most people -
regardless of their education, professional status, etc. -
express the same disfavour for the plane that they exhibited
before.
This case is widely employed as an example of cognitive
dissonance, i.e., the refusal to accept an evidence which runs
contrary to one’s beliefs.5
To reconcile such (apparent) contradictions, we have to
assume people’s unfamiliarity with even elementary handling
of statistics and probability, and to accept the idea that they
will more likely recur to logical ‘shortcuts’, which make us
save time and effort, even at the cost of big mistakes. This has
been shown in a number of cases both related and unrelated to
the treatment of risk. For example, when faced with the
problem of assessing the identity of an unknown individual,
about whom only little information is provided, the majority
of people will typically cling to stereotypes (the resemblance
of the individual’s description to a known archetype), rather
than statistical likelihood (the statistical odds of him belonging
to a given group, or social status, etc.), even when the properly
assessed likelihood is included among the data of the problem.
According to the results of recent research, we suspect that
the above tendency is strengthened in dealing with problems
which imply a certain amount of strain because of their
novelty or complexity. In a sense, it seems that people are
more inclined to elaborate on the qualitative, than on the
quantitative, side of the choice which is submitted to them.
Thus, railways accidents are often seen as more ‘controllable’
than (for example) plane accidents, and therefore less
threatening. While this is ‘obviously’ untrue (the comparison
is made in terms of accidents of given gravity, e.g., fatal ones:
then, ‘controllability’, besides being an illusion, is not
relevant to the final outcome6), the source of the mistake is
clear: quality is perceived as relevant (or, if we prefer, process
utility is considered at least as relevant as product utility): the
idea of ‘crash’ may look more frightening to many than that
of ‘clash’, although, once we reckon in terms of fatal
accidents, the difference can only be perceived at the
esthetical level. And yet, we can easily agree that quality is
important and that, once the actual terms of the choice have
been redressed, it can well be considered meaningful. This
contradiction lies at the roots of a well known dilemma in risk
regulation (see below).
It is perfectly consistent with the observation above to notice
that plane accidents also exhibit a number of characteristics
which can help to understand the attitudes of laypeople.
Plane accidents are perceived as unfamiliar events, whose
probability is more difficult to assess. This can by itself be a
problem, but perhaps plane accidents are also seen as ‘less
natural’ than accidents which happen on the ground. This
may well be the expression of a primitive notion of nature, -
so deeply rooted in fact, that it can be regarded more as an
instinct than a true attitude - but instincts do play a role in our
behaviour. (According to some scholars, a similar bias seems
to be at work in shaping people’s hostility toward nuclear
power stations).
There are certainly other - though not unrelated - elements
which can influence the comparison between travel modes in
terms of their relative riskiness. 
For instance, it can be argued that different sorts of risks are
not assessed in symmetrical manners. Many people tend to
consider travel accidents as real expressions of an unfriendly
fate, which distributes a given number of fatalities out of a
limited stock in a given span of time. This can perhaps
explain another statistical oddity, i.e., the propensity exhibited
by many individuals to believe that the chances of being
caught in a plane accident are bound to rise with the increase
in the number of plane trips that are made by the same person
and that therefore, in deciding whether to take a train or a
plane on comparable routes, it will always be safer to choose
the former.
The way people process information is also relevant to this
issue. To this effect, retrievability can be particularly
important. Typically, the chances of being involved in a given
event can be made to depend on the number of similar events
that one is able to remember.7 Now, memory is influenced by
many factors, including - prominently - saliency. Needless to
say, accidents involving trains are less salient than others
(though perhaps more salient than, say, those involving cars).
In particular, they are far less salient than plane accidents. 
Saliency, of course, depends more on ease of association than
on any other objectively measurable dimension of the event.
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Plane crashes are generally covered by TV and magazines,
and their details are exposed, with much greater  pictorial
emphasis than any other comparable event. Thus, they are
easily remembered and ‘numbered’. The same could hardly
be said of train accidents, unless they can be hooked to a
mental clue, (e.g., bracketed under a heading like
‘privatisation’).
There are, however, other aspects to be reckoned. A highly-
valued danger hanging over a small number of persons is
regarded as worse than a minor danger affecting a higher
number of individuals, even if they come very close to each
other in numerical value (e.g., when assessed in terms of
expected value). 
All this is compounded by the fact that events of a
catastrophic kind are evaluated at a (negative) premium over
equally damaging events, but lacking this character.
One of the most significant facets of risk - and one which has
an obvious cultural dimension - is perhaps provided by what
we could name the degree of fear. A sudden death is seen by
many (typically, in the Western world) as ‘more acceptable’
to a lingering one. This fact, too, can have consequences on
the comparative evaluations of risks in travel.
Individual controllability - which has already been mentioned
as an attribute which people use to evaluate, although
sometimes in very subjective manners - diminishes the
perception of risk. This may have - and it often has – a moral
overtone (e.g., exposing children to a danger which is beyond
their control can look worse, also in the sense of ‘more
morally guilty’). Again, this is just a step away from
considering certain, more ‘natural’, travel modes as less
threatening than others.
Irreversibility is something that can make risk perception
more acute. For example, the risk of lesser, but permanent,
injuries can be deemed more severe than that of greater, but
reversible, ones.
Salience of blame. If reducing risk can also ‘redress
injustice’, the corresponding action may be seen as more
worthwhile. Risk-reducing actions in favour, e.g., of poorer
people (lower class trippers?) are often at a premium vis-à-vis
actions taken in the interest of the rich.
Identifiability of those at risk. The rescue of people trapped in
a tunnel, or in a wrecked carriage, may warrant more money
and time than a risk imminent to a number of random
individuals. Here, however, it should be noted that the use of
a correct practice in decision making requires an ex-ante
evaluation of alternatives, and therefore for the evaluation of
‘disembodied’ risks. Statistical lives should be substituted for
identifiable victims, in order to avoid the psychological and
ethical overtones which are inevitably raised by the problem
of assessing the value of human life. 
Expanding what we said above, we might notice that people
tend to overrate certain risks implied by unlikely events (e.g.,
hurricanes, or guerrilla episodes), while underrating more
realistic risks connected with familiar events or activities
(e.g., contracting common disease, or suffering a heart
failure, or incurring accident during the usual occupations of
a working day). 
By the same token, if an activity is not regarded as
objectionable, or ‘unjust’, its degree of riskiness in generally
considered low (which does not prevent people from asking
exceptionally high compensations in case of accident).
As another example, most individuals seem more sensitive to
deviations from levels of risk which are considered
customary, than to the absolute level of risk.11 Likewise, they
tend to react more strongly when faced with the prospect of
an increase over the current level of risk, or the appearing of a
new risk, than when faced with the prospect of a reduction in
the current - assumedly familiar - level.12
A much needed refinement of the practices followed in
comparing risks would consist in trying to estimate the
advantages to be expected from the risk-reducing action, as
well as the costs at which reduction can be obtained. Ideally,
benefits and costs ought to be combined in a benefit-cost
ratio, in order to give a clear idea of the efficiency of the
competing actions which are being envisaged.
Comparing risk is a demanding job. Still, in a market setting,
where we can be required to evaluate risk per se in an
outright form, or in the form of fixing standards, it cannot be
escaped. What we should do, is to try to rationalise in explicit
terms the less formal thought process which individuals and
governments rely upon when they make choices in any given
area. 
5. Practical suggestions
Some additional remarks are in order, drawing from the most
recent experimental works.
1- People seem to care about the risk to themselves (or other
real people), not to a hypothetical average or worst-case
person. If analysts can help people narrow down the risk
range to a meaningful estimate specific to their unique
circumstances, then their chances to of reaching a higher level
of ‘risk communication’ are increased, and therefore more
meaningful conclusions can be obtained.8
2- Actions, not disembodied risks, should be the object of
comparisons. If our job is setting priorities (as opposed to,
say, simply ranking risks for speculative reasons), then we
should care about where resources go. While certain risks can
loom larger than others because of psychological, ethical or
other reasons, they should not command much attention (let
alone resources) if they cannot pass the cost/feasibility test.
3- Risk should always be the real object of the assessment. As
a matter of fact, a comparison which is often made, but on
faulty premises, is that which considers a single quantifiable
attribute of the things being compared, but which has nothing
to do with risk. An example is provided by sentences like “a
person who smokes x cigarettes inhales as much tar as a
person who eats y steaks.” 9
Yet, we suspect that the habit of translating true expressions
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of risks into - say- physical magnitudes which, at best, can be
an ersatz for the real thing performs a very useful, and
probably necessary, function, in that it allows laymen to get
an idea of the order of magnitude of a certain risk:  how big is
a risk of 10-6? How many people would quickly answer that it
is more than being struck by a meteorite, but less than being
hit by lightning?10 Anchoring is an ubiquitous problem in the
economic evaluation of subjective preferences.
One-dimensional comparisons – albeit founded on
meaningful dimensions – are often unsatisfactory guidance to
all this. Although it is also true that combining more than one
attribute in a final decision is cognitively demanding, and can
give rise to incongruous orderings.
Even after selecting the ‘right’ attribute(s), the danger still
lingers that our data may not be processed, and the various
prospects characterised, in a satisfactory manner. 
It has been found that laypeople do not necessarily find it
difficult to compare heterogeneous risks, nor do they find it
more difficult do compare widely differing kinds of risks
(although they sometimes are troubled by performing
comparisons between more familiar risks). 
Therefore, it can be safely said that risk comparisons,
however engaging, can be framed in terms we are generally
able to make sense of. The meaning of such comparisons can
be greatly enhanced – from the level of plain uselessness to
that of valid help to public decision making – if they are
backed by a satisfactory awareness of the many problems
involved by the exploration of individual preferences, and if
certain provisos are met13.
6. Dilemmas in risk regulation and conclusion
It is well known that people can perceive risk in a different
(sometimes very different) manner from risk as statistically
measured from empirical evidence. In certain places, there is
a tendency to belittle perceived risk and to deny it any right to
stand in the place of objective (sometimes called actual)
measures of risk. This position has prevailed among the
scholars long enough,14 but has never gone completely
unchallenged. Today, as a matter of fact, we are witnessing a
revival of the opposite position. Reliance on perceived risk is
basically founded on the observation that, in an utilitarian
society, subjective assessment of risk cannot be outright
dismissed as ‘wrong’: the public will assume responsibility
for judgement which, however faulty, can bring utility to
them.
At a different level, the conception of risk itself can be
considered so composite and problematic, that a ‘cold’
computing of statistical probability may look inadequate to
the task of transmitting the attitudes of individual toward a
dangerous prospect. Recently, some researchers have gone so
far as to maintain that the subjective perception of risk can be
held superior to the objective one as a guide to public
decisions.15
It can be held that the vision according to which objective
reality ought not to be accorded a relevant place in collective
decision making, is not necessarily ‘progressive’. On the
contrary, this vision has been attacked as inherently
traditionalist and conservative.
Is the dichotomy between objective and perceived risk well
founded? In a sense, all measures of risk must necessarily use
a human medium, so that all they can be labelled as
subjective (and are, in that sense, perceived).  Still, it cannot
be denied that there are such things as scientific methods by
which risks are evaluated on the basis of data, and that such
methods can at times contradict the results of strictly
subjective evaluations. While they do not seem to disagree on
the methods of collecting the evidence required for the actual
decision, supporters of the ‘perceptionist’ school and of the
‘objectivist’ one subscribe to different definitions of risk. The
difference is that perceptionists accept a definition which
encompasses aspects which are missing from that of the
objectivists. In principle, all aspects relevant to the subjective
assessment of risk can be embodied by the former.
The appeal to self-interest implicit in the Utilitarian roots of
the subjective approach is strong. The right to assess one’s
own preferences is certainly an overwhelming argument vis-
à-vis the claim of the technocrats to regulate other people’s
private lives.16 Moreover, technocrats can and do go wrong, or
are simply unable to produce consistent responses, as testified
ad abundantiam by Jones-Lee.17 Therefore, people should not
be foreclosed from participation in risk assessment by a
deterministic vision of the authority of science (and
scientists).
On the other hand, there are additional arguments, which can
be employed in different directions and with ambiguous
results. For instance, reliance upon perceived risk can
produce regulatory ‘mistakes’ (like, e.g., the over- or under-
regulation of certain phenomena). The overall result can be
counterproductive – and possibly adverse to the interests of
the majority. On a different level, perceived risk differs from
objective risk in that it lends itself more easily to
manipulation. The danger implied by a given transport mode
can be magnified beyond the results of objective tests and
evidences. (Still, the uneasiness produced by what is
perceived by many as an ‘avoidable’ danger is an evil in
itself, which – if possible and/or convenient in a truly
democratic process-warrants consideration). According to
many, then, the perceptionist position can be employed in a
‘conservative’ direction. At worst, perception could even be
invoked to support entrenched (but inherently wrong) ideas,
or even prejudices (e.g., that AIDS can be transmitted
through casual contact, or that interurban highways are more
dangerous than intra-urban ones). On the other hand, several
political scientists have found a liberalizing effect of science
and scientific truth. Science can indeed be used to limit the
power of elites to induce actions guided by unwarranted or
self-serving purposes, by holding the elites accountable to a
sort of external reference. And yet, in a real democracy.
unquestioning deference to the conclusions of scientists is
also potentially counterproductive. The opinions of ‘official’
scientists, if not the result of science itself, can sometimes
serve vested interests and be manipulated by authoritarian
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governors much like public perception. The ultimate goal in a
society which, while sympathetic to the Utilitarian view, is
willing to avoid the most unpalatable implications of the
latter, should then be that of striking a balance between
subjectivism and democratic control.
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1. Introduction
The privatisation of the rail
system in Britain can be
seen as the third, and most
controversial, stage of a
process which began with
the Transport Act of 1980
and deregulation of express
coach services in that year.
This was followed by the
deregulation of local bus
services under the Transport
Act of 1985. The rail
privatisation has been the most complex and extensive, due in
part to the different nature of the industry, involving
infrastructure as well as service operations, and freight as well
as passenger. The government’s own policy was often unclear in
the early stages, as Shaw1 has shown. The structure of the
industry remains a subject for intense debate, especially the role
of Railtrack2 (monopoly provider of infrastructure).
This paper follows an earlier piece of work reported to the 1998
World Conference on Transport Research3 which examined the
net financial impacts of rail privatisation, based on the known
sale value of the privatised businesses, and the commitments
made in the first round of passenger franchises (all of which,
with one minor exception, were for seven years or more). It is
now opportune to examine the outcome after the first five full
years of franchised operation, in which much more is known of
trends in ridership and financial performance.
As in the case of the express coach and local bus industries it
is important to distinguish as far as possible the external
factors which would affect performance of the industry apart
from privatisation and deregulation per se. For example, in
the case of local buses an underlying negative trend might be
expected due to rising car ownership, the question being the
extent to which ridership losses (in aggregate) were greater or
lower than might be expected from this and other related
causes. Conversely, in the case of the rail industry since
privatisation the main external factors have been positive,
notably growth in GDP and employment in central London. 
It is also important to distinguish privatisation and
deregulation effects separately. In the case of rail, the industry
is wholly privatised but if anything is more regulated than
before, notably in terms of service levels and fare controls.
2. Structure of the industry
This is very complex, and well described elsewhere. A brief
review is provided at this point to set the scene. Prior to
privatisation, British Rail (BR) was an integrated
organisation, providing both passenger and freight services.
Passenger operations were grouped in three business sectors
(Intercity, Network South East, and Regional Railways), who
were also responsible for their infrastructure. The new
structure comprises:
The 25 passenger Train Operating Companies (TOCs), each
covering a specific set of routes under a franchise agreed with the
Strategic Rail Authority
(SRA). They are largely
monopolies within their own
catchment areas, but some
competition has emerged
through prior existence of
alternative routes (e.g.
London to Birmingham) and
a very limited amount of
‘open access’ operation
permitted by the Rail Re-
gulator (new services which
compete with incumbents).
Railtrack PLC , owner of tracks, signalling, stations and other
infrastructure, which charges TOCs and freight operators for
access. It is responsible for maintenance and renewal of the
existing infrastructure, but is now less likely to be involved in
major enhancement. Railtrack was privatised by sale of
shares to the public in May 1996.
Rolling Stock Leasing Companies (ROSCOs). Three main
companies, privatised by direct sale in November 1995, which
were subsequently resold to other businesses for about 50%
more than the state secured initially. The existing passenger
fleet was split between these companies, initially with little
price competition between them. TOCs obtain almost all their
stock from these companies but can also purchase outright or
lease from manufacturers for supply of new stock.
Freight Operating Companies (FOCs). Most of the freight
business was sold to English Welsh and Scottish (EWS). The
other main operator is Freightliners, the rail container
operator, sold to a management buy-out. In this paper the
financial outcome in the freight sector is treated as neutral,
the gains from sale of the companies by the state being
largely offset by additional access grants.
Apart from Gatwick Express, all TOCs required financial
support at the start of the privatisation period. Most of this
comes from central government via the Strategic Rail
Authority (SRA) but in the seven major conurbations outside
London, the local Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs)
determine service levels and fares on rail services, and are
responsible for the support payments to operators, which are
included in totals shown later.
Although the main national system now offers one of the
most notable examples of vertical separation, certainly in
Europe, integrated operations do remain in Britain. These
include the Tyne & Wear Metro, and Glasgow underground
(under direct public ownership), and also at present, London
Underground. There is also an example of franchising
involving a substantial vertically-integrated operation, the
Docklands Light Railway (DLR) in London. Metro systems
are considered separately in a later section of this paper.
3. Trends in passenger traffic: National Railways in
Britain
Table 1 shows trends in passenger traffic since 1989/90 up to
the latest full year for which figures are available, 2001/02.
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Passenger-km are used as the preferred measure, since
passenger trips may be subject to an element of double-
counting following separation of TOCs within the previous
British Rail structure prior to privatisation. In practice, the
difference is fairly small: for example, ‘passenger trips’ rose
from 812m in 1989-90 to 956m in 2001/02, by 144m or 17.7%,
compared with 17.4% for passenger-km4.
It can be seen that total ridership fell from a peak in 1989/90
associated with a high level of economic activity in that year, to
a low point in 1994/95. This was associated with a recession
(which also affected other modes) and in 1994 itself by strike
action (mainly affecting long-distance and regional operators).
The overall volume then rose steadily at about 5% a year to a
new peak of 38,300m in 1999/2000, an aggregate growth of
33.4% from 1994/95, but then levelled out, as a result of the
Hatfield crash (see below). This affected long-distance in
particular, while London and South East continued to grow.
This pattern varied by sector, the long-distance operators
showing the smallest growth, both over the whole period
(zero) and in the growth phase after 1994/95 (20.6%). The
largest percentage growth over the whole period was in the
regional operators (which cover some major interurban
routes, and operations within all the conurbations outside
London, as well as low-density rural services), of 54.0%.
Data published by SRA enables a fairly close matching with
the three sectors previously found under the BR structure.
Allowance for the transfer of Gatwick Express (a non-stop
service between central London and Gatwick airport) from
Intercity to regional increases the long-distance growth and
reduces that for regional rail, but only to a modest extent.
Over half the absolute growth in rail use over the whole
period took place on the London & South East operators, and
none on long-distance. SRA data also indicates that the
proportion of demand attributed to season ticket use fell from
32.7% to 28.1% over the whole period, although it did grow
very substantially from the low point in 1994-95, representing
28.8% of the absolute network total growth between 1994-95
and 2001/025. It is concentrated largely in the London and
South East area, and correlated with employment levels in
central London. Work by Lange6 indicated that, on a year-by-
year basis for the period 1975-1995, a significant relationship
was found between GDP change and growth in total rail use,
and also separately for InterCity and London & South East
sectors - but not for regional, which was more strongly
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Million passenger-km
of which:
Year Whole Long-distance London Regional      
network   operators & S.E. operators
1989/90 33,600 12,900 15,200 5,600 
1990/91 33,200 12,700 14,900 5,600
1991/92 32,500 12,600 14,300 5,500
1992/93 31,700 12,200 13,600 5,900
1993/94 30,400 11,400 13,200 5,800
1994/95 28,700 10,700 12,900 5,000
1995/96 30,000 11,100 13,300 5,600
1996/97 32,100 n/a n/a n/a
1997/98 34,700 12,300 15,500 6,800
1998/99 36,300 12,600 16,500 7,200
1999/2000 38,500 13,200 17,700 7,600
2000/01 38,200 12,100 18,400 7,600
2001/02 39,100 12,900 18,500 7,700
Percentage change:
1989/90 – 
2001/02      +16.4% +0.0% +21.7% +37.5%
(+1.6%*) (+33.9%*) 
1994/95 – 
2001/02 +36.2% +20.6% +43.4% +54.0%
(+22.4%*) (+50.0%*)  
Average trip 
length (km)
in 2001/02 40.9 174.3 28.2 33.9
Table 1: Passenger travel on national railways 1989/90 – 2001/02
* Percentage change after effect of reassigning Gatwick Express volume of 200m from Regional to Intercity in 2001/02.
Data under the ‘long-distance operators’ from 1997/98 comprises the franchises for Anglia (inter city services), GNER, Great Western, Midland
Main Line, Virgin West Coast and Virgin Cross Country. For the period up to  1995/96 inclusive, it comprises the former ‘InterCity Sector’ of
British Rail, broadly the same services but also including Gatwick Express (which carries about  200m passenger-km per year). London & S.E.
(South East) comprises the franchises closely corresponding to the former Network South East (Chiltern, South Central, Connex South Eastern,
First Great Eastern, c2c (formerly LTS), Silverlink, South West Trains, Thames Trains, Thameslink, West Anglia Great Northern). ‘Regional’
comprises all other operators (including Gatwick Express from 1997/98), including inter alia all PTE services.
Source : National Rail Trends 2001/02, quarter 4. Strategic Rail Authority June 2002, tables 1.1a, 1.1b and Appendix. Sector data up to 1995/96
inclusive is from Transport Statistics Great Britain 1996 edition, table 5.11(a), HMSO London September 1996
affected by local economic variations and service quality
changes.
It is clear that much of the recovery since 1994/95 is due to
growth in GDP, stimulating travel in rail and other modes
above the trends of the early 1990s. Work by the British
central government department responsible for transport (in
2000 known as DETR, and now known as the ‘Department
for Transport’, or DfT) in connection with the ten-year
transport plan published in 20007 indicates that a model
calibrated on the period from 1978 for ‘non commuting’
traffic (i.e. non-season ticket travel) provides a very good fit
both before and after rail privatisation based on the following
approximate elasticities:
GDP change: +2
Total car traffic: -1
Average real rail fares: -1
The ‘car traffic’ term is influenced both by changes in car
ownership and factors affecting use of each car. The latter
includes the effect of rising fuel costs due to the ‘fuel tax
escalator’ (a government policy of increasing fuel duty in real
terms each year) up to 2000. This model has also been used
by DETR to forecast changes under the ten-year plan,
implying that a further growth of about 40% would be quite
plausible. The model did not find specific service quality
factors to be significant at the aggregate level, although train
kilometres run had increased over the period.
Figure A1, reproduced by kind permission of DETR, shows
the estimated non-season passenger volume from this model,
and the actual outcome, giving a very close fit, including the
growth phase since privatisation.
DETR were not able to calibrate a model with a good fit for
commuting (i.e. season ticket) traffic. However, in this case it
would be even less likely that rail service quality has been a
factor, given the lack of major investment in the period since
privatisation (although medium-term growth might have been
evident from the cross-London Thameslink service after its
opening in 1988, and Chiltern route following its
modernisation shortly before privatisation).
Actual and predicted volumes of ‘non-season-ticket’ rail 
demand Index, base 1998 = 100. Source: Department of
Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000). Transport
2010: the Background Analysis, HMSO, London. Actual
outcome is denoted by the black line and solid boxes,
predicted outcome by the grey line and open boxes.
Rail privatisation per se thus does not emerge as a primary
factor, and one can argue that much of the growth since
1994/95 would have taken place is any case. However, an
element of the regulatory framework in the Railways Act 1993
has been important, namely the regulation of fares. Most
season ticket and ‘Saver’ standard class travel was limited to
average annual increases not exceeding the Retail Price Index
(RPI) and from 1999, an ‘RPI-1’ formula has applied. This
directly covers about half the total traffic volume, the other
half being in any case a fairly price-elastic market dominated
by discretionary travel and subject to modal competition.
While real prices rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
average real revenue per passenger-km has varied very little
since 1995, at about 8.5-8.75p in 1999/2000 prices8.
There is however an exception in the long-distance sector.
Here, average revenue per passenger-km rose by about 8% in
real terms between 1997/98 and 1999/2000 alone. A likely
factor is the increases in ‘Super Saver’ fares, a category not
regulated, which is a commonly used ‘walk on’ fare for
personal leisure travel. While the range of low-price book
ahead ‘APEX’ and similar tickets has widened, a user
requiring the same ‘walk-on’ facility as before effectively
pays a higher price.
The SRA has very recently produced a weighted price index,
on a base of January 1999. This indicates that between
January 1999 and January 2002 average rail prices changed
very little, rising by about 1.7% in real terms. However, some
unregulated fares rose substantially – for example, first class
(all operators) by 16.5%, and long distance standard class
unregulated by 9.5%9.
A consequence of the overall stability in real revenue per
passenger-km is that change in total revenue is closely
correlated with changes in volume. Hence, real revenue
growth of 36.0% has occurred since 1994/9510, enabling
TOCs to absorb reductions in franchise payments
substantially from this cause, in aggregate terms.
4. Support payments to passenger train operators
Table 3 shows support paid to passenger train operators from
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Figure 1: Non-commuting rail demand: predicted and actual
Table 2: Comparison of predicted and actual change in
non-commuting rail passenger demand by cause (1979-1998),
and Plan forecast (2000-2010)
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1990/91, adjusted to 1999/2000 prices. For the years up to
1995/96 this was given almost wholly to British Rail (apart
from the last few weeks for 1995/96 in respect of South West
Trains and Great Western franchises), 1996/97 a mix of BR
and TOCs, and from 1997/98 inclusive entirely in franchise
payments to TOCs. It can be seen that support increased in
the early 1990s, largely due to the recession and its effects on
revenue. It then jumped very sharply, doubling between
1993/94 and 1994/95, due to the internal restructuring of the
railway industry prior to privatisation, in which Railtrack and
ROSCOs were set up as separate companies (see discussion
below). Commitments made by franchise operators then
produced the drop to 1999/2000. Under their original
commitments a steady drop would have continued to
2002/03. At 1999/2000 prices, for example, they would have
fallen to about £900m.
However, it was clear that some very optimistic bids had been
made, especially in the later stages of the franchising process.
Whereas the first two bids, by Stagecoach and Great Western
Trains, may now be seen as relatively cautious, the later bids
implied very large increases in revenue, given that operators
directly control only around 30% to 40% of their costs.
If the originally-anticipated sum of franchise payments to
operators from 1997/98 (not shown here) is compared with
the outcome, a further difference of about £125m per annum
may be noted in terms of the public expenditure. This is
attributable to the fact that five PTEs opted to secure services
on ‘gross cost’ contracts in which the operator is paid for
services provided, while revenue is retained by the PTE. In
terms of total public spending, however, this may be ‘netted
off ’ against the PTE payments to the franchisees. For
example, if a group of PTEs were supporting services in the
public sector era which had a gross cost of £300m per annum
and revenue of £100m, the net support would have been
£200m. If these were then franchised on a gross cost basis to
TOCs, the payment to the TOCs would have been £300m
(ignoring any cost changes), but in terms of net public
expenditure this would still have been offset by the £100m
revenue retained by the PTEs. 
In addition to the base revenue levels at 1995/96, some of the
PTE networks have recovered from earlier low levels of
traffic, and West Yorkshire in particular has benefited from
strong growth in Leeds. In practice, the net payments made
by PTEs fell by about 35% in real terms between 1995/96 and
2001/0211, presumably a mix of cost reductions, revenue
growth and any losses absorbed by franchisees where
reductions in payments were faster than these factors would
permit.
Table 3 also shows adjusted figures for 2000/01 to 2002/03
inclusive. In contrast to the originally-expected outcome,
certain franchises have been renegotiated following financial
difficulties represented by their owners, and reflecting the
earlier over-optimism in bids for some regional operations.
The last of the Regional franchises to operate without
restructuring of originally-agreed payments were Central and
Scotrail (both National Express franchises), but as from
March 2002 these too have received additional support.
Anglia Railways, operating a mix of intercity and local
services, have also renegotiated their support12. Within table
3, an extra £150m p.a. has been added (at 1999/2000 prices)
for 2001-02 and £180m for 2002-03 to allow for these
changes. 
The SRA has also brought forward the process of
renegotiating existing franchises prior to their original
termination dates, even where operations are profitable, as
part of its longer-term approach. Agreements in principle
have been reached for Chiltern and South West Trains
(retained by their existing franchisees) and South Central
(transferred from Connex (Vivendi) to GoVia in August
2001). However, profiles of expected cash flows are not yet
available.
If projections were taken from those longer-running
franchises (such as Virgin West Coast) continuing after
2002/03 as currently agreed then a further reduction would
occur. However, this would involve extrapolating from a
limited number of possibly unrepresentative cases.
Furthermore, doubts must also exist as to whether the longer-
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£ million at 1999/2000 prices (approximate)
Year Out-turn or Adjusted figure
original sum of
franchisees' bids
1990/91 1000
1991/92 1300
1992/93 1600
1993/94 1320
1994/95 2540
1995/96 2360
1996/97 2340 (gross) 
1997/98 1940
1998/99 1600
1999/2000 1380
2000/01 1210
2001/02 1100 1250
2002/03 900 1080
Table 3 : Support to national passenger rail services
in Britain 2001/02
Notes:
Derived from table 4.1 in Strategic Rail Authority bulletin 'National
Rail Trends  2000-01, quarter 3', March 2001, converted to
1999/2000 prices by authors. Allowance is also made from 1997/98
for revenue received by PTEs directly at £125m per annum.
'Gross' figure refers to payments before 'administered profit' for BR
services in that year (see White 1999). For basis of 'adjusted figure'
see text .
term franchises will actually perform according to their
present schedule. While some improvement will certainly be
expected in the case of the Virgin franchises, as new trains
and higher speeds come into effect, further delays are
occurring in the infrastructure upgrade, and other franchises
may well need more support than presently budgeted.
5. Operator profitability
In order to remain in business, the franchised TOCs must
attain an operating profit, after taking into account passenger
revenue, franchise payments and any other income, set
against Railtrack access and ROSCO leasing charges as well
as direct operating costs. A very small percentage operating
margin may suffice, given that TOCs’ capital investment is
very small - a 1% margin gives a high return on capital - but
in practice a somewhat bigger figure would be needed to act
as a ‘safety margin’ to allow for future changes in revenue
and costs, especially revenue uncertainty.
The reduction in public expenditure on franchise payments to
operators (including PTE revenues) between 1995/96 and
2000/01 at 1999/2000 price levels was about £980m (from
table 3). Passenger revenue over the same period grew by
£713m13, i.e. around 73% of the reduction would be offset by
passenger revenue growth. The remaining 27%, i.e. about
£260m, would largely be covered in aggregate by the
reduction in Railtrack access charges over this period of 2%
per annum in real terms set by the Regulator in 1995 (at
1999/2000 prices these fell by about £200m between 1995/96
and 1999/2000, after the initial 8% reduction). Hence, only a
small part (about £60m, or 7% of the drop in net support)
would be attributable to net cost reductions (or lower profit
margins) by the operators. This would imply a reduction in
operators’ total costs - excluding track access charges - of
around 3%. Note these calculations assume that operators
were basing their bids on costs after the initial 8% reduction
had been made, and were allowing for the cut of 2% per
annum thereafter. 
This is in very marked contrast to the local bus industry, in
which profitability has greatly improved since 1986, but very
largely due to reduced real costs, and increased real fares
partly offsetting passenger volume reductions14. As already
noted in this paper, real revenue per passenger-km has
changed little since privatisation, hence rail users in general
have not suffered the financial losses experienced by their
(lower-income, lower-status) opposite numbers using the bus.
Estimates by TAS, described by Cheek15, suggest an
aggregate operating profit for the 25 franchises in 1999/2000
(or the nearest equivalent financial year - accounting years
vary between companies) of about £165m (approximately
3.2% of turnover), falling to about £110m (2.2% of turnover)
in 2000/01. In 1999/2000 profits of about £90m in the long-
distance sector, and £115m in London & South East were
offset by a loss of £40m in regional. In 2000/01 11 of the 25
TOCs made losses, including all Regional companies except
Scotrail. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the last
year of British Rail, 1996/97, its passenger train operations
reported an ‘administered profit’ of £200m (or about £215m
at 1999/2000 prices), reducing the net financial support
required from the state by an equivalent sum. The overall
margin in 1999/2000 corresponded to about 3% of turnover.
Further discussion of variations in operator profitability is
provided by Powell16.
The main achievement of the TOCs in cost terms lies not
primarily in reducing total costs but in being able to manage
an increase in train-km since privatisation while containing
costs, i.e. producing a reduction in real cost per train-km of
similar magnitude to its volume growth. A series over the
whole period is not available, but SRA data shows that from
1997-98 to 1999-2000 timetabled train-km rose by 11.2%,
and the 2001-02 level was 15.8% above that for 1997-9817.
TAS data imply a drop of about 3% in money terms in total
cost per train-km between 1996/97 and 1999/200018, or about
11% in real terms, i.e. of similar magnitude to the growth in
train-km over that period . Given that most growth in service
has been off-peak (of the growth between 1997-98 and 2001-
02, only 5% was in London and South East peak services),
using existing stock and that Railtrack charges vary little with
train volume, one would of course expect the additional train-
km to have a much lower unit cost than the previous average.
Work on total factor productivity of TOCs by Cowie19 points
to a similar result.
There are also cases of TOCs which have made ‘across the
board’ service increases in both peak and off-peak periods,
associated with new rolling stock. Notable examples are
Anglia, doubling the Norwich-London main line frequency to
half-hourly, and Midland Main Line (MML), likewise doubling
its core frequency (albeit with much smaller diesel multiple
units, which now handle intermediate flows). Substantial
ridership growth has occurred – in the MML case, about 15%
in one year after an 80% growth in train-km20 and in such cases
there would appear to be an association between operator
initiatives and passenger volume, although this is not very
evident at the aggregate level indicated in DETR modelling21.
6. The net financial outcome
From the viewpoint of the state, the rail industry structure set
up from 1994/95 produced a large internal cash flow which
was ‘recycled’. Railtrack and the ROSCOs made high charges
to TOCs (resulting in the large increase in payments to
passenger rail services shown in table 3). However, while they
remained in the public sector, the net increase in public
spending was much less. When other subsidiary businesses
such as infrastructure and telecommunications companies are
included, the state-owned rail system produced an internal
‘profit’ of about £890m per annum from 1994/5. However, as
companies were sold off the flow was lost to the public sector.
Hence, the state gained through ‘one off’ sales of assets, but
lost a long-term future cash flow of about £890m per annum.
While a seemingly high sum was obtained for all the
businesses, a total of about £4500m in the 1995-98 period
(mostly represented by Railtrack and the ROSCOs) - less cost
of the privatisation process - this reflected a relatively low
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price:earnings ratio of about 6:1 for the biggest businesses,
and much lower for the infrastructure companies. Hence, if
one assumes that all other factors remain unchanged, the
£890m per annum cash flow would be lost. Over 15 years this
would amount to about £13,350m, or if discounted at 6% per
annum in real terms (the discount rate for public sector
investment appraisal) about £8640m. Thus, the state could be
seen to be losing money as a result. Further details of this line
of argument are set out in White22.
This loss was offset by the reduction in payments to
franchisees, as a result of their diminishing bids (table 3).
Taking the then expected outcome to 2002/03 and
extrapolating this figure to the end of the 15-year period (i.e.
2010/11) it could be shown that the state would benefit
overall, assuming that gains in the franchising process were
wholly attributable to the franchisees’ own actions.
However, it can be argued that much of the revenue gain
would have occurred in any case due to ridership growing for
the reasons stated above. In addition, some further cost
reductions might have been expected under continued BR
ownership, rather than no efficiency gains at all. On this
basis, the net financial outcome for the state was very similar
whether privatisation had occurred or continued BR
ownership continued.
7. The role of the infrastructure provider
In order for this financial outcome to be achieved, the greatest
cost reduction pressure was on Railtrack, whose income
derives very largely from rail passenger operations (over
80%) and which was in turn set to fall at 2% per annum in
real terms following the Regulator’s decision in 1996. Its
annual profits would have been wiped out by 2001 had it not
succeeded in obtaining corresponding cost reductions. The
TOCs needed to stimulate ridership in order to attain their
franchise payment reduction targets. Increased train-km may
have played a part in this, necessitating the lower unit costs
estimated above, but under the initial charging regime, only a
very small part of Railtrack’s income varied with the volume
of train-km.
As indicated above, the reduction in Railtrack access charges
was the second most important element in enabling TOCs to
manage their reduced franchise payments, after revenue
growth. It can be argued that a real cost reduction of 2% per
annum is not unreasonable – in an economy with real growth
of around 2% per annum and a stable total population, such
an improvement in output per worker is implicit. However, it
may be far more difficult for an organisation to achieve this
by cutting back, than by increasing total output and income,
effectively deploying existing resources more efficiently (as
the TOCs have done).
A major method by which Railtrack reduced costs was
through contracting-out much of the maintenance and renewal
work. While common practice in many industries, the rapid
shift to this method of working appears to have caused
substantial problems in terms of ensuring quality of work, and
safety. These were highlighted a derailment at Hatfield (on the
GNER main line about 30 km north of London) on 17 October
2000. While the number of fatalities (four) was less than in
other recent accidents, the cause was quickly identified as the
fragmentation of a rail on a section of curved track. This
potential problem of ‘gauge corner cracking’ was then
considered to affect many other sections on the network,
resulting the immediate imposition of severe speed limits and
a number of temporary closures. Long-distance services of all
operators were very badly disrupted. Only from the 2001
Summer timetable was a normal service restored.
Until the Hatfield crash, strong growth in rail use had
continued, in line with trends since 1996, as indicated in table
1. In the quarter year before the crash long-distance volume
was up by 9% on the same period one year earlier23. Trends
since the crash indicate long-distance volumes are still
affected – falling from 13,200m passenger-km in 1999-2000
to 12,100m in 2000/01 (the year in which the crash occurred)
and partially recovering to 12,900m in 2001/02. Conversely,
London & South East continued to grow in 2000/01 and
2001/02, despite significant disruption to services after the
crash. This reflects less scope for its users to change their
behaviour than on routes where more modal alternatives
exist.
In addition to the payments to TOC franchise holders by the
SRA, other major cash flows exist within the rail system.
From the inception of privatisation, a system of incentives
and penalty payments has existed, in order to promote
improved performance . Where TOCs fail to meet specified
performance standards, notably in service reliability, they are
liable to pay penalties to the SRA. Relative to the total sums
paid by the SRA to franchisees these were small until the year
2000/01, in which they reached £102m. While falling, they
remained high in 2001/02 at £81m24. The largest element in
such payments has been poor reliability, in turn substantially
(though by no means wholly) attributable to problems caused
by Railtrack to TOCs. Negotiations thus take place between
TOCs and Railtrack over the compensation due (which also
allows for loss of passenger revenue) – in effect, reduced
track access payments for the periods in question. Hence,
very large payments (or reduced income) were experienced
by Railtrack after October 2000, greatly worsening its
financial position. In the year to 31 March 2001, its operating
margin fell from 16.6% in 1999/2000, to 7.8%. After the
costs of Hatfield, primarily in compensation to TOCs
(£561m), a loss of £307m was recorded25.
In the longer term, the realism of continued reduction in
Railtrack’s real income had been questioned, and the need for
additional finance to maintain and enhance the system more
evident. Under the powers held by the Regulator, a second
periodic review of access charging was carried out, and came
into effect from April 2001. Total support payments increased
by 34.5% between 2000/1 and 2001/2 then by about 5% in
real terms to 2005/6, more than reversing the previous
reductions26. These do not incur a direct cost to the TOCs, as
the franchise agreements render any changes at periodic
review a ‘pass-through’ to the SRA. However, the net effect
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on the state is clearly to increase costs very substantially. The
very large increases in payments in 2001, were in the form of
direct grants rather than via TOCs (charges to TOCs as such
actually fell in 2001/2, but then rise at 4-5% p.a.). The revised
charging system also substantially increased the element of
access charge variable with the volume of traffic, to about one
third of the total, thus reflecting increased costs imposed, and
providing incentives to expand capacity.
Clearly, some of these increases arise from a more realistic
view of future cost levels, potential efficiency gains, and need
to reinvest in the system that would also have applied under
public ownership. However, some elements could be seen as
related directly to privatisation – for example, the assumption
that Railtrack would incur real interest rates of about 8% in
raising capital, whereas substantially lower rates would apply
to direct public borrowing: this is analogous to the argument
applying to the funding of London Underground renewal by
‘Public Private Partnership’ (PPP) or direct state borrowing.
In an earlier version of this paper (June 2001), one author
acknowledged the severe financial problems faced by
Railtrack, but nonetheless considered that ‘….Given its
existence as the single monopoly provider, it is difficult to see
how it could be permitted to go out of business’. Indeed, the
government brought forward payments of about £1,500m due
under the revised access charging regime, to enable Railtrack
to overcome short-run difficulties.
However, further problems continued, and in October 2001
the Secretary of State for Transport placed Railtrack in
‘Railway Administration’, effectively placing the main
infrastructure business back under government control.
Arrangements are being made to set up a new ‘not for profit’
business which will take over Railtrack’s role. The arguments
on both sides have been very complex and its is not the role
of this short paper to examine them.
8. Vertical Separation of Metro systems
The trend towards vertical separation of rail systems can be
traced in part to a general trend towards deregulation and
vertical separation of network industries, in that the same
principles used to justify deregulation of gas, electricity,
telecommunications, etc are being applied to rail. In the case
of European rail networks – particularly the high-speed routes
– EU regulation is also a factor, and has prompted or hastened
restructuring. Such regulation is more a consequence of the
drive for a single market through the free movement of goods
and labour, than it is a consequence of privatisation ideology;
hence directive 91/440 specifically exempted local railways
and Metro systems from its provisions.
Perhaps as a result of there being no framework driven by
external policy, the dominant structural model for European
Metros remains the vertically integrated monopoly entity.
Where a city has had more than one Metro company,
separation has tended to be horizontal rather than vertical (i.e.
an oligopoly comprising vertically integrated firms
imperfectly competing). Having said this, there are
nonetheless a few examples of parts of services being
vertically separated, e.g. the fledgling Metropolitan Railway
in London initially operated using stock from the Great
Western and Great Northern railways; while its competitor
the Metropolitan District extended some services to Southend
by utilising tracks of the Whitechapel and Bow Railway and
tracks and locomotives of the London Tilbury and Southend
Railways. Yet such examples are very much the exception, as
like the railways, Metros have generally developed as
vertically integrated organisations with the operator managing
its own infrastructure. 
Since the early 1990s, a number of European Metros have
restructured. This has led to a move away from the traditional
model and restructuring has increasingly included elements of
vertical separation. Interestingly this has not resulted in a
single model of vertical separation; rather a number of
different models now exist ranging from limited tendering to
open competition for operations or infrastructure. Fuller
details are given in Ball27.
8.1 Stockholm 
The Swedish rail system was one of the first to be vertically
separated (and the experience is said to have been one of the
inspirations for EC91/440), so perhaps it is unsurprising that
Sweden was also a pioneer in vertically separating a metro
system: Stockholm’s Tunnelbana. Vertical separation has in
fact been the outcome of restructuring twice (in 1991, and
again in 1999), in both cases to enable competitive
franchising of operations.
The T-bana is a medium sized Metro with annual patronage
of approximately 300 million journeys over a network of 110
route kms, serving 100 stations. The first line, the Green line,
was opened in 1950 and followed by Red line (1964) and the
Blue line (1975). The T-bana, together with 410 bus routes, 2
light rail lines and 3 ‘commuter’ rail lines, serves a city of 1.8
million people.
Until 1991, the T-bana was owned, operated and managed by
AB Storstockholms Localtrafik (SL) a traditional vertically
integrated, multi-modal public monopoly. In 1991, SL
underwent a radical transformation, centred around the
vesting of operations responsibilities in new quasi-
autonomous subsidiary companies. SL Tunnelbana AB, a
wholly owned subsidiary of SL, took responsibility for
operation of the three T-bana lines, while other subsidiaries
operated the light rail, bus and commuter rail services.
Vertical separation lay at the heart of the new structure, with
the subsidiaries managing operations, while infrastructure
ownership and control remained with SL. The division of
responsibilities this created is shown in table 4.
Separation and creation of the subsidiaries was the first step
towards offering 5-year operations franchises for each line,
not unlike the route tendering used for London bus services.
Franchising was to apply to all SL’s services, including the
three lines making up the T-bana, so creating a de jure
horizontal separation. (This was made possible, or at least
easier, by the characteristics of the network: there is no inter-
running, each line has a separate control centre, and physical 
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interchange between the Red, Green and Blue lines is very
limited with only four stations providing interchange between
the lines – three of these are adjacent.) The franchises were to
last only 5 years. Since this is a short period of time relative
to the long lives of railway assets, vertical separation was a
prerequisite for contestable franchising, as the payback period
on investment would be insufficient in a 5-year vertically
integrated franchise, leading either to no investment or no
competition. The structure is very similar to that of British
national rail, but an important difference is that competition is
purely for the monopoly right to operate services using SL’s
assets; there is no direct on-track competition (reflecting the
realities of high frequency/simple diagram metro operations),
nor is there use of privately owned assets.
The first T-bana franchise (for operation of the Blue Line)
was offered in 1994, followed by the Red Line in 1995 and
the Green Line in 1996. Interestingly, the SL’s subsidiaries
were permitted to bid, and indeed the incumbent, SL
Tunnelbana AB, won all three franchises with that for the
Green Line uncontested.
By the late 1990s, it was concluded that the arrangement was
not as successful as had been hoped (for reasons discussed
below). A second restructuring occurred in 1999 when SL
offered a 10-year operating franchise for the operation of the
T-bana. The division of responsibilities remained as described
above – vertical separation was retained. However, the
nominal horizontal separation was abandoned, with the
franchise covering the unified operation of all three lines.
This time SL’s subsidiaries were not permitted to bid, so the
winner would have to be a private sector company. Ultimately
this proved to be French transport company CGEA (Connex). 
The Stockholm experience raises questions firstly of the
reasons for the original restructuring and then not only of
why the structure was abandoned, but also why the
replacement retained vertical separation. 
In the late 1980s SL faced a severe financial problem with the
proportion of operating costs covered by income at only 36%,
requiring a large operating subsidy. Moreover rising costs
could not be explained by increased service since operated
car-km stood only 12% higher in 1991 than in 1981.
Competition was seen as the way to drive down costs, with
relatively short contracts as the second best to pure open
competition. As explained above, this could only be achieved
with vertical separation so that asset responsibilities and their
attendant sunk costs would not form part of the franchise. The
intention was that reduced operating subsidies would allow
SL to achieve higher levels of investment and bring about
service quality improvements. These twin aims, reducing cost
and improving quality, are evident in the language at the time
of restructuring.
In terms of financial efficiency, the new structure
demonstrated some success: operating costs fell in real terms
for four consecutive years. The franchises were awarded to
the lowest cost (subsidy) in a sealed-bid auction. Thus to be
competitive against outside bidders, SL Tunnelbana reduced
staff employed by 21% between restructuring in 1991 and
award of the first franchise in 1994. It also increased service
volumes, such that staff productivity (in terms of car km per
staff member employed) had risen 39% by 1993.
Accordingly, cost coverage had dramatically improved to
62% by 1999. 
In terms of quality, the increase in service volumes was an
obvious improvement. However, reliability declined
significantly, with the average number of delays over 10
minutes increasing 36% between 1992-4 and 1997-9.
Analysis of various causal factors shows that problems with
the new signalling were predominantly responsible for the
increased delays and decline in SL’s reputation and patronage,
i.e. the problem was not one directly related to the vertically
separate structure, but one related to new asset teething
problems familiar to so many metros both integrated and
separated.
The 1991 restructuring only partly succeeded in creating
contestable franchises. Again however, this is not due to
vertical separation per se, rather it relates to the form of
auction used. The contract covered “overall responsibility for
quality” but the least-cost auction method was fundamentally
at odds with that aim: it successfully delivered price
competition was but blind to the differing abilities of bidders
to improve service quality. A ‘beauty contest’ auction might
have proved more successful. Where there was competition,
the bids were extremely close in price, implying a different
outcome may have emerged if quality proposals were also
considered. Moreover, the incumbent had a clear information
advantage and as a public entity SL Tunnelbana could take a
relaxed attitude to risk, perhaps giving it an advantage over
private sector competitors. Contestability may not have been
truly credible with the incumbent allowed to participate, and
this may explain why the incumbent, having won the
previous two franchises, was unchallenged in the Green line
competition.
The explanation of the second restructuring follows from
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AB Storstockholms Localtrafik Operating Companies
(SL) (Blue, Red and Green Lines)
Specify fares Revenue collection
Strategic service planning Detailed service planning and 
timetabling
Manage franchising process Daily operations
Ownership of Track/signalling Signalling/service control
Ownership of Trains Driver services
Ownership of Stations Station staff
Ownership of Depots Depot management
Infrastructure renewal/replacement Light maintenance including 
cleaning
Acceptance of new technology Operations safety case
Source: SL/Connex Interviewees and Peterson27
Table 4: Division of responsibilities after vertical separation
these conclusions about performance post-1991: vertically
separated operations franchising was not in itself the problem,
rather the associated mechanisms were not in harmony with
the desired outcomes. Thus the nominal horizontal separation
was abandoned to promote a ‘network approach’ to quality
enhancement. The auction method was changed to a beauty
contest approach much better aligned to the quality aim, and
the incumbent was barred from bidding to restore credibility
and contestability. (Indeed the winner would take over a 60%
stake in SL Tunnelbana AB, so it would truly become SL’s
partner.) The contract was for six plus four years, i.e. a base
contract of 1999-2005 with the possibility of extension to
2009 if performance is sufficiently encouraging. The threat
that the contract could be terminated is real, thereby
providing an incentive for quality improvement and cost
control. Finally, the contract incorporates a performance
regime whereby the operator is given an annual grant, with
bonuses and financial penalties contingent on performance in
the areas of reliability, staff visibility, cleanliness, information
and safety. The operator’s profit therefore is strongly related
to its performance. Capital investment remains the
responsibility of SL, however, Connex has a significant role
in determining priorities for investment (a recent example
being ticket barriers). 
Early indications are that the new regime is regarded as a
success both by operator and infrastructure owner. It is too
early to confirm this conclusively, though performance data
shows significant improvements in reliability and cleanliness
performance. If these trends are suggestive of general
performance it confirms the conclusions that vertical
separation of a metro can work, so long as the contractual
framework is appropriate to the situation.
8.2 London
While Stockholm provides possibly the best example of
vertical separation in the European Metro context, it is not the
only example. Moreover, the franchised operations structure
is not the only model a vertically separated metro can adopt.
Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in London where
the London Underground has been vertically separated, but
with infrastructure maintenance and renewal as the
competitive element, while operations remain controlled by a
public sector monopoly. Competition is being introduced into
the element traditionally considered the natural monopoly,
turning the traditional view of contestability on its head.
The London Underground, is the world’s oldest Metro and
one of the largest, with 12 lines stretching over 408 route
kms, serving 275 stations. Annual patronage is approximately
955 million journeys (which is about the same as the entire
national rail network). London itself has a population of 7.2
million and public transport includes extensive day and night
bus routes, a smaller metro (Docklands Light Railway) and a
limited tram system. There are also commuter rail services,
though these are outside the control of the city transport
authority.
Since 1933, the London Underground had been part of a
traditional multi-modal, vertically integrated public body
(known as London Transport in its most recent form). In 1999
a new transport authority, Transport for London, was
established to take over LT’s responsibilities for bus, DLR,
and tram services, and also taxis and the major roads, as well
as integrated transport functions such as fares and ticketing.
The creation of TfL mainly related to changes in London’s
government, with the creation of an elected Mayor and
Assembly. At the same time however, radical change was
occurring for London Underground, which was restructured
into an operating company (retaining the London
Underground Ltd name and ultimately transferring to TfL),
vertically separated from three subsidiary infrastructure
companies (known as Infracos). The Infracos are themselves
horizontally separated into line groupings: BCV (Bakerloo,
Central, Victoria, Waterloo & City lines), JNP (Jubilee,
Northern and Piccadilly lines) and SSL (Sub-Surface lines –
Metropolitan, Hammersmith & City, District, Circle and East
London lines). The Infracos took on maintenance and renewal
responsibility for most assets, with each Infraco taking
responsibility for a group of lines. The only assets excluded
from Infraco control are non-operational property, and those
asset areas covered by existing Private Finance Initiative
(PFI) deals. The resulting division of responsibilities is shown
in the next table.
Thus although both London and Stockholm became vertically
separated structures, the actual arrangement of functions
between the competitive and monopoly parties is radically
different. Creation of the Infracos was a prelude to a
competitive process where private sector consortia were
invited to bid for ownership of the Infracos. This is called the
Public-Private Partnership, or PPP. 
In a sense this represents a partial privatisation of the
industry, though the marked contrast to the national rail case
is that the Infracos lease the assets from London
Underground (cf national rail where ownership of the assets
was transferred into the private sector with Railtrack).
Infracos are required to maintain, enhance and make assets
available for LUL use, in return for which, LUL pays an
Infrastructure Service Charge (ISC); the level being
contingent on performance. At the end of the contract, all
assets revert to LUL with pre-defined minimum useful lives. 
The privately owned Infracos are responsible for raising the
finance necessary to pay for asset renewal and enhancement.
However, given the sums of and non-recoverable nature of
the investment required, short contracts would be impractical.
A 30-year contract was chosen, and this better reflects asset 
lives and the timescales required to plan, realise and receive
the reward on infrastructure improvement28.
Like Stockholm, the causes of restructuring are financial.
Unlike Stockholm however, the problem has not been one of
operations deficits, indeed traffic revenues have exceeded
operating costs since 1993/4. Between 1989 and 2000, real
revenue increased by 60% as a consequence of a strong
economy driving demand, and a policy of real fares increases
against a price elasticity of –0.329. Over the same time real
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costs only grew 26%, hence the internal contribution to
investment has increased significantly30. However, this gross
operating margin has never been sufficient to cover the high
level of renewals and depreciation – a consequence of the age
of the network – and this has meant a continuing need for
subsidy. London’s problem however has been that levels of
grant (and therefore investment) have been a) insufficient and
b) highly variable due to annual funding settlements, resulting
in an accumulated £1.2bn investment backlog.
The government’s chosen means of addressing these problems
was PPP, under which long-term stable funding and asset
management would be provided by the private sector, with
public sector operations, and guaranteed government
commitment. Infracos (in the private sector) raise their own
funds and make infrastructure investment. This requires
vertical separation if operations are to remain public (per
government desire), and long franchises to ensure returns on
investment. It was the financing plan, therefore, which required
and determined the unusual form of vertical separation.
Separation occurred in 1999, and since then the Infracos and
LUL have been ‘shadow running’ the contract in preparation
for transfer to the private sector (expected later in 2002
following recent signature of the Share Purchase
Agreements). The recent and incomplete nature of the change
make it difficult to draw many conclusions about the
structure’s effectiveness at this stage (particularly as the
financial incentives are less effective when Infracos are
subsidiaries). However, the competition for the Infracos
provides some evidence of contestability. Details of the bids
have not been made public, but an available measure is the
number of bids. For the three competitions, a total of 12 bids
were received from 6 consortia31. Four bids per contract
compares favourably with national rail franchises (5-6
average), and is consistent with other large contracts. As in
the second Stockholm competition, in-house bids were not
permitted, putting bidders on an equal footing. The
mechanism and number of bids suggests contestability, at
least in the competition for Infraco Ownership.
The net financial impact of the PPP deal will be affected by
the higher rates of return on capital required by the private
sector consortia in comparison with direct public financing.
Making reasonable assumptions, this suggests that the
consortia will have to undertake the work itself at a cost about
20% less than the existing public sector organisations in order
to offset this effect32.
8.3 Other examples
Fully vertically separated structures are still very much in the
minority. However, other systems are experimenting with
restructuring, including elements of separation. These are
worth brief discussion.
London’s other metro system is the Docklands Light Railway
(DLR), an automated system opened in 1987 and now
carrying 30 million passenger journeys annually. The
structure is unusual, in that railway development
responsibilities and freehold ownership of the assets belong
to DLR Ltd, a subsidiary of transport authority TfL.
However, operations and maintenance were awarded as a
vertically integrated franchise in 1997 to Serco plc on a
performance-based franchise contract lasting 7 years
(reflecting the very low sunk costs it involves because assets
are relatively new and the franchisee is not expected to
replace them). DLR Ltd also has a concession arrangement
with CGLR, a consortium contracted to design build and
maintain the recent Lewisham extension. Interestingly,
operations over the extension are provided by DRML, who
run the rest of the system, with the assets controlled by
CGLR. As a result, the extension is vertically separated
between two private sector companies, while the rest of the
network is vertically integrated but franchised. This
somewhat complicated arrangement appears not to have
adversely impacted upon DLR performance, which has been
consistently good since the opening of the extension in 1999.
The Berlin U-Bahn is a metro in transition from a typically
vertically integrated, multi-modal public monopoly to a
structure more resembling that in Stockholm. Unlike
Stockholm however, where transition was achieved in three
years, the process in Berlin is much lengthier, having begun
in 1994 and due to reach and end state by 2008. In 1999 the
U-Bahn operator, BVG, agreed a recovery and action strategy
with the Berlin state authority, which sought to improve the
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New London Underground Limited 3 Infrastructure companies
(LUL) (Infracos: JNP, BCV, SSL)
Freehold on assets Leasehold on assets
(including stations, depots, track and civil structures, (including stations, depots, track and
signalling, and trains) civil structures, signalling, and trains)
Strategic and detailed service planning Infrastructure renewal/replacement
Manage bidding process Deliver specified upgrades
Traffic hours control of the railway Engineering hours control of the railway
Daily operation Asset availability for operational use
Timetabling Asset maintenance
Signalling/service control Asset improvement
Driver services Depot management
Station staff Cleaning (sub-contracted)
Operations capability Technical capability
Infrastructure technical assurance Detailed technical design
Safety improvement specification Implement safety improvement 
Underground Safety Case for HSE Safety Cases for LUL
Responsibilities under existing PFI contracts, not devolved to Infracos
Specify fares and revenue collection Ticketing/Revenue assets (Prestige PFI)
Power control Power supply (Power PFI)
Communications user Communications equipment
(Connect PFI)
British Transport Police BTP accommodation (BTP PFI)
Source: LUL interviewees and Glover (2000)
Table 5: Division of responsibilities since 1999
company’s financial position and prepare it for competition.
The origins of restructuring can be found in the political use
of public transport during the Cold War division of the city.
Both sides used public transport to maintain full employment,
consequently, by 1992, 12,000 journeys per staff member
employed were made in Berlin compared to nearly 40,000 in
London. With the cold war political imperative gone, BVG
was required to improve efficiency and become cost effective.
As in Stockholm, competition for operations has been seen as
the means of achieving this, thus if present plans are
continued, vertical separation and operations franchising will
take place circa 2008. In the meantime BVG has sought to cut
costs and one of the means of doing so has been to create and
privatise subsidiary companies to provide driver services
under contract. This is not full vertical separation since other
elements of operation are retained by BVG, but it is
nonetheless another variation on a similar theme.
Some metros however have remained firmly vertically
integrated. The small Glasgow Underground is a good
example. The system is owned, financed and operated by the
regional public transport authority, and suggestions that this
should change have been steadfastly resisted.
Another firmly vertically integrated system is the Paris
Metro, owned and operated by RATP. However, lack of
separation does not mean there has been no structural
evolution. From 2000, a formal contract has been established
between the public transport authority (STIF) and RATP. The
contract marks a degree of devolution to RATP, within the
parameters of a performance contract including (limited)
financial incentives.33
While not separation, the contract approach marks a departure
from the traditional model. Moreover, it is the type of
arrangement advocated by the EU in the recent draft
regulation for public service contracts in passenger transport.
The regulation is predicated on creating a level-playing field
and fostering higher quality public transport, rather than
prescribing structures per se. However, the regulation appears
to require a formalised agreement between transport operator
and authority, incorporating a 5-year service contract, and
critics argue this may require the franchised operations form
of vertical separation (given that vertically integrated
franchises of only 5 years may not be contestable). Authorities
both in London and Paris have argued that the complexity of
the operations means that franchising operations for the whole
network is impractical, while franchising lines/groups of lines
is unworkable given the high levels of interchange and
network integration benefits that would be lost.
8.4 Conclusions in respect of Metros
European Metro experience shows that since the early 1990s,
the traditional model of a vertically integrated public
corporation, perhaps best typified by the old London
Transport, is being superseded by new structures. In a number
of cases, the vertical separation of operations and
infrastructure has formed a fundamental part of the new
structure. Stockholm and London provide two examples of
this, but they are two very contrasting examples. The reasons
for this contrast appear to be twofold. Until very recently there
has been no external policy influence on the form to adopt –
the EU public service directive may change this unless its final
form differs significantly from the draft. More importantly, the
form of vertical separation directly reflects the particular
problem that triggered restructuring in the first place. In
Stockholm, for instance, the original problem contracting was
designed to resolve was the persistent operating deficit: hence
competitive least cost tendering for operations. Similarly in
Berlin, it is a problem of high operating costs that is
prompting a move towards competitive operations. For LUL,
by contrast, the problem is an investment deficit, and
infrastructure franchising was seen as the way to deliver the
sustained investment necessary and retain public sector
operations, without significant upfront cost for the public
sector. This implies vertical separation has been used very
much as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.
The differences between franchised operations and franchised
infrastructure are significant, but arguably the similarities are
equally worthy of comment, as they perhaps indicate a set of
characteristics common to all vertically separated metros.
First, regardless of which part is made contestable, strategic
service planning functions are retained by the monopoly
entity. Second, there is a desire to enable (at least the
possibility of) private sector involvement, hence a need for a
contract interface. Third, the length of contract reflects
responsibilities towards assets in accordance with the axioms
of contestability. (i.e. where sunk costs are expected, such as
a contract requirement for the private sector partner to invest
in asset renewal, a long contract is necessary in order for the
private partner to have confidence that a return will be
realised on investment. Similarly if the desire is for contracts
of short duration, private sector interest will vary inversely
with the level of sunk cost investment expected.) Fourth,
beauty-contest auctions tend to form part of the competitive
process, and fifth, the incentives of each party under vertical
separation are aligned using a performance framework
incorporating financial bonuses and penalties.
The traditional industry structure for metro systems is
undoubtedly changing as, like the railways before, metros
begin to adopt forms of vertical separation. In the cases
discussed above it has been clear that vertical separation has
not been sought as an end in itself, but as part of a response to
a particular problem and as an enabler for competition/private
sector involvement. Vertical separation for metros is still very
much in its infancy, whether or not it is a success will be
judged by the performance of vertically separated metros, and
the extent to which other metros also adopt vertically separate
structures. Moreover it will be interesting to see whether the
variety of structures is maintained, or whether a standard
model will emerge, perhaps as a result of EU regulation.
9. Overall conclusions
1. It is desirable to ensure that a comprehensive inventory of
assets is compiled when ownership and/or responsibility for
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infrastructure is transferred to the private sector. In the case of
Railtrack, the sale was completed in a short period which did
not enable this process to take place. Hence, valuation of the
company was related to current profitability and perceived
risk, rather than conditions of the assets as such, and
uncertainty was created about the level of renewal investment
needed in the medium to long term. In the case of London
Underground, a clear asset inventory is necessary in order to
determine the scale and cost of work needed. Hopefully, the
extended period in which the PPP negotiations has been
conducted has enabled this to be developed in greater detail.
2. The interface between train operators and the infrastructure
needs to be clearly specified, to ensure that responsibility in
the event of safety issues and delays affecting final users is
determined. In the case of Railtrack and TOCs this takes the
form of agreements between private sector businesses, with
incentive and penalty payments. In the case of metros, this
applies to private operating companies with public sector
infrastructure (in Stockholm), or private infrastructure
companies with public sector operators (in London).
3. Relationships between infrastructure providers (whether
public or private) and sub-contractors to them need to be
clearly specified, and appropriate controls in place. This is
illustrated by the problems faced by Railtrack in the light of
the Hatfield crash.
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1. Introduction
In Japanese urban trans-
portation, privately owned
and operated railway firms
are common and play an
important role, particularly
in urbanized areas.
Although it is considered
common knowledge that a
majority of the firms are
financially independent
and own the rail
infrastructure they operate
on, how they can manage
is still open to debate. The
present paper focuses on
how these private railway
companies manage their
businesses without lump-
sum subsidies and whether
there are lessons that may
be transferable to other situations.
Previously, Killeen and Shoji1, Shoji and Killeen2 and Shoji
(2001), analysed the 15 so-called “major” private railway
operators in Japan. The paper concluded that it is and has
been the innovative use of diversification strategies that has
allowed the firms in Japan to build a stable ridership
necessary to not only survive but to thrive. 
Some researchers consider the success of the private railways
in Japan to be idiosyncratic. This is usually attributable to
extremely high traffic volumes due to favourable market
conditions (densely populated cities with concentrated urban
cores). This might be true in the case of the “major”
operators, which provide service mainly in Japan’s three large
metropolitan areas. However, it should be pointed out that
there are numerous private rail firms, which operate
successfully even in less populated areas in Japan. The
innovative use of diversification and integration strategies has
helped enable these private firms provide adequate urban
transport at virtually no cost to the government.
The main purpose of this paper is to clarify diversification
strategy as utilized by the “minor” providers of urban
transport. A brief overview of rail transport in Japan follows
the introduction. The paper then details the performance of
and diversification strategy utilized by 63 “minor” private rail
companies operating in Japan. As in earlier studies, Rumelt’s3
methodology for classifying strategic behaviour is adapted
and utilised to analyse the “in-house” (company-level)
diversification strategy of the “minors”. The paper then
focuses the analysis on six firms over a period of twenty
years.  
The main finding of the research is that, although the
“minors” face declining ridership and increased competition
from the automobile, the more efficient firms are profitable.
The paper concludes that the Japanese model exemplifies a
possible scenario in which railway systems could be privately
operated more effectively
and efficiently.
2. A Brief Sketch of Rail
Transport in Japan
Although, trends indicate
an increase in auto use and
ownership and stagnant or
gradually declining rail
ridership, rail transport
maintains a reasonably high
modal share of total trips in
Japan. In 1996, on a
country-wide basis, the rail
modal share of motorized
transport in terms of
passengers was 27%. If
only the large metropolitan
areas are considered this
figure increases to 48%4.
There are 174 rail operators
providing passenger and freight service in Japan. Of these, 88
private railway companies operate passenger rail service. 15
of these firms, usually referred to as “major” private rail
companies, provide service mainly in Japan’s three large
metropolitan areas with the exception of Nishitesu. The
remainder of the firms are called “minor” private rail
companies. 67 of these firms provide rail passenger service
outside metropolitan areas. In addition, 50 quasi-public firms
provide passenger services. A break down according to
ownership and type of service offered is detailed in Table 15. 
In general, the private rail providers receive almost no
subsidies while providing the government with considerable
corporate tax revenues. While all 15 of the “majors” are
completely self-sufficient (no subsidization), the firms
operating in less densely populated centres generally receive
minimal subsidies. In principle, Japanese national
government policy dictates a policy of self-sufficiency even
for the “minors”. Although there is some controversy
regarding this point, most private firms operate strictly on a
commercial basis. Thus, in principle, they are responsible for
their own operating and infrastructure costs.
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TYPE OF SERVICE OWNERSHIP   NUMBER OF FIRMS
 PRIVATE 88
PASSENGER  PUBLIC 14
 QUASI-PUBLIC 50
 JR 6
FREIGHT  JR 1
 PRIVATE 15
174
Note: 1) cable car, ropeway and non-rail operators are not included.
     2) quasi-public operations (Daisan Sekuta) include monorail and Shin-Kotsu (AGT) operators
Source - Ministry of Transport. A look at Rail Transport in figures (Suji de miru Tetsudo),
       Transport Economics Research Center, 1997
Table 1: Number of rail operators in Japan by type
Moreover, in Japanese public transport provision the
operators decide the level and type of services offered. Since
self-sufficiency dictates strategic planning, all private rail
operators have to consider market and demand trends
seriously. Dependant on passengers for income, private
railways have had to treat passengers as customers and
provide extremely reliable, safe and convenient service. In
addition, facing increased competition from automobiles,
buses, as well as other railway firms, private firms had to
constantly improve efficiency.
The rail boom, which occurred in numerous industrialised
countries in the late 19th and early 20th century, was also a
phenomenon in Japan. Most Japanese private railway firms
began operations in the late 19th or the early 20th century and
thus have long histories. Unlike the bankruptcies that plagued
rail operators in other countries, however, many Japanese
firms are still in operation today, although several rail firms
have closed unprofitable lines (in most cases, replacing them
with their own bus operations) and reduced freight services in
response to competition from automobiles. The total route
kilometres of “minor” private railways decreased from 2,842
km in 1965 to 2,147 km in 19856. 
It is generally taken for granted that a large potential ridership
must exist before construction of infrastructure for urban
transport will even be contemplated. This is because the
public sector, not the private sector funds these projects and
there must be a visible need before a project is even
considered to be politically viable. In Japan, however, the
“Railway Nationalization Law”, which went into effect in
1906, restricted the activities of private railway firms. By law,
private firms were restricted to the creation of lines that in
general did not compete with government lines. Private firms
were thus compelled to serve areas with relatively limited
populations. While private firms anticipated that rail
operations could be self-supporting, limited population bases
forced firms to ‘generate’ a steady ridership for rail
operations. This led to the initiation of a business
diversification strategy. 
It is important to note that Japanese private railways have
long been permitted to operate non-rail businesses. Rail
business activities and non-rail business activities, however,
are strictly separated by “Rail Accounting Regulations”
(Tetsudo Kaikei Kisoku), which are set and enforced by the
Ministry of Transportation.  A railway firm is forbidden to
allocate rail and non-rail costing at its own discretion.
Regulations dictate how to allocate costs for common
facilities and administration. Therefore, an intentional cross-
subsidy strategy, whereby a rail company charges low fares at
the expense of non-rail businesses and vice versa is unlawful
and thus avoided.
Today, the private railway firms generally divide their
operations into four divisions: a rail division, a transport
division, a real estate division and an “other business”
division. The rail division, in general, provides commuter
services but some firms provide inter-city, resort access,
airport access and freight service as well. The transport
division provides such services as bus and taxi feeder links to
rail lines, inter-city express bus service and tour bus
operations. The real estate division mainly develops
commercial and residential properties and/or leases these
properties. The other business division’s operations vary
between each firm and include various retail ventures,
restaurants and leisure facilities such as amusements parks,
stadiums, and museums.
In addition to in-house diversification, private rail companies
also form multi-company networks called “groups”. In many
cases, the flagship company of the “group” is the rail firm.  The
members of each “group” are linked by cross-ownership and
other types of other financial ties, interlocking directorates,
long-term business relationships and other social and historical
links. Although many “group” companies remain fairly
independent entities with somewhat “weak” links, the sum of
“group” concerns allows firms to offer a full range of lifestyle
service needs for the communities they serve. 
3. An Overview of “Minor” Private Railway Firms
Of the 88 private railway firms, 15 are referred to as “major”
private rail companies. Classification is conducted by the
Ministry of Land and Transportation and at present includes
firms with annual revenues of over approximately US $700
million. The remaining 73 firms provide rail services in the
less densely populated cities of Japan, and are referred to as
“minors”.
The differences between “minor” firms in terms of scale and
type of services offered are substantial. While several of the
firms have more extensive networks than the smallest
“majors”, others have limited infrastructure. In terms of
service provided, most firms offer either commuter service,
inter-city links, access to tourist areas or some combination of
the three. The total number of passengers carried also varies
significantly.  Shinkeisei, for example, transports an average
of over 300,000 passengers daily, while Arita at the other end
of the scale carries just 78. Therefore, firm differences are
considerable. However, all firms do have one notable
similarity, they are all active diversifiers. 
While the “majors” receive limited or no subsidization, there
are subsidies available to smaller private firms, especially
those operating in rural areas. In 1985, total subsidies directed
at “minor” private railways excluding JNR related firms was
only 918 million yen. This represents only 1% of total
revenue attributable to the “minor” rail firms. In 1995,
subsidies directed at the small and medium including JNR
reform related quasi-public firms, ex-JNR lines and other
JNR reform related lines, totalled 3 billion yen (about US$25
million). This represents only 1.6% of total revenue of the
small and medium railway firms in Japan. To put this figure
into perspective, subsidies for British Columbia, Canada’s
transit system totalled US$230 million (about 27.6 billion
yen) in 1994. Moreover, in 1997, the Ministry of Transport
ceased one of the subsidization schemes for “minors” -
‘subsidies covering a portion of operating deficits’. It should
be noted that fare-reimbursement to the private railway
Trasporti Europei
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operators for discount fares (such as old aged pensioners) is
uncommon in Japan.
While 73 firms are classified as “minors”, 63 were considered
for the purpose of this study. 5 firms, which own rail
infrastructure only and do not offer passenger rail service
directly (these firms typically lease rail infrastructure to other
firms) and 3 recently incorporated firms were excluded from
the study. Two other firms, Osaka-fu Toshi-Kaihatsu, which is
generally referred to as “Senboku” and Kita-Osaka-Kyuko
were also excluded. Both companies operate lines in the
Osaka metropolitan area and their traffic density is well over
100,000 passenger-kilometres per day per route-kilometres.
These two firms were excluded from the study because of the
high-density markets in which they operate as well as because
both these companies are quasi-private. 
Table 2 classifies the “minor” private rail companies
according to passenger density and profitability. As an index
of profitability, the ratio of the revenue from rail operation to
the cost of rail operation (including depreciation) is utilized.
The table also indicates the profitability of the firms at an
operational level. The results indicate that numerous
companies are profitable which do not operate in high-density
markets. Of the 63 firms under study, 29 firms are profitable
in the rail division. In addition, 9 firms covered more than
95% of their rail division costs. Only 11 of the 21 firms with
traffic densities of less than 2000 passenger-kilometres per
route-kilometres per day were not able to cover 80% of
‘operating expenses’, including depreciation. Overall, when
diversified operations are taken into account, 34 of the 63
firms were found to be profitable.
This is quite remarkable given the fact that passenger fare
revenues do not cover operating expenses incurred on
operating, maintaining, and administrating the rail operations
in Europe and North America. In fact, the fare-box ratio (the
ratio of fare revenues to operating expenses which normally
exclude depreciation cost) does not exceed 80% in most cases7. 
Although firms which carried over 10,000 passenger-
kilometres per route-kilometre per day, were almost all
determined to be profitable, passenger density itself did not
seem to have a crucial influence on the overall profitability if
the passenger-kilometres density was more than 2,000.  
Table 3 details the differences in the average revenues
accrued by each division. An average total of 62% of
revenues was earned in the case of the “minors” by
diversified operations. While revenues earned by the real
estate and other business divisions are, on average, similar to
the “majors”, the transportation division generaly plays a
more important role for the “minors”. Bus service is operated
in many cases in lieu of rail service. In general, this type of
bus service does not function in a complimentary role but
rather in a trunk role because the smaller densities are more
conducive to being supported by bus service. 
4. Diversification Strategy of the “Minors”
Rumelt‘s8 pioneering methodology for classifying firms based
upon their diversification activities was utilized in the present
research. This study simplified Rumelt’s eight categories into
five - including firms which are fundamentally specialised
(single business), firms whose diversified businesses are on
the whole vertically integrated with the main business
(vertically integrated), firms which are diversified to an
extent but whose operations largely hinge on the main
business (dominant business), firms which have horizontally
diversified into areas which are related in terms of the market
technology to the main (related business), and firms which
are widely diversified into area not exclusively related to their
main business (unrelated business). It was also necessary to
adapt the model to make it applicable to the transport industry
because Rumelt‘s model was created for comparing firms
conducting business in the manufacturing sector9. 
Due to the complexity of businesses within the individual
divisions in each firm, it was necessary to determine the share
of vertically integrated businesses, related businesses, and
unrelated businesses within each division to sufficiently
quantify the specialisation ratio, related ratio, and the vertical
integration ratio10. While individual differences between firms
were noticeable, averages were taken to standardise the
classification technique. The Tetsudo Tokei Nenpo (Annual
Report of Rail Statistics) published by the Ministry of
Transportation was primarily used because it provided
standardised data for all the firms in the study.
The rail division was considered to be the main business
(largest single business). In the transport division bus and taxi
feeder lines which link residential developments and other
facilities to the rail lines can be classified as being vertically
integrated businesses because of the complementary nature of
their operations. Long distance bus service and tourist buses
(which have duplicate functions), however, are more likely to
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RAIL DIVISION PROFITABILITY
DENSITY1)
NUMBER OF
COMPANIES 100% - 95 - 100% 80 – 95%
less than
80%
FIRMS WITH
OVERALL
OPERATING
PROFITS
FIRMS WITH
CURRENT
PROFITS
(after taxes)
more than 40,000 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
20,000 – 40,000 5 4 1 0 0 5 2
10,000 – 20,000 10 10 0 0 0 9 9
8,000 - 10.000 0 - - - - - -
6,000 - 8,000 8 5 0 3 0 3 2
4,000 - 6,000 5 3 1 1 0 2 2
2,000 - 4000 13 5 3 5 0 6 4
1,000 - 2,000 21 1 4 5 11 8 5
TOTAL 63 29 9 14 11 34 25
Note: 1) density is defined as the average number of passenger-kilometers per route-kilometer per day.
     2) two firms (Sanyo and Kobe Dentetsu) use 1994 data due to effects of the Great Kobe Earthquake.
     3) there are seven companies that also provide rail freight services. But only three of them, their freight
       revenues exceeds passenger revenues; Chichibu (density was 6,300, rail profitability was 84%), Mizushima
      (4,300, 96%) and Sangi (3,000, 102%).  Gakunan (1,400, 81%) has almost same weight of both services.
Table 2: Passenger density1) and number of profitable firms (1995)
_ Revenue percentages
FIRM
_
Number
of Firms
_
Diversification
index4)
_
Operating level
profitability1) Rail Division
Transportation
Division
Real Estate
Division
Other Business
Division
Majors 15 42.87 115 51% 11% 21% 17%
Minors 63 40.433) 101 38% 32% 13% 17%
Note: 1) operating level profitability is defined as operating profits divided by operating costs (including depreciation).
2) the numbers are simple averages of each category of companies
3) the weighted average of DI for Minors was 59.55.
4) DI = (1-√ (∑Pi2))*100 where Pi is the percentage of revenues attributable to a discrete business.
Table 3: Revenue percentages of the majors and firms
operating in smaller markets (1995)
-2,00
2) the numbers are simple averages of each category of companies
3) the weighted average of DI for Minors was 59.55.
4) DI = (1-√ (∑Pi2))*100 where Pi is the percentage of revenues attributable to a discrete business.
 2) two firms (Sanyo and Kobe Dentetsu) use 1994 data due to effects of the Great Kobe Earthquake.
 3) there are seven companies that also provide rail freight services. But only three of them, their freight
revenues exceeds passenger revenues; Chichibu (density was 6,300, rail profitability was 84%), Mizushima
(4,300, 96%) and Sangi (3,000, 102%).  Gakunan (1,400, 81%) has almost same weight of both services.
be related in nature. Some firms have unrelated businesses in
their respective transport divisions including toll roads,
trucks, etc. In some cases, the transportation division or part
of its operations might more appropriately be classified as the
main business. For purposes of consistency, however, the
assumption that rail is the main business was maintained, as
per the analysis of the “majors”.
The real estate division also has a wide variety of businesses.
Vertical businesses include those formed primarily to increase
ridership. Utilization of acquired “core competencies”
obtained from developments located close to rail
infrastructure to develop land in other markets is better
classified as related business11. The location of the business in
question was used as a primary indication of relatedness. The
“other business” division is made up of a variety of
businesses some of which are related, some are unrelated and
some are vertically integrated.
Using the adapted model, the firms were classified according to
strategic type for the fiscal year 1995. The results indicated that 8
firms were single business, 3 were vertically integrated, 6 were
dominant, 6 were related and 40 were found to be classified as
unrelated. Thus, a large number of firms were found to be
following an unrelated business strategy. On the other hand,
more majors tended to utilise a related business strategy. 
When we consider the profitability of each division, the low
profitability of the rail division and the losses accrued by
transportation division became apparent. Total profitability
was calculated by dividing total rail division revenues by total
operating expenses, including depreciation. The total
profitability of the transport division was 103% while the
average profitability (the average of the 63 companies) of the
rail division was only 96%. Total profitability of the transport
division was 93% while the average profitability of transport
division was only 62%. On the other hand, in the real estate
division total profitability was 131%, while average
profitability was 123%.
Although drawn from only one year of data, the results
indicated that the success of the “majors” has been duplicated
by numerous firms operating in less densely populated cities.
Even some firms with extremely small passenger densities
are able to remain profitable. 
There are three major factors most likely to determine the
success or failure of these firms. The first factor is whether the
firms are able to increase the demand for their rail services.
The attraction especially of non-pass holders is of vital
importance to the survival of the firms, as a majority of this
type of commuting is done by automobile. Thus, private firms
operating in smaller markets strive to increase rail use by
attracting shoppers and tourists to its services. This traffic also
contributes to levelling off discrepancies between passenger
volumes during peak and off-peak periods (and directions).
Another important factor is increasing the efficiency of rail
operations. This is achieved through the initiation of
unmanned stations, out-sourcing of rolling stock repairs as
well as by the rationalization of staff and management. In
addition to the above cost cutting measures firms have also
worked to improve the safety and efficiency of rail
operations, as perceived by the customer, through increases in
the frequency of service.
The third factor is the important role of diversification.
Limitations on the profitability of the rail division have
forced firms to look for new sources of revenue. The most
successful firms are those able to increase demand for rail
services and/or the frequency of use of non-pass holders,
largely accomplished through the initiation of diversified
operations. Thus the internalisation of externalities brought
about by creation of rail infrastructure leads to profitability,
which makes it easier for the company to improve services. 
5. Diversification Strategy of Selected Firms
The next step in the analysis was to focus on 6 firms over a
20-year period to get a better idea of the nature of their
operations. The sample was chosen on the premise that
passenger densities should be similar to or less than those in a
“typical city” in other countries. The 6 firms under study
(with their 1995 passenger densities in brackets) included
Sanyo (32,500), Kobe Dentesu (Shintetsu, 29,400), Nose
(39,100), Hiroden (18,500)), Kotoden (6,600) and lyo Tetsu
(6,200)12. Table 4 provides an overview of the firms and
exemplifies the varied nature of their operations in terms of
scale of the rail network, in addition to the high percentage of
diversified operations earnings. 
Figure 1 shows the trends in annual ridership for the six
companies from fiscal year 1977 to 1996. While Kotoden and
lyo face decreasing ridership, which mirrors the situation in
many less populated centres, Shintetsu, Nose and Hiroden
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COMPANY NAME YEAR
1)
ESTABLISHED
NETWORK
SIZE
(PASSENGER
KM)
NUMBER OF
RAIL
EMPLOYEES
ANNUAL
PASSENGERS
x THOUSAND
AVERAGE
PASSENGER-
KMS PER KM
PER DAY
REVENUE
FROM RAIL
OPERATIONS
REVENUE
FROM
DIVERSIFIED
OPERATIONS
OPERATING
LEVEL
PROFITABILITY
SHINTETSU 1926 69.6 768 62,500 29,400 69% 31% 119%
SANYO 1933 70.4 1,013 79,800 32,500 71% 29% 110%
NOSE 1908 15.4 188 32,800 39,100 52% 48% 111%
HIRODEN 1942 34.9 237 65,600 18,500 28% 72% 104%
KOTODEN 1943 60.0 340 16,500 6,600 83% 17% 103%
IYO TETSU 1942 43.5 356 21,900 6,200 29% 71% 114%
AVERAGE 1932 49.0 484 49,800 22,100 55% 45% 110%
Note: 1) all companies except Nose have their predecessors. For example, Sanyo’s predecessor (Hyogo Denki) was
established in 1906 and began rail service in 1910.  Hiroden’s first section opened in 1912 and by 1925 most
lines began services. Kotoden started up rail operations in 1912 and most sections opened by 1927.
     2) number of rail employees includes directors.
Source:  Ministry of Transport, (1995), Annual Rail Statistics, (Tetsudo Tokei Nenpo).
Table4: Comparison of selected local urban transit
providers in Japan (FY1995)
Annual Passengers (thousand)
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Figure 1: Annual ridership of selected minors in Japan (1977-
1996 average)
 2) number of rail employees includes directors.
Source:  Ministry of Transport, (1995), Annual Rail Statistics, (Tetsudo Tokei Nenpo).
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have managed to increase ridership steadily over the course of
the data set. Sanyo’s ridership has experienced considerable
fluctuation, though this is part due to exogenous factors such
as the Great Kobe Earthquake and a change of the definition
of ‘passengers’ under “The Railway Enterprise Law”13.
Table 5 shows the breakdown of revenue percentages accrued
by the respective divisions of each company. The
diversification strategy type and diversification index of each
firm is also detailed. Shintetsu and Sanyo’s operations
indicate a focus on rail operations. Shintetsu earned an
average 62% of total revenues from rail operations over the
period of study, while Sanyo earned 75%. 
Like other private railways in Japan, the six companies under
study have a long history of diversification. At Sanyo, the
inauguration of bus service was in 1936. This was followed
by tourist bus services in 1940 and express service in 1990.
Sanyo’s predecessor (Hyogo Denki) initiated diversified
operations, including facilities to attract rail patronage at the
time of its incorporation in 1910. Other diversified operations
followed in 1918, including power generation and supply,
housing development, and amusement parks. In 1925, the
revenue percentage earned by the rail division was 63%,
while power generation and supply earned 36% of revenues
and real estate only 1%14.
Hiroden earns a majority of its revenues from its
transportation division (61%). This is largely due to the urban
structure of Hiroshima, which is more conducive to bus
operations. While the rail division is mainly focused on
commuter services, it is unique in the success of its tram
operations. Acquisitions and mergers play a large role in
Hiroden’s diversification strategy. A merger in 1938 led to the
inauguration of general bus service followed by the
acquisition of a tourist bus company in 1956. In 1960, the
first retail store was opened followed by the inauguration of
real estate development the following year. The transportation
division was expanded with the start of express bus service in
1984 followed by limousine bus service in 1993. 
Both Kotoden and lyo operate in similar sized and structured
markets in cities with populations of less than a half million
people. While Kotoden has remained rail focussed (62%); Iyo
is an extensively diversified organization. It operates heavy
rail lines in addition to trams, actively develops real estate,
and operates a large transportation division. In addition to
numerous travel agencies, Iyo operates airfreight service and
a store at Matsuyama’s airport. Iyo became actively involved
in diversified operations when faced with declining ridership
from 1965. Much, like Hiroden, lyo attracts a large number of
non-pass holders (72% to Kotoden’s 42% in 1996) partly
because of the presence of famous sightseeing spots in the
area where Iyo operates. 
The analysis determined that Shintetsu and Nose followed
related type diversification strategies due to the high
importance of real estate development. In fact, Shintetsu and
Nose are located in  areas that have developed rapidly,
especially during the 70s and 80s. Diversified operations thus
focus on the development of housing properties. Sanyo and
Kotoden were found to be vertically integrated, due to the
significant role of the transportation division. Iyo and Hiroden
were classified as unrelated although a vertically integrated
strategy classification is probably more appropriate for Hiroden
because it may be possible to classify the bus service as the
main business. Revenue percentages earned by the four
respective divisions clearly represent differences between firms.
While diversified operations increased over the course of the
data period there was a recent trend towards refocusing
operations, indicated by a fall in the diversification index
over the past 10 years. 
Table 6 shows average profitability of the selected firms at
both operating and current levels for each respective division. 
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_ _ _ Revenue percentages
FIRM Strategy DI Rail Division
Transportation
Division
Real Estate
Division
Other Business
Division
SHINTETSU R 35.63 62% 3% 21% 14%
SANYO VI 24.06 75% 15% 9% 1%
NOSE R 40.67 49% - 50% 1%
HIRODEN U 51.00 24% 61% 15% 0%
KOTODEN VI 34.70 62% 27% 0% 11%
IYO U 57.92 27% 42% 22% 9%
AVE. _ 40.66 50% 25% 20% 6%
Note: 1) operating level profitability is defined as operating profits divided by operating costs.
2) VI = vertically integrated business, R = related business, U = unrelated business
Table 5: Breakdown of revenue percentages by division
(1977-1996 average)
g f ( )
Note: diversification index values are averages of six companies for the year in question
 
Figure 2: Diversification index over time (1955 to 1995)
_ _ Operating level profitability Percentage of total profits       Current level profits
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SHINTETSU R 35.63 118 119 87 141 97 66 -3 40 -3 260,767 2% 3
SANYO VI 24.06 112 110 107 149 74 65 9 29 -3 608,751 3% 1
NOSE R 40.67 121 119 - 124 98 45 - 55 0 191,560 3% 1
HIRODEN U 51.00 104 111 97 131 - 63 -54 91 - 443,815 2% 2
KOTODEN VI 34.70 101 98 89 - 190 -225 -549 - 874 8,799 0% 9
IYO U 57.92 109 103 95 173 111 9 -26 106 11 1,137,194 8% 0
AVE. _ 40.66 111 110 95 144 114 4 -104 54 147 441,814 3% 3
AVE. (Note 4) _ 41.86 113 112 97 144 95 50 -15 64 1 528,417 4% 1
Note: 1) operating level profitability is defined as operating profits divided by operating costs.
         2) percentage of total profits is defined as division operating profits divided by total operating profits.
         3) current level profits take into account non-operating revenues and costs (including interest on debt).
         4) Kotoden's result is not included in this average.
Table 6: Profitability of the local firms at both operating and
current levels (1976 to 1995)
Note: 1) operating level profitability is defined as operating profits divided by operating costs.
While all of the six firms were profitable, there were
numerous differences. The rail divisions of both Iyo and
Kotoden, as expected, were less profitable than their
counterparts operating in more densely populated areas. In
addition, much like the “majors”, the real estate division was
responsible for a large proportion of profits while the
transportation and other business divisions suffered losses or
were slightly profitable. In the case of Kotoden, profits from
real estate endeavours were included with other business
profits influencing that figure.
At current levels, which include interest on debt payment, all
firms were found to be profitable over the course of the study
except for Kotoden, which broke-even. The most conspicuous
result is the success of Iyo, which is in large part due to its
efficient use of diversification strategy. Kotoden, which
operates in a comparable market, suffered losses in almost
half of the years of the study. Due to a lack of support from
weak local governments, property owned by the firm was
usually sold to cover losses, a procedure that cannot continue
for any lengthy period of time.
Many studies have indicated that firms which diversify into
fields relating to their main business tend to be more
profitable than firms which expand into unrelated activities
(Rumelt (1982), Itami (1982)). The results from this research
are consistent with this conclusion, although the number of
sample firms is limited. This corresponds with the result
obtained in the case of “majors” (Killeen and Shoji15, Shoji
and Killeen16 (2001)), although further research is necessary
to determine the cause of this result.
Due to decreasing ridership and the continuing recession, the
firms under study are coping in different ways. Shintetsu and
Nose are fortunate in the sense that they are located in higher
growth areas. Shintetsu’s present focus is on improving the
speed of rail services in addition to the development of its real
estate properties. Hiroshima has managed to greatly increase
the number of non-pass holders, which accounts for almost
80% of total ridership. This figure is considerably greater than
in the case of other firms. Sanyo, which suffered heavy
damage in the Great Kobe Earthquake, has since rebuilt its
infrastructure and is striving to improve rail service, although
Sanyo faces severe competition from JR-West. Sanyo has also
strived to improve the efficiency of its transportation division
and the recent rationalization of tourist bus operations was one
such step. Iyo is constantly modernizing and striving to
streamline operations. One such effort was divesture of its of
taxi service in 1976. In addition, Iyo is planning a major urban
redevelopment at its main station.
6. Conclusions
Diversification strategy plays an important role for the many
private firms operating in the less densely populated centres in
Japan, even though these firms vary greatly in terms of scale,
type of services offered and profitability. Faced with decreasing
ridership, increased competition from the automobile, and
nominal subsidies from the governments, the minors have not
only had to strive to improve the efficiency of rail operations
but also generate other sources of revenues. 
The idea is not new. Metropolitan Railway in England and
Canadian Pacific in Canada followed similar development
patterns. While Canadian Pacific originally received huge
subsidies and land grants to complete its network, the Japanese
counterparts were not so fortunate and had to contrive
imaginative methods of attracting ridership and internalising
the benefits accrued by their infrastructure development.
The results of the study found that 34 out of the 63 minors were
profitable at an operating level in 1995. Passenger densities did
not to seem to have a crucial influence on the results in the case
of firms operating in markets with more than 2000 passenger-
kilometres per route-kilometre per day. The six representative
firms, which were considered over a twenty-year period,
exemplified the uniqueness of each firm’s strategy. The results
in terms of related-type firms tending to be more profitable, that
diversification increases with time and that the rail and real
estate divisions were responsible for a majority of profits,
however, were consistent with the result of the analysis of the
“majors” conducted in previous studies. 
Private rail firms have benefited in Japan because they have
been allowed to thrive on competitive principles. Private
initiative allows the development of long-term strategies (in
which diversification plays a crucial role), that are not possible
under political cycles. The diversification indicated here is not
random, but rather maintains the strict goal of increasing rail
ridership. This focused, methodical, long-term strategic concept
has given the transport providers a reliable base of ridership.
Moreover, because Japanese private railways are non-
verticalised and have to pay for their own operating and
infrastructure cost, it is beneficial to have a long-term
commitment to the community they serve. Thus, private rail
firms have taken initiatives in prompting systematic regional
development in and around the areas their networks serve,
and have developed in close harmony with trackside
communities to the mutual benefit of both. It should be noted
that diversification contributes in such a way that companies
can more easily develop a market-oriented outlook based on
its experience from operating in a non-rail competitive
business environment. 
The Japanese example provides us with a role model that may
lead to increased private initiative into the provision of public
transport services, including rail transportation17. The success
of the private rail companies in Japan, “major” and “minor”
alike, indicates that the Japanese example may be duplicable
in other settings. How the Japanese example can be applied to
other countries is an important point for further research.
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1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the
production economics issues
surrounding the vertical
separation of infrastructure
from rail services with regard
to passenger operations. A
case study of the British
passenger railway privati-
sation is used. The issues
therefore are not solely
restricted to a vertical sepa-
ration but also a horizontal
division between different
aspects of rail operation.
As is well-documented
elsewhere, within a European
context Britain is neither
unique nor revolutionary in
dividing its rail system vertically, with such divisions first
occurring in Sweden in the late 1980s and subsequently
followed by Norway, Denmark, France (partial) and the
Netherlands. The British approach to rail reform however is
unique in three other aspects. Firstly, the extent of horizontal
separation of the former state owned railway, with the former
monolithic state enterprise being divided into 104 individual
autonomous units. This division was not solely by type of
operation, but further divisions were made within these types of
activities e.g. three rolling stock companies, 25 passenger
franchises, (originally) five freight companies, 14 infrastructure
service units etc. Secondly, with only five years between the
government white paper1 and full implementation of the revised
structure, the time-frame over which these structural changes
were implemented was very short. Thirdly, the extent of the
involvement of the private enterprise in these reforms, with 96
of the autonomous units highlighted above transferred to the
private sector2. To contrast this approach to reform with
Sweden, services (both passenger and freight) were integrated
into the state operator Statens Järnvägar, whilst the
infrastructure with the exception of the Inlandsbanen was
transferred to Banverket. The former ‘combined’ national
operator was thus vertically separated into two new companies,
infrastructure and services. Importantly, the service operator
was transferred as a whole into the new (publicly owned)
operator3. Some horizontal division did occur through
competitive tender of regional routes, where several private
sector companies were successful in the bidding process. In
other European examples however, reform of the state operator
has taken the form of divisions by type of operation. For
example, in Germany the former state company has been split
into five stand alone subsidiaries, which roughly equate to
intercity, regional, freight, infrastructure and stations. All are
currently owned however by Deutsche Bahn and the railway
remains vertically integrated. 
The division of the state owned British Rail is fully covered
elsewhere4. Consequently, this paper is an empirical
investigation of railway structures arising out of Britain’s radical
reforms of the passenger railway. Specifically, issues such as
economies of scale with respect to passenger train service
provision, the substitutability of inputs through factor markets,
and the productivity and efficiency of train service provision are
examined. The following
sections give a review of the
literature relating to
economies of scale, elasticity
of the factors of production
and efficiency with regard to
railway economics. An
overview of the British train
operating companies (TOCs)
is given before a translog
cost function is estimated
using data from the first five
years of operation of these
TOCs. From this function
estimates are derived for
economies of scale, factor
elasticities of demand and
efficiencies. Conclusions are
then drawn and policy
prescriptions from the British experience given.
2. Economies of Scale, Efficiency and Productivity
Preston5 identifies two schools of thought with regard to railway
economics that have considerable consequences on the vertical
(and indeed horizontal) separation of the railway. The first is the
long-held view that both infrastructure and services are
indivisible components that constitute a natural monopoly, and
hence returns to scale are significant and inexhaustible given the
market size. An alternative is that returns to scale and natural
monopoly effects are solely associated with the infrastructure
and not in the operation of services6. Preston7 terms the former
the traditional view and the latter the revisionist view.
Following revisionist logic, any restructuring of the industry
should not be based around the necessity to maintain the
infrastructure and services under the control of the same
organisation. Furthermore, any horizontal separation of the
services component of the railway into individual units is
unimportant as the implications are that such companies will
exhibit little, if any, economies of scale. This was the view that
eventually emerged from the short British public debate over
reform of the railways. Many issues of course remain, such as
the suitability of on-line competition, length of franchise under
such a system, regulation of the industry etc. but these are
outside the scope of this paper and are covered elsewhere8. 
Empirical studies on the topic of economies of scale within rail
operations in a contemporary European context are few, and no
studies have been undertaken on train service companies.
Preston9 examined fifteen western European railways using data
over a twenty-year period, 1971 to 1990. Using three outputs,
train-kilometres, route length and percentage of freight train-
kilometres, and three input prices, labour, energy and materials,
he found evidence of the classic u shaped cost curve, with
increasing economies of scale for smaller railways and
diseconomies of scale for larger operators. Furthermore, most
railways were found to exhibit increasing returns to density, a
concept that relates to the use of the network; increasing returns
would suggest that, based on a European average, most railway
infrastructure was found to be under-utilised. At the minimum
efficiency scale (optimal production level), in terms of train-
kilometre output, SNCB (the Belgian state operator) was found
to be nearest the optimal level of train-kilometre production and
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network size. Shires and Preston10, in an expanded study to
include data up to 1994 and two other European railways, found
the Swiss state operator, CFF, to be nearest the optimal train-
kilometre and network size levels. Interestingly, the inclusion of
four later years may have slightly increased (by around 10%)
the estimated MES point.
Cantos Sanchez11 in a study of twelve European state railways
over an eighteen year period between 1973 and 1990 found
similar results with regard to train-kilometre production,
however all railways were reported to display considerable
economies of density. The results also showed evidence of
substitutability between track infrastructure and passenger
operations but complementarity between track infrastructure
and freight operations. In other words, higher track costs result
in lower passenger operation costs, but lower freight costs result
in higher track infrastructure costs. This would strongly indicate
no economies of scope between freight and passenger
operations, a similar finding to Preston12. Any horizontal
separation, therefore, does not need to organise passenger and
freight services within the same company. 
Whilst based upon a very much smaller scale of operator,
Filippini and Maggi13 and Cowie14 both found existence of
increasing returns to scale for the Swiss private railway
industry, thus further confirming that scale effects within
integrated railway operations are significant. There would
appear therefore to be strong empirical support for economies of
scale within integrated operations. If, however, scale effects are
estimated for purely train service companies and found to be
constant, it may be implied from the literature that economies of
scale are solely related to the infrastructure. This would in part
empirically underpin the revisionist view, which suggests that
all (in this case passenger) railways should be vertically
separated. Economic theory would further propose a horizontal
separation to maximize economic welfare benefits through the
contestability of markets. This would relate to both productive
(lower costs) and distributional (lower prices) effects.
With regard to elasticities of substitution, again little empirical
evidence exists. McGeehan15 in a study of the Irish state
operator Córas Iompair Éireann over the period 1973 to 1983
found a small degree of substitutability between labour,
equipment and fuel. Similarly, elasticities of substitution derived
using the modeled cost share values (equations [3a] and [3b]
below) from Filippini and Maggi’s16 translog cost function for
the Swiss Railway industry suggested a small degree of
substitutability between all three of the inputs specified within
the function, labour, energy, and capital. Elasticities derived in a
similar fashion from Cantos Sanchez’s17 model produced
estimates consistent with substitutability between labour and
energy and labour and material, but complementarity between
energy and materials.
What is important in this context is that if a high degree of
complementarity between inputs is found, this may suggest that
theoretically these should be under the control of a single
organization. For example, if rolling stock and infrastructure
were found to be complementary, this would be an argument for
an integrated, rather than a vertically separated, railway18. If
however these two inputs were found to be substitutes, then this
may be an argument for a vertically separated railway, as such a
division would theoretically create competition between factor
markets19. The organizational structures of state railways
however have not allowed such an analysis to be performed, as,
using McGeehan20 as an example, it would make no logical
sense to split a railway horizontally into labour, equipment and
fuel companies. Nevertheless, previous literature is useful in
informing the current study.
With regard to studies on efficiency/productivity, a plethora of
literature exists on the assessment of performance of European
state railways. These have employed a number of different
estimation methods, ranging from total factor productivity
measures based upon index numbers and data envelopment
analysis efficiencies21, to technical efficiencies based upon
econometric estimation of a stochastic production frontier22.
Oum et. al.23 provide a comprehensive review of these studies.
In brief, the state railways of Sweden and the Netherlands have
tended to perform strongly, whilst the performance of the
nationalised British Rail has tended to be variable, strong in
some studies24 but poor in others25. In relation to the
performance of the British industry since reform, Cowie26
estimated productivity gains of around 3-4% for the 25 train
operating companies over the first three years of ‘privatised’
running, whilst Preston27 estimated a similar value based upon
productivity of the network.
3. The British Passenger Rail Industry
The British passenger railway was formally privatised
between 1996 and 1997, with the first franchise awarded to
National Express, who took over the running of the Gatwick
Express from 6th April 1996. The last franchise to be let was
the problematic (then as now) West Coast mainline, which
was taken over by Virgin Rail on 31st March 1997.
Consequently, the whole franchising process was completed
in just under a year. From 1996 onward however, all TOCs
were at least in shadow running, therefore this can be taken as
the first accurate year for which reliable data exists on the
separation of the former state owned company. Industry
statistics for the period 1996 to 2000 are given in Table 1.
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Diff
Train Total 368.38 382.60 398.83 417.09 429.24 60.86
Kilometres Maximum 32.99 34.60 35.04 35.04 37.60 4.61
(000s) Minimum 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.30 -0.02
Mean 14.74 15.30 15.95 16.68 17.17 2.43
St Dev 9.87 10.30 10.57 10.43 10.93 1.06
Journeys Total 776.40 831.19 874.40 936.50 960.40 184.00
(000) Maximum 113.40 118.20 122.90 131.90 142.40 29.00
Minimum 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.10
Mean 31.06 33.25 34.98 37.46 38.42 7.36
St Dev 30.58 32.21 33.67 36.04 37.75 7.17
Passenger Total 31.96 34.34 35.76 38.26 38.69 6.73
Kilometres Maximum 3.35 3.57 3.67 3.93 4.14 0.79
(m) Minimum 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Mean 1.28 1.37 1.43 1.53 1.55 0.27
St Dev 0.98 1.05 1.06 1.14 1.15 0.17
Networks Total1 24289 24289 24841 24860 25257 967.80
(km) Maximum 3016 3016 3016 3016 3016 0.00
Minimum 14 14 14 14 14 0.00
Mean 972 972 994 994 1010 38.71
St Dev 906 906 930 933 933 27.17
Note: 1.  Not to be confused with the total size of the British passenger rail route kilometre.  As an
example, total route kilometre was 16,666km in 1998, therefore there was some 8175 route
kilometres contained within two or more franchise areas.
Table 1: British Passenger Railway, 1996-2000
Train-kilometres relate broadly to the supply of rail services28,
and, in part, the level of output contracted by the SRA under
the franchise agreements, whilst journeys and passenger
kilometres refer to public demand. As can be seen from Table
1, the period under review has been a time of expansion, with
train-kilometres in total increasing by some 16% over the
period, passenger numbers by 21% and passenger kilometres
by over 23%. The table also reveals considerable variation in
terms of size of operators within the British industry. For
example, the largest TOC in 2000 (South West Trains)
operated over fourteen times the number of train-kilometres,
carried over thirty times the number of passengers and twenty
times the number of passenger kilometres than the second
smallest operator (the Gatwick Express)29.
To put the British privatised industry roughly into the context
of the literature, the largest network operator, Scotrail, with
just over 3000 km, would be around 80% of the size of the
estimated optimum. In terms of train-kilometres, South West
Trains, with an output level of 37.6m, would be about a third
of the output of the estimated optimum. It would appear
therefore that based upon estimates calculated from integrated
railways, all British TOCs are too small in size to take full
advantage of scale effects. British TOCs however are purely
train service companies that own very few assets (track
access is purchased and rolling stock is leased), and thus may
exhibit quite different production economic characteristics
with regard to company size.
4. Methodology
The method used is the commonly applied translog cost
function, and is fully detailed in Greene30, hence only a brief
synopsis is given. The general form of the translog cost
function for a single output and j = k inputs to be estimated is
of the form:
J J
1nCi =A+α1nQi+ Σ βj 1n Pij + 1/2δ(1nQi)2+1/2  Σ γjj(1nPij)2j=1 j=1
J       J J
+  Σ Σ γjk 1n Pij 1n Pik+  Σ ρj 1n Pij 1n Qi + ei; j≠k [1a]j=1  k=1 j=1
Where: Ci = total cost for firm i
Qi = output of firm i
Pij = cost of input j for firm i
A minimum requirement for the function to be well behaved
is that it must be positive and homogeneous of degree one in
input prices i.e. an increase in input prices will lead to the
same proportionate increase in total cost. The following
restrictions are therefore implied:
J J                        Jβ1 + β2 + ... + βj = 1,  Σ γjk =  Σ γkj = 0,     Σ ρj = 0 [1b]j=1            k=1                     j=1
In order to operationalise the model, the following share
equations are also normally added, where Sj relates to the
proportional share of costs of input j:
∂1nCi J                            J      J                                JSj =           = βj + Σ γjj 1nPj + Σ   Σ γjk 1n Pik +Σ ρj 1n Qi [1c]∂1nPj j=1 j=1   k=1                            j=1
These are simply calculated by taking the partial derivatives of
the cost function for each of the specified inputs, and represent
the input derived demand functions. Imposition of the restrictions
listed under [1b] ensures that the cost shares sum to unity.
Inclusion of the share equations allows an increase in the
degrees of freedom and also the demand for factor shares
based on input prices to be predicted. In order to estimate the
model, one of the share equations must be dropped to
overcome the problem of singularity and Zellner’s31 method
of Seemingly Unrelated Regression applied.
5. Data and Results
Three inputs are specified in the estimation of TOC costs –
labour, rolling stock, and infrastructure. Review of company
annual reports revealed that on average these three inputs
accounted for around 85% of total costs. Figures relating to
annualised wages, rolling stock leasing charges and
infrastructure access charges were obtained from the annual
accounts and these were divided by figures relating to staff
levels, tractive rolling stock units (i.e. multiple units and/or
locomotives) and route kilometres to obtain prices of the three
inputs. All input prices were, as a matter of course, standardised
to 2000 values using the average annual retail price index for
each respective year. This was an academic exercise however as
the final form of the estimated cost function standardised all
financial values (see below), irrespective of the (time) units of
currency in which they were originally measured
With regard to the output, train-kilometres are used. TOCs are
assumed to sales maximise, hence consistent with this
assumption TOCs will attempt to produce cost efficient train,
rather than cost efficient passenger, kilometres. Furthermore,
a large percentage of TOC income comes in the form of
franchise payments from the Strategic Rail Authority, which
are paid on the basis of providing train services in the
franchise area, irrespective of use. Indeed two TOCs, Scotrail
and Merseyrail, operate full cost contracts with the regional
Passenger Transport Executive in their franchise areas.
The study only includes 23 of the 25 TOCs in Britain. In the
first instance, the Island Line based on the Isle of Wight is a
vertically integrated railway hence infrastructure costs could
not be derived. In the second instance, a complete set of
figures could not be obtained for the Great Eastern Railway,
as this company’s accounts do not distinguish between rolling
stock leasing charges and track access charges. All data
relating to the other TOCs has been taken from the company
annual reports, the Strategic Rail Authority32 and the annual
Rail Industry Monitor produced by the TAS partnership33.
All financial values have been standardised by one of the
input prices (infrastructure) to reduce the estimation effects of
multicollinearity. Due to the high degree of correlation
between many of the right hand side terms of equation [1a],
the effect of each of these terms would be ‘smeared’ across
other terms due to the high degree of correlation. As the
individual terms will be used to estimate scale effects and
elasticities of substitution, this is an important consideration.
Equation [2] gives the actual equation to be estimated and
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also includes a time component to test for technical progress
over the period reviewed. 
1n(Ci/PN)=A+α 1nQi+βR 1n(PR/PN)+βL (PL/PN)+1/2δ (1nQi)2
+γLL1/2 1n(PL/PN)
2
+γRL 1n(PR/PN)1n(PL/PN)        [2]
+ρRQ 1nQi1n(PR/PN)+ρLQ 1nQi1n(PR/PN)+τT+τQTQi
The parameter values along with the associated regression
statistics from estimation of equation [2] are given in Table 2.
Examining the various regression statistics, this would appear
to be a reasonable model from which to examine economies
of scale, elasticities of substitution and efficiencies. The
overall fit, at 0.9619, suggests that most of the variation (just
over 96%) in total costs is explained by the production of
train-kilometres and variation in the three input prices.
Hence, the cost function fits the data very well. Furthermore,
nine of the twelve estimated parameters are statistically
significant at least at the 5% level including both of the time
variables. Finally, the appropriateness of the functional form
(Translog) was tested against an alternative specification of
the cost function (Cobb-Douglas) by use of a likelihood ratio
test. This was found to be highly significant, suggesting that
railway technology is better represented by the Translog
rather than the Cobb-Douglas functional form.
6. Elasticities of Substitution and Demand
Further examination of the results begins with calculation of
the Elasticities of Substitution and Demand. Following
Greene34, these are given by:
γii+Si(Si-1)σii = [3a]Si2
γij+Si Sjσij = [3b]Si  Sj
Where: Si and Sj are the
mean cost shares of inputs
i and j respectively.
Equation [3a] represents elasticities of demand whilst equation
[3b] represents elasticities of substitution. As there are three
inputs specified in this model we have three forms of equation
[3a] and three forms of equation [3b], one for each two-way
combination of the inputs. These latter measures describe the
extent to which the average firm will substitute one input for
another. For ease of interpretation however, these are
expressed as own and cross price elasticities of factor demand
by multiplying by the relevant cost share, thus:
Eij = Sj  σii                                                                                                                                [4]
As highlighted by Button and O’Donnell35, while σij = σji,
there is no reason to assume that Eij = Eji. These figures are
presented for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000 in Table 3.
All of the own price elasticities of demand have the
appropriate sign, i.e. all are negative, hence a rise in the price
of that factor will lead to a decline in its usage. For example,
in 1998 it is estimated that a 10% rise in the ‘price’ of rolling
stock would lead to a 6.11% decline in its usage.
Infrastructure has the lowest elasticity of factor demand
suggesting this is the most inelastic of the three inputs
specified i.e. least sensitive to factor price changes. Over the
three years shown, the values for rolling stock remain
relatively constant, but for labour there is a notable decrease
in the elasticity of demand. In the period under review, TOCs
on the whole have reduced staff levels to improve
productivity and save costs in an attempt to keep pace with
cuts in subsidy36. Taken at face level therefore, this result
would be consistent with economic theory; as fewer workers
are employed, those that remain become more difficult to
substitute or ‘transfer’. It is worth noting that more recent
times have seen increased industrial unrest within the
industry, with work to rules and one-day strikes occurring in
several of the franchises. This should not be looked at in
isolation however and wholly attributed to such changes in
the labour market, as it is also in part due to the horizontal
separation of train operating companies. This has resulted in
localised pay agreements and pay differentials within the
industry increasing.
The other notable movement in factor price elasticity has
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Parameter Term Estimate St Error T Stat
A Constant 4.1986 0.1431 29.3345
βk Rolling Stock 0.2132 0.0190 11.2042
βl Labour 0.2520 0.0249 10.1210
βn* Network 0.5348 n/a n/a
α Train Kilometres 1.6083 0.0945 17.0264
γkk Rolling Stock Squared 0.0373 0.0030 12.4418
γkl Rolling Stock/Labour -0.0028 0.0036 -0.7670
γkn* Rolling Stock/Network -0.0345 n/a n/a
γll Labour Squared -0.0264 0.0083 -3.1750
γln* Labour/Network 0.0292 n/a n/a
γnn* Network Squared 0.0053 n/a n/a
ρry Rolling Stock/Train Kilometres -0.0011 0.0064 -0.1789
ρly Labour/Train Kilometres -0.0126 0.0067 -1.8938
ρny* Network/Train Kilometres 0.0138 n/a n/a
δ Train Kilometres Squared -0.2332 0.0361 -6.4577
τ Time -0.1120 0.0267 -4.1930
τ y Time/Output 0.0205 0.0099 2.0707
* - These terms are derived from imposing the restrictions given in equation [1b].
          For example, as βk + βl  + βn = 1, then βn = 1 - βk - βl.
2R  = 0.9619, F = 262.44, df = 103, p = 0.0000
Table 2: Parameter Estimates from the Translog
Year Rolling Stock Labour Network
Rolling Stock 1996 -0.609 0.212 0.159
1998 -0.611 0.206 0.153
2000 -0.606 0.226 0.166
Labour 1996 0.228 -0.870 0.295
1998 0.238 -0.854 0.306
2000 0.261 -0.823 0.333
Network 1996 0.382 0.657 -0.454
1998 0.373 0.648 -0.458
2000 0.344 0.598 -0.498
Table 3: Own and Cross Price Elasticities of Factor Demand
been with regard to the infrastructure. This became more
price elastic in the last year under review, suggesting that
changes in the price of infrastructure will lead to more
increases/decreases in usage than would have been the case in
the past. Given the subject of vertical separation of the
railway, it is worth noting that in a static analysis (i.e. no
changes in the other factor markets) this would appear to
suggest that the price regulation of Railtrack’s access charges
have been reasonably successful over most of the initial
privatisation period, as a decrease (i.e. more inelastic) would
be an indicator of greater market control. 
Examining the cross price elasticities of factor demand, the
positive signs indicate that all inputs have a degree of two-
way substitutability. The relative low values however
associated with rolling stock and labour, and rolling stock and
infrastructure combinations would perhaps suggest a fixed
factor proportions technology amongst these inputs i.e. no
substitutability. There would however appear to be a small
degree of substitutability between labour and infrastructure.
When worked through a simulated 5% real rise in the price of
infrastructure, estimates calculated from the 1998 figures
would suggest that to maintain its level of output the average
firm would increase tractive rolling stock by 2% and labour
by just over 3%. Similarly, a 5% real increase in the price of
labour would be predicted to lead to a 4.3% decrease in staff
numbers and a 1.5% increase in track access. Furthermore,
such an increase in the labour price would also result in a
small increase in rolling stock (1.2%). Taken together
therefore, this is simply substituting labour for capital.
It should be highlighted that all of these results relate to a
five-year period, and whether such a relatively short time
period or the accuracy of the measurement allows for such
precise analysis is debatable. Nevertheless, the results would
appear to concur with actual events and do make some logical
sense.
7. Economies of Scale
Following Christensen and Greene37, economies of scale can
be estimated from equation [1c] by applying the formula:
∂1n CiEOS = 1- [5a]∂1n Qi
or in full:
EoS = 1-[α+δ1nQi+ρRQ1n(PR/PN)+ρLQ1n(PL/PN)+τq ] [5b]
Economies of scale are thus defined as the rate of change of
total cost with respect to the change in output, and will be
positive i.e. increasing, where this is greater than zero and
negative i.e. decreasing, where this is less than zero. The
results of estimating equation [5a] for each TOC in each year
are given in figure 1. This plots these estimates against output
in order to determine if economies of scale vary with firm size.
Figure 1 shows marked variability with regard to output and
the level of economies of scale. It would thus appear that scale
effects are present in passenger service provision, thus the size
of TOCs is important. Examining the results more closely,
these would initially imply an inverted u-shaped long run
average cost curve, with smaller companies exhibiting
decreasing economies of scale and larger companies increasing
economies. Given the method employed however, these results
are also entirely consistent with the traditional long run u
shaped average cost curve. As firms become larger, the rate of
change of costs is found to be smaller than the rate of change
of output, indicating that average costs (per train-kilometre) are
falling for all railways in the data set as output grows. Thus all
TOCs are operating in that area of the long run average cost
curve where average costs are falling and hence output levels
are below a hypothetical minimum efficiency scale.
In an attempt to relate the above findings to previous
literature, a very rough calculation was taken by assuming a
quadratic function for the scale effects with respect to train-
kilometres shown in Figure 1, and then extending the series.
Such a functional form would be consistent with a u-shaped
average cost curve and would ultimately capture the
hypothetical minimum efficiency scale (MES) level of
production. This estimated an MES point in the order of 56m
train-kilometres per annum. This level of output would be
around half the size of an integrated railway based upon
previous studies38. Furthermore, it would also suggest that the
optimal number of franchises in Britain should be around five
to six in order to maximise scale economies.
The significance of the time variables in Table 2 is indicative
of technical progress over the period, and this may also be
expected to have an impact upon scale effects over time. With
declines in labour and the reported substitutability of labour
by rolling stock and infrastructure in Table 3, this may
suggest a subtle switch towards a more capital intensive
production process. This would imply that scale effects have
increased over the period. White39 used a similar argument for
the British bus industry. Referring to equation [5b] and the
results in Table 2, these would suggest that the MES point has
risen over the period reviewed, by a value of 0.0205 per year
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(the τQ co-efficient in equation [5b]). In order to give this
value some context, if factor prices remained constant the
mean passenger railway in 1996 would need to increase
output by around 8% per year in order to prevent slipping
further away from the optimal level of production. As most
TOCs have not expanded output at such levels, over the
period the majority of TOCs have ‘moved’ further away from
the MES point. This however will be re-considered later in
the conclusions.
8. Cost Efficiency
Equation [2] was used to estimate deterministic corrected
ordinary least squares (COLS) efficiencies. This was found
by applying equation 6.
Efficiency = exp(ei-e+)        [6]
Where:
ei = residual (actual minus estimated cost) from equation [2]
for TOC i.
e+ = largest negative residual from equation [2]
In simple terms, equation 6 identifies that firm which has the
lowest actual to estimated costs i.e. the largest negative
residual. This is based upon an ‘average’ calculated from all
firms within the data set. This, by definition, is the most
efficient firm and all others are then related to this firm based
upon a cost frontier i.e. how far away they are for a given
level of output from the most efficient firm.
When considering ‘efficiency’, under the output measure
used (train-kilometres) there can be many sources of
inefficiency for a railway company, such as the terrain, type
of service (stopping services are detrimental to the cost of
producing train-kilometres as a higher number of inputs are
required), and the prevailing climate. To a certain extent, such
exogenous factors would be taken into account by estimating
a stochastic efficiency frontier, however such estimations are
problematic in the case of systems of equations40. In the
following analysis therefore, the absolute efficiencies are less
relevant than the relative changes over the time period, as the
latter roughly assumes that such external factors have
remained constant over the period.
Results relating to cost efficiency are plotted in Figure 2.
These are presented as two industry averages (the mean and
the median) for each of the five years reviewed.
According to Cowie and Riddington41, deterministic COLS
efficiencies tend to underestimate the true efficiency level42.
For example, a data envelopment analysis43 carried out on the
same data set gave a mean efficiency of over 80% in 1998.
Whilst accepting therefore that true absolute efficiency levels
may be considerably understated, the COLS efficiencies
presented in Figure 2 nevertheless do give an indication of
the overall trend. This shows a decline over the period, in the
order of 4-5%, with most of this decrease occurring over the
last three years. Previous analysis of factor substitution and
economies of scale has suggested that over the period 
reviewed there has been a switch to a more capital intensive
industry and the significance of the time variables suggests an
increase in the production frontier. The results on efficiency
however would strongly indicate that these effects were at
their highest at the beginning of the period. Latterly, it would
appear that most TOCs failed to keep pace with technical
progress hence, despite considerable productivity
improvements, average efficiency fell. Technical progress in
this example relates to reductions in staff levels and better
utilisation of rolling stock and infrastructure. Economists
would term these short run measures, as different amounts of
a variable factor (labour) are being added to, or in this case
subtracted from, fixed amounts of the other inputs (tractive
rolling stock and infrastructure). Consequently, these can
probably be considered as ‘one-off ’ post-privatisation
measures rather than an indication of a change in production
processes that will continue into the medium to longer term. 
Short-run measures taken at the beginning of the period are
now virtually exhausted and staffing levels at most TOCs
have now stabilized, some even increasing. Given the high
influence of these short-run effects, little else can be said
regarding efficiency levels, as a longer time period would be
required in order to provide a fuller and more meaningful
analysis.
9. Concluding Remarks
The most significant finding from the preceding analysis is
that the size of train operating companies matter. In any
vertical separation of the railway therefore, consideration
needs to be given to the size (and hence number) of the train
service provider(s). Although significant, scale effects were
found to be smaller than in comparison to previous studies
based upon vertically integrated railways. It can thus be
deduced that scale effects are associated with both service
provision and the infrastructure, and hence with regard to
company size, railway economics would appear to be more
consistent with the traditional rather than the revisionist
school of thought. Furthermore, it was suggested that all
British TOCs were operating on the downward part of the
average cost curve i.e. all were too small in terms of train
kilometre production. Therefore, one of the key areas for
productivity gains for TOCs would be in the area of scale
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economies. In Britain however, expansion in train-kilometres,
and hence firm size, is restricted by the franchise system, the
size of the market and limited excess infrastructure capacity
on many parts of the network. Consequently, firm expansion
could only arise out of the next round(s) of re-franchising or
through the market for corporate control i.e. acquisition.
The actual number of train operating companies within
Britain however should not be solely based upon production
economics. There may be a number of advantages in having a
larger number of franchise holders, such as the ability to
provide a stronger local and regional focus, greater
benchmarking opportunities (for regulator and operator alike)
and the existence of a higher number of potential competitors.
A small degree of substitutability was found between the
inputs, however, this result should be treated with some care.
If, for example, TOCs reduced labour levels and improved
utilisation of existing inputs, then there would appear to be
substitutability between labour and the other two inputs.
Technically speaking of course this is true, but these effects
may be over-estimated as the period was particularly notable
for reductions in labour and increases in frequency (i.e. train-
kilometres). When added to the results on efficiency, these
suggest that the substitution effects identified involving
labour are to a large extent due to ‘one-off’ measures taken
during the early period of private sector operation. A longer
time period would therefore be required to investigate
substitution effects between inputs, and hence competition
between and within factor markets. This would also impact
upon scale effects over time. In particular it would suggest
that the 8% annual growth of output required to ‘keep pace’
with technical progress is an over-estimation as it only refers
to short run measures. It can be concluded however that the
actual privatisation of train service provision companies has
induced a single step expansion of the production frontier and
a small switch to a more capital intensive industry.
Finally, based upon estimates of the price elasticity of
infrastructure, it would appear that in the British example the
regulator has been reasonably successful in controlling the
market power of the monopoly operator, Railtrack. Any such
conclusion however must be highly guarded, as other factors,
most notably the meltdown of Railtrack’s finances and its
ultimate placement into administration, suggest that this issue
requires a far more focused and detailed investigation. 
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1. Introduction
On a regional and
metropolitan scale railway
transport de-verticalisation
is linked with federalism
and the territorial decentra-
lisation of the political
choices. This is also a great
trend in Community
regulations and in many
countries both inside and
outside the European
Union.
On this territorial scale
railway transport enjoys less favour than in the other market
sectors. Thanks to the mid-long range long-haul links, in fact,
rail has gained competitiveness in the last 20 years.
Regarding passenger transport, this has occurred mainly
through the enlargement of high-speed connections (and
networks) able to compete with air transport. Freight
transport has gained thanks to the increasing environmental
and infrastructural costs of transport on road and measures
imposing higher restrictions and costs.
On a regional scale, similarly, the only fundamental
competitive field in rail transport seems to be underground
transport, due to road network overcrowding and the
consequent growth in general costs of road transport.
In this context, the regionalisation of a rail transport inclined
to de-verticalisation outlines a new institutional picture. It
combines regulations aimed at efficiency (separation of
infrastructure management from service production in which
competition is promoted) with the territorialisation of skills
based on subsidiarity, which aims at increasing transport
effectiveness through a closer relationship between needs
planning and collectivity requirements. In this way greater
competitiveness allows the recovery of market-sections
belonging to short-range metropolitan passenger transport -
where private transport external costs and public road
transport fiscal costs weigh heavily on the sustainability of
the urban socio-economic system.
This aspect gives regional railway transport a much more
important role than has been the case, because the last few
decades have seen not only a progressive consciousness of
the environmental costs of individual car transport, but
unfortunately also the sunk costs of collective road transport
effectiveness (in terms of general costs) and its high fiscal
cost (the structural deficits of the public transport system)1. In
this way collective transport, with low or no local
environmental impact and possibly automatic control, has
became the only mode of transport able to “force” the trade-
off among effectiveness, environmental sustainability and
“tax sustainability” implied in urban mobility politicies. Rail
transport – train or tube – avoids the cumulative effects of
overcrowding, maintains a high average speed compared to
other modes, and has the advantage that electric tracks reduce
localised pollutant emissions (in urban centers due aprox. 2/3
to transport).  Moreover,
the high ratio between
passengers and drivers
reduces staff costs, which
represent over 70% out of
the management costs in
the public road transport.
This increases the
competitiveness of rail
transport – tramways,
people-mover systems, and
undergrounds in the urban
context; and undergrounds
and regional railways in the
suburban and subregional context. This is nevertheless
limited by the following:
- proportionate demand compared to initial investments 
amount;
- ability to ensure repayments suitable to the huge 
investments, able to attract private capital through project 
finance but adequate even for public financing, 
considering the scarce availability of tax resources;
- suitable planning skill, subsequent to the substantial 
irreversibility of the realisation of railway infrastructures 
(urban or regional) on the territory, in particular in the 
valuable and “sensitive” urban and periurban territory.
2. Competition in regional public transport services
2.1 Liberalisation, privatisation and competition in
railway transport
Currently, liberalisation and privatisation also involve railway
transport in replacing of government intervention with
boosted competition, producing new institutional and
managerial structures. They allow allocative and dynamic
efficiency growth, but are not able to solve all the problems,
particularly because a liberalised railway transport market
doesn’t aim automatically at competitive or contestable
structures. Government intervention in the sector is of crucial
importance because it has to ensure a close proximity to
competitive market functions.
Inefficiency in the public production system has stimulated
economic policy trends toward the liberalisation and
privatisation of large economic fields – thanks to the
strengthening of European integration based on the
achievement of competitive principles in the markets. This
means, respectively, the promotion of a free or at least easier
access to market offers in order to achieve a more competitive
market structure, and undertaking at least the partial transfer
from public to private property (as long as the private
component effectively holds the decision-making power).
In the phase prior to private market and enterprise economic
policy, reasoning is motivated by other more contingent
factors. For example, public finance constraints (more evident
in the Euro area countries due to the restraints imposed by the
stability pact) tend to alienate public undertakings, both
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profitable ones (further  profits coming from their alienation),
subsidised, and structurally poor ones like transports, because
even if subsidisation continues, privatisation is able to
minimise or at least reduce the revenue costs.
In this way the proprietary asset passes from mainly public to
mainly private or mixed control, and thanks to the
liberalisation of market access, the industrial organisation
passes from a monopoly situation to a situation of
competitive oligopoly or competition (in or for the market, as
explained later in the paper).
These trends aim at:
- increasing efficiency by re-establishing information 
mechanisms (prices) and proper incentives for the 
competitive assets;
- attracting private capital to public undertakings (in the 
transport industry capital intensive innovations make 
public financing of investments problematic);
- reducing public deficit at different government levels.
In the same way, the main tasks of sector liberalisation are:
- promoting market contestability and overcoming the 
present and possible future monopolies by private 
operators;
- guaranteeing service production (characterised by positive 
externalities) independently by direct profitability of its 
production and sale;
- limiting negative externalities of metropolitan and short-
range transport realised through other means of transport.
Market contestability requires conditions aimed at setting
market access and exit costs to zero. So access to the
production technologies must not  be connected to the
production scale, and there must not be sunk costs (such as
infrastructure costs, marketing costs, R&D, etc.).
In this way a contestable market allows, in theory, the same
efficiency of perfect competition, since the incumbent will be
forced to behave like a competitor in order to prevent “hit-
and-run” competition from potential new entrants. 
Nevertheless, perfect contestability and perfect competition
can hardly be found in the real world. A further task for
political decision-makers pursuing regulations will be that of
minimising the inefficiency of a non-fully contestable market,
through adequate control measures.
The instruments of competition for the market2 are found in
the sector of regulations aimed at promoting contestability,
which has to choose by auction the private operator to
manage a certain asset or service production for a fixed
period of time.
Thus, even if a competitive market (or competition in the
market) can’t be promoted due to the technical characteristics
of production, usually characterised by strong scale or net
economies, it is possible to restore the competitive
mechanism through competition for entrusting the monopoly
for a particular period of time.
The target of guaranteeing production of goods/services as
public properties, or generating positive externalities, even
without direct profitability stimulating private producers,
gives rise to the need to subsidise this production. The
regulation target is then twofold.  On one hand it guarantees
the productive efficiency of the subsidised production in
order to minimise the revenue costs, while on the other hand
it guarantees the quality of the goods/services produced and
the satisfaction of the needs expressed by the demand for
those goods or service.
Evidently, market competition can be used indifferently both
in entrusting a potentially profit-bearing asset and in
tendering a subsidised service, in which the public subject
states that (for social reasons) the service has been sold below
cost.
Regional railway transport assets combine a de-verticalisation
systems, keeping the infrastructure manager apart from
railway service producers through a regionalisation process
that introduces market competition. This functions because,
as an institutional client, the region expresses popular demand
for railway transport in assigning production to a railway
system.
The following paragraph analyses the ways in which the two
processes are introduced into the Community and Italian set
of rules, and proposes an investigation of the problems
arising from the complex setting up of such a deeply
innovative institutional and organisational asset.
2.2 The European trend and the Italian case
The European set of rules stems from the main principles on
competition set out in the Treaty of Rome3. These stipulate
that no agreement, decisions, or negotiations should be taken
which in any way damage the healthy functioning of a
competitive market, and that there must be no abuse of
dominant positions over the market in order to separate its
behaviour and prices from those of the competitive market.
These trends apply both to private and public undertakings.
Nevertheless, both regarding competition and the prohibition
of dominant positions, and the prohibition of public aids, the
large numbers of exceptions and their enumeration (which
sometimes is too vague) creates exceptions in the rail industry
that end up over-stepping the rules. 
Particularly, there have been policies of aids and public
subsidies in rail transport designed to oppose two market
failures particularly important for modal distribution balance
and for the consequent impact on the economy: 
– the trend towards a natural monopoly due to technological 
reasons peculiar to the railway market (importance of 
infrastructure sunk costs);
– the lack of balance in negative environmental externalities, 
much lower in rail than in road transport, which causes a 
inefficient modal split.
If we take into consideration even the “historical” positive
externalities of railway accessibility, (especially during the
great industrialisation of the second half of the nineteenth
century and of the first decades of the twentieth century), and
investment suitability in the field of keynesian expenditure
policies supporting the aggregate demand, we can understand
the several exceptions to the principles of competition and
free market characteristic of the Community structure and the
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consequent prevalence of public aids and subsidies.
It is possible that this trend has been necessary to railway
transport in order to  maintain a certain effectiveness
regarding increasing market requirements, despite certain
competition (even if decreasing) from other modes of
transport. At the same time the trend has:
- favoured the rise of the so called “government failures”, 
in the end requiring intervention in order to re-establish 
competition and make service production more efficient;
- created huge financial discrepancies which heavily 
affected public finances (which pay more attention to 
financial balances), and consequently the monetary 
unification and the “stability pact” of the E.U. member 
states.
Since natural monopoly is essentially determined in
infrastructures, whereas the railway transport service market
is (at least) more (if not fully) contestable, and since progress
in railway technology (particularly in signalling and
controlling) has gradually disengaged infrastructure
management from service management liberalisation has
concentrated on the service sector (with only a few
exceptions, as in the case of the British railways). 
In fact, in the 1990’s, tendencies within the European
Community were:
- the economic and functional split between railway 
service production and infrastructure management;
- the consequent liberalisation of the service market, in 
which several railway systems can operate with their own 
trains on the same line or infrastructure network;
- the persistence of property in this infrastructure network, at 
least under strict public control.
The Council Directive 91/440/CEE introduces the above
mentioned separation between infrastructure management and
service production and underlines (art.4) the need for
independence between management of rail undertakings and
public authority.
The production of the service offered to meet the mobility
requirements of the collectivity, as evaluated by the political
decision-maker, is imposed through a public service
obligation ruled by a proper service contract.
The principle of freedom of access to railway infrastructures
is dealt with by the Council Directive 95/19/CE (which does
not apply to operators of urban, extra-urban, or regional
services) which directs governments to identify an authority
able to distribute infrastructure skills equally by allocating
time paths so that the access cost to the infrastructure,
together with the grants-in-aid,  guarantees the balance of
accounts to the infrastructure manager. 
Italy has adapted itself to the Community rules on these
points through the D.P.R. 8/7/1998 n.277 and 16/3/1999
n.146, which establish financial and organisational separation
between infrastructure and service, the granting of railway
permissions to new subjects, the distribution of the railway
skills (allocation of time paths), and the different ways of
determining and collecting usage fees for the time paths.4
Consequently, Ferrovie dello Stato SpA has re-organised itself
into four departments: infrastructure, local and regional
transport, passenger transport, and freight transport. The first
department has become the new society Rete Ferroviaria
Italiana (RFI), under the control of FS, whereas the other
three departments have converged into Trenitalia, and have to
compete with other railway operators5 as reflected in
Community trends.
This context of reorganization and deep institutional and
managerial transformation of the railways was the
background for the complex of rules known as the “Bassanini
Reforms”. These are inspired by subsidiarity (as recognized
and promoted by the European Community) and are aimed at
decentralizing important government competencies to the
regions, by transferring to them the relevant resources and
(still only partially) tax loads.
The reform delegates the programming, legislation and
financial responsibility of regional and local authorities,
aiming at increased correspondence between the needs of
administered collectivities, increased local devolvement of
responsibility in the use of resources, and easier concertation
between territorial authorities. At the same time it accepts the
other big strategic orientation - the “de-verticalisation” and
liberalisation of transport - in light of the implementation of
competitive procedures for the selection of service suppliers.
This complex set of rules is based on the “Bassanini laws”
(law 15/3/1997, n.59 - modified by law 15/5/1997, n.127, the
so-called “Bassanini bis”, and by law 16/6/1998, n.191, the
so-called “Bassanini ter”), on the subsequent implementation
of legislative-decrees (D.lgs. 31/3/1998 n.112, D.lgs.
22/9/1998 n.345, D.lgs. 20/9/1999 n.400), and on the regional
laws which implement the guidelines established by the
reform. The new order, then, implements subsidiarity,
delegating to local authorities those public functions which
do not require unitary national management. Legislative-
decree 19/11/1997, n.422 (the so-called “Burlando decree”)
implements the Bassanini reform in the field of local public
transport and delegates to the regions those competencies of
public rail transport (and programming) which do not require
unified state management. 
The Burlando decree (later modified by the above-mentioned
D.lgs. 20/9/1999 n.400) sets some principles of regional
competence. First of all, the regions, which are responsible
for the programming of regional and local public transport
requirements, must arrange Regional Plans for Transport and
Mobility, and through Triennial Service Plans, define the
traffic areas (which have already been arranged by
law10/4/1981 n.151) as well as the minimum service
standards necessary to meet the mobility needs of the socio-
economic regional system. According to the programming,
they must identify the transport service manager by means of
competitive procedures (conforming to the Community’s
position as stated by Regulation 93/38/CE, implemented by
D.lgs. 17/3/1995 n.158) and sign manager service contracts
with them which, inter alia, regulate the quality and quantity
of the service, implement programs, rates, managers’
remuneration by the public administration, and relations to
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employees etc. Competitive procedures, managers’ choice,
and service contracts must promote the improvement of the
price-earnings ratio, which since 2000 should be at least 0.35.
The strong “social” connotation of transport falls within the
concept of “minimum service standard”. This is defined as
the supply of service adequate to satisfy the citizens’ request
for mobility and represents the public service obligation
whose cost is shouldered by the regional budget6.
While for road transport the Burlando decree covers the
possibility of a further delegation from regional to local
authorities (provinces and municipalities, according to
whether the services are in the territory of a single municipa-
lity or not), rail transport, like marine transport, falls directly
under the competence of the regions replacing the state as
“institutional client” in relations with the infrastructure
manager and railway companies by delegating transport on
rails and signing the service contracts relating to it7.
3. De-verticalisation at regional level: opportunities
and risks
Institutional and organizational order has changed
dramatically.  Two “Copernican revolutions” are taking place
in the organization of rail transport. Apart from the
pioneering era of the XIX century, it had been historically
based on self-production by a single or largely dominant
public operator usually in a monopoly situation. There were
few exceptions (one such was Italy, with its railways in
concession). Against this pre-existing condition, which denies
any possibility of competition and deprives the management
of any incentive to increase the efficiency and/or the quality
of the service, there are two different policies: de-
verticalisation, with the separation between infrastructure
manager and service producers and the introduction of
competition for the market, and regionalisation which is
inspired by subsidiarity.
In fact the historical context is one of the main causes of the
slow and constant decline of railway transport, as seen in
increased user costs and, consequently, in decreasing  market
segments. Though not the only cause, the different relevance
of external costs creates a systematic disequilibrium between
total costs and costs for the user which, in a decentralized
decision-making8 system, systematically penalizes railway
transport since it is characterized by minor external costs.
It is, however, difficult to introduce competitive mechanisms
in the railway field. For this reason de-verticalisation and
regionalisation might not lead to significant increases in
effectiveness and efficiency, at least in the short run. This
does not mean that this reorganization is not just, nor that
local public transport on rails cannot be improved. The
greatest potential is found in metropolitan mobility systems
where costs are much greater than those paid by users, and
which are now unsustainable both from the environmental
standpoint because of the high level of environmental
externalities, and from the financial point of view because of
the high level of subvention of infrastructures and collective
public transport.
Thus within the context of regionalisation, it is on the urban
and metropolitan level that we find one of the best “strategic”
opportunities for railway transport. In a highly jammed and
polluted system where public transport has heavy tax costs, it
represents, a (locally) less-polluting means of transport whose
infrastructure cannot be used by individual traffic and whose
passenger-km costs are largely lower than those for road
transport (conditional to adequate minimum efficient scale).
From this point of view, it is fundamental to delegate the
programming of regional mobility to the regions. As
mentioned in the previous paragraph, this is articulated in the
following different points:
– arrangement of planning documents;
– quantitative and typological definition of minimum service 
standards;
– possibility of distributing state transfers among the various 
means of transport;
– possibility of stimulating the efficiency of transport 
producers by means of market competition, that is to say 
competitive procedures to service allocation and the 
service contract between the regional or delegated local 
authority and the service manager.
Actually, these potential strengths seem to encounter more
than one problem.
In terms of planning, many regions have neither arranged nor
are arranging Regional Plans for Transport and other planning
documents, for they are considered useless or uselessly
binding.
As far as the definition of minimum service standards is
concerned, regulations present a concept, which although
theoretically and logically clear, can easily be distorted when
applied in practice.
First the distribution of state contributions between the
regions is not based on objective criteria expressing the
potential mobility requests of different areas and/or their
supply of infrastructure in proportion to the population,
productive structure, or surface. On the contrary, it seems to
be based on a projection of historical trends which are
scarcely apt to evaluate changes brought about by time and
which can be influenced more by electoral motives than by
objective evaluations.
Secondly, the budgetary constraints represented by state
transfers constitute, the criterium for the definition of
minimum service standards. In this way they are not those
considered necessary for the mobility needs of the population,
but rather those which can be financed with a certain amount
of state transfers. Since there is no regional transport
planning, the definition is limited to the mere quantitative
aspect (a certain amount of kilometers or of seat-kilometers),
and does not produce effective programming of regional
mobility systems nor does it define qualitatively and
typologically the “minimum” service standards.  Moreover,
since there are different elements that endanger the efficiency
of the system of auction and competition for the market as
presented by the reform, the real risk is represented by the
“jamming” of liberalisation at the regional (for railway
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transport) and/or subordinate territorial level (for road and
tramway transport) 9.
For more or less the same reasons, the possibility of freely
distributing state contributions among the various means of
transport is paralyzed in the event by the need to maintain
production standards in every means of transport which are fit
to justify productive and occupational standards and transfers
equal or proportional to those historically achieved.
Lastly, as far as the introduction of competitive mechanisms
is concerned, we must remember that a tender system à la
Demsetz10 is efficient if:
- competitors can obtain inputs in competitive conditions;
- collusion is impossible or not convenient;
- incumbent positions create no advantages (informative, 
technological, etc.);
- after the assignment there is a body capable of enforcing 
the contract or sanctioning the assignee, or revoking the 
assignment.
These conditions are not likely to occur in the situation we
are examining.
In detail, the first of them implies:
- the absolute equality of access to the network for Trenitalia 
and other operators. This in turn requires the existence of a 
non-colluded regulator (certainly not a company in the 
same group) during the assignment of train paths as well as 
the preventive knowledge of the possible charge for this 
access;
- equal access to rolling-stock, with regard to which 
the question of property is still controversial; an “English” 
solution would be desirable, where rolling-stock is 
delegated to third-party companies (not necessarily private 
and, if public, also regional) which grant its usage to the 
private winner of the tender against prearranged rates11.
As far as the second condition (impossibility or
inconvenience of collusion) is concerned, the tendency of
many regions to create mixed companies between regions
(and possibly local authorities), Trenitalia, and other existing
railway companies during the regional implementation of the
Burlando decree appears at least suspicious. In this way they
limit the competition standard and give the incumbent a
strong advantage over potential new competitors.
Even without coming to this borderline situation, where
owner and competitor coincide12, the risk of labour and social
conflicts can easily make the buyer not indifferent to
suppliers and let fade the real desire to acquire the service on
a really competitive market. 
Even the third and the fourth conditions do not seem to be
completely fulfilled. This is mainly due to many Regions’
incapacity for real programming, and to the (partially
consequent) tendency to define the need for transport as a
projection of pre-existing conditions and/or that allowable
with limited resources.
Furthermore, it is important to notice that there are usually
managerial, technological, and financial barriers which
prevent entrance to this field. Many potential competitors do
not dispose of the necessary assets. As mentioned before, this
is due to the problem of access to infrastructure and rolling-
stock, and to the fact that specialised personnel take a long
time to train and that the main personel trainer continues to be
the incumbent itself. In addition to this, many potential
competitors could not dispose of sufficient dimensions or
financial capabilities with regard to limits purposely
introduced in the call for bids in terms of production volumes,
bonds, guarantees etc.
Moreover, informative asymmetries in favour of the
incumbent are very likely, since the incumbent is the
“historical” depositary of railway competence with regard
both to the granting authority and to potential competitors.
This implies these difficulties: 
- for the competitors: in submitting a tender knowing the real 
technical, financial and risk conditions; 
- for the granting authority: in checking the respect of the 
service contract.
For all these reasons, it is possible that only Trenitalia takes
part in the auctions for regional service. Its (public) owner
will then, however, make good its possible losses. Since
market competition has been introduced to challenge natural
monopoly, the less efficient the market becomes, the more
likely the case of a single competitor is.
In the present situation – with a publicly owned incumbent –
the auction will reach the expected result only if the tendered
service allows management cost reductions. That is to say, if
they guarantee – as stated by art. 19, c.1 of the Burlando
decree on service contracts – the “complete correspondence
between service burden and available resources net of tariff
revenues”.
This last argument introduces another possible difficulty with
the reform, linked to the kind of contract signed between the
granting authority and the winning company. 
In particular, among the most common kinds of contract -
management contracts, gross cost contracts and net cost
contracts – it has been stressed13 that the net cost form most
stimulates service trustees to operate not only on costs, but
also on revenues, since supply corresponds to the difference
between estimated revenues and agreed management costs,
such that revenues lower or higher than estimated are enjoyed
or carried by the company14.
Even when tariffs and service quantity are set by the granting
authority, the net cost contract still represents a revenue
incentive, at least for the increase of service quality (which
influences revenues) and for the incentive to fight evasion by
passengers. For inverse reasons a gross cost contract should
have negative effects on the service quality standard as well
as on evasion rate, while a pure management contract would
not stimulate the trustee to make an effort to control costs.
This subject is important, because the formulation of the
above-mentioned art.19 c.1. of D.lgs.422/1997 is quite
ambiguous. In fact the words “net of tariff revenues” do not
imply the implementation of net cost contracts.
Considering the service contract features, there is also the
possibility that the mechanism stimulates efficiency improvement,
mentioned but not specified in c.4 of the same art. 19.
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Other problems are represented by the difficulty of
maintaining and promoting functional and tariff integration of
services on road and rail. This is due to the implementation of
competitive procedures in regional railway transport and local
public transport.
Complementarity of urban road, underground, and railway
networks (as well as complementarity with private transport,
which can be realized only with adequate interchange
facilities) represents one of the benchmarks of the new
politics for urban mobility because the consequent
intermodality allows a better dimensioning of vehicles with
regard to the volume and the rate of demand territorial
scattering15. This complementarity is accentuated by an
integrated tariff system, which requires an agreement between
the different service managers. Public transport tenders have
already shown the impossibility for potential new entrants to
foresee the economic features of their possible agreements
with other manager and, in particular, with the railway
manager. This difficulty will be stressed by the introduction
of a similar regime also on the railway side, which will make
the result of such an integration completely undefinable. At
the same time, the possible integration rate between one’s
own and other managers’ service network deeply influences
both costs and revenues, but is unknown to competitors. The
unpredictability of economic benefits could let people prefer
the (minor but definite) benefits of a mere elimination or non
consideration of complementarity agreements.
This problem cannot be easily solved and, unfortunately, can
lead to an advantage for incumbents and maintain the status
quo, unless the region (for railway transport) and public
authorities (for local public transport) play a more important
role in the planning of networks and in the functional and
tariff integration of the different kinds of service. In fact, if
single competitors are not stimulated to guarantee
complementarity, this must be requested by granting
authorities themselves and a regulator must define its
economic conditions.
A final theme which should be dealt with - but which is too
specific to be dealt with here - is the possible risk that
regulations introducing calls for bids on transport service
could thwart the use of project financing for the most
important infrastructure works (and, in particular for railway
ones). This problem can be particularly relevant for
undergrounds and so, theoretically, is beyond the object of
this reflection.
4. Local Public Transport (LPT) on rails
and its figures
Regional railway transport is now assigned to the Regional
Transport Division of Trenitalia. This division is set out in 21
Offices (19 regional and 2 provincial) where about 22
thousand employees produce a transport supply of about 170
million train-km per year. That is about 6800 train-days and
more than 65 billion seat-km, globally offered by Regional
Transport including regional, through way, and inter-regional
trains.16 Regional service demand is estimated by the
company to be about 19.5 billion passenger-km, while the
average number of transported passengers on a weekday is
about 1,400,000.
In the balance sheet for the year 2000 (the most recent
available online), revenues from public service contracts with
local authorities were only 7,6 million euro (16.2% more than
in the previous year), while production - freight and
passengers - amounted to 8,397 million euro (6.2% more than
in the previous year). In this way the contribution of public
service contracts with local authorities to the production
represents only 0.09% or 0.16% if we consider only the
revenues generated by the sale and supply of services (that is
the total 1 in the table below). 
This sum is going to increase both in the final balance for
2001 and in the following years. This is mainly due to the fact
that in 2000 many service contracts between Trenitalia and
the regions had not been signed yet.
It has to be stressed, however, that according to budgetary
data - which are also confirmed by the service chart 2002 -
the sum of the grants from the public service contract with the
state and those from the public service contracts signed with
local authorities almost equals the revenues generated by
passengers on internal travel.
These are the main values involved in the privatisation of
local public transport on rails introduced by legislative-decree
n. 422/97.
5. Regional progress towards privatisation
As far as LPT is concerned, the transfer of competence from
the state to the regions was concluded with the regional laws
implementing the reform17 and with the first service contracts
which public and private subjects consider as a test prior to
the tenders to be made within 2003.
In consideration of what could happen in the next two years,
it is interesting to focus on a survey by Federtrasporto (2001)
which compares the content of these first documents with a
grid of interesting elements.
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INCOME STATEMENT (000 of euro) 2000 1999 Difference
A. Value of the production
1. Revenues of sales and supplies
a ) Products of passenger traffic
Ordinary clientele 2.041.814 1.925.776 116.038
Territorial public authorities 7.592 6.532 1.060
b) Products of freight and mail traffic 735.045 699.307 35.737
c) Public service contract with the State 1.612.962 1.511.876 101.086
d) Other revenues from sales and supplies 368.890 327.896 40.994
Total 1 4.766.302 4.471.387 294.915
2. Variations of stocks of under production, semi-finished and
finished goods
9 0 9
3. Variation of work made to order -33.854 25.092 -58.945
4. Increase of facilities for internal work 864.052 782.712 81.339
5. Other revenues
a ) Revenue grants
According to EEC regulations 1.449.628 1.430.586 19.042
Others 137.999 125.019 12.980
b) Employment restructuring fund ex lege 448/98 998.530 974.179 24.350
c) other revenues 214.996 97.044 117.952
Total 5 2.801.153 2.626.828 174.325
Total A - Production value 8.397.661 7.906.018 491.643
  Source: Gruppo Ferrovie dello Stato
Table 1: Value of FS Group production in the year 2000
A first analysis shows that the regions are more interested in
an improvement of the quality standards of the railway
transport than in its economic management. This is
demonstrated, by the fact that, with the exception of Liguria,
every region has created its Service Chart. The focus on
quality standards rather than on economic details could be
justified by the fact that economic terms will be imposed by
the competition during the tender (competition for the market
and not in the market), by the pursuit of profit as well as by
the creation of net cost contracts where commercial risk is
taken by those producing the service18.
However, service quality includes many different aspects -
travelling times, service frequency, service reliability, air-
conditioning and cleanliness of the carriages, staff courtesy
both on board and on land, punctuality and accuracy of
information, etc. - which are difficult to judge according to
one single measure if evaluated before signing a contract. In
this way often the only element taken into consideration is the
possession of a quality certificate, which is quite restrictive if
compared with the different elements listed in table 2.
Moreover, if calls for bids continue to show preference for a
multiplicity of criteria for identifying the economically more
advantageous offer, the problem of their effectiveness arises.
That is to say the possibility for the authorities of deciding
which offer is the most advantageous for the collectivity is
very difficult19.
It is evident that, in case of informative asymmetry between
the subjects taking part into the “game” (not forgetting that to
this day the state was the competent authority for public
transport), we can expect that during the first tenders the
incumbents’ offers will be far from optimal, such that this
inefficiency is included in the public service contract, or in
other words, that the collectivity has to pay for it. This
distance between the ideal quantity of service realizable with
public subsidy and the quantity actually indicated as 
minimum service standard will be proportional to the
informative asymmetry rate present on the market.
In other words, public service, in particular the definition of
minimum service standards, is likely to be measured on the
strength of historical results which include an internal
inefficiency, risking to reproduce it even in the future and
betraying, in this way, the true spirit of the reform20.
The scarce relevance given to the possibility of increasing the
offer of service with respect to the quantity indicated in the
service contract as well as the lack of incentives (with the
exception of the obvious increase of revenues for the
company) for the increased number of passengers speak in
favour of this argument.
For this reason, it would probably be useful to consult a great
number of surveys and benchmarking studies in order to
pinpoint the efficiency standards of the individual operative
structures that operate in similar contexts. For local
authorities this would imply a great effort from the point of
view of their internal skills. After years of having had only
programming and mainly administrative tasks, these
structures should now be reinforced with economic and
transport competencies. That is why no region has to this day
created yardstick competition or price cap systems which link
public service subsidy to the achievement of certain
efficiency standards by the company that wins the tender.
It is important to notice that regional authorities are very
interested in the integrated tariff system of public transport. It
is evident that they have a double target: improve the quality
of the service while allowing the passenger to use more easily
different means of transport managed by different subjects -
such as tram, bus, train, underground. This implies
introducing a single ticket, and the desire to increase the
efficiency of each means of transport taking them to the ideal
traffic level (for which average costs are minimal)21. From
this point of view, in many regions the creation of a
metropolitan railway network allowed a relevant expansion of
the services, which are at the citizens’ disposal for their intra-
urban mobility without worsening road traffic conditions.
The lack of tariff systems recording passengers’ real routes
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Abruzzo
Basilicata
Calabria
Campania
Emilia R.
Lazio
Liguria
Lombardia
Marche
Molise
Piemonte
Puglia
Toscana
Umbria
V. Aosta
Veneto
Total 6 0 16 8 15 16 0 3 16 5 1 3 0
  Source: Federtrasporto, (2001), Monitoraggio del TPL, n° 2, luglio.
Table 2: Features included in the service contracts
Regions-Trenitalia
Regions
Regional law (R.L.) details
Piemonte R. L. n. 1 of 4 january 2000 Norme in materia di trasporto pubblico
locale, in attuazione del decreto legislativo 19 novembre 1997, n. 422.
Lombardia R. L. n. 22 of 29 october 1998 Riforma del trasporto pubblico locale in
Lombardia
Piemonte R. L. n. 25 of 30 october 1998 Disciplina ed organizzazione del
trasporto pubblico locale
Liguria R. L. n. 31 of 9 september 1998 Norme in materia di trasporto
pubblico locale
Emilia Romagna R. L. n. 30 of 2 october 1998 Disciplina generale del trasporto pubblico
regionale e locale
Toscana R. L. n. 42 of 31 july 1998 Norme per il trasporto pubblico locale
Umbria R. L. n. 37 of 12 october 1998 Norme in materia di trasporto pubblico
locale in attuazione del decreto legislativo 19 novembre 1997, n. 422.
Marche R. L. n. 45 of 24 december 1998 Norme per il riordino del trasporto
pubblico regionale e locale nelle Marche
Lazio R. L. n. 30 of 16 july 1998, Disposizioni in materia di trasporto
pubblico locale
Abruzzo R. L. n. 152 of 23 december 1998 Norme per il trasporto pubblico
locale
Molise R. L. n. 19 of 24 march 2000 Norme integrative della disciplina in
materia di trasporto pubblico locale
Campania R. L. n. 3 of 28 march 2002 Riforma del Trasporto Pubblico Locale e
Sistemi di Mobilità della Regione Campania
Puglia R. L. n. 13 of 25 march 1999 Testo unico sulla disciplina del trasporto
pubblico di linea
Basilicata R. L. n. 22 of 27 july 1998 Riforma del trasporto pubblico regionale e
locale in attuazione del decreto legislativo del 19-11-1997, n. 422
Calabria R. L. n. 23 of 7 august 1999 Norme per il trasporto pubblico locale
Table 3: Regional laws after legislative-decree n. 422/97 of
reform implementation19
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(for example with a magnetic card) and of reliable surveys on
the used capacity can lead to conflicts in revenue
management from the integrated tariff system between rail
and road operators (with the possibility of generating forms
of  cross-subsidy). This is more likely to happen with net cost
contracts where, as we said before, commercial risk is taken
by those producing the service, especially in case of long
term contracts and of investment plans which can influence
traffic distribution quite differently.
6. Privatisation of railway system and of LPT
As we mentioned, local public transport is undergoing a
double transformation:
• on one hand, the reform of local public transport tends to 
privatize the production of the service itself, leaving the 
programming and planning phase to local authorities 
(regions or provinces) which have the task of determining 
the traffic basins and the so-called minimal services; 
• on the other hand, the railway reform of EEC Directive 
440/91 which has taken place also in Italy, provides that 
transport service is left to private enterprises, while the 
management of infrastructures (an element which 
characteristically is a natural monopoly) is delegated to a 
subject under public control (in Italy RFI).
This leads to a sharp distinction between the privatisation
process of local public transport (LPT) on both road and rail,
even though both processes are taking place simultaneously.
In the first case market competition ideally involves a great
number of operators negotiating with the public subject to
give them the exclusive concession for producing transport
services, while in the second case a third subject is involved -
the infrastructure manager.
Railway enterprises, then, compete for the right to produce
LPT service exclusively according to the timetable,
supplementary services, costs, and public subsidies which, in
case of positive results in the tender, will later be negotiated
with the infrastructure manager. It is very difficult for railway
companies to ask for time paths at the moment of the call for
bids. In fact, according to the procedures for assigning
railway capacity, if the company does not use the capacity
which has been assigned to it, the infrastructure manager
must revoke the assignment and, more importantly, confiscate
the guarantee lent in his favour22. With regard to this situation,
present Italian regulations do not consider the possibility of
the regions booking train paths, but this empasse should be
overcome by implementing the Directive 2001/14/CE or
creating regional laws on this issue.
In case the request of train paths gets closer and closer to or
should even exceed the offer, a problem in train path
management arises which has to be solved by the Italian
infrastructure manager (RFI) who has already outlined a
complex system of  priorities among the requests. If we take
into consideration that the transport services must not be
concentrated over a certain limit in the hands of a single
operator, regional traffic has priority (in the process of
assignment of train paths to the ones who have requested it),
together with the high speed services on dedicated
infrastructures and the freight services on dedicated lines
(first priority level according to President of Republic’s
decree 146/1999). In the case of incompatibility among same
priority services, however, regional transport is favoured only
in the time band 6.00-9.00 A.M.
Moreover, great urban areas may greatly benefit from the
shifting of urban traffic from road to rail, but are also those
areas where railways are congested or highly utilised. Here it
is possible that the infrastructure manager may prefer to
assign paths to freight trains or other passenger trains that are
more profitable than urban ones, with the risk of a “path
rationing” behaviour.
The presence of a third subject whose task is to make train
paths available for the arrangement of LPT service on rails
has consequences related to the sanctions provided by most
service contracts in case of service delay or decline in quality.
In fact there is the concrete possibility that the railway
companies are considered responsible for reasons due to the
infrastructure manager. This isn’t so important for the final
responsibilities of the railway companies, because they still
have the chance to make up for the possible damages or for
the incidental charges caused by the infrastructure manager.
This is important for the suitability of the penalties belonging
to the service contracts drawn up by the regions concerning
the provisions of the General Access Conditions (Art. 1) to
the railway infrastructure.
7. Investments
In order to face the new competence of the Local Public
Transport, regional authorities have set up a series of
investments with the purpose of improving the public service
both in quantity and in quality. The railway industry has
benefited from these public investments as well as from the
investments provided by the present service producer
(Trenitalia).
Trenitalia has provided for the allocation of 2.090 million
euro for the four-year period 2002-2005 (427 million euro for
2002) which are to be split as follows: 862 destined for the
purchase of new rolling stock and for restyling or revamping
the already operative rolling stock, 146 million euro for
improving safety on board, 83 million euro for improving
information services for passengers and for the electronic
collection system, and 41 for the expansion and the
strengthening of workshops.
In recent years, Italian railway companies have been making
a great effort to improve transport conditions and the service
quality of regional transport. In the main urban areas the
integrated tickets road+rail (bus+train) have been succeeded
by the new trains TAF (High Usage Train) and the TBF (Low
Usage Train) which have been intentionally created for local
traffic. There are 67 trains of this kind up to now, and another
32 will be added within 2003. Other efforts aim to improve
traveller comfort thanks to air-conditioning in the carriages,
better internal and external cleanliness, and sound
communication of information.
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As mentioned before, local authorities also take part in these
efforts, or at least some of them, by allocating  capital for the
purchase of new rolling stock or signal systems, and for travel
information at the railway station – as seen in Liguria,
Lombardia, Lazio, Toscana, Veneto, Abruzzo, Campania,
Emilia Romagna, Marche and Piemonte. The chance for the
local authority to invest in local transport service is provided
by the reform implementation (see, for instance, Art. 43 of
the law of Regione Campania; Artt. 6 and 20 of the law of
Regione Toscana, Art. 10 of the law of Regione Lombardia,
Art. 18 of the law of Veneto) on condition that the incumbent
of the investments can not transfer them or use them for
purposes other than local public transport (LPT). 
These investments are increased by those which follow the
drawing up of service contracts with local authorities for
levels of service that surpass the minimum.
The nature of investments in the railway industry has
repercussions for the length of service contracts. Investments in
equipment such as rolling stock must take into consideration
that the economic life of the goods greatly exceeds the contract
length, so that it becomes necessary to lay down rules for the
incoming of new concessionaires in the investment
management23. The service contract length provided by the
regional laws goes from a 3 years minimum in case of  direct
assignment (according to the law of Regione Lombardia), and
5 years in case of assignment according to tender procedures
(law of Regione Liguria), up to 9 years maximum as set out by
Art. 18 of the legislative decree 422/97.
8. Italian reform and the European regulations
As affirmed by Boitani and Cambini24, the most tricky
menace to the deregulation process just begun in Italy could
come – if the version of February 2002 should be approved
by the European Parliament and by the Council – from the
new Community Regulations 2000/0212(COD) regarding
public services duties and public service contracts in the field
of passenger transport by rail, road, and on inland waters.
Another theme purposely faced in the Regulations is
controlled competition instead of deregulation or privatisation
of local public transport (LPT) services as an instrument for
making public transport more efficient and attractive. What is
most important is that the regulations give large discretion to
local authorities in opening the market to competition. 
The last version of the Regulations has raised (art. 7) the
maximum threshold standard “de minimis” value, on the
basis of which local authorities can entrust services without
tendering - bringing the threshold from an annual average
value of 400 thousand euro to one million euro in the
assignment of extra services and from 800 thousand euro to 3
million euro in the assignment of a whole network. In these
cases the public authority has to indicate in advance that it
isn’t going to call for tenders, in order to give anybody the
chance to present different proposals for the provision of the
same public service. In this way the authority forces the
public body to value them and to express reasons for possible
acceptance or rejection. If this stands, however, small urban
centres could be completely excluded from all competitions,
particularly centres that have economically undersized
companies and which are less equipped (because of their size)
for making comparative evaluations on a non homogeneous
basis (differently from what would happen if they called for
public tenders).
Moreover, the new Art. 8 of the E.U. Regulations gives local
authorities the direct possibility of supplying local public
transport service, taking a step backward towards the sharp
separation, indicated also in many regional laws, between the
phase of the transport service planning and the phase of the
real production of public service. As well, conflicting
interests between regulated bodies and regulators will emerge
and develop in such a way that in many cases they would end
up coinciding.
The solution provided by Art. 9 seems to be quite odd, as it
would impose the subcontracting of part of the services if the
public tender winner concentrated prominent market shares in
itself. It is clear that the community legislator considers a
certain level of competition valid only by a minimal number
of operators, rather than by the possible “hit and run”
behaviour of potentially new elements, increasing market
contention rather than the number of operators.
In order to amortise investments, art. 6 finally provides a 15
years maximum limit for public service contract length for
transport on rails, higher than normally indicated by the
regional laws. Such a large time period could produce the risk
of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the transport system
management which could reflect on the ability of the reform
to affect transport services costs and the service level offered
to citizens.
9. Prospects and open problems
Even if the terms foreseen for the beginning of tender
procedures are quite close to date, there are two regions in
Italy, according to a survey conducted in the first half of
2002, which are closer to the announcement of tenders. They
are Liguria and Lombardy, which have chosen different ways
of carrying out service privatisation. Liguria, in fact, is going
to call for only one tender for the whole regional railway
service, whereas Lombardy has “broken” the railway network
into different basins which will be entrusted through tenders
during the period 2004-2008.
The choice of Lombardy is based on the fact that the time
necessary to a company to complete rolling-stock is
extremely long, different than in the LPT for road25.
Moreover we have to consider that, following the LPT reform
in Italy, the railway industry can acquire rolling stock
property even if it has been financed by the state or by the
regions (or other local authorities), highlighting the difficulty
that other non-incumbent bodies face in participating in the
tenders, unless the tenders are announced in advance (years
before).
This problem is reduced in case of non-electric railway lines
because the delivery time of diesel trains and tractors are
shorter (so the times for the birth of new rolling stock
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companies are reduced) and because the lack of an electrified
railway line with the same voltage remains one of the main
barriers for the entrance of foreign companies.26
These facts point out that one of the obstacles to the
realisation of LPT target reform is the lack of an independent
body (an agency for instance27) to whom it is possible to
entrust the property of the rolling stock, with the
subsequently exclusive task of giving railway systems
management to public service concessionaires through
leasing contracts. All this lets us think that the first tender
session should end up with the confirmation of the present
service transport managers, but this doesn’t mean that there
will not be improvement in the service quality and a
reduction on its cost.
Consequently, tenders should set off a new interest in
enterprises which already have the railway licence and safety
certificate, that’s to say the ones which manage the railway
lines in administrative concession and which could be soon
interested in acquisitions, joint-ventures, and co-
partnerships.28
This leaves open questions of future chances of having
multimodal public transport services. This solution would
allow the creation of real tariff coordination for the different
transport modalities involved, avoiding possible competition
among different transport systems29. This seems feasible in
some regions – such as Lombardy, where it will be probably
applied to the Brescia-Edolo line – but isn’t considered as a
valid solution in other Italian Regions.
10. Concluding remarks
Railway transport is experiencing a difficult transition from
public production and centralisation in planning and
management of service and infrastructure to open-market
service management and regionalisation of a great part of
transport planning (that is to say everything not considered of
national or international interest, implementing subsidiarity).
In Italy (with significative analogies with France and
Germany and partially with the United Kingdom) the first
feature of this new order is based on the implementation of
the EU regulations to separate infrastructure management and
service production (de-verticalisation) and on the
contemporary liberalisation of the latter by means of
competition for the market. The second feature is obtained by
delegating to the regions (Bassanini reform) the planning of
regional and local public transport (regional plan for
transport, triennial program for local public transport service),
the definition of transport service in order to satisfy citizens’
request for mobility (minimum service standard), the
regulating function by means of the choice of service
manager (as mentioned, by means of competitive
procedures), and the control of the manager’s activity (by
means of the service contract).
This system, based on the principles of liberalisation (and
potential liberalisation) and regionalisation seems to be apt, at
least theoretically, to increase both production, by
reintroducing competitive and market mechanisms, and
service efficiency with regard to the needs of the local
community, by empowering regional government.
Consequently, railway transport is going to play an important
role in urban and metropolitan mobility. In particular, it is
fundamental for government strategies in big metropolitan
areas, because it allows the simultaneous increase of
effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of transport, while
other kinds of strategies present some trade-offs for the
achievement of the different goals.
However, if we consider the liberalisation processes in
transport of the last  25 years as a whole, the introduction of
competitive principles has met more difficulties in the area of
local transport.
Avoiding any consideration of de-verticalisation in general
(the question has already be examined in other chapters of
this special issue), the possible dangers for the
implementation of the global project for regional railway
transport represent the items on the policy makers’ agenda.
They can be defined in this way:
1. Role confusion and consequent conflicts or collusion. The
outlined scenario presents a complex system with many
actors. For this reason it is fundamental that the roles of the
region (regional mobility planner and institutional service
claimant), of the infrastructure manager, and of the service
manager are well defined. The complexity of the situation
and the attempt to protect pre-existing interests can, on the
contrary, lead to a partial clash of functions, as we have seen
for the constitution of regional railway companies. This leads
to many possible conflicts of interests and/or collusion, as we
have already mentioned: between region and tender winner,
between infrastructure manager and railway transport
companies (for train tracks30), or between region and
incumbent, if the latter is the favourite service trustee for
political, social or labour reasons.
2. Advantages for the incumbent. These derive from the
potentially different access to inputs (the mentioned problems
concerning the assignment of tracks, the property of rolling
stocks, the training of personnel), from the dimension of other
operators (if the pre-existing operators are too few or too
little), from political and labour pressure (as partially
mentioned in point 1, caused by the preference to maintain
the status quo).
3. Planning difficulties. In addition to a frequent technical
insufficiency in planning capabilities by regional authorities,
a more important aspect is the real definition of minimum
service standards. In fact, they risk coinciding with those
which obtained with the existing “historically” determined
state transfers that are. This would thwart the concept of the
reform in terms of the response of regional requests to the
real needs of the users.
4. Difficulties connected with competitive procedures. The
problems mentioned, particularly in § 3, can allow tenders to
become tenders for management, maintaining unchanged the
situation rents, the entity and the cost of personnel, and the
existing service, thwarting the possibility of increasing
service efficiency and effectiveness.
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5. Difficulties connected with service contract. There are
many problems deriving from the implementation of the
service contracts between regions and railway companies. In
particular they are due to:
- the definition of the kind of contract (art.19 c.1 of decree 
n.422/1997) and, in particular, the opportunity to sign net 
cost contracts, in order to stimulate service trustees not 
only to reduce costs, but also to increase revenues;
- the definition of the kind of incentive for the improvement 
of efficiency by the service manager (art.19 c.4 of decree 
n.422/1997);
- the evaluation by the region of the real fulfillment of 
contract commitments and the real possibility of punishing 
possible breaches;
- the evaluation of service quality standards;
- the difficulty of  feed-back as far as the fulfillment of the 
goals and the final request needs by the service producer 
are concerned.
6. Difficulties deriving from the generalised use of
competitive procedures to increase functional and tariff
integration with the transport on wheels and, in general, with
the urban and metropolitan transport, which is produced by
other companies.
7. Difficulties in activating construction and management
concessions (project finance), since the service production
must be delegated with a competitive procedure.
8. The insufficient financial and taxation autonomy of the
regions. This is a “transversal” problem which involves many
sectors of the economy and which influences many of the
above-mentioned points.
Apart from the above-outlined difficulties, this reform could
lead to deep changes in regional rail transport and, plausibly,
also in supply (cost reduction, reorganization and
rationalization of the network, increased labour unrest), in the
market (bilateral monopoly situations where the distinction of
roles and a real liberalisation, followed by a possible
privatisation, seem to be fundamental), and in the cost for
users (increased tariffs, greater attention to the final client by
companies which, up to now, were mainly production
oriented).
On the other hand, we can say, without exaggerating, that
keeping regional socio-economic systems depends on the
sustainability of the short-range transport system and that
railway transport plays a fundamental role, at least in some
kinds of “urban systems”. In fact, the suitability of local
public transport is strongly linked to the typology of
metropolitan growth. Railway transport could be the right
choice in a monocentric radial urban system (cities belonging
to the “industrial triangle”, but also some big cities of
Southern Italy), but even more in polycentric diffuse systems
(such as, for example, those of Veneto and Tuscany), while
those urban fabrics reproducing ad infinitum the same
“module” around elevated service standards are, inevitably,
based on individual road transport (but they are not very
diffuse in Italy and in Europe).
With regionalization, the region becomes the centre of
transport networks according to a logic which foresees the
inter-connection of international networks (such as Trans-
European Networks), national high speed/capacity networks
and local transport on rails and road. From this point of view,
the regional governance of request definition is fundamental
in order to optimise the interface with national (railway)
transport and with local transport (road, collective and
individual).
Railway transport planning and management can become one
of the linchpins of competition among territorial economic
systems and could regain, at least partially, that role of
localizing factor that it had during the industrial revolution
between the last half of the 19th and the first decades of the
20th century, when it was essentially a freight transport mode.
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NO T E S
1 In Italy the number of people transported has inverted the increasing
trend at the end of the ‘70s, going from 6 millions 150 thousands
passengers in 1978 to less than 3 and a half million in the last years,
while there has been a growth of people transported by underground and
a much more evident decrease in bus transport. Musso, E., and C.,
Burlando, (1999), Economia della mobilità urbana, Utet, Torino, cap. 4.
2 Demsetz, H., (1968), “Why Regulate Utilities?”, Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 55-65.
3 See articles 81, 82 e 86.
4 The fees, calculated on costs base (circulation, energy, general
expenses and indirect expenses), must grant the balance account to the
infrastructure manager, Zucchetti, R., and M., Ravasio, (2001),
Trasporti e concorrenza: dal monopolio pubblico al libero mercato,
EGEA, Milano. The time paths entrusting considers first of all the
mobility need of the citizens, relations ruled by service contracts
(regional and local), high skilled services and freight services and, in the
end, national passengers’ services.
5 The first new operators obtained permission in 2001.
6 As we will mention in the next paragraph, the real definition of
minimum service standards is one of the most difficult aspects of the
implementation of the reform.
7 As regional implementation rules are quite different, regional railway
management includes different disciplines such as the creation of
regional companies and the call for bids and, in some cases, regional
laws do not arrange mechanisms for entrusting services. Zucchetti, R.,
and M., Ravasio, (2001), op. cit.
8 It is not by chance that railway transport had greater and longer
success in centralized economies. It is symptomatic that the German
Democratic Republic’s reunion to Germany and its conversion to a
market system implied a collapse of railway market segments in that
country.
9 In parallel, the transposition of the same mechanism between Region
and local authorities, as far as municipal and provincial transport on
wheels is concerned, lets “minimum service standards” correspond to
regional subventions, which, usually, correspond to a service standard
that is much lower than the present one and create serious financial
difficulties to local authorities. Theoretically, they could integrate
regional subventions in order to enhance their service standard with
regard to the minimum one, but this is almost impossible because of
their financial situation. In this way public transport risk overstuffing
overmanned with regard to the service quantity which is possible to
tender. This stresses labour opposition and risks making calls for bids
meaningless.
10 Demsetz, H., (1968), op. cit.
11 Even existing rolling-stocks should be given to these societies in order
to avoid any advantage for the incumbent.
12 Paradoxically, this conditions the difficulty existing for municipal
road transport companies which compete with others in tenders which
have been called by their own owners!
13 Boitani, A., and C., Cambini, (2002), “Il Trasporto Pubblico Locale in
Italia”, Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Vol. 4, n° 1.
14 In a gross-cost contract, supply corresponds to the estimated and
agreed management costs, independent of the revenues taken by the
granting authority.
15 For a more detailed treatment, Musso, E., C., Burlando, (1999), op.
cit., chapter 8.
16 Service Chart 2002.
17 Table 3.
18 Taking into consideration subjects charged with industrial risk (linked
to management costs), and commercial risk (linked to the revenue
trend), literature usually distinguishes: management contracts, where
the client is charged with the two kinds of risk, gross-cost contracts
where the operator is charged with industrial risk and the client with
commercial risk and net-cost contracts where the operator is charged of
both the risks.
19 Since so many elements weigh on the evaluation, it is necessary to
establish a test specimen among these criteria.
20 As far as LPT by road is concerned, in one case the incumbent was
forbidden to take part in the tender, in order to diminish the informative
asymmetry between competitors and the “auctioneer”, but this solution
cannot be applied to LPT on rail, as we will see later.
21 Think, for example, that an urban railway network can transport up to
70 thousand passengers per hour on one single rail at a speed of about
30-35 Km/h, while in case of a bus transport the transport capacity is
reduced to 10-15 thousand passengers per hour.
22 Whose value is equal to the highest between the 10% of the economic
value of the contract and its economical value referred to the month of
greatest supply by the infrastructure manager (art. 10 “The Criteria and
Operating Procedures for railways capacity allocation” and art. 1
“General Access Conditions” to the railways infrastructure).
23 It is evident that the lack of chances for new concessionaires to
succeed in the patrimonial management of rolling-stock and equipment
leads the railway industry towards insuperable barriers in market entry
and exit.
24 Boitani, A., and C., Cambini, (2001), “La riforma del trasporto
pubblico locale: problemi e prospettive”, Workshop Antitrust, Milano,
22 giugno.
25 The Regione Lombardia has estimated  the average time between the
order and the delivery of a train of about three years. 
26 It is known that the EU countries have electrified lines with different
voltages, so interchangeability is guaranteed only thanks to tractors able
to adapt themselves to different voltages (much more expensive than the
ones used in the single national lines).
27 Regarding independent authorities in the transport field, see also
Boitani, A., (2000), “Un’Autorità indipendente per i trasporti?”,
L’Industria, Vol. 24, pp. 821-832.
28 Regarding co-partnerships see Torbianelli’s article in this volume. For
an economic analysis of the regional railways lines see Canali, C.,
(1988), Le Ferrovie Regionali in Italia, Step,Parma.
29 Regarding competition among alternative transport modalities see also
Marchese, U., (2000), Lineamenti e problemi di Economia dei
Trasporti, ECIG, Genova.
30 It is necessary to mention that another difficulty could be arise from a
recent EU attitude tending to divide the use of the network into “nodes”
and “arches”, in order to let the use of the former pay more than the
latter. For local transport, which is based on nodes, this would mean that
it should pay most of the use of the infrastructure network. 
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1. Introduction 
Other articles featured in
this edition illustrate the
main characteristics and the
most remarkable themes of
railway reform in Italy, as
regards urban and local
transport. They clearly
point out that the issue of
de-verticalising the railway
system in Italy is strongly
linked to a general reform
of competencies. As high-
lighted, for example, by
Musso and Ferrari: “…the
regionalisation of a railway
transport inclined to de-verticalisation outlines a new
institutional picture, combining regulations aimed at
efficiency (separation of infrastructure management from
service production in which competition is promoted) with the
territorialisation of skills, based on subsidiarity, which aims
at increasing transport effectiveness through a close
relationship between requirements planning and collectivity
requirements” 1. 
This article features an in-depth analysis of the most
significant issues in the regionalisation process of railway
competencies. This analysis is carried out through the
observation of the actual situation in a specific geographic
area: the north-eastern part of Italy (comprising the regions of
Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Trentino Alto Adige,
represented in fig.1).
Indeed, this area: a) has been at the forefront of a significant
economic development over the last 10-15 years; b) features,
in the main region (Veneto), an articulate and multi-centric
urban structure within
which the urban railway
system has a very
important potential role,
considering the current
road congestion levels and
the dispersion of town
centres; c) includes
different models of
regional administration
(Veneto has an “ordinary
statute”, whereas Trentino
Alto Adige and Friuli
Venezia Giulia, bordering
on foreign countries, have
“special statutes”2); d) has
seen the development, over the last years, of a politically
strong movement for the decentralisation and devolution of
policies, in all sectors.
The proposed analysis does not aim at describing and
discussing in detail the overall aspects of the actual
implementation of the railway reform in the Italian regions.
On the contrary, the analysis focuses on the description of the
real situation, which, albeit partial and limited (since based on
examples), aims at illustrating the nature of the problems the
Italian reform is facing.
2. Implementation of the Railway Reform in Veneto
2.1 The regional legislative framework and the state-
region agreement
Of all regions in north-eastern Italy, Veneto is the most
important in terms of size, population and economic
parameters. This is the main reason why the text comprises a
large description of the Veneto example. Due to the size of
the region and, therefore, the scope of the issues, it is a
particularly interesting example. 
In the Veneto Region, the implementation of the railway
reform has been carried out according to a procedure similar
to that adopted by many other Italian regions with ordinary
statutes. 
As soon as in 1998 the regional legislation on transport in
Veneto3 adopted the guidelines of the national Legislative
Decree n. 422 dated19/11/97, that were amply illustrated in
the articles by Marcucci and Musso-Ferrari. According to
regional legislation, the fundamental objective of the Veneto
region is to overcome the monopolistic model of transport
service management. The same law defines the strategies to
be implemented generally by all transport modes (bus and
railway transport) to reach that objective. The strategy
comprises the following points: a) the introduction of
competition rules into the periodic committal of services,
through calls for tenders aimed at choosing service providers
or private partner companies managing those services; b) the
introduction of public service contracts based on the
principles of effectiveness and profitability, able to ensure full
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Figure 1: Friuli Venezia Giulia and Veneto
compliance of their contract obligations as regards available
services and resources, net of revenues from tariffs; c) the
integration of tariffs among the various transport modes,
promoting the separation of organisations responsible for
services planning and financing activities from those actually
managing the services. 
Furthermore, particularly regarding the railway sector, the
regional Law statues that the provisions of the directive n.
91/440/CEE be applied also to regional and local transport
structures. Other parts clearly call for the principle of
separation between the planning/regulatory functions
(principal) from the functions of industrial management
(agent) and the one concerning the stipulation of service
contracts, featuring precise contents, backing, and description
of promotion mechanisms. 
Over and above these principles, there is the decision that
authorises the regional Council “to set up a company for the
management of the railways that are managed by the state on
commission, and are entrusted to the Ferrovie dello Stato
S.p.A. for restructuring.” The above-mentioned company
may acquire shareholdings in companies whose statutory
purpose is the management of regional and local railway
services.
Overall, it can be said that the principles established in the
Veneto regional legislation aim at setting up a system for the
production of public transport services, including railways,
based on competition. It is worth mentioning that the same
framework explicitly envisages the possibility of the regional
Administration’s active involvement, through a company of
its own, in the production of railway services in the region4,
neglecting the possible negative implications of such a
participation for the competitive environment (see paragraph
2.3.2). 
In Veneto, as in other Italian regions, the instrument
regulating the devolution of competencies from the state to
the regions was the so called “Accordi di Programma”
(framework agreement) between the Ministry of Transport
and the regional administration, directly conferring upon the
latter the funds for the acquisition of railway services from
railway companies operating in the region. 
Before the adoption of the agreement, these companies
operated directly on behalf of the Ministry, and received
subsidies for the services provided from the Ministry, not the
region.
Regarding the Veneto region, the framework agreements for
the two railway companies operating in the region (Trenitalia
S.p.A. and Ferrovie Venete) were stipulated between the
Transport Ministry and the regional government5 in 2000. 
For Veneto, the devolution of railway competencies was
implemented for certain categories of urban railway transport
services, notably: a) for passenger transport services
performed by “regional” trains (for journeys within the
region’s borders), b) for certain “inter-regional” trains,
communicating with bordering ordinary-status regions
(Lombardia, and Emilia Romagna). 
2.2 The experimental service contracts between
Regions and railway companies 
In general, according to the principles of competencies’
devolution, the state-region framework agreements explicitly
require that the relationship between the two parties be
further regulated through an additional agreement, also
known as service contract.
Specifically, the service contract between the region and the
railway company directly derives from the framework
agreement as regards: a) the threshold for regional financial
support (subsidy); b) certain contract obligations, among
which the most significant is monitoring, i.e. compulsory
accounting and reporting activities (in favour of the region)
regarding production costs and other technical, economic, and
financial parameters.
The contracts envisaged by the state-region framework
agreements are defined as “experimental” because of the
compulsory “monitoring” (over and above other product-
related parameters) of analytical production costs with the
objective of shedding light, year after year, on costs actually
imputable to the urban railway service production by each
regional network. In the long run, therefore, the result should
be a sensible distribution of state funds among the regions,
based on a correct estimate of cost of production figures.
According to the provisions of the framework agreement with
the state, and in collaboration with railway companies
operating in the region’s territory under the old regime, the
Veneto Region started drawing up the first experimental
service contracts (2000-2001) as soon as in 2000. 
In spite of the differences between the two counterparts
(Trenitalia is the state-owned Italian railway company,
whereas Ferrovie Venete is a small integrated operator
performing its services on a secondary line of approximately
70 km between Adria and Mestre ), the two contracts are
based on identical principles and, therefore, can be discussed
jointly. However, it should be pointed out that their duration
is different The contracts with Trenitalia (strategically very
important because they cover most of the services in the
region) have been envisaged as annual contracts to ensure a
better management of the experiment. The contracts with the
“local” railway have a 3-year validity.
2.2.1 Clauses for the monitoring of economic
parameters
The contract between the region and Trenitalia explicitly
recognizes that the parties, first of all, should set up adequate
tools and resources for measuring, checking, and evaluating
the physical, economic, and financial variables involved in
service production. Knowledge and information are
considered very important. 
More specifically, the information gathered should permit the
following: evaluating costs and revenues of each line;
measuring of cargoes on each line and train; monitoring the
quality of services provided; measuring customer satisfaction
(quality perceived).
The contract further specifies and requires the railway
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company to collect information relevant for the control of
management. This includes: fare-paying transported
passengers; annual service distances actually covered (as
against planned amounts, due to strikes, accidents, natural
disasters); operative cost of service per kilometre, forecasted
and final; operating speed of services (ratio between train-
kilometres* and number of hours of service offered) based on
official timetables; and ratio between revenues from services
and operative costs, net of infrastructure costs.
According to the contract, the railway operator should submit
this information to the region, as precisely defined in the
contract. 
As stated, the contract defines the economic/management
monitoring parameters to support the regulatory entity (the
region) in its monitoring of the entire regional transport
service system, in both input/output aspects and the
evaluation of the levels of efficiency. 
Another purpose of these clauses is to motivate the multi-
product state-owned railway company (Trenitalia) to further
refine its system of analytic accountancy, which, if left
unchanged, will not have allowed a rational charging of costs
to the services produced on behalf of the region, and their
distinction from costs pertaining to other services (long
distance, etc.).
The control mechanism also requires the railway company to
provide basic information referring to the resources
specifically dedicated to the production of services for the
region. In the contract special attention is given to personnel
information (number of employees allocated to each
function).
Further compulsory information on the service provided
relates to the difference between planned and actual service
provision: number of rides lost, number of break-downs,
accidents, and shifts from planned driving hours (which ought
to be registered both in absolute values and in percentage
points each six months).
2.2.2 The difficulty in rolling-out the application of the
monitoring clause
One year after the contract between the Region and Trenitalia
became active, the transfer of information appears still far
from its full realisation. Hence, the Veneto Region still does
not have the basic information on the services management
costs.
The failure to transfer information poses no problems over a
short period, but taking further steps in the implementation of
the reform may become much more difficult. 
It is true that the region does not necessarily need to receive
information concerning costs for purposes that are directly
connected to the management of the Trenitalia contract.
Indeed, during the first years of contract application, the
subsidy transferred to the railway operator for the
performance of services basically does not depend on the
costs of management, in the sense that no mechanism has
been devised to connect the cost trend and the financial
public support (see paragraph 2.2.4). 
However, there seems to be no case for a mild breach of the
spirit of the contract. In fact, it should not be forgotten that
the main objective of the monitoring clauses is to improve the
knowledge, at the local authority level, of costs (and the
operative margins!) in the production of services across the
regional network, also in view of a possible tender. Such
information is essential for the definition of the tender
criteria. 
Considering the prospect of a future tender for the
commissioning of services may explain Trenitalia’s
reluctance to provide data, according to the company’s
strategy of preserving maximum information asymmetry. 
Trenitalia has no interest in providing the region with
information that may reduce its scope for action (and profit!)
at the moment the tender takes place. Trenitalia would benefit
from the difficulties the region might have in identifying the
economic parameters for the tender, given that each year of
delay means, for Trenitalia, the smooth carrying out of its
business. Finally, even in the period that precedes the tender,
the failure to provide cost information is advantageous for the
railway operator - who runs no risks of being criticised
because of excessive margins when the annual subsidy is
being defined. 
The railway company is partially justified by the fact that the
knowledge of costs imputable to a single production segment
is not readily available. Only after splitting into different
companies, i.e. over the last few years, has Trenitalia started
to sort out their analytic accountancy sector. It is true,
however, that a possible weakness in the accounting system
was well known long before the signing of the contract.
2.2.3 Service quality and its monitoring
In general, as Musso and Ferrari point out well, the regions
are much more sensitive to quality than to the issue of cost-
efficiency, because the quality of services moulds the
citizens’ opinions (including those of political nature) on the
work of the local bodies. 
The provisions on the monitoring of the quality of services
play a very important role, including in the service contracts
between the Veneto Region and the railway companies. 
The requirements on the quality of service contained in the
experimental contracts between the Veneto Region and
Trenitalia define, above all, a generic commitment towards
the improvement of the levels of quality perceived by the
clientele. 
On the whole, an effort towards giving “an optimal response
to the needs” is required, focusing specially on the needs of
the disabled (eliminating architectural barriers, standardising
compositions as regards the position of cars for the transport
of the disabled, etc.).
According to the contract, service quality monitoring also
falls (in principle) within the railway operator ’s
responsibility. The operator should provide data on adhesion
to the minimum standards every six months, including the list
of trains arriving late by more than five minutes6. 
However, the region can carry out a survey by sampling, in
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order to assess compliance with minimum quality standards
(frequency, punctuality, cleanliness, condition of the rolling
stock, quality perceived by the clientele), but the sampling
criteria should be defined in agreement with the railway
company. Regional authorities’ employees can carry out these
surveys in full. The monitoring activities by regional
surveyors comprise the following: the identification of
punctuality upon arrival at destination, comfort (the average
number of available seats, the time passengers spend
standing, temperature/air-conditioning, equipment, lighting
and door efficiency), cars and restroom cleaning, respect of
minimum contractual standards, and identification of causes
for possible delays. The check is carried out on samples
without prior notice as to the composition being examined
and taken as an example. 
Inspections on Trenitalia trains began in November 2002. As
regards the evaluation of the quality of service, it can be said
that service quality monitoring poses less difficulties than that
of the costs of production. 
Cleanliness is considered a crucial element in the service
contracts, and the relevant detailed regulations are surprising.
The contract meticulously lists the stations requiring daily
cleaning (the main ones), or fortnightly, weekly, etc.  As
regards cars, the cycles for the different cleaning services are
also outlined (full service, every 60 days, normal, every 5-10
days, superficial, daily), whereas checks are carried out every
six months on a sample of at least 10% of the trains. The
evaluation criteria for cleanliness are based on parameters
referring to three different areas of the car (external,
compartments, WCs), on the basis of which a weighted
average is produced. During the checks and, therefore, upon
judgement, the scores are given with reference to a parameter
of acceptable quality, considering also other parameters
including the car’s age.
As regards crowding and comfort, a more generic
classification is envisaged, according to which “the trains
compositions should be planned in such a way to suit the
demand, foreseeing – if possible – a seat for every passenger;
nevertheless, if this is not possible, actions should be taken to
reduce to the minimum the time the passengers are forced to
spend standing, not exceeding 20 minutes.” The evaluations
are carried out on a monthly basis.
Trains cancelled due to technical failures in the cars or
infrastructure should not exceed 0,5% of the planned
services. If there are problems, downtime should not exceed
an hour.
Finally, as to the transmission of information to the public,
there should be railway maps and audio notices on-board the
trains with suitably equipped cars. The stations should be
equipped with a timetable for trains and buses, a map of all
local passenger transport services and adjacent parking areas,
tables with tariffs (both for trains and busses), and the
indication of the departure platform. 
In general, respect of monitoring obligations should be
checked and discussed periodically by an ad hoc technical
committee comprising representatives of the institutions
involved (railway company, ministry, and region), to evaluate
or reformulate the parameters in prospect of contract renewal.
To date, however, the technical committees apparently have
not met the expectations regarding the task entrusted to them.
2.2.4. Other features of the experimental service contract
General aspects 
Over and above the monitoring of the economic and
qualitative service parameters, the contents of the service
contract deserve attention in other aspects.
Under an experimental contract the railway operator is
required to draw up a service operations programme complete
with all information (distance, time-table, operation days,
train-km, etc.) for each train operated. Furthermore, the
railway company carries the costs of management supporting
administrative activities, and of the programming and co-
ordination of ancillary activities (maintenance and control of
the rolling stock, etc.)
In that respect, there is an interesting clause in the contract
with Trenitalia, according to which the railway company
commits itself to ensure as far as possible that maintenance of
the rolling stock take place at facilities located in the region,
to achieve a locally-generated economic return, and ensure
that the rolling stock remains within regional borders.
The contract aims at promoting flexibility within the agreed
operating programme. In general, the path towards the re-
programming of kilometric distances remains open, to allow
quick adjustments to changes in demand or to promote
intermodality. The railway company has the responsibility of
drawing up a declaration on the service actually provided. 
The continuity of the service on low demand distances is
ensured by the opportunity given to the railway company to
set up replacement journeys by bus, previously agreed with
the region. Furthermore, the railway company can include
integrated railway/bus services in its operation plans,
provided these are previously approved by the region and
agreed upon with the bus companies. 
The contract model comprises a clause granting the region the
right to act directly - being directly responsible for the
services - in the event the operator abandons or suspends the
service (for reasons not attaining the failure to pay the
subsidy). In cases of Force Majeure, there is no reduction of
the subsidy due, provided the company ensures a suitable
replacement transport service by bus, both in terms of
timetables and type of service. 
Contract penalties 
The nature of the penalties is classified according to the type
of event: 1) failure to comply with the parameters of
punctuality as regards the timetable; 2) other types of non-
compliance (failure to comply with the cleaning cycles or
provide the information required to the public or to the
supervisor). 
1) The shifts from the parameters of punctuality are
sanctioned according to different criteria, depending on the
type of service involved. For this purpose, three groups of
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services have been identified:
a) services performed by inter-regional trains connecting
large urban centres (i.e. Verona-Bologna; four services) 
b) services performed by regional and direct priority trains
(i.e. Venezia-Padova-Verona-Brescia; eight services).
c) other services performed by regional and direct trains.
There are two tolerance thresholds: max 12% of trains with a
delay exceeding 5 minutes and a max of 6% of trains with a
delay exceeding 15 minutes. For each percentage point
exceeding the two tolerance thresholds, in a 6-months period,
different penalties are applied (varying, in 2001 from approx.
7,500 Euro to approx. 20,000 Euro), depending on the type of
service and the tolerance threshold breached. 
The services most significantly protected by the penalty
mechanism belong to category b), being of the greatest
interest for the region (daily commuting between the urban
centres of the Veneto). There is, however, a sort of an
acquittal bonus reducing the burden and the possibility of
penalties: if 90% of total annual services registers delays not
exceeding 10 minutes, the penalty is not applied. 
Shifts from cleaning cycles and compulsory railway
information service are defined by single breaches of contract
as identified through inspection or through notices given and
then checked, irrespective of the service category. In 2001,
the penalties ranged from 250 to 500 Euro for a single breach.
The reinvestment of revenues deriving from the application
of penalties and sanctions is determined by the region, but
should be designed to enhance the railway service or the local
public transport system in general.
Nature of contract and incentives 
Like many other experimental railway contracts enacted in
Italy, the one between railway companies and the Veneto
Region is in principle a net cost contract (Boitani-Cambini,
2002). 
The contract defines the services to be provided, the subsidy,
and the tariffs. These envisage that the incentives in favour of
the railway operator are mainly linked to the opportunity to
reduce costs and increase the number of passengers carried,
although the most recent version of the contract contains
some price-cap elements.
There is no connection between the subsidy and the level of
costs in regional network operations. Still today, the subsidy
amount is equal to the one applied in the period preceding the
reform of the contracts. For the issue of cost reporting, we
refer to paragraphs 2.2.1 e 2.2.2 on clauses regulating the
monitoring of production costs. After all, there seems to be
no real opportunity for the introduction of mechanisms that
would enable the region to benefit from cost reductions
applied by the railway operator.
Tariffs are set by the region which, generally, applies the
principle that tariff increases should not lead to competition
distortions with regard to road transport. The transition from
the first experimental contract (2001-2002) to the more recent
one (2002-2003) has introduced some changes. According to
the first edition of the experimental contract, the railway
company could put forward tariff adjustment requests only
once a year, aligned with the planned annual inflation rate,
except in the case of non-recurring investments made by the
company. Furthermore, that contract envisaged that tariff
variations (always defined by the region) were granted
exclusively for “the enhancement of the quality of services”
both on ground and on-board, and for improving the quality
of the rolling stock. The new edition of the contract saw the
introduction of a price-cap mechanism that recognises two
further parameters (personnel cost and fuel cost, respectively)
as reference points for tariff variations. The mechanism is
rather complex. For example, as regards the costs of
personnel, different threshold percentage variations have been
considered for each salary category. The regional body hopes
that this mechanism does not raise debates over its
interpretation. 
2.3 Prospects for the service management on the
Veneto network
2.3.1 The Regional Urban Railway System project
(SFMR)
In a long term view, the role of the Veneto Region as a
planner of local and regional railway transport services is
bound to expand in the central part of Veneto, as indicated by
the planning project for the “Regional Urban Railway
System” SFMR-Sistema Ferroviario Metropolitano Regionale
(Net Engeneering, 2001).
The SFMR scheme was elaborated at the end of the 80s, but it
was in 2001 - exactly during the transfer of railway
competencies from the state to the regions - that a more
detailed proposal for a project was drafted. The purpose of
the SFMR is clear: defining an integrated transport system
capable of supporting and responding to the development of a
multi-centre urban area as is Veneto, while ensuring adequate
levels of accessibility, in order to make up for the growing
(and in certain areas dramatic) saturation of the road network.
The SFMR project is specially designed as a project for
transport services and not as an infrastructure project. It does
include a component of infrastructure planning, but the latter
is the result of a precise estimate of requirements in terms of
services needed. The fundamental elements of the planned
system relate, in fact, to the operative programme.
The most salient features are: the coordinated scheduling of
trains and buses and the system of constant frequency
departures. The project includes the definition of an
integrated tariff system (only one travel document for the
entire bus and rail Public Transport network7), the
identification of rolling stock requirements (in terms of
quantity and quality), the main features of the customer
information systems, and the management model.
Planners believe that the implementation of the SFMR ought
to be achieved within a fully redefined and effective
legislative framework . All evaluations are based on this
hypothesis. For example, regarding cost estimates, the
planners who drew up the economic and organisational
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profile of the SFMR have “decided to make no reference to
the current average costs of the FS (...); the trend towards a
bigger opening to the market... ought to lead to a different
and a more efficient model of service production, and to the
reduction in the cost of production. (...) According to the
adopted methodological approach, the supposition was that
the SFMR service be provided by an ad hoc company...”8.
2.3.2 SFMR run by a company managed by the Region?
As well in political terms, and albeit implicitly, the SFMR
project represents a clear indication of the way the Veneto
Region intends to introduce an integrated services
(road/railway) management system, operated by a railway
company set up according to efficiency principles. 
The question is, in perspective, whether a strong political
intention to entrust the management of the entire Veneto
network to a single company can be actually achieved in a
truly competitive environment. Many regional regulations
seem to open alternative paths, but do not ensure the same
respect of the principles of competition.  
First of all, the same art. 28 of the already mentioned Veneto
Region Law allows the region to acquire “capital shares in
companies whose statutory purpose is the management of
regional and local railway services”, through companies born
out of the transformation of “local” commissioned railways
(see paragraph 2.1). Undoubtedly, these regional subsidiaries
could propose themselves as service managers in the region,
and it is difficult to imagine their defeat in a tender
competition, should they forge an alliance with the incumbent
railway operator currently managing the entire rolling stock. 
What recently happened to the small company Ferrovie
Venete is an important indication. In April 2002, Ferrovie
Venete merged into a larger regional company (Sistemi
territoriali S.p.A.), operating in the field of planning. After
the acquisition, Sistemi Territoriali came to comprise also the
railway sector. It is interesting to note that the company has
started negotiations with Trenitalia Cargo Division to operate
in the regional railway cargo sector. In future, it seems
possible that this sort of collaboration with incumbent railway
operators may extend the local public transport sector.  
2.3.3 Two sensitive issues: tenders and rolling stock 
The issue of the regional companies is useful for introducing
the last topic of this case study concerning tenders for the
assignment of services. As already pointed out by Musso and
Ferrari, there is still much uncertainty as to the possibility of
achieving true market competition based on tenders. The
legislation is quite vague The first law (dated 1997) sets 2003
as the year for the organisation of tenders, but many doubts
emerged in the meantime. First of all, Law 166 (dated 2nd
August 2002) enabled this date to be postponed in order to
organise a tender for services for formerly commissioned
regional railways (of the type Ferrovie Venete).
Furthermore, there is complete uncertainty as to the crucial
problem of the incumbent’s (Trenitalia) assets, which
basically include the rolling stock. As referred by Marcucci9,
there are two national regulations at stake. The first is the
aforementioned Law 166 which, in dealing with public
service calls for tenders, states that the basic assets should
never become a discriminatory element for the evaluation of
competitors’ offers. 
According to this regulation, the tenders should ensure that the
assets owned by an incumbent are made available to the
operator chosen through the tender . According to this type of
norm, Trenitalia, even if it loses a tender, would be compelled to
make available (while preserving ownership of) its cars. 
In this regard, however, the hypothetical scenario, envisaging
the formal making available of the rolling stock by Trenitalia in
favour of a potential winner, seems to have been already defined
by Trenitalia as an unfeasible scenario, at least in Veneto.
The second norm is the one envisaging the application of
Law 448/2001 (Art. 35), requiring the separation of assets
and services to entrust the services to “industrially/
economically significant sectors”. However, no relevant
decree has been adopted yet to decide whether the public
transport sector falls into the category of “industrially
significant sectors”, creating a climate of complete
uncertainty. 
Facing this and other problems (the lack of information on
the cost of production, etc.), the Veneto Region is also
running late with the preparation of the tenders.
After all, the issue is about the chances for the tenders to be
organised in such a way to enable a truly competitive
environment. As observed, the regions are strongly pushing
towards the setting up of regional railway companies that
include - both in their management and capital structures - the
same Trenitalia. Some authors (Boitani- Cambini, 2001) point
out that these sort of projects do not promote competition but on
the contrary enable the strengthening of existing incumbents.
3. The situation in the special-status regions
3.1 The issues connected to the inter-regional trains 
So far we have illustrated the situation of the Veneto Region.
Veneto is very important, both for its size and urban density,
hence the importance of the issues exposed and their playing
as examples for the remaining Italian regions. 
This last part of the article will discuss some specific
problems of two other north-eastern autonomous Regions
(Trentino Alto Adige, comprising the two autonomous
Provinces of Trento and Bolzano, and the Region of Friuli-
Venezia Giulia). The special nature of the problems these two
regions face is due both to their political and administrative
organisation (see note 2), and their geographic position vis-à-
vis their “strong neighbour” (Veneto). Set on the periphery,
both regions represent areas with relatively weak traffic but
strongly gravitate towards Veneto, to which they are linked
by very important railway connections (the Brennero line and
the lines Venezia-Udine-Tarvisio and Venezia-Trieste). The
two regions are given less space here due to the limited scope
of the issues involved.
In the first place, it ought to be said that the special status
Trasporti Europei
122
V I T T O R I O  A .  T O R B I A N E L L I
regions in the north-eastern part of Italy are running late
compared to the others with ordinary statutesin terms of the
acquisition of competencies for railways, because of a more
complex legislative procedure (see note 2).
Thanks to a legislative decree, the two autonomous provinces
of Trento and Bolzano acquired their railway service
competencies as early as in July 2001. However, the law was
not immediately followed by a State-Region framework
agreement, at least not until 2002, and the same is true for the
service contract. In these Provinces, the relations with the
railway operators is still managed by the state, although there
are some agreements between the regional body and
Trenitalia on tariff integration and the setting up of certain
new trains between the region and the railway company. 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, in a way, lags even further behind, due
to the lengthy procedure required for the formal adoption of
the regional law by the Parliament. The law adoption
procedure calls for a qualified majority and is, as such, time-
consuming. 
For the special statute regions, an important problem for the
implementation of the reform lies in the conferral of
competencies for inter-regional trains that travel across the
territory of two or more regions. For example, the law
conferring railway competencies to the Autonomous
Provinces of Trento and Bolzano requires that bordering
regions reach an agreement over the assignment of these
services, prior to the stipulation of service contracts. 
Generally, reaching agreements is complex because of the
overlapping of many market segments. A detailed
observation shows the situation between Veneto and Friuli-
Venezia Giulia on whose territories inter-regional trains
perform both the role of urban transport and feeder service for
long-distance trains (where Venezia-Mestre is the hub). In
this context, it should not be forgotten that for the lines
leading to the country’s “outskirts” (Friuli-Venezia Giulia and
Trentino-Alto Adige), there are very few long-distance trains
planned, because of the weak demand and low revenues
(considering that these services cannot be subsidised).
Therefore, long-distance passengers in Friuli-Venezia Giulia
using inter-regional trains as the initial or final portion of
their journey with a connection train in Mestre, could face
serious problems in terms of timetables and connections if the
trains were managed (e.g. within an SMFR framework) by
the Veneto Region, taking into consideration only the needs
of metropolitan passengers, to the detriment of those
travelling long-distance. 
Currently, the two regions are involved in a controversy over
future conferrals of inter-regional services, given that the
Veneto Region seems to have no intention of giving up the
competency over these trains.
3.2 The ministerial guidelines for the period of
transition
To conclude with the issues regarding the special statute
regions and their running late with competency transfer
procedures, it should be mentioned that the Transport
Ministry recently drafted guidelines for provisory contracts
between the regions and Trenitalia, to temporarily regulate
the production of services while awaiting the definitive
devolution of competencies to the regions. Although the
contract has temporary validity, notably until the definitive
transfer of competencies to the regions, the guideline drafts
can be criticised from several view points. The planning
criteria and the identification of the criteria for the definition
of the contribution seem very rigid. The indications on the
service to be produced, as against contribution, are given only
in terms of train-km (a fixed subsidy is set and valid in any
case, at the national level), while neglecting the basic and
distinctive features of the services (peak and off-peak, etc.) as
regards the cost of production. Furthermore, there is no
specific regulation for loss of revenues due to special tariff
reductions (social tariffs). And service quality rules are weak.
In spite of contract’s temporary nature, it would probably
have been useful to includesolutions complying with the
principles that the regions will try to apply when they are
entrusted the competence over these services. More
specifically, an analysis could have been made to look into
the most interesting solutions adopted by those regions that
already approved their service contracts, and to include them
in the draft contract. If the temporary contract does not
acknowledge the true requirements of the regions now, it runs
the risk of loosing the opportunity to anticipate and facilitate
the transition from old to new models. Should the draft
contract remain unaltered, the regions that still await the
conferral of services will have to overcome the biggest hurdle
- including in their relations with Trenitalia - instead of
following a smoother path traced by a central authority more
strongly focussed on the future. Transport policy and a
legislative culture are hardly matters that can be made up and
applied overnight through the formal adoption of a law.
4. Conclusion
To conclude, notwithstanding the latest legislative changes,
the Railway Reform in one of the economically most
important Italian areas is still at the pre-development stage.
The main cause for concern is that, in spite of good intentions
and expectations, the practical application of experimental
service contracts does not seem able to solve, indeed neither
to diminish, the problem of asymmetric information that is
still strongly benefiting incumbent operators. This
persevering of asymmetric information is critical, as it is
slowing down or blocking local authorities’ efforts to obtain
the information necessary to prepare the tenders. The latest
examples of service contracts applications raise the question
whether there is need to envisage stricter rules, at national
level, regulating the release of information by local transport
incumbents or, alternatively, to carry on studies aimed at
assessing the efficient-cost level for railway operation on
regional networks. These studies should be co-ordinated at
national level and supported centrally by the public sector.
However, the results of the case study analysis lead to believe
that the regional authorities themselves are interested in
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maintaining very good relationships with the incumbents over
the preparation of the tenders. Indeed, the incumbents may
provide the necessary support for the setting up of regional
companies, subject to local authority’s control, which seem to
be a long term implicit objective of the local authorities. In
Veneto, the SFMR project and the recent acquisition of
Ferrovie Venete have launched a signal that should not be
underestimated. There is still much to do, even in the
developed and effective north-eastern Italy, to achieve an
environment of true competition in the railway sector.
NO T E S
1 See, on this issue, Musso and Ferrari., op.cit
2 The special status regions (“autonomous” regions) have a higher
degree of legislative autonomy compared to regions with ordinary
status. However, their greater autonomy is counterbalanced by a
stronger control of regional laws by Parliament, checking their
compatibility with the Constitution. This implies longer and more
complex control procedures, compared to those applied to laws adopted
by Regions with ordinary status. 
3 Regione Veneto, Regional Law no 25 dated 30 October 1998 (BUR no
99/1998).
4 As regards Veneto, the railway company Adria-Mestre is a remarkable
case. This local-level company has been commissioned by the state and
since 2002, after a number of misadventures, has joined a regional-level
company with rather broad objectives (“Sistemi territoriali” S.p.A.). 
5 Framework Agreement between the Transport Ministry and the Veneto
Region for the Enactment of the Devolution Act envisaged by Art. 9 of
the Legislative decree no 422/97; Framework Agreement between the
Transport Ministry and the Veneto Region for the Enactment of the
devolution Act envisaged by Art. 8, Par. 3 of the Leg. D. no 422/97
6 The minimum quality standard is defined by: cleanliness of stations
and onboard trains, punctuality, crowding and comfort, reliability and
information system. Furthermore, the continuous monitoring of the
service standards and a periodical survey, taken at least once a year to
collect comments by the clientele on the quality perceived, are
compulsory.
7 For tariff integration problems in Veneto see: Veneto Regional
council, 2002, The tariff system of the local public transport -documents
and analysis, Venice.
8 Net Engennering, (2001), p. 105.
9 See, on this issue, Edoardo Marcucci. op.cit.
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1. Introduction
The production of railway
services is characterised by
economies of scale and by
technical indivisibility.
Such rigidity, as well as its
non-lucrative character
related to capital remunera-
tion due to the use of public
investments, has histo-
rically guaranteed the
development of the railway system within a natural
monopolistic environment dominated by the presence of
state-owned companies. 
As a matter of fact, apart from the USA, where railway
management was given to private companies within a strictly
regulated regime, nationalisation was the solution adopted in
all European countries, the Soviet block and the Third World
countries.  Relatively recently, however, the rigidly vertical
structure of the railways has often been the object of
discussion. This is because technological progress has
contributed towards the reduction of that rigidity that has
characterised the organisation of the production of services.
In other words, despite the presence of unrecoverable
investments (sunk costs) and average costs that decreased so
greatly as to make competition inapplicable, the technical
limitations that force the concentration of the market on the
supply side have been weakened. 
This situation, as well as increasing subsidy levels, drove the
Governments of many countries to undertake reforms in this
field in order to design organisation schemes that could
overcome the pre-existing unity of the railway enterprises.
Japan’s strategy for introducing a certain level of competition
in the market was the creation of individual private firms, six
of which are dedicated to local passenger traffic, one to the
transport of goods, one to high speed connections, and others
to the management of regional railway networks.
In South America and Africa the restructuring of the railway
system, carried out by the World Bank, had as its main
objectives the geographical fragmentation of the networks
and the achievement of a higher level of competitiveness
thanks to the transfer of services management to private
companies operating in a market controlled by an
independent regulator. 
2. The European Railway Policy and the Reform of
British Railways
In the years following World War II, most European countries
showed a tendency to nationalise the railway system. 
The Labour Government in Britain was deeply influenced by
the alleged successes of the Soviet Five-Year Plans while
trying to redefine the management structure of the public
services1. A nationally unified model was chosen for the
railway sector because, according to the policy makers, only
centralisation could guarantee relevant economies of scale
and organisational simplification, whereas public property
would have avoided the
negative aspects that gene-
raly characterised mono-
polies. This policy lead to
the birth of a great bureau-
cratic structure hardly
directed towards the market,
the economic sustainability
of which was essentially
based on public funding. 
A transformation of the
main guidelines of the British railway policy took place as a
consequence of the situation in the US market. In the US,
after the 1970 crisis, the Congress approved the Rail
Passenger Service Act and created the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (Amtrack) in order to provide long
distance passenger transport services as a monopoly. The later
bankruptcy of the railway companies of the Midwest and
North-East (such as Penn Central) led to the creation of the
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), privatised in 1987,
to which the transport of goods was assigned. It was this
experience that persuaded the British Government to take a
totally innovative approach to railway policy. 
Free trade, which was at the basis of the Treaty of Rome that
created the EEC, was also applied to the railway sector in the
1990’s. Directive 440/91 established that the countries of the
EU were to separate infrastructure from operations, at least in
accounting, in order to delineate an evolutionary path for the
European railway market characterised by the presence of
distinct operators in competition with one another. In 1995,
with the approval of directives 95/18 and 95/19 regarding the
release of licences to railway firms and the sharing of the
infrastructural capacity, a further step was made towards the
opening of the market to competition.
European railway policy is based on the hypothesis that the
main types of technical and economic rigidity involve the
infrastructural aspects of the railway system. On the contrary,
in transport services the reduction of concentration on the
supply side might contribute to increasing the industrial
efficiency, being this not subject to excessive fixed and sunk
costs.
After the promulgation of the 1991 directive, the Commission
passed other regulations with the aim of defining in detail the
procedures for applying separate accounts (for the network
and services), the regulation of market access and the
application of fares for the use of the infrastructures. In the
field of the transport of goods, Quinet2 argues that the most
recent EU policy has aimed at overcoming the national
individualities that make up the main barrier to operator
access to the market.
The individual countries reacted in different ways to this EU
innovative policy.
In particular, the vertical separation of the railway enterprises
took place rather swiftly in the North European countries. For
instance, Sweden chose separation between network
management (assigned to the state) and production of the
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transport service (assigned to a private firm). The long
distance transport of goods and passengers is now liberalised,
whereas the individual regional councils manage local
transport. The overcoming of the original monopolistic
scheme introduced a remarkable increase in productivity due
to this simplification.
In Germany, the redefinition of the railway system began in
1994, when the private firm D.B.A.G. was formed from the
merging of the railway companies of East and West Germany.
The objective of the German reform was the subdivision of the
completely privatised transport activities into different regional
market areas, whereas infrastructure was left to the state.
The cardinal principle established by the UK Government for
increasing the productivity of its railway system is its division
into different market areas (Intercity, Regional Railways,
etc.), with the intention of individuating the most appropriate
solutions for each of them. The 1993 Railway Act established
the creation of: 
a) a public firm, Railtrack3, forced to operate according to
private company criteria for the management of the network
and the infrastructure, 
b) twenty-five firms (Train Operating Companies - TOCs) for
the management passenger transport, 
c) three firms (Rolling Stock Leasing Companies) for the
renting or leasing of rolling stock4,
d) two firms (Infrastructure Service Co. and New
Infrastructure Projects) specialising in the maintenance of the
tracks and machinery and in designing and building new lines
respectively.
Railtrack’s income essentially consists of the fees paid by the
TOCs to use the railway infrastructures. This circumstance
helps one understand the importance of the issue of the
definition of the economic value of routes that create both
competition between the transport firms and income for the
managers of the infrastructures.
In this respect one has to notice that, as in other industries
characterised by an important distribution phase, in the
transport industry the infrastructures are a fundamental factor
in the processes of regulation of the level of market
competitiveness because they cannot be reproduced
immediately. In other words, the influence of the
infrastructures might limit the industry’s potentials and
prevent the market from achieving a greater level of
development and economic efficiency. As a consequence, a
valid regulation of access to infrastructures seems essential in
order to protect competition among operators and the
interests of the passengers as users of a public service. 
The privatisation of British Railways followed a procedure
based on the subdivision of the railway firm into individual
components in competition with one another in order to
eliminate the power of the monopoly and increase internal
efficiency.
This separation principle was also applied to the management
of the transport services. Each TOC operates on different
areas and lines. The track assignment to the TOCs is carried
out using the franchising system, the conditions of which are
established by the Franchising Director, elected by the
Government. The TOCs’ need for their own equipment has
turned out to be relatively modest. They leased rolling stock
from companies that had received all the rolling stock
previously belonging to British Railways. As far as the use of
the network and machinery is concerned, contracts will also
be stipulated between the individual TOCs and Railtrack,
which can rent or lease stations. The Strategic Rail Authority,
whose role in establishing the policy relative to the
infrastructures is particularly delicate, is in charge of the
regulation of the railway market, whereas the control of
Railtrack and the access to the infrastructures is assigned to
an independent agency (Office of Rail Regulator).
The privatisation of British Railways, which earned the
treasury 4.5 billion pounds, is certainly the most significant
experience of vertical separation of the railway service.
Britain is the only European country where all firms
operating in the railway sector are private.
3. Privatisation and efficiency of the British railway
system
The renovation model followed in Britain is characterised by
the recovering of market mechanisms in all the sectors that
form the complex railway industry. This was done by
privatising the infrastructures and opening competition for the
transport service, for the provision of rolling stock,
maintenance, the design and construction of new tracks. 
The British experience is the most innovative example of the
process of vertical separation of the railway system. At the
moment, however, it is difficult to express an unambiguous
judgement on the overall results achieved by the system from
an efficiency point of view. 
As a matter of fact, in the railway sector, the variables that
should be taken into account in order to be able to
satisfactorily judge the new management model are several. 
The market share certainly has a remarkable importance: an
increase in railway transport demand is an objective of
entrepreneurial character, the effects of which go beyond the
firm, since it is a source of positive externalities which arise
from the weakening of the modal imbalance.
In this respect the results have been unambiguous, because in
the year 2000 the railway system achieved its best
performance in the passenger sector since the promulgation of
the Beeching Plan in the sixties. An analogous judgement can
be expressed about the sector of the transport of goods, the
demand of which has constantly been growing since 1994.
A further positive aspect of the British method was the public
funding of the railway industry which, as a consequence of
the massive involvement of private shareholders in all
branches, registered a sharp decrease5.
It must be emphasised, nevertheless, that the model of
privatisation of the infrastructures does not involve direct
Government funding for the renovation or the enlargement of
the network. Such burdens are the duty of operators of
privatised sections, which are eligible for public funding.
Railtrack, therefore, receives indirect government funding via
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the fares paid by the firms in charge of the transport services.
Despite the rather high level of the fares, however, the system
is unable to guarantee a flow of funds appropriate for the
needs for its fixed capital to renew itself and grow, since a
large amount of these funds are used to pay the shareholders
of the firm managing the infrastructure. This is the cause of a
large imbalance between profits and investments, as those
opposing privatisation often emphasise. 
The shortage of investments is currently the main hurdle to
the development of the field and the maintenance of the
service level reached so far6.
These problems are made even worse by the lengthening of
the time necessary to renew the rolling stock, due to the fact
that the procedure introducing new trains onto the network is
hindered by the limitations imposed by Railtrack7.
Furthermore, in order to make the structural deficiencies less
obvious the manager of the infrastructure tends to apply, ever
so often, harsh speed limits8 that result in longer travel times
and a reduction in the productivity of the investments of the
transport firms. The coexistence of distinct operators for
travelling activities and the management of the infrastructures
leads, therefore, to a reduction of the efficiency of the system
as a whole, due to friction in the relationship between
operators whose interests might diverge.
In a nutshell, the current British railway system is
characterised by an insufficient capacity from both a
quantitative and a qualitative point of view. The lack of
appropriate cash flow has hindered the possibility of carrying
out a programme to make the consequences of this renovation
compatible with the real potentialities of the supply, in terms
of traffic development. It must be mentioned, however, that
these shortcomings are the consequence of the scarce
investments planned by the policy followed, for decades,
within the railway industry.
A confirmation of the poor conditions of the British Railway
industry comes from the results of an analysis carried out
towards the end of 2001 by the Strategic Rail Authority
which, in its Strategic Plan, emphasised the need to invest 70
billion pounds to modernise infrastructure and the rolling
stock. Only this way, according to the representatives of this
regulatory body, will they be able to cope with the increase of
supply, the magnitude of which is estimated to be 50 % in the
passenger sector and 80% in the goods one.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion it can be said that the relevance of the
necessary investments, together with the scarce and belated
profitability of the products, is the main cause of the failure
of the privatisation of the British railways. From this
experience it turns out that it is currently difficult to
completely do without any sort of public intervention in the
railway sector, because an infrastructure funding scheme
relying exclusively on the private sector cannot be put into
practice.
A confirmation of how difficult it is for the management
mechanism of the British railway network to cope, comes
from the gradual growth of Railtrack’s debts9 and the
reduction of the size of the income from the characteristic
management within the company’s income structure. The
poor liquidity, therefore, necessary to fund the investments
and guarantee a good efficiency level of the infrastructures in
use, has caused a considerable qualitative degeneration of the
supply and an inevitable reduction of the safety level of the
railway services. In other words, despite that fares applied to
access the network are considerably high, most of Railtrack’s
income goes into paying its shareholders, resulting in further
increases in the fares to the final customers10 and a reduction
of the funds available for the renovation and maintenance of
the network.
A further negative aspect of the British railway renovation is
the pressures on Government from the managers of the firm
managing the infrastructure. This makes the policy makers
particularly sensitive to the needs of the demand and safety
aspects. Furthermore, the presence of one operator only in the
management of the infrastructures increases the rigidity of the
system, making the Government more vulnerable to demands
from Railtrack.
Major importance is given to the issues concerning the
influence that interest groups might have on the processes
that define public intervention. It is not a coincidence that the
most recent political economy studies give considerable
importance to the act of influencing political power
(lobbying) by the social classes and groups11. 
These considerations emphasise that nowadays, not only it is
impossible to remunerate the invested capital, but public funding
still turns out to be essential to both the use of the network and
the investments into new infrastructures. Only in this way can
the system guarantee a qualitative standard appropriate to the
needs coming from the demand side and a level of fares which is
able to stimulate competition and to promote the development of
the market where transport firms operate.
These inefficiencies drove the British policy makers to create
Network Rail, a non-profit company which, according to
information disclosed at the end of June 2002, will have to
purchase Railtrack at the price of 500 million pounds, 300
million of which will be paid by SRA. With the same
operation the English Channel Tunnel railway line will be
passed over to London and Continental Railways.
As far as the travel sector is concerned, the importance of the
efficiency gains coming from the revaluation of the
principles of competition must be emphasised. It is,
therefore, necessary that the recuperation of market
mechanisms be beneficial to the community in a way that
more than makes up for efficiency losses resulting from
fragmentation of the supply. We must not forget that the
production of railway services is characterised by economies
of scale and network economies. Pluralism on the supply
side might cause increases in average costs, due to the
reduction of the production scale, and generate problems for
customers arising from the poor connection between lines
and the increased difficulty in getting information relative to
the services offered and fares.
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1 The planned economy model attracted British policy makers more than
the National Recovery Act and the Roosvelt’s New Deal’s regulation,
which grew in importance in the US at the beginning of the century.
2 Quinet, E., (2001), “Competition and Development of European
Railways: Paths and Perspectives Compared”, paper presented at
Conference held at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, January.
3 Railtrack, privatised in 1996 and currently quoted on the Stock
Exchange, owns an infrastructure consisting of 10,000 miles of tracks,
40,000 among bridges, viaducts and tunnels, 2,500 stations, 9,000 level
crossings and 90 workshops for the maintenance of the rolling material.
4 Rolling stock renting and leasing have the aim of reducing the barriers
to the new operators’ entrance to and exit from the market, limiting the
capital necessary to start a transport service. 
5 In particular circumstances Government has granted Railtrack
substantial extraordinary funding in order to modernise the network. 
6 The average delay in year 2000 was 45 minutes.
7 Despite this since 1993 rolling stock has considerably grown by
acquiring 2,350 new passenger carriages, 2,500 goods wagons and 310
locomotives. 
8 The most limiting restrictions are imposed on high-speed trains since it
is these vehicles that make rail subsidence more likely to happen, due to
the greater rail wearing. 
9 According to government predictions, by 2003 the debts will increase
by about 8 billion pounds.
10 The price of a return ticket for a 180 km journey (e.g. from London to
Birmingham) is 60 pounds.
11 The conceptual innovation of this part of literature between the
economic theory and political science emphasise the government’s
failures due to the hurdles present in the valuation mechanism of social
preferences.
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1. Introduction
One of the first concerns
facing the government of
the unified country was the
creation of links between
the Italian regions. In
building an infrastructure
system, the French model
was followed, where the
role of experts (and
engineers in particular)
was highly esteemed1. The
Grands Travaux were, at
least for a decade, a
necessary reference for the
aspirations of the Italian upper class2.
Initial conditions, however, were far from ideal. The roadway
system inherited by the Kingdom was in an appalling state
and practically devoid of border crossings; the railway system
was quantitatively limited and consisted of a series of
regional sub-systems lacking any links with one another.
Lastly, the port system required thorough restructuring and
relaunching. In general, the first priority appeared to be that
of improving the rather minimal integration between the
regional economies. What was offered to the first liberal
rulers was based on very different previous experiences and
presented characteristics that were just as different. A great
effort, also at the level of administrative conformity,  was
necessary. On the whole, there can be little doubt that in Italy
in 1861, the infrastructure system was lacking in every
respect3. In light of this, the attempts  made by more than one
scholar to quantify the role of infrastructures taken as a whole
within the sphere of the process of industrialisation and
economic development of the country appears more readily
understandable4.
2. The construction of a new Italy
The physical construction of modern Italy began in 1861.
This not only meant creating a national market, but also
applying a new spatial and organisational dimension to the
territorial problems that had intensified with unification5. The
construction of the infrastructure system was the necessary
premise for all this, to the point that transportation seemed to
be the answer  (even more than the concept of  the “nation”)
to creating a real identity for the new country6. In other
words, the physical and territorial concept of the nation could
actually be defined as the shaping of space by the
infrastructure system. 
Thus, the roadway and rail systems, the layout of canals for
navigation, irrigation and industry, land reclamation,
improvement of unproductive territory and development of
ports became integral aspects of the main aspirations of the
new rulers. Infrastructure was found to be at a crossroads of
formidable interests. With the creation of lobbies for political,
military, business, and locally-based interests, the aims of the
new state were inextricably entwined with the private goals of
some powerful groups7.
Infrastructure was imme-
diately viewed as an impor-
tant client for these groups,
favoured by the financial
impotence of the state that
was constrained to delegate
the building of the infra-
structure network through
the institution of con-
cession. This institution did
not have enough foresight
to clarify respective roles,
leaving the way open to
conflict and offering ample
possibilities for speculation and profit. 
It is difficult to say to what extent real industrial ambition
was an aspect of the project. The prevailing economic activity
was still agriculture, and transportation was largely viewed as
the ideal means for taking agricultural products to market,
and only secondarily as an important means of aiding the
unification of the country. The historical period coincided,
however, with the early industrial development of north-
western Italy, and so the new infrastructure system developed
in response, on the one hand, to the need to join together all
the fragmentary pieces that formed the country and, on the
other, to the general tendency to strengthen those areas that
were economically and industrially stronger even before
unification.
3. The railways first and foremost
The logic that was followed at the moment of the creation of
the national railway system was marked on one hand by the
rejoining of the various sub-regional systems just barely
delineated in the pre-unification era, and on the other by the
hurried construction of lines held to be fundamental to the
physical unification of the country. The adoption of time
restrictions inevitably provoked much error and dysfunction,
due overall to the scarce attention given to the complex and
diverse realities of the territory. The incoherent scattering of
numerous small networks of rail lines that changed the design
of the map of the young Kingdom, was almost chaotic and
accentuated the longitudinal character of the Italian railway
system. This policy, justified by the conviction that the
railways were essential for guaranteeing the very survival of
the state did not, however, addressed the obvious problem of
clear imbalance in the rail coverage of different parts of the
country. Indeed, regions like Piedmont8 and Tuscany9, in
which the construction of the first lines was carried out in the
sphere of at least a minimum development plan (though more
so in the early phase), contrasted with areas characterised by
the total lack of any rail lines. 
The system that was being created in the 1860s thus suffered
continuous interruptions and was substantially without
transverse connections, those with more difficult construction
caused by the need to cross the Apennines. Within five years,
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from 1861 to 1866, the size of the railway system doubled,
going from little more than 2,000 km to more than 4,500; it
will not be superfluous to note that in 1861 Great Britain
counted 17,000 km of railway and France 9,300. 
In 1863 the tracks extended down the Adriatic coast as far as
Foggia, the following year the line from Bologna to Florence
was opened, and in 1866 Rome was linked to Ancona and in
1867 with Pisa. Later, in 1879 the Naples-Foggia line went
into operation, and in 1872 the Rome-Florence line was
completed. Two years later the Genoa-Pisa line was also
completed. In the same era some of the longer tunnels were
opened or at least begun: we can remember the two projects
by the Giovi, brought to a close between 1846 and 1855, and
those of Fréjus, realised between 1857 and 1871. In a second
phase the Brennero mountain line (1867), the Pontebbana
Udine-Tarvisio (1879), the Gottardo line (1882) and still later,
the Sempione line (1906) came into being. The opening of the
passes effectively permitted the connection of Italy to central
Europe, flinging open the doors to more and more easily
reachable markets10.
4. The world of the railway companies at the dawn
of the Unification
With the formation of the new Kingdom, the world of the
railway companies was profoundly reorganised. The
Kingdom of Italy had inherited an extremely confusing
situation from pre-Unification governments, with regard to
the companies that managed the railways built up to that time.
Some were entirely based on private initiative, others were
more or less openly supported by the individual pre-
unification states, nevertheless all appeared weak and
incapable of meeting the challenges imposed by the new
state. Aside from the government, as many as 22 large and
small companies were in charge of the existing rail system on
the peninsula11.
In 1865 the excessive number of often unprofitable
companies was drastically reduced by a selection process that
privileged the one with the best financial structure12. The
future of the railways in the country was about to be delivered 
into their hands. The Italian government then had to devote
itself to developing an efficient system of management, that
commenced in 1865 with the first general restructuring, the
so-called “legge dei grandi gruppi” (law of the large groups),
enacted two months after the promulgation of the law for
administrative unification of the Kingdom of Italy. This law
provided, in appendix F, for the organisation of public
projects, which was very important for the railways as it
provided the regulations for construction, concession and
policing the system.
Restructuring brought about the abandonment of the state
management that had been operating until then in a good part
of the Piedmont system. Railway construction and operation
were entrusted to three major private capital societies: Strade
Ferrate Alta Italia, Strade Ferrate Romane and Strade
Ferrate Meridionali, that were to manage a system of 1,500-
2,000 km each, and to whom was generally assured a subsidy
for each line or kilometre of line in operation (decreasing
with the increase of the takings); at times this was substituted
by the guarantee of a minimum interest rate per annum on
stocks, as well as by other forms of subsidies, according to
various and variable mechanisms even between specific lines
run by the same company. In addition to the main companies,
some small companies existed that had remained
independent, such as the Società Vittorio Emanuele and the
Table 1: Italian railway network 1839-1990
Year km Year km
1839 7 1890 13.617
1840 20 1895 15.959
1845 152 1900 16.417
1850 620 1905 17.067
1855 1.268 1910 18.079
1860 2.435 1915 19.640
1865 4.623 1920 20.374
1870 6.460 1925 21.094
1875 8.037 1939 22.372
1880 9.309 1951 21.711
1885 10.901 1965 20.381
1890 13.617 1975 20.176
1895 15.958 1990 19.576
Source: Maggi, S., (2001), Politica ed economia dei trasporti.
Secoli XIX-XX. Una storia della modernizzazione italiana, Il
Mulino, Bologna, p. 30.
Table 2. Railway companies in operation in the Kingdom
of Italy at the end of 1864
(excluding those of the Veneto and Papal State) 
Piedmont State Agency 566 418
Companies:
Torino-Saluzzo 103 –
Alessandria-Tortona 116 –
Genova-Voltri 15 –
Savona-Acqui – 158
Alessandria-Cavallermaggiore 43 55
Alessandria-Acqui 34 –
Torino-Pinerolo 38 –
Chivasso-Ivrea 33 –
Santhia-Biella 30 –
Torreberetti-Pavia 41 –
Mortara-Vigevano 13 –
Vigevano-Milano – 36
Novara-Alzo 36 6
Arona-Domodossola – 59
Lombardia e Italia centrale 743 69
Livornesi 293 151
Maremmana 224 10
Centrale Toscana 171 60
Romane 383 238
Meridionali 482 508
Vittorio Emanuele 32 1.120
Sarde – 386
Total 3.396 3.274
Source: Sachs, I., (1885), L’Italie. Ses finances et son développement
économique depuis l’unification du royaume 1859-1884, Guillaumin,
Paris, p. 964.
Franchisee km in km under 
operation construction
or planned
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Compagnia reale sarda, to whom in 1863 was given the
concession to construct rail lines in those regions that were
still without: Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia13. 
The system was soon rocked to its foundations by the
introduction of the “corso forzoso” (suspension of the
currency in gold), adopted in 1866 as a result of the third war
of independence. This suspension, in fact, caused an almost
10% devaluation of the lira against other currencies,
consequently raising the cost of imported products and
ruining companies with concessions, which largely depended
on foreign industry for the supply of both coal and rolling
stock. Moreover the government’s financing system, based on
the so-called “guarentige a scala mobile” (escalating
guarantees) system, that is the above mentioned public
subsidies, that diminished as traffic increased, did not
encourage the administrators of these companies to seek
increases. Therefore various financial vicissitudes occurred,
with the State advancing future subsidies, guaranteeing
bonds, undertaking the construction of new main lines and
continuing the construction of lines already contracted
directly under the supervision of the state civil engineers - as
in the case of the Ligurian coastal rail and railways in
Calabria and Sicily. Moreover, diverse legislative provisions
would be made, that brought about first the modification to
the conventions of 1865, followed by the recovery of the Alta
Italia (with the ex-Austrian lines inherited after 1866) and
Romane systems.  In short, long and heated discussions were
held, culminating in 1876 with the fall of the historic Right
party and the parliamentary revolution due to the defection of
the group of Tuscan deputies linked to the Strade ferrate
Meridionali14.
The peninsula was divided longitudinally with the intent to
develop north-south traffic, and the system was entrusted to
the Società per le strade ferrate del Mediterraneo in the
western part and to the Società per le strade ferrate
Meridionali in the eastern part; the Società per le strade
ferrate della Sicilia received the lines on that island, while
previous arrangements remained in effect for the Ferrovie
della Sardegna. What was new was the division between
property, that remained under state ownership, since railway
property was by then so vast that no private group could
redeem it, and the management, assigned to the three
companies for a maximum 60 year term, renewable every 20
years. The shareholdings were owned by large Italian and
German financial groups, as well as the newly established
national mechanical industry with companies like Ansaldo
and Breda.
While infrastructures and stations thus remained under public
ownership, the State sold its rolling stock to the three large
companies, thus foreshadowing a situation that in some
respects resembles the current situation regarding the
ownership of equipment and infrastructures, but with the
fundamental difference that the trains and networks were
managed on a unitary level with a territorial base. 
The government guaranteed the company shares a minimum
annual dividend of 3% and three special funds were set up:
one for natural disasters, one for the renewal of fixed and
mobile assets and one for increasing equity, this last was
financed by the issue of government bonds. Capital was
expected to increase by 3.5% per year, but the system never
achieved its goal, since traffic did not grow at the expected
rate over the subsequent period of economic depression.
5. Railway companies, a new protagonist
Railway companies wherever they were before Unification
took the form of corporations. Compared with limited
partnerships, the most common form of business association
in Europe before the advent of the railways, the “anonymous
partnership” extended the benefit of limited responsibility to
all its members instead of one part alone. The railway
corporations were composed of the Board of Directors,
responsible for the management, and the Meeting of
Shareholders, that according to the by-laws met once a year
to approve the budget. The secretary ruled the company and
often in a dictatorial manner without considering the wishes
of the members.
Railway companies were a significant new element on the
Italian scene from the point of view of business organisation,
of which they offered a model that was extensively copied in
later years.  To mention one example, let it suffice to say that
the railway managers were the first company executives in
the modern sense15.
6. The debate on nationalisation
With points of greater or lesser intensity, the debate on
nationalisation spanned the entire period from the first
reorganisation of the railway companies in 1865 until 190516.
Thus, there were forty years of controversy and conflict that
would lead, as was noted, to the fall of the Right party in
187617, and pass through the conventions of 1885 that
artificially extended the life of railway companies18. 
During the last years of the 19th century the commissions
nominated to reform the railway management began to pick
up steam. As well, the role played by the 1898 referendum
that approved the nationalisation of the railways in
Switzerland cannot be forgotten, as this decision significantly
influenced Italians’ views on the subject.
As the government was forced to take over more and more
economic obligations, the supporters of rail nationalisation
were ever on the increase. When a left-wing government
came to power this orientation changed. In 1878 a
commission was appointed to investigate operations. Based
on this commission’s conclusions a new reorganisation was
implemented after intense disputes in April 1885 on the legge
sulle convenzioni (law on concessions). The introduction to
the over 300 page report began with the following statement:
“Few projects have been subject to such long and patient
study as this one on the railway concessions, possibly
because no other project has been so important until now”.
The railway question was, indeed, absolutely central to the
national political economy. 
If the government’s choice of private enterprise led to leaving
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railway management to the companies, they were also
burdened with many obligations regarding the protection of
public interest and equal treatment. In the sphere of relations
between the State and the railways, the function of some early
“railway authorities” proved to be particularly interesting.
These consisted, at first, of the Direzione generale delle
strade ferrate, then of the Commissariato generale per le
ferrovie concesse all’industria privata, and finally of the
Ispettorato generale governativo sull’esercizio e sulla
costruzione delle strade ferrate, that were supposed to control
the activities of the concessionaires. These institutions,
closely linked to the Ministry of Public Works, proved,
however, to be incapable of guaranteeing State interests -  in
practice leaving the companies free to operate as they wished
and to furnish such poor quality service that it was said to be
at the point of complete disintegration.
The nationalisation of the railways could be seen as a typical
state intervention in the economy of the country.  It was,
however, a fundamentally disorganised operation (in view of
the economic emergency and of what was considered as the
need to come to its rescue), quite contrary to the notion of a
well-organised, planned action aimed at a specific body of
political and economical objectives. Since theory had been
found wanting, nothing remained but to trust in empiricism as
a method of railway policy, an attitude that did not change
after subsequent post-nationalisation government initiatives
in this strategic sector. In short,  critical change was enacted
hastily, without any idea of what sort of new organisation to
give to the railway system. 
The positions held in the country represented a highly
interesting kaleidoscope of opinion. They include: those of
the Meridionali, which resisted to the last, and by virtue of
their strength opposed the main Italian railroad company’s
plans to incorporate the other company, Mediterranea; the
companies that produced railway materials, attracted by
opportunities in terms of orders that seemed more likely after
the elimination of private management; and the military,
naturally favourable for strategic and defensive reasons. In
the final analysis, it is not unlikely that nationalisation came
about for a number of very different reasons, originating from
different sectors and not all working in the same direction but
tending, nevertheless, to place on the shoulders of the state
the stresses and problems caused by imbalances in the sector
of economic growth. 
From this point of view, nationalisation has been accurately
defined as the crucial result of the new relations between
economic and political circumstances and a relevant factor in
the capitalistic transformation of the beginning of the century. 
7. The nationalisation law  
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Italian railway
system was based on the aforementioned concessions
stipulated in 1885. These had a maximum duration of 60
years, divided into three periods of 20 years each, at the end of
which both contracting parties could request the closure of the
contract with two-years’ advance notice. On June 30, 1903
notice was given by the government. That same year prime
minister Giovanni Giolitti, strongly convinced of the principle
that railway transport should be controlled by the State and
very much afraid of the worsening of the conflict between the
private companies and personnel, ordered his experts to
prepare an initial draft law for nationalisation, which was
presented in Parliament at the presentation of the government
program on 1st December of that year. The design of the law,
as intended by Giolitti, also had to serve as a contractual
weapon in negotiations with the private companies.
After the controversial debate characterised by the intervention
of numerous members of Parliament as well as the press, and
after the first national strike in Italian history, held by the
railway workers against the proposed law that considered them
public employees, legislation nationalising the railways was
passed in April 1905 -  much earlier than corresponding
measures taken in the other main European countries.
On April 11th, 1905 the draft law which was to become law
n°. 137 was presented to the Chamber; it was ratified as a
transitory decree with reference to a future, final law on
railway operation. Some detractors claimed that the text was
prepared in excessive haste. Eight days later, April 19th, it was
approved by the Chamber, and on April 22nd by the Senate; in
both cases there was an overwhelming majority in favour of
nationalisation.
The state paid an amount equivalent to 500 million lire to
indemnify the railway companies, largely collected through
special subscriptions by the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. Much
of this capital was directed toward one of the more promising
industries at that time - electricity19. 
With nationalisation, the autonomous administration of the
Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) was created. It was conceived as
something new in the Italian economic system, the first
example of a corporation linked to a ministry (that of Public
Works), but endowed, through the Board of Directors
presided over by a general manager, with the necessary
freedom to manage a market-oriented service. 
The business was organised around a largely privatised base,
borrowed from the earlier managements of the companies,
with less complex decision making and bookkeeping
procedures than those of the public administration, and a more
agile structure and with personnel paid in a different manner
than by the State. It should be borne in mind that the “stato
giuridico” (legal status) of railroad workers granted in 1906,
prepared the way for that of civil servants granted two years
later. The  extensive autonomy that, according to attentive
socialist observer Filippo Turati, could have generated a lack
of responsibility, was gradually narrowed in the course of the
years by the imposition of greater control on the firm.
8. The secondary railways
With regard to the secondary Italian railways, it serves to note
that a precise legal definition to distinguish them from the
major lines did not exist, even if since the last years of the
19th century this term had indicated the so-called railways in
concession, i.e., the railways managed by local companies
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and not inserted into the main system. It serves moreover to
note that the national system, created in 1905, had always
included some tracts with characteristics typical of secondary
railways: for instance territorial placement at the service of
the countryside and minor centres, limited traffic, the
departure of mainly agricultural products from their stations,
and in some cases tourist use20.
At the time of nationalisation in 1905, the State Railway
system counted about 17,000 km. As well, about 3,000 km of
railway and another 3,000 km of tramway belonged to private
enterprises or municipalities, that maintained a large number
of small steam powered trains and both steam and electric
trams. 
In Italy the strong development of the secondary railways
began in last twenty years of the 19th century with a genuine
generalised movement to promote the branching out of the
railway, producing a myriad of leaflets supporting the projects
of the single outlying lines, today conserved in libraries and
local archives. These brochures were substantially the same in
the introduction, where a single scholar or the promoting
committee for a line always made grand reference, sometimes
with the use of elegant expressions, to the civility brought by
the presence of the trains. 
With the completion of the main lines, the outlying centres
began to clamour for the trains that, in an agricultural society
without for the moment the automobile, seemed the only link
with civilised life capable of bringing economic development
and political and social modernisation. Italy was a country
with an ancient infrastructure and numerous lively towns,
often having been founded on hills in order to escape the
centuries-old endemic illness malaria. These towns were
often, in their municipal activity, the protagonists of the
completion and management of a secondary system on the
peninsula.
In the last twenty years of the 19th century, the development of
narrow gauge technology, that allowed narrower curves and
steeper slopes thereby reducing the need for great engineering
works, and the achievement of particular gripping systems
like the rack-and-pinion, made it possible to link by rail the
many small towns and villages located in the hills and on the
slopes of mountains. The medium-sized municipalities thus
would increase their investments in the sector thanks to the
power to take out loans with a public bank, the Cassa depositi
e prestiti.
In 1879 the so-called “legge Baccarini” was passed (named
after the minister of public works in charge), representing an
attempt to classify the so-called complementary railways
needed to complete the railway system for the peninsula by
dividing them into four categories. The fourth and last
category consisted of “secondary railways”, 1,530 km of lines
that could be constructed as long as the interested provinces
and municipalities possessing the necessary means found
them useful and took on the responsibility to contribute to the
expenses.
Most of the trunk lines of the secondary railways, constructed
between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the
20th, were conceeded to local municipal enterprises and not
managed by the major companies. After the general
administrative reorganisation of 1865 and 1885, some
railways remained entrusted to specific private societies that
on 31 December 1887 operated a total of 1,326 km of track:
414 km were assigned the Compagnia reale sarda, and 189
km to the Palermo-Marsala-Trapani.  Along with the more
extensive lines, there was also the Società veneta with 134
km of the lines Vicenza-Schio, Vicenza-Treviso e Padova-
Bassano. 63 km were operated by the Ferrovie Nord Milano,
that would be noticeably extended in the new century, and
134 km by the Ferrovia dell’Appenino Centrale Arezzo-
Fossato di Vico. At the beginning of the 20th century other
lines would be added to the list - mainly those links with
mountain centres in the Alps and Apennines - and already in
1905, immediately following nationalisation, the overall
extension had climbed to 3,419 km, of which 2,061 were
normal gauge and 1,358 were narrow gauge. 
Although not comparable with that of Switzerland, the
mileage of mountain or hillside tourist lines was also quite
extensive in Italy. This infrastructure was completed within
the first thirty years of the 20th century, when trains reached
Campo Tures, Predazzo, Ortisei, Cortina d’Ampezzo and
Agordo in the Dolomites, Renon, La Mendola, Malè and Riva
del Garda between Trento and Bolzano, Piazza Brembana and
Clusone in the valleys of Bergamo; Vallombrosa, Gubbio and
Norcia in the central Apennines; Castovillari, San Giovanni
in Fiore, Mammola, Cinquefrondi and Sinopoli in the interior
of Calabria; Palazzo Adriano and Piazza Armerina, to
mention only two localities touched by the dense system of
narrow gauge Sicilian railways; and Mandas, Sorgono and
Arbatax in Sardinia.
Moreover, where the huge investment necessary for a railway
was not justified, rails were even placed on ordinary suburban
streets, constructing horse-powered, or more often steam
tramways, with small locomotives and lightweight wagons. 
The decline of the tramway began in Italy in the 1930s. The
words of the minister of Communication, Costanzo Ciano,
have remained famous. According to him it was necessary “to
take the bull by the horns and just tear out the tracks” from
the streets, as they were interfering with the motor vehicle
circulation21. The elimination of tramways continued,
moreover, along with that of the secondary railways, into the
‘50s and ‘60s, when transportation policies had decisively
embraced the cause of motor vehicle transport, assigning a
definitely marginal role to systems on rails, operated by state
or public companies, in general, and characterised by deficits
and inefficiency. 
9. Conclusions
The history of the Italian railways in the 19th century has
many analogies with the phase of transition that the system is
going through in our own time. At the same time we can
discern a number of major differences. Privatisation has
certainly been the predominant trait in modern railway
development for at least the past fifteen years. Although then
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slow and muddled, this can in any case be considered the
most significant new development. A parallel with what
occurred in the last quarter of the 19th century comes
spontaneously to mind. At that time the question was whether
to nationalise or not, and almost all agreed with this as the
most appropriate solution for enabling the Italian railway
system to reach its final maturity. Today, with equal
unanimity, we are moving towards the idea of a privatisation
whose outlines are still rather unclear and that, up to now, has
not been able to solve the deep-rooted problems that have
long afflicted the service. Although it is going in the opposite
direction, the experience of the long pursuit of nationalisation
may perhaps have something to teach those who are called
upon today to alleviate the oppression that motor vehicles
have come to represent in our daily lives.
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